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The Relevance of Sin and Justification Today
In a symposium on "The Role of the Concept of Sin in Psycho­
therapy, Dr. 0. Hobart Mowrer, a distinguished research psychologist, 
makes the following statement.
For half a century now we psychologists, as a profession, 
have very largely followed the Freudian doctrine that human 
beings become emotionally disturbed, not because of their 
having done anything palpably wrong, but because they instead 
lack insight. Therefore, as would-be therapists we have set 
out to oppose the forces of repression and to work for under­
standing. And what ix this understanding, or insight, which 
we so highly prise? It is the discoverythat the patient or 
client has been, in effect, too good) that he has within him 
impulses, especially those of lust and hostility, which he 
has been quite unnecessarily inhibiting. And health, we 
tell him, lies in the direction of recognising and express- 
these impulses.^
Dr. Mowrer calls for a rediscovery of the concept of sin. He antici­
pates the objections to such a concept? sin cannot be readily defined) 
it is an unscientific concept; and morality is relative. As he both 
defines and defends the concept he says?
If it proves empirically true that certain forms of conduct 
characteristically lead human beings into emotional insta­
bility, what better or firmer basis would one wish for 
labeling such conduct as destructive, self-defeating, evil, 
sinful? . . . .
In light of the total situation, I see no alternative 
but to turn again to the old, painful, but also promising 
possibility that man is pre-eminently a social creature 
(or, in theological phrase, a child of God) and that he
Dr. Mowrer is research professor of psychology at the Univer­
sity of Illinois. His paper was read in a symposium. Other par­
ticipants were Dr. Charles A. Curran, of Loyola University,
Dr. Edward Joseph Shoben, Jr., of Teachers College, Columbia Uni­
versity, and Dr. Albert Ellis, of New York City. The quotations 
used here are from the News Release and transcripts published by 
the American Psychological Association, Washington, D. C., 
September k, 1959 •
lives or dies, psychologically and personally, as a function 
of the openness, comaunity, relatedness, and integrity which 
by good action he attains and by evil action destroys. 1
He praises Alcoholics Anonymous as a realistic therapeutic program.
Future psychotherapy, whether secular or religious, will have to
"take guilt, confession, and expiation seriously and will involve
programs of action rather than mere groping for 'insight'."
However, as we shall see in our study of depth psychology, we 
cannot accept the inference that Freud teaches that 'human beings1 be­
come emotionally disturbed, not because of their having done anything 
palpably wrong, but because they Instead lack insight." There may be 
a sense in which Dr. Movrer's statement is appropriate, but, in the 
main, we must recognise the cardinal importance of the concept of 
guilt within the Freudian system of psychology. Freud considered 
guilt as the shaping dynamism of the mature psyche. 2
Mowrer seems to be calling for a recovery of an instrumental- 
istic— or functional— conception of accountability.
In the debate Dr. Albert Ellis, a psychotherapist, of Rev 
York, counters with the contention! "There is no place for the con­
cept of sin in Psychotherapy." He says that no human being should 
ever be blamed for anything he does.
Nevertheless he agrees that "there is such a thing as human 
wrongdoing or Immoral behavior." He concedes that "as members of a 
social community, we must have some standards of right and wrong."
2
1Ibid., p. 2.
^See Infra, Chapter Five.
But these should he based on 'long-range or socialised hedonism." Yet 
he would accept "any other rationally planned, Majority-approved stand­
ard of morality that is not arbitrarily imposed by an authoritarian 
clique of actual men or assumed gods." Psychotherapists should show 
their patients that "they have often acted wrongly, badly, self- 
defeatingly by their antisocial actions," 1
Dr. Sills describes two elements in the sense of "sin":
"(a) I have done the wrong thing and am responsible for doing it) and 
(b) I am a blackguard, a sinner • . . . a valueless person,"
He seems to be objecting to the second element. The psycho­
therapist's duty is to help the patient to focus on "the only real 
problem at hand— which isi How do I not repeat this wrong deed next 
time?’’ The patient should come to feel that wrong actions are no 
cause for guilt feeling or self-blaming. This is not to say that
he should deny responsibility for his actions.
Dr. Ellis concludes with a statement which seems somewhat ambig­
uously to advocate a retention of something of the first element in the
"sense of sin" as he defines it.
If, in this thoroughly objective non-guilty manner, we can 
teach our patients (as weH as the billions of people in the 
world who, for better or worse, will never become patients) 
that even though human beings can be held quite accountable 
or responsible for their misdeeds, no one is ever to blame 
for anything, human morality, I am sure, will be signifi­
cantly improved and for the first time in history aivllised 
people will have a real possibility of achieving sound mental
^News Release, p, 3, and the Transcript of Dr. Ellis' 
address. '
khealth. The concept of sin la the direct and indirect cause 
of virtually all neurotic disturbance. The sooner psycho­
therapists forthrightly begin to attack it, the better their 
patients will be.*-
Semantic confusion abounds in this debate as in many discus­
sions of the concept of sin. Ellis seems to be attacking principally 
a compulsive sense of shame, which may or may not accompany one's 
awareness of having offended some person, some institution, or some 
rule of safe conduct. But In his attack he leaves unanswered a ques­
tion which he himself seems to force into the discussion. How can we 
assume responsibility for "misdeeds'’ and not feel "blameworthy"7 In 
the light of what we are learning about what actually goes on in one's 
intrapsychlc world of emotions, can we expect realistically ever to 
be able to evoke an awareness of wrongdoing without svoking at least 
some degree of self-blame?
Perhaps this exchange is more illustrative than informative 
for our inquiry into the meaning of the Christian conceptions of 
sin and justification in the light of depth psychology. Mowrer 
favors what he considers to be a realistic concept of sin as an 
instrument in the psychotherapeutic technique. Ellis is repelled by 
any thought of using such a tool if it risks a deepening of shame
^Transcript, p. 2.
Cf. "Emotionally disturbed people are hopeless just as long 
as they make no effort to change. For change, virtually by defini­
tion, requires effort; and effort usually requires a goal, an idea, 
a concept . . . . .  It is the concept of hope that negates hopeless­
ness.” Albert Ellis, "Helping Troubled People," part of a chapter, 
from Ellis’ book How To Live With A Neurotic, reprinted in Pastoral 
Theology, IX, 82 (Great Neck, tf. y7, iMerch, 1958), pp. 33-^i-
5feelings in the patient* Perhaps the two views can be reconciled.
Aside from his plea for a 'socialised hedonism," Ellis’ statements 
seem to argue that the issue is the meaning of the element of self­
condemnation, the shaming sense of blameworthiness*
Hie term sin is further confused by that frequent use by 
evangelists and theologians who seem to say: 'You are guilty for
simply being who and what you are; you should feel responsible and 
guilty for things which you really cannot have avoided: your heri­
tage , your self-concern, your twisted emotions.'’ Sin seems to in­
clude what are often called fate and conditioning.
In the history of Christian theology we find such terms as 
original sin," "total depravity," mortal and venial sins," and 
"unpardonable sin," to say nothing of such categories— sometimes 
transferred to cinema marquees as "the seven deadly sins."
The Mowrer-Ellls exchange serves to illustrate what seems to 
be relevant for contemporary man in any use of the term sin. Both 
psychologists and theologians are dealing with this phenomenon: If a
person perceives what he regards— or comes to regard— as evil, or "bad," 
especially when it follows his own choices and deeds, does he not seek 
its cause within himself and feel compelled to rigfrt what he considers 
to be wrong? Is not the very awareness of such "wrong" accompanied by 
a compulsion to undo it? Beyond this observation we face another 
question: How can we account for the frequent convulsion to take
the blame for something even when in the objective it is not reasonably 
possible? Professor Archibald MacLelsh, in his play J* B., is among
many— including Sigmund Freud in hie own way— who insist that man in 
becoming man seems ever to be in quest of guilt.These questions 
will occupy much of our discussion to follow.
Although the concept of sin is somewhat confused in this 
dialogue between Mowrer and Ellis, 2 it does include the element of 
guilt (feeling): "I have done wrong. I must make restitution."
Dr. Ellis takes pains to point out that another element is often 
Interwoven with guilt feelings, namely a sense of unworthiness: " I
am unclean, unworthy, valueless." Like most psychotherapists he could 
cite numerous examples of morbid self-flagellation, even self-hatred 
which has been imposed on the patient by hie social environment. 
Self-hatred is suicidal, and by the mechanism of projection it can 
be murderous. It negates life and meaning.
Perhaps Christian theology in its genius can distinguish be­
tween guilt and shame (feelings). We shall examine later this pos­
sibility in the light of depth psychology. The aim of our study is 
somewhat "instrumentalistie.' What practical, realistic, responsible 
use is possible for Christianity and society in its inherited concep­
tions of 8in and justification? To be sure, these are terms of art
■^ Archibald MacLeish, J. B., "A Play in Verse' (Boston,
Houghton Mifflin, 1957)* The present writer has heard Professor 
MacLeish— in a broadcast interview— discuss J. B.'s quest for guilt.
2"Sin," a religious term, is used here in one way by 
Dr. Mowrer, and in another by Dr. Ellis. Hence they are not argu­
ing pro and con a precise concept. To Mowrer, it is more or less 
the awareness of having done some wrong either by commission or 
by omission. Ellis stresses the element of self-condemnation, ftie 
lack of precise definition characterises ouch of the historical and 
contemporary discussion of sin. See infra, Part One.
in theology. Sin it before and against God! Justification it before 
and b£ GodJ In the realm of theology proper depth psychology says 
somparatively little. What it says most explicitly— in Freud, espe­
cially; even in Jung— can have value only in suggesting the psychic 
"mechanisms’ and "archetypes” by which one arrives at conceptions—  
images (!)— of God. Yet, if ve are to speak of theological concep­
tions of sin and righteousness, we must speak of "theological" 
conceptions of God.
Christian Theology and Depth Psychology
We shall pursue these conceptions not as abstractions. Our
inquiry is basically concerned with the motivation, behavior, and
possibilities of what Christian theology has characteristically
described as "man as sinner. " 1 Without over-working the explosive
terminology "sinner, sinful, sin," we can focus our inquiry on the
problem of man-in-his-existenee-and-in-society. It is man the psyche-
\soma the specifically human organism vis-a-vis his milieu.
Theology should seek light on this nan not only from psycho­
analytical psychology but also fro® others among the prolific theories 
of personality; including Kurt Levin’s Field Theory; 2 the careful, 
eclectic system proposed by Gardner Murphy, who is at present the
characteristic haaartiologieal phrases See, for example, 
George F. Thomas, "Man As Sinner", Chapter 8, in his Christian Ethics 
end Moral Philosophy (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, i9!?$), 
pp. also, other works, to be cited in Chapter Two, notes,
infra.
^For example, Kurt Levin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality 
(New York and London, McGraw-Hill,~1935T
director of research for the Menninger Foundation, H. A* Murray's 
personology,2 Gordon Allport's 'psychology of the Individual and 
ego psychology,"3 H. J. Eysenck's cautions, critical, experimental 
view which treats the subject in teres of dimensions of personal- 
ity.1*  , ' ' ■ ■ . ;:s . . . ;■ ■ ■
Our study will confine itself to the schools of psycho­
analysis/’ Including sons which have green up la reaction to certain 
Freudian doctrines. In our usage psychoanalysis will he roughly 
synonymous with depth psychology, although Freudians in Great Brltlan 
have succeeded pretty ouch In reserving the tern "psycho-analysis."
*For example, see Gardner Murphy, Personality; A Biosoclai 
Approach to Origins and Structure (New York, Harper, 19^7). Murphy 
edited Al Outline of l^noraai jpsychclogor (New York, Modem Library,
1929).
^For example, H. A. Murray (and collaborators), Explorations 
ia Psrsonclity (New York, Oxford U. Press, 1938). Murray, (si 
Isrvarl), Is a pioneer In relating clinical psychology, depth psy­
chology, and social psychology.
3sc«e of Gordon Allport's writings which are especially rele­
vant to theology are listed In the Bibliography, infra.
**Sane of H. J. Eysencks *s writings which are especially rele­
vant to our study are listed in the Bibliography, infra.
Perhaps the best recent survey of contemporary personality 
theories las Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindsey, Theories of Per­
sonality (New York, John Wiley A Sons, Inc., London, Chapman sTHall, 
Ltd., 1957), xi plus 572 pp. with Index.
Pioneering in personality theory was William McDougall.
Cf. also William Brown, Mind and Personality (London, London 
University Press, 1926), pp. lo argues a unity in personallty- 
as-such, "a unity of the mind from every point of view." He contends 
also for s a n K l  distinctions between normal and abnormal psy­
chology. Tbmy are two different sciences, even as are physiology ss 
such and pathology (pp. 267-268).
9for themselves. In the United States, for instance, the term "psycho­
analysis" is used for the theories and practice of the various 
"schools," including those founded by Karen Homey and Harry Stack 
Sullivan. For our purposes it seems legitimate to say simply 
"schools of psychoanalysis," rather than "psychoanalysis and its 
derivatives."-1- Sigmund Freud is regarded as the founder of contem­
porary depth psychology, with his theories of the meaning of dreams 
and his clinical interpretations of slips of the tongue and behavior 
vhich can be described as "acting out” some unconscious or irrational 
intent.2 He himself on occasion referred to the new "science" and 
art as "depth psychology." It is exploring the inner world of the 
patient, going deep into his personal history and into his uncon­
scious, irrational problems and motivations.3
C^f. H. Crichton-Miller, Psycho-Analysis and Its Derivatives, 
"The Home University Library of Modem Knowledge, fco. IbU (London, 
Oxford University Press).
2A. A. Brill has translated and edited six of Freud’s early 
formative, treatises, including The History of the Psycho-analytic 
Movement, in The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud (The Modern Library, 
New York, Random House, Inc., 193$, 106l pp.).Freud himself did not 
consider these as all of his basic writings to that date. Brill did 
not present them as the whole story, certainly. They all appear in 
other translation. The works in German are found in Sigmund Freud 
Gesammelte Werke, Chronologisch Geordnet, Banden 1-17 (London, Imago 
Publishing Co., Ltd., 19^7* The collection edited by Brill includes 
The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, The Interpretation of Dreams, 
and Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious, along with Three Contri­
butions to the Theory of Six, and taTpoo, and the History.
3ls psychoanalysis more ’scientific" than theology? Cer­
tainly Freud, for example, thought his methodology was. However 
some of his confidence was perhaps illusory. See, for example,
J. W. N. Sullivan, The Limitations of Science (New York, Viking,
1933* a Mentor Book, 19^9-J, at p .1 T&J. Sullivan sees the dog­
matic character of psychoanalytic-metapsychological theories,
10
Probably we are veil into a new era of ccMHuni cation between 
depth psychology and theology, although sons of the dialogue suggests 
as In former tines no real dialogue at all. Psychologists nay In* 
velgh against the worst in theological dogma as though it were con­
temporary theology at Its best. At the sane tine theologians nay be 
guilty of misrepresenting the Insights of psychology, there should 
be no more reason for psychologists to attack outdated fornulations 
as though they were contemporary theology than there la for theolo­
gians to bore In on the absurdities of a bygone psychology. Perceptive 
theologians of the Protestant Mecumenistic" persuasion,especially, do 
not ignore the correlative disciplines, including depth psychology.
Too often however they fall to understand what Is actually being 
said by someone In depth psychology, even as depth psychologists can 
misunderstand each other. In our study we shall attempt with dili­
gence to avoid misrepresenting what either depth psychology or 
theology seems to be saying about a conscon concern: the problem of 
man-ln-hls-exlstence-and-in-soclety.
At the same time we shall keep In mind the corrective value 
in mutual criticism. Truth is served by the quick discernment by 
one discipline of any offensive literalism and crude reductionism 
present in another.
specifically, the libido theory. He says, rightly, that the freud­
ian libido theory Is no more or leas scientific than theological 
determinism (which asserts that all cornea about by the will to ste-r 
claar of the excesses of deterministic formulations. There Is much 
more to Freud's thought than hla determinism, even as there Is more, 
for instance, to Calvin*si
11
Nowadays we find a number of corrective disciplines in the 
field. Obviously depth psychology has hardly confined itself to any 
one clearly defined academic discipline. Nor has it seemed content 
to function merely as a therapeutic technique. It has been like a 
volcanic eruption, from vhich lava has flowed over the surrounding 
terrain. True, it functions primarily as a practical healing art. 1 
Yet Freud, Jung, Rank, and the others to some extent, have provided 
a metaphysics and assumed a quasi-scientific posture; in short, they 
offer, each, his own Weltanschauung:. Professor Talcott Parsons, of 
Harvard, points out how Freudian psychoanalysis has from its imagin­
ative use of clinical material extrapolated social theories inade­
quate for the sociological and anthropological studies which they 
have stimulated. 2
The sorties into theology proper have been dealt with by 
many.3 Later we shall review Freud's theory of racial guilt.
■k)f course, there is more to psychiatry than ,:depth psychology. ’! 
Cf. for instance, Sir David K. Henderson, The Psychopathic Personality, 
Inaugural Postgraduate Lecture, Session 19$1-5? (Oxford University 
Press for the U. of St. Andrews, 1952, 23 PP-)» Psychiatry's view of 
the patient must be both broad and deep, with regard for the mysteries 
of inheritance and for the ieleological and purposive (McDougall).
2Talcott Parsons, "Psychoanalysis and The Social Structure" - 
i a paper written in 1950, reprinted as Chapter XVI in Essays in Soci­
ological !Rieory, revised edition (Glencoe, Illinois, fee Free Press.
i# T T pp~ 1 5^3^.
Cf. also Sidney Hook, ed., Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method, 
and Philosophy (New York, N. Y. University ^ress, 1$'$9 )•
Instance, Edgar P. Dickie, Revelation and Response, 
for 1937 (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 19WI,
L. W. Grensted, Psychology and God, Bampton
^See, for 
The Kerr Lectures 
pp. 31-36. Also,
It is erroneous to assert or to assume that there is no God simply 
because he may be conceived via images of the parent and the paren- 
tlfylng society. "The God and Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ' may 
be conceptualized through the "mental mechanisms," including "pro­
jection." However, we still hare the question: "What must we do
in the presence of such a concept?" What on earth can account for 
such an image except the experience of mankind? Here the perception 
of C. G. Jung is more helpful. 1 Yet even he may be trying to conquer 
too much hidden territory by assumed knowledge. Clinical concepts,
Lectures, 1930 (London, Longmans, Green & Co.). Cf. David E. Roberts, 
Existentialism and Religious Belief (Roger Hazelton, editor, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1957), at page 22k, apropos of the atheism 
of Jean-Paul Sartre: Sartre's refutations of belief in God partake
of "the genetic fallacy that how a belief came about explains Just 
what the belief is and means." See infra, Chapter Fourteen, notes.
The works of L. W. Grensted are especially helpful and per­
ceptive, in psychology and religion, including also: The Psychology
of Religion, "The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge 
{London, Oxford U. Press, 1951)* Grensted and, for instance, also 
R. S. Lee, in Freud and Christianity (New York, A. A. Wyn, 19^9), 
pp. 125-139# ««e a possible constructive use of the projectlon-of- 
the-father-image hypothesis.
1C. G. Jung's writings on religion are numerous. Represent­
ative of his method and point of view are: Modern Man in Search of
A Soul, trans. W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynea Ta Harvest Book, itav 
York, Harcourt, Brace, and Company, first published in 1933, a col­
lection of essays translated from the German )j Psychology and Reli­
gion, The Terry Lectures (New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University 
Press, 1938# London, Oxford University Press). Two Essays on 
Analytical Psychology (revised edition, Collected Works, edited by 
Herbert &sad, Michael Fordham, and Gerhard MlerJ Bollingen 8eries,
No. It New York, Pantheon Books, Inc., 1953)# gives a good intro­
duction to Jung's "Analytical Psychology." Other works especially 
related to our kind of inquiry are: Psychology and Alchemy (Col­
lected Works, Bollingen Series, No. l£, 19i>3)l The Integration of 
Personality, tranc. Stanley M. Dell (N. Y., Farrar & Rinehart,
1939T, and Answer to Job, trans. R. F. C. Hull (London, Routledge
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even of mental mechanisms and of archetypes, cannot erase the funda­
mental mystery and the existential anxiety in which one's very nature 
poses its question of meaning. The theological answer to this ques­
tion may well touch the "mechanisms'' of the awakening mind. This 
much is granted! One's concept of God, as well as hie lens through 
which he sees all social and vocational meaning, is shaped by his 
own experience. The lens continues to be pliant under the hand of 
continuing experience. But the conception of God may be either 
opaque or transparent with respect to the agape— the love and grace 
of "the God and Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ"— which seeks the 
individual and the society.
Organised, as well as private, religion has fostered both 
kinds of conception of God, the opaque, Idolatrous image, and the 
transparent, liberating Image. The Hebrew conception of God as 
Yahveh may well be the leaven of our expanding knowledge of nature 
and the universe! Perhaps we are able to muster courage to go into 
the unknown only because we have— however faintly— a conception of 
ultimate reality which is able to go with us, Indeed to be there at 
every stage before we arrive. Ho idol will do. No opaque image is 
adequate. "He Who Creates" or He Who Is Who He Is" is a liberating 
conception of God. To go one step further and to say that Yahveh is
& Kegan Paul, 195*0- Writings on religion, including some of those 
mentioned above, have been collected in a volume entitled! Psychol­
ogy and Religion: West and East, trans. R. F. C. Hull,(Bollingen
series No. 31# 1953T an anthology of Jung's writings, selected 
and edited by Jolande Jacobi.
revealed In the realm of persons as present in Jesus as the Christ
is to link power and love in our vision of ultimate reality.
The Justification of Our Comparative Study
How can depth psychology be related to Christian theology?
Can these two disciplines he compared in a way that does no vio­
lence to either’s genius? Our argument is simple; yet perhaps it 
is cogent enough.
Christian theology is essentially soteriology. The Chris­
tian gospel is a message of soterla: 'deliverance/' making vhole
and well/ "salvation." Systematic theology, or dogmatics, and 
philosophical theology are both derived from practical theology and . 
beholden to it. Its concern is the communication and the implemen­
tation of this saving gospel: the gospel of justification by grace"
to man-in-hls-existence-and-ln-sooiety.
Justification is the saving act and process.^ Grace is its 
cause and mode. Faith is the channel. It is the subjective aspect 
of justification by grace. The governing concern of theology there­
fore is to perceive, elucidate, proclaim, and express the actual 
presence of the saving grace of God. At times the fora which this 
grace takes may seem more 'secular" than sacred. The servants of
the visible Church are ever in danger of saying, :THe casts them out
oby the power of Beelsebub. Even though they may avoid such
-^See infra, Part Three, note.
2cf. Mk. 3:22, Mt. 12:2fc, Lk. 11:15.
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blasphemy they frequently fail to see the soteria even when it is 
taking place before their very eyes.
Now, depth psychology makes no claims to be the finger of 
God, the saving grace of God as he is conceived by Christian theol­
ogy. Yet the ’’art" of emotional and mental healing is in fact soterl- 
ological. Some may argue that it can be merely analogous to the 
dynamics of the Christian gospel. However, the practical working out 
of "saving grace" is beset with ambiguities, regardless of who tries 
to describe it, whether theologian or psychologist.
The saving act and the word about it are to be distinguished, 
at least logically, regardless of how they may be intertwined in our 
experience. The therapist’s relationship with his patient (or 
client), as a person with a person, is perhaps the dynamic factor 
in the healing process. The grace of healing is incarnatlonal regard­
less of what the therapist's theoretical frame of reference may be.
The bringing of salvation is Informed by his "theology," his philos­
ophy, and his psychological theory, to be sure. But healing takes 
place; it is essentially a saving act and process.
Theologians are justified" in attempting a comparison be­
tween the anthropologies and the soteriologles of the two disciplines. 
Each is essentially a soterlology. Each has both explicit and impli­
cit anthropological assumptions and insights. Of course they differ 
markedly in their larger frames of reference. For instance, Harry 
Stack Sullivan’s idea of salvation for his patient may be at the most 
progress through the psychological phases of developing out of Infancy
into an adult heterosexual pattern of adjustment. 1 Quite obviously, 
the goal of Christian salvation cannot be reduced to this. Never­
theless genuine soteria may be taking place through the ministrations 
of a psychotherapist with a limited, or "bracketed,H goal of therapy.
Were the comparison possible only via mere analogy it would 
be justified. Each discipline analyses and tries to save man-in- 
his-existence-and-in-soeiety.
Traditionally Christian theology has discussed this problem 
under the rubric of sin— or better, sin and evil. Sin is before- 
and-against-God, agalnst-the-nelghbor, and agalnst-the-self. Each 
aspect of sin implies the other two.
We cannot expect psychology to adopt this same rubric, al­
though Dr. Mowrer seems to argue for some inclusion of it in the 
methods of psychotherapy. Freud actually believed that the indi­
vidual psyche comes already laden with the feeling of guilt, a 
racial guilt.^ He chose to define it as Oedipal or parricidal.
Jung takes seriously all the traditional religious and theological 
symbols, including the conception of sin.3 Even the more 
"sociologically-oriented" therapists seem to presuppose something 
like sin and something like justification. A "wrong" way of life
•^Harry Stack Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry 
(Washington, D. C., The William Alanson White Psychiatric Founda­
tion, 19 7^ ), pp. 28ff.
%ee infra, Chapter Five.
^For example, in "3ke Spiritual Problem of Modern Man," 
"Psychotherapists or the Clergy," Chapters 10 and 11 in Modern Man 
in Search of a Soul, especially at p. 198 and pp. 233-2Mu
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can be changed. The twisted emotions and "will" must be straight­
ened out and strengthened in the "right" direction.
Ve do not find the depth psychologists arguing that, for 
this or that reason, it is better to heal than to allow the psyche 
to deteriorate! They simply assume that man as psyche-soaa is in­
trinsically worth saving. Hence, without being consciously theolog­
ical, the depth psychologists do seem to presuppose a kind of the­
ology, in the sense of a presupposition of ultimate meaningfulness 
and value in our common existence.
Meanwhile theologians may not be conscious of the fact that 
they are also psychologists, at times perhaps rather poor ones.
They do assume certain things about the psyche of the individual 
whenever they speak of him. They assume a kind of group psychology 
whenever they speak of man collectively. They may assume that man 
is highly reasonable or that he is mostly Irrational in his atti­
tudes and behavior. They may assume that he is free to choose the 
good if he is convinced of its goodness, or they may assume that he 
is relatively enslaved by the evil so that he is unable to choose 
the good even if he recognises it. Some may say that he is so 
blinded that he cannot even recognise the goodness of the good over 
the badness of the bad. Variants of these psychologies have found 
expression within Christian theology. Regardless of their position 
on such traditional questions all theologians have assumed the role 
of psychologists in the very act of discussing man.
Hence ve must see the theologian in the psychologist and 
the psychologist in the theologian as we approach this study. It
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may veil argue that each discipline should seek enrichment from the 
other. Despite the excesses and occasional darkening of counsel with 
vords without knowledge in depth psychology, it goads us to a depth 
theology, with an ever deepening appreciation for the coejplexity of 
the human psyche, a more profound anthropology, and a more under­
standing soterlology.
Christian theology may in return offer assistance to depth 
psychology in helping it discover the sources of its own presuppo­
sitions. If the Insight8 of theology are in any sense true for all 
of human life, then both disciplines can serve the same ultimate 
cause. In Christian language this is the Kingdom of God. Its im­
mediate expression is the bringing of "the glad tidings of salvation."
Both Christian theology and depth psychology have a faith 
that human life is somehow justified, that it is redeemable or, that, 
in a profound sense, it has already been redeemed from the forces 
which would degrade and destroy its essence. They do not get together 
liturgically and recite the same credal phrases. But perhaps they do 
believe basically in the same reality. They may both be essentially 
agapeistic in their genius. Ihere can be no doubt of the fact that 
the admitted concern and raison d ’etre of each is soteriological.
What May Be Gained from Our Study?
This comparative study may bring a clearer idea of the mutual 
enrichment possible for theology and depth psychology.
Also it may provide criteria for a meaningful reformulation 
of the Christian conceptions of sin and justification. It should he 
of help in the semantic difficulties. Is the problem of man-in- 
hie-existence subsumed under the rubrio sin alone? Or must it be 
analysed under the twin conceptions of sin and evil?
Not only should we rediscover the interrelatedness of the 
conceptions of sin and justification but we should see them both in 
the practical, though limited, light of depth psychology. We can 
then hope for pointers along the way to a more responsible and real­
istic implementation, as well as communication, of the Christian 
gospel of grace.
The Limitations for Our Study
As we have already seen, the Christian concern for the prob­
lem of man-in-his-existence-and-in-society seeks light not only from 
the exciting depths of psychoanalysis. The tragic element in exist­
ence pervades society. The "Kingdom of Evil"1 seems to involve dy­
namics greater than those even of collective individual evils.
Here our terminology is influenced by the writings of Walter 
Rauschenbusch. Opposing the Kingdom of God is the Kingdom of Evil. 
Rauschenbusch, influenced by the Schlelermacher-Pitschl-H&rnack tra­
dition, wrestled with this idea. His idea of sin came to be virtually 
a concept of evil in general. Evil Is that which violates the will of 
God, which is known to us In terms of the best interests of the 
'treasure of heaven, namely, human life. See Chapter IX, A Theology 
for the Social Gospel (New York, Macmillan, 1917). Cf. John tfl 
Bennett, ' The Social Interpretation of Christianity," in S. M. Cavert 
and H. P. Van Dusen, eds., The Church Through Half a Century (N. Y., 
Scribner, 1936), at pp. 120-l£l; Arthur C. McGil^ fert, "Walter 
Rauschenbuschj Twenty Years After," in Christendom, III, 1, Winter 
number, 1938* PP« 96-109; John C. Bennett, Social Salvation (New York, 
Scribner, 1935 )> P* **-•
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Hence, as ve inquire Into the motivational and topographical 
aspects of man-in-his-existence-and-in-society ve are ever conscious 
of the complexities, many of vhich are not accessible to our researches.
We shall discuss the origins and the contemporary expression 
of the Christian conceptions of sin and justification in order to set 
the stage for the more exhaustive study of the aspects offense and 
guilt in the light of depth psychology. Hence ve risk too cursory 
a treatment of the vast history of the conceptions. We do neglect 
their expression in Roman Catholic theology. This Is a calculated 
risk, since we have chosen to limit our study to contemporary Prot­
estant "realistic" and "corrective' theology's use of the doctrines. 
However ve have both Roman Catholic and Protestant legalistic expres­
sions of these conceptions In mind during much of our critique.
Likewise the treatment of depth psychology is limited.
Perhaps it should be even less sweeping. 1 But ve have tried to 
bring together certain representative points of view, since the phe­
nomenon of depth psychology itself is undergoing continual change.
As, for instance, a comparative study of the thought of one 
theologian with that of one depth psychologist. Since the near­
completion of this thesis ve have read two doctoral theses vhich 
cover some of the same ground, though in quite different ways. Ohey 
are: (l) Robert E. Elliott, Sin and Neurosis: A Study of Two Per­
spectives Upon the Problem of Human Brckenness (thesis, University 
of Chicago, 195^7-* unpublished, though available in microfilm. 
Elliott*s material is principally Augustine and Richard Niebuhr 
(theology) and Freud, Rank, and Fromm (psychotherapy). He seeks 
the common ground: vis. "brokanness." (2) Robert C. Kimball,
Implications of the Thought of Tillich and Freud for Relating 
Theology and Psychotherapy (Thesis, Harvard, i960). Kimbail ex­
presses the hope that other comparative studies will be made. He 
also focuses on the common ground, the boundary area, where Freud 
and Tillich seem to be viewing and trying to solve the same problems
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Freud's writings are still read with seriousness. Many of his dis­
ciples seem to treat them as "scriptural authority. However other 
’Freuds' have arisen, leaders of original genius, who offer for the­
ology both challenge and insight. Perhaps we neglect C. G. Jung too 
«ruch in our exposition, especially since he says much about religion 
and has considerable knowledge of Christian theology. Our reluctance 
to treat hi* at greater length is due (l) to the linltations of space 
and (2) to the highly speculative character of what he says that is 
different fro* what the others are saying. Jung says such of what 
the others say, perhaps. He is making unique contributions to 
psychotherapy as such. But his vast treatment of culture and psy­
chology would see* to carry us beyond the scope of our United in­
quiry. Such writings are *ore properly in the range of cultural . 
anthropology, even as sone of Erich Frosm's works are nore properly 
to be regarded as ideological tracts for the tines than as clinical 
depth psychology.
We have also neglected somewhat to include former studies 
of religion and psychotherapy. By now there is an abundance of 
literature by theologians which relates especially practical theol­
ogy to depth psychology.* The work of David Roberts on Psychotherapy
(anthropological). He goes so far as to suggest that though Professor 
Tillich's expression is theological," the substance of his message is 
from psychotherapy (p. 235). This observation seens a bit too selec­
tive and circular; 1. e., seeing as substantial only that which is 
psychotherapeutically substantial. This nevertheless valuable study 
will soon be available in microfilm.
^Books which have been consulted include the following:
Seward Hiltner, Pastoral Counseling (N. Y., Abingdon-Cokesbury, 19^9)j
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and a Christian View of Man seems outstanding In coming to grips vith 
the theoretical— or doctrinal— dimension. 1
Our research has been stimulated by this literature. A gen­
eral reading of such works and of the journals devoted to religion 
and psychotherapy2 is presupposed throughout our discussion, although 
we have limited occasion to cite these works.^ Our research has been 
primarily in the writings of practicing depth psychologists themselves, 
notably, Freud and Freudians, Jung, Alfred Adler, Otto Rank, Karen 
Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan, and a man who founded no school of 
analysis, Ian Suttle. His papers, Included in his posthumously 
published volume The Origins of Love and Hate were such a rewarding 
find for this research that we have consulted them at every stage
John 0. McKenzie, Nervous Disorders and Religion; A Study of Souls 
in the Making, The Tate Lectures^ 19^7 (London, Alien & UnwTn, 19^1); 
John G. McKenzie, Nervous Disorders and Character, The Tate Lectures
for 19*A> (London, Allen & Unwin, lOd&J.
Other relevant works arei J. A. C. Murray, An Introduction 
To A Christian Psycho-Therapy (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 19*>^ ); Leslie 
D. Vaatherhead, Religion and Healing (London, Hodder &
Stoughton, 1951); And earlier works: H. Crichton-Miller, The New
Psychology and the Preacher (London, Jarrolls, 192k)} W. Fearon 
Halliday, Psychology and Religious Experience (London, Hodder and 
Stoughton, 19^9)} Thomas Hywol Hu^hasT ft*e flew Psychology and Reli-
fiuus Experience (London, Allen & Unwin, 19337I "Clifford E• Barbour, in arui the New Psychology (London, Allen A Unwin, 1931)*
^David E. Roberts, Psycnotherapy and a Christian View of Man 
(N. Y. Scribner’s Sons, 195^7^ Another book which 'leals with tEe two
disciplines systematically is: William Graham Cole, Sex In Christian­
ity and Psychoanalysis (Oxford University Press, 1955)T
oThese Include: Pastoral Psychology and The Journal of
( mmmmmmmmmrnHm— mmmm — — ■■■ « ■ i ' ■ > ■ mrnmmmmm w m m n h m m m b  rnammm____________ see Bibliography, infra).
^Provocative theological treatments include also:
V. R. Matthews, The Problem of Christ in the Twentieth Century,
The Maurice Lectures (London, Oxford University Press', 1956), in
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of our inquiry. 1 Suttie, himself a psychiarist, developed his own
theories out of his extensive clinical practice and his vide reading, 
Vbut vis-a-vis Freud, Freudians, Jung, and Adler.
Freudians included in our treatment of depth psychology 
Include thinkers as different as Melanie Klein and Erik E. Erikson. 
They are studied not so much because of their differences but because 
of their depth of perception within their particular frame of refer­
ence. This guiding principle holds true for the inclusion of the 
several differing schools of depth psychology: Jungian, Adlerian,
Rankian, and the so-called revisionist (Homey and Sullivan and 
others). It is the principle which accounts for our Inclusion of 
Ian Suttie.
which he deals with the inferences for Christology of both Freudian and 
Jungian theories of libido and the unconsciousj especially: Albert C.
Outler, Psychotherapy and"the Christian ifessage (Hew York, Harper,
195^ )j and Lewis JV Sherri 11, Guilt ancT RedeLipuion, The Sprunt Lec­
tures, (Richmond, Virginia, The Jc&in Knox Press, )• Sherrill 
makes a constructive application of the implications of agape in 
therapy.
Provocative also are the writings of Anton Boisen, a minister 
and sociologist, who himself has suffered psychotic illness, from 
which he recovered, and which he has interpreted autobiographically 
with reference to the experiences of men like George Fox and John 
Bunyan: Anton Boisen, The Exploration of the Inner World (New York,
Harper, 1936* 1952): Cf. his Religion "in Crisis and Custom (New York, 
Harper, 19 5^, 1955)*
Also, we mention the significant work of the Academy of 
Religion and Mental Health. 3. g., Religion, Science, and Mental 
Health, "Proceedings of the First Academy Symposium on Inter 
discipline Responsibility for Jfental Health - A Religious and Scien­
tific Concern" (New York, N. Y. University Press, 1959), 107 pp.
1Ian D. Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate (London, Kegan 
Paxil, Trench Trubner, 19557 'kj- f* STthough in some respects a
2k
Our research in the writings of these various thinkers has 
been guided by our basic question! Is there light for the Christian 
conceptions of man-as-sInner and of Ju»tification-by-grace-through- 
faith?
Tin Method— or Path— of Exposition
In Port One we shall try to bring into clearer focus the 
Christian conceptions of sin and justification by reviewing their 
Biblical origins and suggesting Important facets of their contem­
porary expression.
In Part Two we proceed to examine !:man-as-sinner" in the 
light of depth psychology. How does man-in-his-existence-and-in­
society appear through the lens of depth psychology? We must ex­
amine the nature of man as subjectlve-self-within-his-psyche-soma-
\world of feelings and constructs vls-a-vle his milieu, as this Is 
elaborated by the various schools of depth psychology. Hence the 
opening question will be: Who is the sinner? meaning: Prom whence
within the complex inner world of the individual comes culpable—  
accountable, as well as non-culpable, wrongness? We are In quest of 
the subject-self. Then we must examine the nature of guilt feelings, 
the individual’s own assumption of guilt and responsibility. We 
encounter cosqpllcations such as that which we have already seen In
difficult book to read, it is remarkably extensive in both range and 
depth of perception. Cf. L. W. Grensted, The Psychology of Religion,
pp. 61-62.
See also Part Two, notes, infra, re: Suttie’s work.
Ellis' definition of a sense of sin. Hence study of the nature of 
guilt feelings will lead us on in our quest to consider the compli­
cations of shame, of anxiety, the meaning of despair, and the compli­
cations of self-concern.
Following this our principal question, we shall treat in Part 
Three, somewhat more briefly, the presence of justification in the 
act and process of psychotherapy.
In the Conclusion ve shall bring together the threads of our 
inquiry and suggest certain “realistic" and responsible directions 
for Christian theology's use of these two conceptionsj sin and 
Justification.
We now proceed to Part One and first to our review of the 
Biblical origins of the ideas of sin and justification.
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PART ONE
THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTIONS OP SIN AND JUSTIFICATION
CHAPTER ONE
THE BIBLICAL ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPTIONS
Sin in the Old Testament
We do not find one systematic doctrine of sin in the Old 
Testament. Most of the terms for sin” are objective, simply de­
scribing error or the deviation from a norm. The most common vords 
are based cm the root^lTln (h t 1). It refers not to motive or in­
ner quality, but simply to mistake, missing the route, or failure to 
do something in particular. Thus, as Gottfried Quell says, "the 
commonest expression for sin in Hebrew lacks the deep religious 
quality of our word . T h e s e  19 f] words were used for breaches of 
civil law, deviation from the moral standards of the group, and the 
breaking of the rules governing personal relationships.
1A principal source for our linguistic study of the concep­
tions of sin and justification is Gerhard Kittel, editor, Tneolo- 
giachos Worterbuch sum Neuen Testament. Our references are io Bible 
"or&s, translated an& edited fcy J. R. Coates (New York, Harper,
Alan Richardson, editor, A Theological Word Book of the 
Bible (London, SCM Press, 1950), hiss also Wen consulted, along with 
various other commentaries and studies. The reference to Gottfried 
Quell is to Gottfried Quell, George Bertram, Gustav Stahlin and 
Walter Grundmann, H31n," in Bible Key Words, III, p. 7. Cf. 
Richardson, A Theological Wordbook, p. £27.
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A smaller group of words translated a in are built on the 
sh This root word seems to go beneath the sur­
face act to get nearer the underlying motive. It means rebelling 
and connotes a more active and less formal aspect of behavior.
Human responsibility is stressed. In Isaiah 1:2 it is used in de­
scribing the sons rebelling against the fathers. Jeremiah (2:29) 
uses it to depict man trying to initiate legal proceedings against 
God. 1
A term that occurs tvo-hundred-and-tventy-seven times in the 
Old Testament is j"] 'j ^  (J_ v h,) which has both a secular and a reli­
gious use: to twist. The noun has more of a religious connotation,
stressing guilt. Cain says, "Jty / ^ ^  (J_ a w o n) is greater than
r v, "2 I TI can bear.
A verb meaning to err is p|^ fik £)• noun is used
to express "creaturely going astray.' 3 Although it describes a de­
viation from the right path, it implies a good intention. In 
Job 12:6 we encounter the term, where it connotes something like 
the Greek idea of fate: man is entrapped in a kind of wrongness
which prevents him from reaching his goal. God denies him the 
ability. This term is used in Isaiah 28:7f for example, where the 
drunken priest and prophet are described as reeling to and fro.
■^Blble Key Words,II, p. lOff.
2Ibld., pp. 5-6, p. 22. The reference 1. to Genesis 1*:12. -
3jbld.
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Other roots which are used in describing irrational wrongnees are
and^JjJj]sh Jj. .
In the Wisdom literature the conception of sin seems to be 
of a kind of wayward ignorance.
Uke term used most often for "sin ("evil"J) is 
(r sh l), which occurs two-hundred-sixty-one times.1
Leaving the study of the Old Testament's terms for "sin" 
and ’’sins," we seek the origins of the Christian conception also in 
the over-all mentality of the developing Hebrew religious culture.
The story of Adam's fall has been regarded as the locus classIcua 
for the idea of Bin as the "original sin." It has been used to 
describe the condition of man as sinner. The story of Noah is an­
other account of mankind's felling into sin.^
The story in the third chapter of Genesis, of Adam and Eve 
in the garden of Eden, yielding to the temptation to eat of the for­
bidden fruit and thus incurring the punishment of eviction and de­
nial of the fruit of the tree of life, deals vith the problem of 
evil in general as well as that of specifically culpa!le wrongness. 
There hangs over this story an air of inevitability. Like Prome­
theus, man-in-Eden wishes to be sis God. Here he wants the added 
faculty of knowing good and evil. He gains it but at the price of 
great suffering. Knowing good and evil proves to be too much for
*See Ludwig Kohler, Theologie des Alten Testaments, (Tubingen, 
Verlag J. C. B. Moher— Paul S>ie\>acK, 19^7), pp. 159-1&^*
^Genesis 6s1-6 and following.
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ia36ti*•  u 9  SU 4JS8S  vO A S  W JS  Xsi4'.>>«. *<?STasSw  m k <iT 3w ^
i^iwu i/litiA^ surely otis# jAs read th&? storey w^e wi'Oqj help ide*rivl—
x y. ouxiiHiX^ st syBpstbciiotsi xly with *he ^crs» It is si i®**
tensely^  tmssn, c^ lwnou^ ps moflfc%»isckx-.^ ■*> Wrss-v ti.&*- uu*.^
WJCpWr 1 <Q Cl'y.Zi**<JL * j jLitaUi J if *
7iitivy one is In a state c» lonocftocs• Th8Q •»■-' ;-^  jOivu>* 
ststt^ 5 csx t»rs£^ »^c kuowljss ssad o^f sfcaai^sl w U f T > m * * 0Ei i#,
as desuribed in tuo t&lui, coi.i>uitos p4jyci*C'i>.*(^ '.-<ic*- ,-i.y wvtri on® s own
striv i ■Bcr^ Ci., tbs ts.w-'OSt tCiiv-3i''3fti. iy>*i XctiOii isi i ..xi * *»*.«^
ws by willing it sc vnethsr I Uks it or not* The suit is frcca de­
pendant borsnay out into guilt sod enforced Independence* *By the 
sweat of thy brow shall tnsu asm broad* Such so aware * ms s o* 
having been evloted— such ecsivititios of sis (T)— itvcs side by 
•Ids with tbs attitude %^fss absolves the sslf from gailt in the
nans of determinism. This Is in tbs St OJT^  tsOO^  i"0 4 ifcW tbs
dstspslultt^ lflfbsocc of tbs woman Tbou gavest ms j Evo blames tbs 
serpent* Tbs sc^ vavit i\jprese-*is tbs sinister presence t-. o .■*. xu 
human Ilfs iven before human culpability*
? nevertheless tbs story doss tms to stress Adamfs fww 
choice. His disobedience was voluntary* 1L* is culpable— if wtei
as to lurk a ucubt about unths 
it was really sinful. -'There is ae question but that it was a free 
and wilful act in defiance of an injunction* But was tbs injunc­
tion right? The serpent seems to be the only spokesman Who Is In 
direct opposition to it. But the narrator leaves scorn doubt as
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to his own opinion. Would man he man without the knowledge of good 
and evil? What kind of being Is this Adam of paradise?
The temptation is described as being practically Irresist­
ible. The serpent— with whom also the reader, If not the narrator,
Is able to identify himself as a ’reasonable' creature— talks rea­
sonably, voicing man18 grievance against the fate decreed. The pen­
alty Is surely out of all proportion to the offense. "Yea, hath God 
said . . • God must be trying to hold man under, to deny him
further development. Surely the command is a selfish one on God's 
part. The serpent urges Eve to break her "bondage" by eating the 
fruit, thus receiving what God tries to keep for himself only. "Ye 
shall be as God, knowing good and evil."
Is this story supposed to read backwards as follows? We are 
deprived of the benefits of Eden simply because ve tried to be our­
selves, knowing good and evil. Therefore we must have been forbid­
den the privilege of knowing good and evil, a privilege which we in­
dulged anyway. The story does seem to describe roughly the intro­
duction to life vhich everyone who develops beyond Infancy seems to 
get. By nature we are in a state of eviction from paradise; that 
is, we who are no longer infants.
What are the consequences of the woman and man's yielding to 
the temptation to indulge their "humanity," to partake of what seemed 
good for food, good to look at, and a probable source of wisdom?
(1) One consequence Is that sense of shame, vhlch Dr* Ellis 
has described as the second element in the sense of sin.1 "They 
saw that they vere naked."
(2) They are suddenly overcome with loneliness, the sense 
of being cut adrift, separated from God. They have fallen from 
their accustomed security, the erstwhile harmony of life in Eden. 
Their friend has become their judge. He is now as a hostile stranger 
to them. They have no one else to take his place, and they had de­
pended on him. This is his world. Without him they can do nothing.
Hence they are hopelessly alienated from the very creator of their 
being. He now stands over them as a judge.
(3) A third consequence is their coming to know how ab­
solute is this disparity between themselves and God. They are 
aware of their total inadequacy in the mysterious universe. Tragic 
is the disparity between their actual powers and their new knowledge.
(k) A fourth consequence is their overpowering sense of 
doom. The sentence is hard and final, however unjust it may seem. 
They are evicted from the beautiful, peaceful garden. They are 
denied the assurance of continued life. All the woes of mortality 
are seen as the direct consequence of their disobedience, their one 
act of rebellion against the will of the erstwhile friendly Creator 
of life.
Mankind's fate is luridly set beside that of the snake, 




obscene, description of the banality of nan's existence! The author, 
or authors, reads as theology what he sees the actual lot of human­
ity to be.
As the personality develops out of early infancy, he seems 
urged from within and from the outside to realise his own individ­
ual destiny, to grow in knowledge and to conquer the world so to 
speak, by knowledge. Ian Suttie calls the process 'psychic weaning. ”1 
Freud sees a series of clearly defined crises, climaxing in the 
Oedipus complex. 2 Otto Rank sees it as the emergence of the in­
dividual will— via counter-will, necessary for progress in indi­
viduation. ^
The story of Adam's fall assays to tell more than the story 
of an individual's psychogenesis. Yet how could the author's own 
experience of infancy and of emerging from its innocency have failed 
to inform his narration? In any case, the perception of the al­
legory seems to be profoundly that of an introspective genius. The 
story says that for man as man the situation of his existence seems 
impossible if he risks knowing the awful truth. The story unmerci­
fully pits man against God. Everyone who reads it at all sympa­
thetically must relive his own unequal conflict: a mere mortal—
who is nevertheless ambitious to overcome his mortality and to es­
tablish his own inner strivings as being essentially related to the 
very meaning of the universe— confronts the actual universe. -He
1Infra, Chapter Four. 2Infra, Chapter Four.
3Infra, Chapter Five.
finds it indifferent to him, if not hostile. He is at once urged 
on to fulfill his strivings. This is depicted by the argument of 
the Berpent. At the same time he is urged to recognise his place 
as a mere creature who must adapt to the will of God— he must sim­
ply fit into the greater design of animals and things. To be in any 
sense an individuated being he must assert himself. He does. In 
asserting himself he takes on too much. He experiences feelings of 
unworthiness, inadequacy, alienation, hopelessness, doom. He suf­
fers throughout his life and finally dies. The more elevated his 
vision of himself, the more drab and tragic seems the death to 
which he must inevitably yield. To believe in himself as he aspires 
to be is to contradict the end fact of his existence. This is the 
dilemma with which the story of the Fall deals. Man makes a poor 
substitute for God when he falls back upon himself. His self-image 
is as woefully inadequate as an idol.
Taken by itself this story Is a pessimistic— or at least a 
realistic— allegory which ties up all the evils of man's existence 
with the fact of death. Man can choose between continuing in a 
kind of post-natal, even fetal, stupor (the state of innocence in 
the garden) and becoming conscious of his relative independence and 
responsibility (knowing good and evil). To be homo cogitans he must 
pay the price of lonely suffering and death. To exist is to exist. 
But to know that you exist is to know that you die.
Quell makes much of the story's emphasis on "knowledge."
He sees it as what Kant defined as practical reason, the power to
3^
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make judgments and to act on then, "vhich exalts roan to a divine 
sovereignty in the sphere of his ovn affairs. " 1 It is possible 
to interpret this story as teaching that such knowledge is the germ 
of sinful behavior. 3%e qualitative leap is into practical reason! 
However the Old Testament doctrine as a whole does not focus on 
knowledge as such as the locus of sin. It is the will. Lucifer 
said, "I will be like the most high. ' 2 The prophets addressed 
their hearers as wilful collectives and wilful persons who should 
change their goals and their behavior.
Certainly, however, the name given to the forbidden fruit 
in the garden story is by no means a merely incidental and arbitrary 
detail. We may see here a further correspondence with depth psychol­
ogists' descriptions of the child's mounting desire to know, even 
to achieve godlike power through knowing.3
As it is appropriated by Christianity the story of the fall 
of Adam emerges as a part of a new optimism. As in Adam all die,"
WordG' III, p. 26; Cf. p. 30.
2Isaiah lk:12tt.
3cf. Freud*s conceptions of omnipotence feeling, gnoaiphilla, 
or episteroophilia, to which we shall refer again in Part Two, infra.
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says the apostle Paul, "even so in Christ shall all be made alive 
The 'sin of Adam— and of all of us— is overcome in Christ. 2
We need only mention the long history of the theological 
commentary on the third chapter of Genesis and the argument over 
what essentially was the nature of the eating of the forbidden fruit. 
To Augustine it was the fall from rational control of one's will into 
sensual irrationality: concupiscence.3 To the Reformers this fall,
even if it did involve man in concupiscence, was a fall into the 
bondage of the will to the sinister power of evil, a twisting of 
the whole personality away from its center in God back upon itself 
as center* v The characteristic term of this arrogant willing to be 
like the Most High is hubris, sometimes almost synonymous with pride.
Our way of interpreting the Old Testament literature is influ­
enced more by textual and critical studies than was that of the
4  Corinthians 15:20-28.
20ur discussion of the story of the Fall follows that of Quell 
Bible Key Words, III, p. 23ff., consulting also: Cuthbert A.
Simpson, ^Exegesis," Genesis, Chapter Three, and Valter Russell Rowie, 
Exposition, The Interpreter^ Bible, Vol. I (New York, Abingdon, 
1952), pp. 501-^15. C£. G. Ernest Wright and Reginald H. Fuller, The
Book of the Acts of God, Christian Faith Series" (New York. Doubledav.
”60-6^ ifscfioiarly, while stressing the doctrine of original 
sin). Cf. Robert Mackintoen, Christianity and Sin (New York, Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 191*0# PP- 50-53- Be says ttaa4:original sin was not 
a dominant pre-Christian doctrine.
3cf. a representative statement by Paul L. Lehmann, that 
Augustine's view of original sin and the fall is complex, although it 
does come close at times to being the libel which Pelagius contended 
it was against human nature, especially in Augustine's writings on 
Marriage and Concupiscence. - Lehmann, "The Anti-Pelagian Writings," 
in Roy W. Battenhouse, A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, 
Chapter VIII (New York, "Oxford U. Press, ~1955 J> pp."^b3-^3^i at p. 221.
^See infra. Chapter Two.
Reformers, not to mention their sore Biblicistic successors of the 
Seventeenth Century. We ere warranted in taking a fresh look con­
tinually at the Biblical sources themselves, which are the anchor of 
the Church’s tradition, with its various explanations of the nature 
of man-as-sinner and of his possible justification.
The Old Testament is the cumulative library of a national 
religion. "Sin” against God can include minor violations of cere­
monial laws, even hygienic lavs, all of which take on a religious 
significance. We have a conception of sin in the priestly tradition, 
as in the prophetic one. The Wisdom literature links righteousness 
with the virtue of rational foresight and discipline. In certain of 
the psalms we read of "sinners" as a group or class of people con­
trasted with the "righteous." The dutifully righteous in ceremonial 
and moralistic, external, matters seem to have been the "spiritual 
leaders who most obstructed the 'Spirit of Christ," to whom the 
Hew Testament bears its witness.
Of course the dominant theme in the Old Testament is God and 
His community Israel. The community stands before God. Israel is in 
a covenant— berith— relationship with God. The community is like 
a person who has "cut a covenant"— made a solemn indenture or 
contract— with his neighbor. In another figure, the nation is 
likened to a wife toward her husband. Israel is In a marital-like 




According to Deuteronomic religion in the Old Testament, 
national sin is a breach of the covenant. The sin of the indivi­
dual is to be Interpreted in the context of the national stance.
The individual, in a sense, represents the community. His vrong is 
the connunity’s vrong against God. Hence, his guilt is primarily 
for having offended God— the God of the community. It is, second­
arily, against the community— which he has misrepresented.
The stories of the fall of man from the state of innocence 
and harmony actually serve the function in Genesis of pointing up 
the drama of reconciliation. The real story of 'the Beginnings” 
of Israel is that God by grace provided a way for the alienated 
coBsminity (Adam and Eve; the people, after a purging, in the days 
of Noah) to be restored to a good relationship with Himself.
Genesis traces the covenant from the situation of Adam to 
the saga of Abraham, whose descendants were to be as the stars and 
as the sands in number. The promise is repeated to Isaac and to 
Jacob— or Israel. In this covenant idea ve confront the "chosen 
people” mentality, vhich is by no means restricted to the Israelites. 
Indeed, as it is appropriated by Christianity in the concept of a 
new Israel” it continues to be used for good and perhaps also for 
ill in Christendom.
In the prophets, like Isaiah and the Isaiah "school” of 
writings, 1 ve meet an elevated and expanded vlev of Israel's
Without entering into the discussion as to hov many differ­
ent prophets may be represented in succeeding generations in the Book 
of Isaiah, ve refer here to what may be called the Isaiah corpus of 
writings•
relation to God. Israel is His servant with a mission to the world, 
a religious mission which transcends nationalism and imperialism.
In the context of this higher prophecy sin is offense against the 
vocation of Israel to be a kind of spiritual savior for the world. 
"Sin” is acting against the "will of God," which is defined in terms 
of harmony, justice, and peace. It covers a world larger than 
Israel alone. Even in Jeremiah,* and Ezekiel, who say that every* 
one will henceforth be accountable for his own ’sin," the guilt is 
against the God of the community of Israel. It is the sin of the 
community against its soul and mission, which derive from God.
In conclusion we may say that in the Old Testament sin Is 
defined as offense against God and against the comnunlty as God 
wills the comnunlty to be. Sin is disobedience to God, the God who 
stands over the community and commands by event and by the word 
which correctly interprets the event.3 The truth in the interpre­
tation appeared in subsequent validation of the prophet's word by 
events. The understanding of the will of God developed through a 
process of "word" and event.
The consequence of disobedience, breach of community, of­
fenses, is alienation. The covenant, even that marked by the giving
ijeremiah 31:27-30. 2Ezekiel, Chapter 18.
3we must not overlook the obvious fact that in the life of 
Israel the prophet himself was an event as well as the interpreter 
of events.
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of the tables of the Lav to Moses, is always a covenant of grace.
God offers the reconciliation, the restoration. The community and 
its members are called into a nev obedience.
Traditionally, Christian theology has regarded the covenant 
as a symbol of the restoration of meaning to the human race after 
the loss of essential harmony and direct ion. This is quite explicit 
in the writings of Paul, as ve shall see in the discussion of the 
conceptions of sin and Justification in the Rev Testament.
Sin in the Nev Testament
The Nev Testament follows the Septuagint in using hamartia 
as the principal term to denote offense against God and its accom­
panying guilt. It is used to denote sin (l) as a single act, (2) as 
a characteristic of human nature, and (3) as a personal power of 
evil.
In its Greek usage it connoted failure or mistake. Plato 
used the term to express wrongness as flaws of art and poetry, con­
trasting it with orthotoiB. Aristotle meant by hamartia ’missing the 
mark," through lack of strength, skill, or knowledge.1
The New Testament writings reflect knowledge of the Septua­
gint and of the Apocryphal writings— many of which, no doubt, were 
regarded as a part of ’The Scriptures.” The Greek rendering of the
•^ Gustav Stahlin, Greek Usage, Chapter IV of Book Three, 
Sin, in Bible Key Words, III, pp. 1*6-52, at p. 1*6.
Old Testament probably presents a wore concise and unified concep­
tion of ain than does its Hebrew antecedent. It emphasizes sin as 
that which separates man fro® God.'1'
Of course we do not find one systematic conception of sin 
spoiled out in the New Testament as a whole, although we do see con­
siderable development beyond the pre-Christian Hebrew theology. The 
Synoptics and The Acts of the Apostles do not present a unified doc­
trine of sin. Haaartia is used for specific actions. Jesus spoke 
of sin as debts in Matthew’s rendering of the disciples' prayer and 
in the parable of the debtors.^ Over against man's debt Jesus places 
God's forgiveness. God offers forgiveness to aan the debtor. In the 
legal system to which sin-as-debt alludes, the debtor mist suffer 
punishment. If he refuses forgiveness of his debt he must face the 
judgment. God is man's Judge. He offers to forgive the debt. Jesus 
is using an old Judaistic idea. Judaism had long insisted on the 
readiness of God to forgive the truly repentant. But in Jesus' use 
of the concept: God takes the initiative, seeking out the debtor
and offering him the forgiveness I Jesus demonstrates this by him­
self mingling with the so-called sinners” of society and eating 
with them. He was known as a 'friend of sinners.’ Thus he offended 
the tastes of the recognized spiritual leaders of the times.
^George Bertram, The Doctrine of Sin in the Septuagint,'
Sin, ibid., pp. 33-38.
^Matthew 6:12, Luke Cf. Walter Grandma nn, "Sin in
the New Testament, Sin, ibid., at pp. 68-70.
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In speaking of "sin," Jesus addressed his harshest remarks 
to those who liked to be recognised as "the righteous" in contrast 
to "the sinners.”3- Tbe self-righteous were "righteous" only in the 
sense of being compulsively devoted to the external religious code 
of the would-be theocratic nation. They were actually sinful be­
cause their spirit was opposed to the Spirit of God.2 They went 
so far in their opposition to the good work of Jesus— his bringing 
of health and wholeness— that they accused him of being the instru­
ment of the Devil. This confusing of goodness with badness was the 
extreme of obscurantist opposition not simply to the agent of the 
goodness, but, said Jesus, to God himself.
Jesus saw the worst offenses as (l) leading others astray;3
(2) self-congratulating, play-acting, hypocritical, formalistic, 
hence obscurantist, "righteousness";^ and (3) actual— if not 
conscious— blasphemy against the presence of God in our midst: the
failure to expect Him, to recognixe the good as it actually does
overcome the evil.5
-For example, Matthew 23. Cf. discussion in Richardson, 
op. cit., p. 228.
^For example, Mark 3t20-30.
^Matthew l8;7ff., Luke 17llff.
^Matthew l6?3ff., Matthew 23, Luke lls^U.
5nark 3:28-30, Matthew 12:31-32, Luke 12:10. Cf. discussion 
in Robert Mackintosh, Christianity and Sin (Hew York, Scribner, 191*0, 
p. 72 (after Canon E. R. Bernard", Sin, * in A Dictionary of the 
Bible— see Bibliography, infra).
1*3
Although Jesus did not formulate an elaborate doctrine of sin, 
his mission seemed to focus on removing its power. ''I came not to 
call the righteous but sinners to repentance.1,1 'The Son of Man came 
to seek and to save the lost.”2 His battle was not only against 
culpable wrongness, but also against Illness of body and mind, and 
against the despair in death.3
In the parable of the Forgiving Father, whose elder son
failed to share the Father's compassion for the "prodigal son,
Jesus treated of theology proper as well as hamartiology and soter- 
iology. + God— the God whom he served and represented— is like a 
loving Father toward the very elements in society whom the "elder 
brother1 status elements condemn out of hand. No one and no atti­
tude represent God truly unless they actually rejoice at the prodi­
gal's return; indeed, unless they actually go out to meet him. The 
context of the parable, with the stories of the lost sheep and the 
loet coin, seems to says the truly "righteous"— or Godly— goes out 
to try to find the erring one, the straying sheep, the lost some­
thing of value. The truly ’’righteous" tries to restore the "unright­
eous" to harmony and meaningful existence.
In the parable of the sheep and the goats, or "3he Last
Judgment," Jesus teaches that the truly justified way cf living is
l*fatthev 9j13. 2Luke 19s10.
3Traditionslly, the distinction is between sin as guilt and 
the power of sin (and evil).
^Luke 15:11-32.
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to accept "the least of these wy brethren"— the least "like a»" (?) 
of humanity. 1 Both groups are surprised in this scene of krlsis, 
of judgment— as separation of the good from the bad, of the vorthful 
from the worthless I The "blessed" have not been conscious that they 
have followed the way that leads to life and worth as contrasted to 
death and waste. "When saw we Thee?" Inasmuch as they accepted 
their neighbor (including the stranger) in his need they accepted 
the Christ• The "cursed" are equally surprised. They have not 
been conscious of following the path away from life and meaning as 
they rejected and ignored their neighbor (including the non-status 
elements, and the stranger) in hie need! In rejecting or refusing 
to accept the least like the "son of man on his glorious throne"—  
the essential humanity, the Christ— they have rejected Him and life 
itselfi Men and nations— groups of men, collective man— are judged, 
separated (i), by their acts of choosing, even when they may be un­
aware of the implications of their attention and "selective inatten­
tion." 2
The God whom Jesus proclaimed and demonstrated is agape- 
istic! Jesus approved and infused new meaning into the ancient sum­
mary of the Torah: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy
being and thy neighbor as thyself.3 The Fourth Gospel depicts him
-^ Matthew 25:31-^6* See the discussion by T. W. Manson in 
Major, Manson, and Wright, The Mission and Message of Jesus (New 
York, Dutton), pp. 5^0-5^•
%arry Stack Sullivan’s phrase. See Infra, Part Two.
^Matthew 22:37-39*
as giving a new cossnandment s "Love one another as I have loved 
you, he said to his disciples shortly before he was taken captive 
by his enemies. 1 He washed his disciples' feet.2 He served them. 
Greater love has no man than this: that he lay down his life for
his friend!
Quite clearly therefore Jesus' teaching about sin stressed 
the wrongness in refusing or falling to accept others in their need 
and to serve them. His view of "others" and of "need" was profound 
beyond all subsequent attempts to triviallse it* It is as he said, 
according to the Fourth Gospel, "The words that I speak to you; they 
are spirit and they are life."3 His impact on our problem of man- 
in-his-existence-and-in-society is spiritual in its genius and in 
its power. Bie neighbor's need is for sustenance in realising his 
essential humanity.
Jesus Invited persons to seek the Kingdom of God and His 
righteousness.^ By inference then, not to seek it is to lose out 
on the meaning of life.
The stories of his own temptation disclose Jesus' triumph 
in his own personal battle with the anxieties that form the tempta­
tion to offend against the essential humanity In one's self, in 
neighbor, in society, to offend against God. Jesus refused these 
three responses to anxiety:




(1) To live by bread alone. Ike neighbor is not simply 
Ban in his economic need.
(2) To fall down and worship the power of evil, the sin­
ister destructive forces that affect and inform our existence, 
whose ’Justification” seems only power as power though corrupt.
The neighbor is not simply man in his need to get along, to have 
power in adjustment with the powers that be.
(3) To put God to the test, by leaping off the pinnacle of 
the temple, trusting God's angels to bear him up. Ike neighbor is 
not simply man in his need for security, desiring a magic susten­
ance in all his undertakings, demanding supernatural verification: 
"sight" Instead of "faith" . 1
Paul expanded the Synoptic view of sin, perhaps without 
materially changing it. 2 To him hamartia is an active force, often 
personified, as a rival power holding man in its sway, trying to 
keep him from the salvation offered by God in Christ. It is a dy­
namic, dictatorial regime under which all men are enslaved. It is 
the elan behind man's alienation from God his Creator. Paul spoke 
of Adam's sin in the garden of Eden as the original sin for the 
whole race of mankind. Sin reigned from Adam to Moses.3 With his
1Matthew Vil-11, Luke ^:1-13- The allusion in our last 
statement is to II Corinthians 5:7.
2Sin is viewed both formally and materially. Paul's major 
contribution to hamartlology seems to be in his analysis of the 
sinister power of evil.
^Romans 5:12-21.
Judaistic orientation Paul taught that sin had taken on a special 
character since the time of Moses and the giving of the lav. Any 
breach in the harmony of life prescribed in the decalogue is recog­
nised as sin. !Hie law therefore is a device not for creating sin 
but for detecting it. By the lav is the knowledge of sin.1 Paul 
goes beyond the Pharisaism of his times vhen he denies that right­
eousness by legal observance is even possible. Like Jesus,2 the 
Apostle understood the interior character of sin. It could actually 
motivate its assumed opposite: legalistic perfectionism.3
The salvation desired and offered is deliverance from the 
dominion of this sinister, pervasive, enslaving power: hamartia—
sin and death. The Synoptics depict Jesus as proclaiming the good 
news of the reign of God and urging men to have metanoia— a change 
of heart, a change of direction— and to accept the forgiveness 
offered by God.^ Paul casts the theme in the theological perspec­
tive of God-in-Christ. He can go so far as to describe himself in 
his erstwhile self-righteousness as the chief of sinners.^
The Synoptics speak of the death of Jesus as being for the 
remission of sins and for the ransom of s i n n e r s I n  both the more 
explicit theology and the implicit teaching of the Synoptics, as
^Romans 3*20; 7:13- 2Mark 7*1-13-
^Romans 3*27-31# Chapter 4, and I Corinthians 13:1-3*
**Mark 1:14-15. 5i Timothy 1:15.




Professor Donald Baillie reminds us: Jesus1 life was integrated
with his death in a redemptive mission. He lived for sinners. He 
died for sinners.1 Ihere was no change in character in Jesus1 man­
ner of dying. It is simply the consequence of his manner of living. 
Paul says that God was in Christ— living, dying, rising from the 
dead— reconciling the world unto himself . 2
In Romans, Paul describes the two realms: sin and right­
eousness, identifying the latter with Christ, and with being en 
Christo.3 Christ, whose realm is righteousness, liberates man, who 
is in bondage to sin. The man who is liberated shares Christ’s 
death as though it were his own death to sin when he by baptisis is 
identified with Christ.^ The result is a redirection of desire.
The dynamic of sin for Paul, as for John and James, is in the emo­
tions, when sin is seen in the subjective dimension. Underlying
•^ Donald M. Baillie, God Wac In Christ, 'An Essay on Incar­
nation and Atonement" (Hew York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 19^6), 
p. 183.
2II Corinthians 5:19* See Baillie, Ibid., p. 201ff.
^Romans 16:7; II Corinthians 5:17*
Cf.: James S. Stewart, A Man in Christ (London, Hodder &
Stoughton, 1935)j Albert Schweitser, The Mysticism of Paul the 
Apostle (London, Black, 1931), PP* 20^-226: Paul’sT^en £hriBto1
is like Jesus' ’Kingdom cf God,' p. 223 and PP« 376-39^* Rudolf 
Bultmann construes the phrase to refer to being in the "body of 
believers, the "body of Christ.'' We see it as primarily an eschata- 
logical formula."— Rudolf Bultmann, The Theology of the Hew Testa­
ment, Volume One, trass. Kendrick Grobe 1 ( London,"1§CM Pretie, I9J2), 
p. 311; also Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in Its ConteKporary 




hamartia is epithumla, translated lust or desire. Epithuaia has a 
broad meaning which includes the kind of self-assertiveness against 
God which classical theology has seen in the Fall. 1
Although Paul describes sin as a state into which nan is 
born and as an Independent force which enslaves him, he does not 
lose eight of human freedom. Yet such freedom seems to be possible 
only for the liberated, the Christian, man, as Luther later ex­
pounds it.2 The person who is free from the bondage of sin is he 
who has accepted the grace of justification offered by God in 
Christ.
The apostle teaches that sin and its temptation persist 
even in the life of the Christian. He speaks of the "old man" or 
"old nature, 1 the Adamic nature— or "old Adam, and describes the 
ongoing struggle between the two laws within man: sin versus right­
eousness} the law of the flesh (the mortal man) and the law of the 
spirit.^ it is possible to ain against the community, the ideal of 
coEttunity— the body of Christ, other Christians, and Christ himself.
*Cf. Galatians 5?IT* It "must be understood in a compara­
tive sense as the mania for self-assertion over against the claim 
of God, which bursts into flame when challenged by the commandment." 
Grundmann in Bible Key Words, p. 79. Loosely, eplthumia is libido 
in depth psychology. Freud never broke clear from iiantifying 
psychic life" energy with sensual, sexual desire.
Jung has given libido a less reductlonistic meaning. See, 
for instance, Jung, "Freud and Jung— Contrasts," in Modern Man in 
Search of a Soul (Harvest Books edition), pp. 120-122.
^Infra, Chapter 2. 3Romans 7?7-25-
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Sin, as In the Old Testament, is primarily against God, the creator 
and source of life and of righteousness* As in the Old Testament, 
sin is a breach of coearanlty. It is against others in that it mis­
represents essential humanity before God.
Paul cannot speak of sin apart from death* Death too is 
depicted as a power which enslaves man and robs him of the meaning 
which is possible for his life* Death is the crowning evil, the 
end result of the lav of sin. It is described as the consequence 
of the disobedience by Adam and Eve in the garden* The "law of sin 
and death” is defeated only by Christ and his resurrection* In 
Adam all die. In Christ shall all be made alive*1
In the Epistle to the Hebrews the prevailing idiom differs 
from that of Paul* We find ourselves in the world of the Old Test­
ament priestly ritual, yet with a compelling re interpretation. Our 
guide seems to be steeped in Hellenistic culture. "Sins” are acts 
of wrongdoing. But the underlying idea of sin is that it is run­
ning counter to the will of God as it is revealed in Christ. The 
unforgivable sin is to refuse forgiveness, to reject God's mercy—  
indeed, his specific implementation of that mercy in the priestly 
and sacrificial work of Christ— and the free way of life which it 
opens for the individual* The unpardonable sin is to spurn 1 the 
Son of God." 2 This strong metaphor is used for the attitude which 
turns indifferent to the good news of justification by the grace of 
God in Christ. Sin is self-justification, or else, indifference to
*•1 Corinthians 15:22. ^Hebrews 10:29*
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justification. Eternal death is the price one oust pay who rejects 
the gospel after he has once received it. Hebrews more than implies 
that one may fall from this grace of Justification. "It is a fearful 
thing to fall into the hands of the living God."1
The Epistle of James, which has often been contrasted with 
the writings of Paul, which Luther called "an epistle of straw," 
speaks of sin in dynamic terms. Psychologically the root of sin is 
epithumla (desire), even as it is for Paul's discussion of the sub­
jective dimension of hamartia. James' treatmert is pragmatic and 
not so theological as Paul's, however, The writer sees the fol­
lowing progression: desire, then sin, then death. 2
Both First Peter and the Johannine writings stress sin as 
the negation of love. It is all but identified with hatred, but 
hatred as rejection. Sin is the rejection of the love of God and 
is manifest in the failure to love others! This hateful offence 
against God can be overcome only by His love as forgiveness. But 
to receive justification, the sinner must be born anew, so to speak. 
He must have a change of heart so that he can receive God's love.
In the Johannlne literature the symbol of light3 is dominant, along 
with life and love. Faith is a response to the Light of Life, the 
love, grace, and truth in Christ.
-^Hebrews 10:31.
2James 1:15. Epithumla, In James, "corresponds exactly to 
the £r*bbinicalj evil inclination,' says Grundmann, op. cit.. p. 85.
^Cf. Edgar P. Dickie, God Is Light (London, Hodder and 
Stoughton, 195*0.
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The Fourth Gospel uses, along with hamartia, anomia and 
adikia to denote the attitude and behavior vhich run counter to 
the lav or commandments of God. Sin is lavlessness and unright­
eousness. Man is in a state of darkness, of condemnation, a state 
of sin, thus separated by his very wont from God. Jesus said to 
the self-righteous leaders of the nation, who boasted in being de­
scended from Abraham I "You are of your father the devil. "3- Only 
those vho receive Jesus Christ are allowed to become the children 
of God. 2 The sin described is a deep-seated emotional force. To 
receive Christ is to receive the pover, or active right, to become 
the children of God. "You do vhat your father didJ'3
God1 s coming to man in Christ— Ho Logos, the word of God 
in personal expression— is the invasion of darkness by light, 
giving opportunity to those condemned already to accept a new na­
ture. The Judgment of sin is the krisisx the separation of light 
from darkness. "They are condemned already"; that is, they vho sit 
in darkness are in darkness already. If they choose the light they 
are saved from the darkness. If they love darkness rather than 
light and choose to sit in darkness still, they Judge themselves. 
They choose not to be caught up into the nev aeon vhich the light 
brings
If a man rejects this proffered salvation he simply remains 
in his sin and dies in his sin.5 Rejecting the grace of God is the
-^ohn 8:W*. 2John 1:12; John 8i39ff. 3j0hn Qtkl.
^John 3:19. 5John 8:2^; John 3:18b.
sin unto death. 1 Christ opens a way out of darkness. The sin unto 
death is refusing to use the exit, which is the entrance to life.
All unrighteousness Is hajsartia.^  However, not all hamartla 
Is unto death •' A momentary lapse Into the ways of darkness need not 
mean the rejection of the Light and of the salvation which it gives.
He who acknowledges his guilt is forgiven. Sin is Bade 
worse If it is denied.^ 5 Indeed, the Johannine writings, by their 
use of the darkness-light motif and their insistence on honest con­
fession suggest that sin is essentially obscurantist choosing against 
the light, against the grace, against the way of life. Darkness, 
self-defeating misery, rideath," are by choice where the Light has 
come. Indeed there is an obseurantlsa unto death. Death is the 
opposite of the reality which the believer sees in the Light, in 
the Christ.
In the Apocalypse we see the dramatic conflict of sin 
against righteousness. Ihe latter gains the complete victory in 
the end. Wiis is a deeply joyful affirmation in the midst of suf­
fering. Sin, by the individual and by the group, is rejecting God 
as he is revealed in Christ. The choice is depicted as being a 
clear-cut either/or. One can reject the revelation of God in Christ 
by adulterating it with the idolatry of the culture which it con­
fronts. Rejection can take the form of simply being indifferent
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XI John 5:l6ff. 2I John 5:17- 
hf. I John 1:5-10, 2il-lk.
or undecided, lukewarm, toward the nev reality which has broken into 
the world of human affairs, 1 Sin is essentially rejection of Christ 
as King, rejection of his Kingdom, which is the only, authentic 
telos of human effort and history. The elements of life which are 
not caught up into this realm will be destroyed as waste.
The Kingdom of God may appear to be weak. But it is the 
only lasting reality.
It seems almost a travesty to try to thread all of these 
3trands together regarding the nature of sin as it is troated by 
the various schools of thought in the New Testament. We note dif­
fering emphases, but little if any contradiction. Nowadays, in the 
light of depth psychology and under the mandate to deal with our 
problems with as lucid a terminology as possible, perhaps we should 
subdivide the conception— or category— of sin as we find it espe­
cially in Paul and the Johannine theology. Instead of denoting by 
our term sin all of the phenomena which they could subsume under 
haaartla, perhaps we can serve better the cause of truth and clarity 
by using two categories; sin and evil! Evil is the larger, inclusive 
category, which they call darkness and the way of death, which Paul 
treats as an independent force, a demonic counter-force to the 
saving, loving, grace of God. Evil is the tragic element in our 




is culpable: the culpable, accountable, relatively free, choosing
of despair against the hope offered by the grace of God. 1
Sin is eminently a religious category. It is offense 
against that which alone is worthy of the devotion of human beings. 
It is settling for same anxiety short of concern for the Kingdom of 
God. It is failure to love God with one's whole being and to love 
one's neighbor as oneself. Since Christ is the fulfillment of the 
law— the Torah— sin is failure to accept him, his way, his ethos, 
his grace•
In the Pauline writings the sin seems to be, for man as he 
confronts the new reality which Christ represents; refusing to 
leave in spirit the old Adam— the old way of thinking and planning, 
in order to partake of the new, to be in Christ rather than in Adam. 
Yet the thrust of Paul's writings seems to be toward community in
Compare with such an inatrumentalistic" argument for our 
own contemporary use of the term sin the following conclusion as 
to the doctrine of sin in the Bible, in the book by Quell, Bertram, 
Grundmann, and Stahiiii:
(i) Sin is as fundamental a characteristic of this world 
as the fact that it has been created; (li) sin is man's rebellious 
self-assertion over against the claim of God, not only on the part 
of certain Promethean individuals, but universally, as an essential 
of all human existence; and (iii) the whole meaning of redemption 
Is concentrated in the forgiveness of sins. This is what distin­
guishes Christianity from Hellenism and from Judaism. To under­
stand this is to understand the fact of Christ." Bible Key Words, 
III, p. 87. Italics, ours.
Our own contention is that if we are ever to get at the 
problem instrumentalistlcally ve must make a clear distinction 
logically between accountability and over-all evil— or "the 
demonic. Contrary to the frequent objection, however, such a 
distinction by no means requires a surrender of the larger cate­
gory: it merely insists upon careful distinctions within it.
Christ, rather than private, insulated, piety— or simply sainthood in 
isolation from the community. The meaning of life is not to he seen 
in the ancient saga of Eden and the Fall hut in the recent account 
of Jesus of Nasareth and the Resurrection. The meaning is not to
he discerned so asuch in the Torah— the Law of Moses— as in the
righteousness of God revealed in Jesus Christ.
Yet, at the same time, the man in Christ, though a new crea­
ture, with old things having passed away and all things having become 
new, 1 is nevertheless, in his existence, still the man in Adam.
The law in his members continues to do violence to the law of his 
spirit, but his faith is that he is forever delivered from the law
of sin and death in its telos. He is being saved. His is the telos
of God*s salvation en Christo.
Everyone is a sinner. The sinner ’’being saved” is still a 
sinner but one who sins only despite his new orientation. He desires 
to live in harmony with God and with his neighbors, a harmony which 
is beyond mere adjustment out of fear. It Is the harmony due to 
the agape of God being shed abroad throughout his psyche.^ He 
chooses the Kingdom, the grace, the justification of God.
Actually the New Testament conceptions of sin presuppose 
throughout the evangel, the gospel of salvation. In other words, 
the Christian conception of sin presupposes the Christian conception
1II Corinthians 5:17*
Admittedly we are taking great liberty with the phrase 
en tal8 kardlals hemon.” Romans 5*5-
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of .justification by grace! Hence, when we treat of the contempo­
rary expression of these conceptions we shall treat them together. 
Meanwhile we shall review the origins of the conception of justi­
fication in the Old and New Testaments.
Justification in the Old Testament
The term justification derives from the word for righteous­
ness. Righteousness is that positive, affirmative, harmony to which 
sin is the negation. Justification is not a prominent term in the 
Old Testament. However the idea is there. Psalm 51, for instance, 
expresses fervently the desire for justification. Here the desire 
for forgiveness, as in Psalm 130, for example, includes the yearn­
ing for restoration to whatever relationship has been breached and 
disrupted by the "sin.”
RlghteouBneGS, judgment, and justice are frequent renderings
of Hebrew words used to describe such harmony with the will of God.
Hebrew terms like Cl 3  Ul^J (mishpat), "judgment," p  “J ^ ( gedheq), p~7Sfj
justice," "to be right," to justify, 11 (fresedh), "mercy,"
V ® '*or what George Adam Smith called "leal love, " 1 and p' (frog),
'statute," likejrj1*^ ) (berith), "covenant, have both a theologi­
cal and a juristic use. It is not known what the relationship may 
have been originally between the two kinds of usage. Whatever the
l>Hosea and Mlcah come to mind especially. Cf. George Adam 
Smith, Ttta Book of the Twelve Prophets, new and revised edition,
2 vols. (dar&en CTty, New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1929).
■
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relationship, God is depicted as the Judge, as one who defines right* 
eousness by his very nature, and as the mind behind the events of 
nature and history. Hence a personal or national misfortune is 
often interpreted as an unfavorable verdict by God.-*-
Martin Luther's momentous rediscovery of the Pauline doc­
trine of “Justification by faith" has impressed on theology the 
importance of one of the many statements which support the Lutheran 
interpretation, the succinct summary text! "The just shall live 
by faith." Actually Paul was quoting Habakkuk 2;^ and rendering 
the meaning quite freely to express his theology.
Gottfried Quell expounds the saying in Habakkuk as meaning 
simply: Man escapes the death which his enemies have planned for
him, by maintaining an unflinching faithfulness to God’s command­
ment. 2 The Old Testament word for faith i s ^  (emunah),
T '* •which means steadfastness, fidelity." "Abram believed God and 
it was reckoned to him for righteousness."8 He depended on God.
He trusted Him. He committed himself to a way of life which relied 
on God.
The righteous man is the man who is appraised to be what 
he should be by the eternal and ultimate Judge of human value.
Justice" in the Old Testament is defined by this theology. Hence
*-Our discussion here follows rather closely the presenta­
tion in Gottfried Quell and Gottlob Schrenk, Righteousness, in 
Bible Key Words, IV (New York, Harper, 1951 )• Cf. Norman H. Snaith,
1 Just, Justify, Justification,’ in Richardson, ed., A Theological 
Wordbook of the Bible, pp. 118-119.
^Bible Key Words, TV, p. 7* 15 j6.
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righteousness in a person, as in a nation, Means Inner wholeness, 
health, harmony, the order which was believed to prevail throughout 
the universe— God s creation, thought presupposes God: He is the
beginning of all reflection. In the beginning Qod wes active. God 
crested. All that He created was V iH (Tov ), good. '’1 Kight- 
eouaness Is the integration of self which is at peace with God and 
with the cosmunity that demonstrates his will. Kight^ouaness neons 
rl.-ht rclatioo.
Hesedh. the Old Testament tern which lies behind the Hew 
Testament words for mercy and compassion, includes the idea of 
loyal love. It denotes the inner quality of the righteousness which 
the prophets emphasised, notably Hoaea, who appealed to a responding 
love in wayward Israel, who was like an erring wife, whose husband 
continued to forgive her and to seek to restore her to a right 
relationship.
The events of history were interpreted in a way which 
pointed up the meaning of righteousness as well as that of sin. 
Goodness was sanctioned by peace and prosperity. E il was bound to 
be somewhere in the life and attitude of the community whenever bad 
times prevailed or calamity befell the nation.
But we do have the paradox which la featured in the book of 
Job. Why do the righteous suffer? The dualism between God and his 
adversary— righteousness and evil as forces behind the scenes, 
dramatically depicted anthropomorphieally— is introduced. Thus
^Genesis It18.
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culpable wrongness and tragic evil seem to be distinguished. The 
book ends proclaiming the Justification of God, while underscoring 
the finitude of man. Job's suffering had not been because of his 
sin. However, in the midst of his suffering he had sinned, ihe 
tragic, non-culpable wrongness that had swept into his life occa­
sioned culpable wrongnes6. Ibis sin was not so much his ignorance 
as his wilful, too exclusive, reliance on his own inadequate knowl­
edge about the meaning of the plight of man in his existence under 
God. The story says that he should have recognized his inadequacy 
and foregone the agonizing censure which he directed against God.
The story of Job teaches that Justification, the act of 
being considered righteous, is not necessarily manifest in the life 
circumstances of a person or of a nation! In other words, death 
and the shocks that flesh is heir to, though they are often thought 
to be the effects of sin, are by no means to be regarded as the 
sure sign of unrighteousness. They may actually accompany right­
eousness. They are the lot of the Justified as well as the unjusti­
fied. Despite the lesson of Job however, there is, even in the 
epilogue, a disposition to reward righteousness by rescinding the 
sentence which seems so irreparable as the destiny of man according 
to the Genesis story of the Pall. There may be a tendency in the 
epilogue to undo a bit the profound doctrine that evil is one thing 
and ain is another with respect to material prosperity. Without 
sinning one may be the victim of tragic evil. The epilogue hints 
that without sinning one may be temporarily deprived but that his
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righteousness will win for him in time even the material prosperity. 
Yet the man Job died— at least we do not gather that his latter good 
fortune included a kind of return to Eden with access to the tree of 
life.
Both Job and the man of fidelity in Habakkuk oust have died, 
on this side of Eden. Uhe manifest dimensions of justification in 
the Old Testament are temporal and this-worldly, although not with­
out spiritual significance of a high order. Later, Christian 
constructions placed upon the conception a beyond-death signifi­
cance, which transcended the emphasis on achieving meaning via 
progeny, the perhaps dominant telos for the individual in patri­
archal Israel. 1 In the Christian era, the promises given men in 
the Old Testament are spiritualized and applied to eternal dimen­
sions. 2
The Old Testament as a whole is not greatly concerned with 
eschatology. Therefore the admonitory passages about death as the 
reward of the wicked should be read in a temporal sense. To live 
may mean, in addition to living on in one's progeny, to have honor 
and to have a "stay of execution before the inevitable "sleeping 
with the fathers." Death is as a sleep. Otoe wish of the righteous 
was for a peaceful sleep. Perhaps such a wish served often as a 
motive for devotion to the lav.
*Cf. "Familial immortality" as the hope of the Jewish 
people, according to Otto Bank, Psychology and the Soul, trans. 
by William D. Turner from Seelengiaube und Psychologic (Phlladel- 
phla, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950), p. TJ •
C^f. I Corinthians 151^ 2-50.
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To be righteous, to be justified in the eyes of God, meant to 
live in harmony with God and with the caMsunity which is beholden to 
him, as he revealed himself in event, in word, and in tradition.
In later Judaistic legalism the conceptions of sin and 
Justification became somewhat hardened. They were first given a 
spiritual twist. But then they were externalized. To be Justified, 
to be righteous, seemed to be an obsession with the pharisees of the 
New Testament period. Indeed, the very force of Paul*a corrective 
theology may be in part due to his own conditioned concern for 
justification. Luther’s reforming zeal was that of a monk and 
priest who centuries later came to the discovery after a similar 
conditioning in a time when the official religion had become quite 
exteraalistic in its conceptions of sin and justification.
No doubt every age has had a great many who have simply 
taken their justification for granted. In the Old Testament, as 
in later periods, we encounter the quest for justification in those 
men who for some reason have an urgent desire and need for forgive­
ness. They must make restitution; they feel compelled to undo their 
wrongs or the wrongs of society. For examples, vs think of David, 
after he had Uriah murdered in order to take Bathsheba, of Hezekiah 
after he witnessed the profanation of the temple, of the remnant of 
the Southern Kingdom, which finally returned from the Babylonian 
captivity to the ruins of Judah. These all sought justification 
in the sense of restitution and restoration to their former situa­
tion. They desired a return to a "righteousness" which they felt
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they had squandered or betrayed. To their minds 1 righteousness 
represented a situation of well-being and right relations. Never­
theless Justification by grace does not appear as a fully developed 
doctrine in the Old Testament. It is introduced to us as a specific 
conception in the New Testament, notably by the Apostle Paul.
Justification in the New Testament
The New Testament meant more by the term dikaios than did 
the Greek culture, from which it borrowed the word. For Greek 
writers it meant 'right, ''being in line with tradition, ” and at 
times "beautiful, 1 "good," "fitting," and "justice.
The Septuagint pictured ho dikaios, the righteous man," -
as one who obeys God in the theocratic community. 1 God himself is 
described as dikaios, also.
By the time Christianity burst upon the scene, Judaism had 
introduced teachings about rewards and punishments and drawn a 
legalistic boundary between "the righteous" and "the sinners," as 
we have noted earlier. The term dikaios was used to describe 
teachers and prophets. Hie synagogue loved the expression "Messiah 
our righteousness."2
Jesus soemea to recognise, at least for purposes of dis­
course, the traditional Jewish contrast between the righteous and
1Bible Kiev Words, IV, p. 16.
%f. Jeremiah 23:5# 6j 33*15; Zechariah 9:9\ Bible Ksy 
Words, IV, p. 17.
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sinners. But he emphasised love as the ultimate test of right­
eousness . 1
As we saw, during our discussion of Jesus' conception of 
sin, there are implicit criteria in the stories of his own tempta­
tion: in the wilderness, right after his baptism, and later in
Gethsemane, we should add, when he prayed for the cup of suffering 
and death to be taken away from him, yet conquered the wish with 
the prayer: "Not my will but Thine be done." 2 Jesus' conception
of justification, his doctrine" of meaning in life, of reconcilia­
tion, of salvation, is radically opposed to three kinds of reduc­
tion ism: (1) economic, (2) political, and (3) "religious." He was
opposed to economic reductlonism for an anthropology, to political 
relativism for an ethics, and to religious arrogance for a "philoso­
phy." Hence, we can say, Christianity in its genius is opposed to 
ideas of salvation (l) by bread alone— by mere economics or by 
materialistic melioration alonej (2) by uncritical adjustment 
(bowing down to worship "Satan") to "life as it is" - by opportun­
istic relativism; and (3) by faith in magic (putting God to the 
test, making of him a kind of great magician!)— by arrogant, super­
stitious presumption.3
*Cf. Luke lUjUj See Bible Key Words, ibid., pp. 22-23.
2Mark lU:36. ^Cf. supra, pp. ^2-^3•
Doubtless the stories of Jesus* temptations1 are In the New 
Testament literature to point up the contrast between the new order 
and the old, the "new Adam" and the fallen Adam. The "second Adam" 
was tempted even as was the first. But he refused a self-seeking, 
self-centered solution. Somehow he was strong enough to respond 
in a truly "righteous" manner to temptations which human nature 
seems incapable of resisting— at least without radical reorienta­
tion, like that which he himself taught, namely a pervasive concern 
for the Basileia ton Theou, the Kingdom of God. The temptations 
were all real: Jesus felt the pull of "bread alone” reasoning, of
submissiveness to the powers that be, of religious showmanship. In 
Gethsemane he was for a moment— or for alternating long moments—  
toying with the idea of avoiding, perhaps by escaping, the ordeal 
he knew was coming. He resisted the temptation by refusing to leave 
his chosen orientation. He continued to pray, to battle it out with 
the temptation— the anxiety, and to force himself again and again 
to the chosen goal of his ministry: "Thy will be done."
"Hot that my hunger should be satisfied, but that life 
should be given to men." This was Jesus' orientation. "Not that 
I should rule over the visible order of the world by submitting to 
its obvious sanctions, but that God-and-goodness alone should be 
served!" "Not that I should demonstrate that God Is with me, but 
that God's agape— love — should be revealed to those who do not feel 
that He is with them."
1If these are reports of actual happenings, they must be 
based on Jesus' own account of his ordeal.
65
66
Paul was overwhelmed by such a vision of righteousness, 
the dikaiosune tou Theou in Jesus Christ. He then reacted strongly 
to the Judalstlc tradition, which he himself had been representing 
with ardor. He began reiterating an almost forgotten note within 
the heritage of Judaism! ®vere is none righteous} no not one. " 1 
Yet he described the Christian way of life by the term righteous.g
Dikaiosune in Greek usage meant "justice in government" and, 
also, ’judgment." In the Septuagint and in the New Testament it 
often means simply "doing right in the sight of God." The Johannine 
literature stresses the definitive nature of Christ’s righteous life 
for the Christian conception of righteousness. Righteousness is a 
gift of the Kingdom of God.3
James, who is intent on refuting both legalism and quietism, 
stresses that righteousness is practical love and obedience to the 
will of God. His idea is far removed from the tendencies in 
Judaism to think of righteousness as earning merit by obsequious 
legal and ceremonial observance.^
As was indicated earlier, the doctrine of justification by 
grace through faith was given its fullest expression by Paul. His 
interest in the problem was fostered by his own knowledge of and 
former long adherence to the rabbinic tradition. Saul the pharisee 
had been accustomed to look for "a righteousness of the Law”—  
construed in terms of the careful observing of precepts. As we
^Romans 3:9-20. %f. Romans lOtl-U) 6:12-1^.
3schrenk, ibid., p. 37* ^Blble Key Words, ibid., pp. 38-UO.
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have noted, according to the Synoptics' and the Fourth Gospel’s 
portrait of Judaism, the official emphasis on righteousness was 
concerned with externals, outward show, rather than inward love. 
Jesus could call it whitewash for sepulchres.1
After his conversion from Jewish legalism Paul began using 
his keen dialectical powers to point out the satisfying change his 
new faith was making in hie accustomed mode of thinking. As 
Gottlob Schrenk says, Justification became the battle-cry of his 
mission because it expressed a new understanding of the relation 
of Christ to the Law. Paul uses the sacred word of Judaism—  
righteousness— in the service of his polemic against the Jewish 
conception of the Law.*'2
The Pauline reaction to Judaism is regarded in many ways 
as a recovery of the Old Testament prophets* emphasis on righteous­
ness as fresedh— an inner dynamic of loyalty and love which impelled 
a person toward the wholeness and harmony implied in the conception 
of "the righteousness of God.” But Paul dealt more directly with 
the Old Testament idea of God as Judge, demanding obedience and 
rewarding it while punishing disobedience.
In Paul the rabbinical idea persists that only "the right­
eous" can have fellowship with God. But Paul departs from rabbini­
cal orthodoxy when he says that therefore no one is actually eligi­
ble for such fellowship. Ho one can achieve righteousness on the 
basis of his own merit. Only God's grace, taking action through
1Matthew 23s27. 2Bible Key Words, ibid., p. hi.
6$
Christ, can bring about the desired relationship. righteous­
ness by faith in Christ includes both justice and mercy. The 
Hsbrev understanding of mlsbpat, •;edhaq, and fresedh are all impli­
cit in the Fauline conception of justification.
The solution to the problem of sin which Paul construed as 
(l) guilt, (2) the power (3) death, is justification
by grace, the grace of God in Christ I All gen ore in a state of 
rebellion against God, Even the cosmos reflectc this state of 
affairs.* Likewise the righteousness of God is to be seer, in a 
universal setting. Stqu as the state of sin began with an act and 
continues as a dynamic force in man's very nature, so the righteous­
ness which confronts It is primarily an set of God in Christ, a 
dynamic which affects the entire human race. It is a dynamic as 
active as "the wrath of God” and the sinister result of sin, namely, 
death.g The saving act of righteousness as it did battle with sin 
and von the victory once and for all was hi luster ion— propitiation, 
restitution!— identified by place and time at the arose of Christ,
Romans 8119-22. Cf. Allan D. Galloway's brilliant study,
The Cosmic Christ (Hew York, Harper, 1951)*
^Viewing Homans as a development of the theme announced in 
Is 17, rendered He who through faith is righteous shall live," Anders 
Hygren sees the liberation as (a) from the wrath of God 
(Romans 5 s 1*21); (b) from sin— through baptism to serve righteous­
ness (6sl-23); (c) from the Law (7sl-25)| and (d) from Death 
(8i 1-39)— Part Two, of Cocanept&ry on Remans, trans. Carl C.
Ra&*suas*n (Philadelphia, Muhlenberg Press, 19^9)# PP* 187-3^9• Cf. 
,#V*hen the faithfulness of God encounters the fidelity of men, there 
Is manifested Hla righteousness. There shall the righteous man 
live. This is the theme of the Splatle to the F.omans. Karl Barth, 
The Epistle to the Bogans, trans. by Edvyn C. Hoskyns (London,
Oxford tf, jPress7’T 9 S l), p. b2.
where the way of the Lav hat met Its logical end.1 Always, In Paul, 
God Is the source of righteousness. It is defined in terns of Him.
At tines, it is true, Paul speaks of righteousness in a 
juristic, forensic sense, as though it is the innocence which is 
declared by a Judge who finds the defendant not guilty. But this 
very figure, though it snacks of legalisn, serves to point up the 
radical nature of the dikaiosune tou Theou, since it suggests that 
its effect is to accept as innocent one who is not righteous in and 
of himself. Hence, there can be no room for arrogant self­
righteousness even on the part of the man who tries to live by 
faith. He depends on a righteousness which is not his but God's.
By Justification Paul means forgiveness, reconciliation, 
and the very character— as righteousness— of God in action. Justi­
fication is a continual conmmlcatlon of the very substance of 
eternal life to man, not however as an infused grace hardly dis­
tinguishable from man's own energies.2
^ible ttey Words, IV, p. U3. Cf. Romans 3*21, 25, 26;
5*9ff«# II Corinthians 5*18; Galatians 3*13-
“The so-called dialectical or crisis theology is probably 
right in insisting that the very life of the Christian ’conception" 
goes out of it when the grace is conceived as resolving the dia­
lectic, the "God-over-against-man-ness." Here is the ancient 
problem of nature and grace. If the two are identified, the 
dialectic— with its creativeness (?)— is lost. Yet even in this 
view there is an essential humanism» According to Karl Barth,
"The humanity of Jesus is the image of God. We cannot, however,
find God's image in other men as it is in Him."— David Calms,
The Image of God in Man (New York, Philosophical Library, 1953), 
p. ltS, where he is discussing Barth's Dogmatlk, III, 2.
Cf. Paul L. Lehmann's critical study of Rltchllan theology
in the light of the early writings of Karl Barth, Forgiveness t
All men die. Death seems a denial of the ultimacy of Justi­
fication. Therefore Justification can be accepted as such only by 
faith, by depending on God to affirm it beyond the apparent negation 
implied by death. "The wages of sin is death," says Paul, "but the 
gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord."*-
Yet Paul does not slaply declare and elaborate a doctrine 
of Justification and teach that it should be assumed in spite of 
contradictions. He himself believed it to be a dynamic force which 
fights against the sinister evil which he has described as sin.
Even as sin works within man, so Justification works within him 
giving him access to the tree of life, to the "fruits of righteous­
ness " even on this side of death. Faith is not simply s hopeful 
assumption, a kind of hopefulness about life. It is part and parcel 
with the grace of Justification, "the means whereby the individual 
is drawn into participation in the consequences of the saving event, 
says Schrenk. 2
To be Justified means to become forthwith a member of "the 
Body of Christ." Justification by faith is itself dynamic, although 
it Is not conceived as being a special psychic force. It is the 
determination of the whole personality to rely upon God's saving
Decisive Issue in Protestant bought (Hew York, Harper, 19^0). 
duilt is the tension Wtween man's disobedience and hie responsi­
bility in the face of the divine command (p. 150). But with the 
command cooes the forgiveness, the grace, which is the affirmation 
of the possibility an Christo; 'no excuses can be accepted"
(pp. 151ff.).
^Romans 6:23. %chrenk, in Bible Key Words, IV, p. k7.
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aet In Christ. But this determination is movement, not a listless, 
passive surrender. Rightly understood, there seems to be no con­
tradiction between Paul and James: Justification by faith is no
excuse for idleness; it is actually a new dynamic for meaningful 
activity.
The term dikaioo1 and the family of terms based on dikaios—  
including dikaiosune, dikaioaa, and dikaios is— belong first to the 
language of salvation and only subsequently to that of ethics, in 
the New Testament, especially in the mind of Paxil. Yet he seemed 
to take for granted the rabbinic idea of the Last Judgment accord­
ing to deeds (works) and saw no contradiction between it and Justi­
fication by the pure mercy of God.2
Although they belong first to soterlology In the logic of 
the New Testament the dikaios family of words is used to describe 
the ethics of life. In this connection it is important to remember 
that righteousness is, first and always, a dynamic concept. It does 
not denote quietism at any stage. It is teleologleal, leading to 
the royal domain of grace, whose law is agape— love and acceptance, 
and to eternal life, the life of the new aeon, the new reality, the 
new creation.3 Dikaiosune means "both the righteousness which
*A* in Romans 5*16, for example.
^Romans 3*19-20) 5*18-19) 8:33) II Corinthians 5*10, 15) 
Galatians 2:16. Schrenk, Bible Key Words, IV, p. 6k. Also, ibid., 
p. 17.
^The new aeon" or "new age" is in contrast to "this present 
age” or aeon. Cf. I John 2:17: "Ho kosmos paragetai . . . .  ho de
poiou to thelema tou Theou menei els ton aiona.
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acquits the a Inner and the life-force which breaks the bondage 
of sin." 1
Righteousness is the law of the universe to which everyone 
must be subject on pain of "death." It Is the completely objective 
norm which exercises the authority of life and death over a man.
It Is not a part of his own endowment, at least not since the evic­
tion from Eden. Hence the euangelion Is good newB of reconcillation 
through faith in Christ to the authority under which man has been 
suffering the penalty of death. In Paul’s doctrine therefore right­
eousness is depleted as the power of new life.
As Schrenk points out, Paul’s idea of justification is 
closely related to his en Christo terminology.'* Paul's "mysticism" 
continues to be a matter of debate. We nay interpret his idiom 
"in Christ" as a figurative way of expressing the state of Justi­
fication. Otherwise we find two different theologies in Paul. It 
may well be that the mystical terminology is used by way of illus­
tration and must not be pressed to its-logical conclusion any more 
than his law-court terminology. 3 The conception of justification
1md., p. 52. 2Ibid., p. 51.
3ibid., p. 52; Cf. Albert Schweitzer, in The Hystlcism
of Paul the Apostle, where he says that in Paul there are two inde­
pendent conceptions of the forgiveness of sins: "According to the
one, God forgives in consequence of the atoning death of Jesus; 
according to the other, He forgives because through the dying and 
rising again with Christ He has caused the flesh and sin to be 
abolished together, so that those who have died and risen with 
Christ are, in the eyes of God, sinless beings. The former of 
these doctrines is traditional, the latter is peculiar to Paul, 
and is a consequence of the mystical being-in-Chrlst" (p. 223).
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cannot "be separated fro® "the Spirit" terminology, as we see it, 
for example, in I Corinthians 6:8 and Romans 8.
Schrenk lists Paul's different uses of the term dikaloun—  
"to justify": (l) forensic, as in Romans 8:33-3^* where its
opposite is katakrinein~nto condemn"; (2) experiential, as in 
Romans 5si* 2 and 12:1, 2; (3) eschatologieal, as in Romans 8; and 
[k) redemptive, especially when the preposition apo is used with 
the verb dikaiothenai: justification is deliverance from the power
and consequences of sin.^
This fourth use is seen for example in Romans 6:7, where 
Paul says, "He that is dead is justified from sin." The same idea 
is strikingly presented in Acts 13:38* 39* where in the synagogue 
at Antioch, Pisidia, Paul says, "Be it known unto you therefore, 
men and brethren, that through this man Qjesusj is preached unto 
you the forgiveness of sins; and by him all that believe are justi­
fied from all things, from which ye could not be justified by the 
law of Moses. " 2
In this sermon Paul was linking justification with Christ's 
resurrection. It is an act once and for all. It is the meaning of 
the resurrection. Dikaiosls, which is used only twice in the New 
Testament, both times in relation to the resurrection, is God's
^Schrenk, Bible Key Words, IV, pp. 61-65 • 
following the argument of Schrenk, ibid.
f
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absolving Judgment. It brings life out of death and thus affects 
the whole of man's existence. 1
Paul characteristically makes Justification correlative with 
life. 2 Hence it seems legitimate to read him as teaching that Justi­
fication is the giving of meaning to existence. Its telos is life
rather than death. Justification is the Christian answer to the
vquestion of meaning for personal existence, vis-a-vis suffering 
and death.
Sin and Justification in Christian Scriptures
As we have seen, the conception of sin presupposes the fact 
of Justification. Justification is the dynamic act of God as he 
comes to sinful man in the person and work of Jesus Christ. Its 
meaning is demonstrated by the Resurrection, which is the reversal 
of the implications of death. Though objective to human nature, this 
dynamic can become the basis of man's existence and thus free him 
from ’’the law of sin and death.” However such Justification, as
Romans 4:25 and 5sl8. Cf. Schrenk, ibid., p. 71.
^Romans 5sl7-21j 6|4j 8:2, 6, 10. Cf. Schrenk, ibid., 
p. 73• A general review of Paul's usage shows that the formula, 
the righteousness of God,” carries with it the conviction that 
at the very moment of Justification the believer is admitted into 
the status of righteousness in the new life: Justification is the
means whereby he is brought under the creative power of the right­
eousness of God.” Such a theology is consistent with the "funda- 
xnental discontinuity between God and man' by our understanding 
the new reality in a "faturiatic indicative" mood: "Man is not
yet what he is" (Paul L. Lehmann, Forgiveness, pp. 133> 140, I4lff.). 
The possibility is only in Christ. The Christian man lives in a 
kind of eternal future,^accoraing to Paul's theology (expounded in 
the so-called ”Barthian" manner).
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deliverance, is by faith alone. Neither the actual ’’first fruits” 
nor the hope of complete redemption as confirmed in the Resurrec­
tion are produced by human effort or good works. Self-justification 
is no Justification at all. Ve see this in Jesus' approach to the 
pharisees, for instance. Both the Johannine and Pauline writings 
are quite explicit about the Inadequacy of self-Justification.
Yet the van who ia through faith Justified gives himself to the 
cause of righteousness. Hiis is the cause of Christ, of self-giving 
agape, love^ and dedication to the wholeness and harmony of the 
Kingdom of God.^
C^f. the systematic treatment of agape: Anders Wygran, Agape
and Eros, two volumes (London, S. P. C. K., 1932-1939). Riough his 
cfiGtinetions between agape and eros seem to be too categorical and 
over-drawn, Bishop Nygren’has helped establish the term agape as 
symbol for the love which Paul eulogises in I Corinthians ±5. It is 
the love of God revealed in Christ. Cf• Hygren, Cn—IIM>ntary on 
Romans, p. 199*
^ See also the brief but representative comments on the agape-
eros issue in David Cairns, The Image of God in Man, p. 17*4-.
Professor Weis Ferre, now of Andover-Wevton Seminary, insists 
that agape is also the norm, not simply the motif, of essential 
Christianity. Although Ferre’s writings have not been a source for 
our present study, his name is frequently associated with the recent 
emphasis on agape, especially in the wake of Wygren's studies.
See Gottfried Quell and Ethelbert Stauffer, Love, Bible Ke*
I# notably in this commentary cm the story of the Good 
Samaritan: "Jesus destroyed the whole centripetal grading system,
in which the centre was «I», but retained the idea of the neighbor 
as organizing principle and founded a new system, in which the 
centre was 1 Thou.f ” This is not a mechanical system. Hie neighbor- 
concem is with need: whooo-ever and wheneveri (p. Vf).
 ^f^ e Kingdom of God’ which has been so important a symbol 
in Rltchlian and liberal theology may have fallen into comparative 
f disuse in the woke of the telling criticisms of liberalism by the
Justification cannot be attained by human effort. It can 
only be accepted. Yet it can be defined as God's acceptance of his 
estranged creature. The writer of Ephesians begins with a doxology 
which extols the grace of God that makes us "accepted in the 
beloved." Man's justification by God is described as God's accept* 
ance of him into the relationship of Jesus Christ and God.
Justification is forgiveness and acceptance as they are 
depicted in Jesus' encounter with the "sinners"— "publicans and 
harlots." By being accepted the sinner gains a sense of security: 
his feet are set upon a rock; his way is established. He can relax 
from his former futile strivings, which Paul describes as strivings 
governed by the law of sin and death. Now the justified man can 
live as one who is being made whole. He does not wait passively 
for his salvation to be completed. The man who is justified by 
grace through faith can live by imaginative steadfastness.
Sin, as described in the New Testament, is both a universal 
condition and an active, volitional rejection of the will— and the 
proffered grace— of God. Men are in darkness and the valley of the 
shadow of death. But they may love darkness rather than light 
because they identify their worth with their wrongness. Ihe Light
protest of so-called neo-orthodoxy. However, it is interesting to 
note that Professor Tillich uses it as the symbol in the final part 
of his system: "The Problem of History and The Kingdom of God,"
which is to be Part V in his projected Systematic Theology, of which 
three parts have been published, in two volumes, to date. In any 
case, the symbol continues to have considerable life in it. Both 
agape" and "the Kingdom of God" will have prominent use in our 
exposition and conclusions.
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shines in the darkness, and the darkness Is revealed as darkness; 
the wrongness, as wrongness. Sin is seen to be sin by Its encounter 
with God's righteousness. Adam confronts Christ. If nan rejects 
the Son-of-God— Son-of-Man he confirns himself in his sin. On the 
other hand, if he receives Christ in the sense of accepting Christ's 
acceptance of him, he is brought out of darkness into light; he is 
saved fron his sin.
Justification affects both the condition of tragic evil and 
that wrongness which we describe as accountable or culpable, result­
ing from freedom of choice. 1 Justification is imputed. It is not 
acquired. It is given. Yet it can be accepted or rejected. Kan 
cannot justify himself; yet he can refuse to be justified. He can 
reject God's free gift. Hence the essence of sinfulness as culpable 
vrongness is the rejection of the grace of God!
The New Testament does not offer us besides Jesus a perfect 
example of "the righteousness of God." Paul himself does not seem 
to be completely free from "the lav of sin and death” nor from the 
subtle intrusions of self-justifying tendencies. It is in a con­
text which warrants this latter observation that we come upon one 
of his most eloquent epitomes of his conception of justification by
1In Latin terms, justification is effective for both the 
vitium and macula and the reatus, both the corruption and the guilt. 
See the writings of Professor dliver C. Quick; for example, Doctrines 
of the Creed (London, Nisbet, 1938), pp. 218-19, 236.
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grace: 'I worked harder than any, though it was not I, but the
r V -  •- \  ’* '  t- “* • t ;  ■* *  \  - < V -  ;* . *• \ ; l  * ’ v , .  •>'
grace of God which is with me.M*
At the same time, despite the bold contrasts given in para­
bles, sermons, and epistles, we may not find an incontrovertible 
example of one who lives completely under the sway of sin, of self­
justification and rejection of God's grace, with no trace of faith 
as the acceptance of justification. Indeed, the faith of the 
Christian is that he need not founder on the rocks of his own 
strivings. He can live with his self-justifying nature by maintain­
ing an ongoing inner revolution against the dictatorial law of sin, 
death, and meaninglessness. As Paul said, ”0 wretched man that I 
aml Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank 
God through Jesus Christ our Lord. So then with the mind I myself
serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin .......
The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free 
from the law of sin and death. " 2
The composite Biblical view of sin and justlficat ion sees 
the subtleties present in the phenomena of human existence which it 
helps to explicate. For Instance, self-righteousness can be present 
even in the more impressive confessions of sin. Sin can be the power 
behind "righteous" causes. By holding to the paradox of justlfica- 
tlon in the midst of guilt we can at least be comparatively safe 
from oversimplifying either concept: sin— sin-and-evil— or its
antidote justification.
Corinthians 15s10. ^Romans 7:25; Romans 8:2.
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Justification by faith" means justification nby grace through 
faith. It is the righteousness of Ood as it is given and imputed to 
man without being produced by him. It can be accepted or rejected in 
every day*a attitude and behavior. Quintessentially sin is the 
rejection of the grace of God. Quintessentially justification is 
that grace, the agape of God as it comes to man in his existence.
CHAPTER TWO
THE CONTEMPORARY EXPRESSION OF THE CHRISTIAN
—  JB B W H M T O ------------------------
Ifce Background for the Contemporary Expression
As ne have noted, the Biblical origins are the anchor of the 
tradition vhich informs the contemporary conceptions of sin and justi­
fication. Yet even our study of the Biblical sources is dependent 
on contemporary textual scholarship. Nevertheless this contempo­
rary interest in the vorld of the Bible is a kind of returning to 
the spring for vater. Contemporary theology is ever in dialogues 
with the past, primarily with the Biblical origins, and with the 
exigencies of the present.
This contemporary dialogue with the Biblical context of the­
ology is mindful of former dialogue, the long history of thought 
within Christendom, the former returning to the Biblical springs, 
and the continual reappraisal of what those springs actually are.
We have already spoken of the Reformers and of Augustine, their men­
tor as they journeyed back to Paul and the New Testament in their 
quest for renewal in the Church. Thorough treatment of the tradition 
would consider the history of dogma from Paul through the Greek and 
Latin Fathers, Augustine, Lombard, certainly Anselm and Abelard, to
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the Summa of Thomas Aquinas, which represents the height of the Medi­
eval synthesis of Biblical and Aristotelian thought, and through the 
precursors of the Reformation, the Reformers, taking cognisance of the 
third force in that era— the Anabaptist type of protest, the post- 
Re format ion hardening of ’Reformed theology, 17 the post-Kantian cor­
rective theology of Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Herrmann, who restored 
to some considerable degree the humanistic genius of the Christian 
faith, the emphasis on essential humanity, on to the more recent 
"Barthian” type of corrective, which has called for a recovery of the 
kind of reverence for God as transcendent, over against, above, and 
totally other than His creation. The present mood of theology includes 
(l) The Christian humanism with its emphasis on experiential religion 
along with rational volition, which the Nineteenth Century theologians 
seemed to invoke; (2) The recognition of the transcendent reality 
beyond the mere experience of mankind— the awesome technological 
advances now even into outer space reinforce this conviction; and
(3) The increased recognition of both the inner and the external 
limitations of reason and volition. The philosophy of Kierkegaard, 
the intuition of non-verbal artists,of writers like Dostoyevsky, and 
the explorations of the depth psychologists, encourage this latter 
recognition.
Before we examine the contemporary expression of the Chris­
tian conceptions of sin and Justification we should perhaps look a 
bit more closely, though briefly, at the thought of the reformers: 
Luther and Calvin. Protestant theology continually refers to their
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formulations, especially on these particular subjects. It also 
follows then in disagreeing with St. Thomas Aquinas— while taking 
tine to criticize and in some cases to re-evaluate his system. 1 
It continues to take St. Augustine seriously. Yet, like the Re- 
fomers and the Bishop of Hippo hinself, contenporary theologians 
are In conversation with the tradition only as it elaborates the 
formative insights— and proclamation— found in the Bible.
Martin Luther, in his Treatise on Christian Liberty, set 
down two propositions concerning the liberty and the bondage of 
the spirit: "A Christian man is a perfectly free lord of all, sub­
ject to none. A Christian nan is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, 
subject to all. ' 2 Here is a nev freedom, not so much of the basic 
biological energies of the Freudian psyche, but of the controlling
Thomas Aquinas is by no means Ignored even in Protestant 
theology. The so-called "neo-Tfcomlsts” (among Roman Catholics), 
Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson, and others, have brought him to 
the fore in theological conversation. An example of his relevance 
to our question is the following passage from Karl Adam: "It is
possible that a man's practical reason may sometimes fall, not re­
cognising God's will plainly and clearly as such or being involved 
in invincible error. In such a case he is not bound to the objec­
tive lav, but to that which appears to his conscience to be God's 
will, although the judgment of his conscience be objectively false. 
No less an authority than St. Riomas stresses this obligation of the 
erroneous conscience. Even in so vital a matter as belief in Christ 
a man would act wrongly vho should profess this faith against the 
judgment of his (erroneous) conscience (Summa, Prima Secundae, Q, xix, 
A. 5)" • Karl Adam, The Spirit of Catholicism, translated by Justin 
McCann, O.S.B. (revised edition, Image Books, Garden City, New York, 
Doubleday), p. 2CFJ.
2Martin Luther, A Treatise on Christian Liberty, many edi­
tions: E. g., Three Treatises (Philadelphia, The Muklenberg Press.
19^3)f P« 251ff., the edition used in Vergllius Ferm, ed., Classics 
of Protestantism (New York, Philosophical Library, 1959), pp. 39-66, 
at p. 41. ..
self— nore Like the Freudian ego. It la at the same time a new ser­
vitude, of the aelf, not to the demonic and Irrational energies of 
existence, but to the community of mankind, to the God of the com­
munity and of the universe of which it is but a part.
What, to the Reformers, was the nature of sin? Adolf 
Haraack, In discussing the history of dogma, admittedly from a point 
of view, says that the sin in all sin and the guilt In all guilt la 
godlessneaa In the strictest sense of the word. It Is that unbelief 
which Is not able to trust God. In Luther's frequent mention of 
concupiscence as a component In the sin of unbelief Hamaok sees an 
emphasis not on sexual desire, but on the pride of the heart, the 
lust of the world, and the selfishness of the spirit. He holds that 
Luther discarded the Augustlnlan emphasis on concupiscence as sexual 
desire. 1
"Inasmuch as man Is created to and for God, the 'original
righteousness' Is accordingly fear, love and trust....... " By
"fear" we understand "reverence," in this statement by Hamack. 
Luther's concept of the fall of man was that man lost these virtues. 
D m  "righteousness of God" includes grace, truth, mercy and holi­
ness. God bestows on man whatever faith he can have. God actually 
creates the penitence which brings him to receiving the grace of 
forgiveness and restoration. God does the work, not man, "propter 
Christum," for Christ's sake. Conscious guilt and misery are
1Molf Harnack, History of Dogeia, trans. from 3rd German 
edition by William M*Gilchrist (London, Williams and Norgate, 1899),
VII, pp. 200-201.
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replaced by gracious standing and blessedness. Justification is an 
ongoing process in the Christian's life. It is answer to the con­
dition of sin. It is a given state of grace. It is answer also to 
sin as offense. It produces the conviction that God alone can bring 
forth good works. Thus has Luther's protesting theology propelled 
the force of individualism in the western world. "The Christian 
is through his God an Independent being, who is in need of nothing, 
and neither stands under bondage to laws nor is in dependence on 
men. He is priest before God, taken charge of by no priest, and a 
king over the world. " 1
But Luther could have benefited, even as theologians today 
must, from a more realistic sense of social structure and the actual 
functions of institutions and associations with respect to "the 
grace of God,” even when they are corrupt. As R. H. Tawney says in 
Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, Luther himself "was conscious 
that he had left the world of secular activities perilously divorced 
from spiritual restraints.” Christian morality was to be maintained 
by the State, while the Church continued a means for introducing 
people to that grace whose fruit was to be good works.2 The question 
of justification by grace was not answered lnstrumentallstlcally even 
by its stentorian herald, Martin Luther.
ilbid., pp. 201-212; 212.
2R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (first 
published in 1922, S Pelican feook^  Vesfc Crayton, Middlesex, Penguin 
Books, 1938), PP. 89-110.
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The following quotation illustrates the Reformers' use of 
Augustine, as well as John Calvin's own manner of treating the sub­
ject of sin. Writing with reference to the controversy between 
Augustinian and Pelagian anthropologies, Calvin sunsarised the argu­
ment of Augustine, which of course he himself adopted:
The matter cannot be more briefly summed up than in the eighth 
chapter of his Treatise De Corruptions et Gratia, where he shows, 
First, that the human will does not by liberty obtain grace, but 
by grace obtains liberty. Secondly, that by means of the same 
grace, the heart being impressed with a feeling of delight, is 
trained to persevere, and strengthened with invincible fortitude. 
Thirdly, that while grace governs the will, it never falls; but 
when grace abandons it, it falls forthwith. Fourthly, that by 
the free mercy of God, the will is turned to good, and when 
turned, perseveres. Fifthly, that the direction of the will to 
good, and its constancy after being so directed, depend entirely 
on the will of God, and not on any human merit. Thus the will 
(free will, if you choose to call it so), which is left to man, 
is, as he in another place . . . .  describes It, "a will which 
can neither be turned to God, nor continue in God, unless by 
grace; a will which whatever its ability may be, derives all 
that ability from grace. " 1
Calvin went on to dispose of the problem of dualism. His 
solution sounds strange to our ears today. God blinds and hardens 
"the reprobate" by deserting them or by delivering them over to Satan. 
Satan is dynamic evil. God turns his monstrous work to his own glory. 
Calvin begins this discussion with a recapitulation of his doctrine of 
sin, using Augustine's example of the horse end the two riders. Man 
is the horse. He can choose either God as his rider, or the devil.
The Satanic rider is not a skilled but a careless, foolish rider.
This illustration Itself shows an understanding of dynamic psychology, 
long before the present era.
^John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. by 
Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids, Michigan, Eerdmns, 195?, Book II, 
Chapter III, lfc), Vol. I, p. 26k.
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That nan is so enslaved by the yoke of sin, that he cannot of 
his own nature ain at good either in wish or actual pursuit, has,
I think, been sufficiently proved. Moreover, a distinction has 
been drawn between compulsion and necessity, making it clear that 
man, though he sins necessarily, nevertheless sins voluntarily . • • 
Augustine . . . .  compares the human will to a horse preparing to 
start, and God and the devil are the riders. "If God mounts, he, 
like a temperate and skillful rider, guides it calmly, urges it 
when too slow, reins it in when too fast, curbs its forwardness 
and overaction, checks its bad temper, and keeps it on the proper 
course) but if the devil has seised the saddle, like an ignorant 
and rash rider, he hurries it over broken ground, drives it into 
ditches, dashes it over precipices, spurs it into obstinacy or 
fury.**
Certainly the bondage of the will as described by Calvin and, 
before him, by Augustine, was a bondage to a certain kind of ignorance—  
as want of insight— as well as to reckless disorientation.
The Influence of Calvin's Geneva has helped to confuse law and 
gospel, morality and grace. In the post-Reformation history there 
have been other influences as well, which have tended to externalise 
sin and justification in a way that confuses any study, philosophi­
cal or psychological, of these conceptions. Ve need only listen to 
some of the most publicised evangelistic preaching of today to 
realise how widespread are various legalistic, superficial concep­
tions of sin and of its antidote God's saving grace.
The subjective dimension of moralistic guilt is properly 
described under neurosis and compulsions. If one feels guilty be­
cause he has broken a commandment he may, it is true, be simply 
aware of his offense against the society to which he is beholden.
But If he actually lacks a deep love and appreciation for the order
1Ibid., Chapter IV, 1, pp. 265-266. Cf. Plato, Fhaedrus 2k6 
(where there are two horses with one charioteer). Professor Dickie 
calls this to our attention.
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vhlch that commandment represents, his guilt may likely be a neu­
rotic ego-defense against a deeper fear of the removal of some bene­
fit vhlch the quasi-theocratic society-image is supplying him. Also, 
today, as in former times, there is a coration notion that to be blessed 
vith material vealth and success Is a sure sign of justification—  
that God is with one. "He vbo is industrious shall prosper" can take 
on the force of a religious credo. Indeed it has.1.
Needless to say, the conceptions of sin and justification 
have been in need of corrective formulation from time to time, even 
since Luther and Calvin.
'Hie Issue: Hov to Speak Theologically
" to the Problem of Man
Quite simply, the question before theologians today is 
whether Christianity can formulate a true analysis of the problem 
of man-in-his-existence-and-in-society and state clearly and imple­
nient ingly solutions to this problem.
A forceful, if highly philosophical, way of presenting Chris­
tian theology in view of this challenge is employed by Professor Paul 
Tillich, now of Harvard. He follows systematically what he describes 
as a method of correlation. Dialectical in method, it proceeds as an 
effort to correlate existential questions with theological answers.2
*Cf. the studies made by Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch, and
Tavney.
^Professor Tillich introduces his method in Systematic 
Theology, Vol. I, pp. 3-76. Cf. Vol. II, (1957, pp.W-lSl 5
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Many others, including, notably, Professor Karl Helm, of 
Germany, are trying to meet the same challenge.3- The late Professor 
Donald Baillle, of St. Andrews, for example, speaks of a malaise 
which characterises man, which perhaps can be searched out best by 
depth psychology. But it is for theology to discern its meaning and 
to speak to it the gospel of meaning.2
Professor Kiarl Barth, of Basel, prefers to begin with the 
answer, or rather, with the ’revelation"— "the Word of God" via 
the Church-creating event. Theology is ever a restatement of the 
Kirchliche— Churchly— faith.3 With the tradition, Barth says— as 
Indeed does every theologian, it seems, today— "Sin means to reject 
the grace of God as such • • • • What is done by men in individual
-^Pr of ess or Karl Heim has continued in the perhaps controver­
sial tradition of "Christian apologetics." Among his works are 
Spirit and Truth and God Transcendent. Two works, published in English 
in 1953» are I bhrlstlan Faith and Natural Science! and The Transfor­
mation of the Scientific World Vlew (See Bibliography, infra J.
Heim contends for an understanding that the self ("the Ego") 
and "the personal God" belong to a dimension which is different from 
those of every thing which is accessible to "scientific investigation." 
— Christian Faith and Natural Science, p. 3^ *
2Donald M. Baillle, Qcd Was In Christ, pp. l62ff.
^Cf. for example, Karl Barth, Pie Doctrine of the Word of God, 
Vol. I, Part I of his Church Dogmatics, trans. from the 2nd German 
edition, by G. T. Thomson (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 19^9)* His point 
of view is stated In conscious contrast even to that of Emil Brunner's 
"eristics"— or the ad hominem, accomodating, approach which attempts 
to show the dead-end of reason and the meaning of revelation with 
respect to "reason," p. 28. "The task of theology would then consist 
in the 'struggle against the self-assurance of the modern spirit,'" 
says Barth. Theology's task is to measure the Church's language about 
God by the measure of her own essence, the event of revelation,"the 
Word of God in Christ.— Ibid., and following.
actions, from the action of Pilate down to that of Judas, is the 
rejection of the grace of God." 1
Barth reiterates the theology of the Hew Testament, especially 
of Paul, using quite consistently the same terminology* Hence his 
must be a "Churchly" audience, hearers and readers who have already 
become steeped in the thought-forms and language of the earliest 
Christian theologians. For this Barth has little apology, since 
theology is the Church's— and the tradition's (?)— conversation with 
itself about its faith. 2
Approvingly Barth quotes the Heidelberg Catechism at Question 
60t How art thou righteous before God?" The answer is:
Only by true faith in Jesus Christs that is, although my 
conscience accuse me that I have grievously sinned against all 
the commandments of God, and have never kept any of them and 
that I am still prone always to all evil, yet God, without any 
merit of mine, of mere grace, grants and imputes to me the per­
fect satisfaction, righteousness and holiness of Christ, as if 
I had accomplished all the obedience which Christ has fulfilled 
for me, if only I accept such benefit with a believing heart.3
The alternative to self-justification is to live by forgive­
ness alone.* Both sin and justification are understood as such only
^Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, trans. by G. T. Thomas 
(London, SCM Press, 19*5, 1952), p. 105 .
According to Professor Barth, Dogmatics investigates the 
language which the Church uses, and seeks to measure its conformity 
to the essence of the Church, which is not what she can "dream up" 
about God, but what God says to herf 1. e., Jesus Christ.— The Doc­
trine of the Word of God, p. 3^«
3Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, p. 159.
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by the person vho has already crossed over into an understanding of 
grace. Thus does Barth reiterate with conviction the traditional 
understanding of sin and justification. He says, further, dramati­
cally, that the Judge will one day put the question, "Did you live 
by grace, or did you set up gods for yourself and perhaps want to 
become one yourself?"! Sin is rebellion against God and rejection 
of his grace. The doctrine of the fall of nan, of "original sin, 
is simply that nan in being born is placed in a situation where this 
rebellion is the order of the day.
Although the actual content of Tillich's doctrine nay be 
quite similar to that of Barth's elaborate, reiterative, system, 
his way of discussing the phenomenon is markedly different. Sin is 
"the act in vhich ve turn avay from the participation in the divine 
Ground.” Here ve encounter a recognition of the difficulty vhich con­
temporary minds have with the very term God. Sin is "the turning to­
ward ourselves, making ourselves the center of the vorld and of our­
selves . . . .  the drive in everyone, even the most self-restraining 
one, to draw as much as possible of the vorld into himself. ”2
1Ibld.
2paul Tillich, "The Good I Will, I Do NoV published In 
both The Union Seminary Quarterly Review, XIV, 3 (March, 1959), 
pp. 17-23, and Religion In Life, XXVIII, k (Autumn, 1959),
PP* 539-5^5* In his Systematic Theology, this vay of describing 
sin would come under "Estrangement as Concupiscence." Cf. ibid., II, 
p. 59ff• Tillich identifies the Christian conception of sin with the 
contemporary conception of ’estrangement," to vhich he gives content 
as follovs: estrangement as "unbelief,” "hubris," "concupiscence,"
the three traditional modes, and as "fact" and as "act," individually 
and collectively. Rien he discusses it vlth respect to tragic
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He agrees with Barth— as with the whole tradition— that sin is under­
stood only hy those who have been delivered from its power: "We can
speak of sin, because its power over us is broken." 1
We see in Barth and Tillich an illustration of contrasting 
ways of dealing with the conceptions of sin and justification, al­
though both sen think of sin in dynamic terms and regard justifica­
tion as its dynamic solution.
Sin: Condition or Offense? Sin-and-Evll and Justification
Apart from method in theology, other Issues affect the tempo­
rary use of the conceptions of sin and Justification. We have already 
referred to the Augustinian-Pelagian debate, which actually does per­
sist into our own times.
We need not review the many ramifications of the controversy 
between the ancient theologians. However we must confront the issue 
which they represent to contemporary theology. Pelaglanism stands 
for the insistence on essential freedom of the will. "If I should,
I can!" Man can be enlightened as to what is evil; he then can be 
exhorted to be righteous, to do the good, with confidence that he 
can. Pelagian and semi-Pelagian thinking has often led to
self-loss and world-less, separation and individualisation, finl- 
tude, and despair. — Systematic Theology, II, pp. 51-90. Although 
our own approach to the question is aware of Tillich's writings and 
no doubt influenced by them, our treatment does not follow along the 
route of his system. The present study is but a theological fragment, 
and it is perhaps more fragmental than systematic.
lMThe Good I Will, I Do Hot," ibid.
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self-Justification, on the one hand, and to discouragement to the 
point of unredeemable despair, on the other.
Reinhold Niebuhr calls F. R. Tennant's thought an elaborate 
restatement of Pelaglanlsm. 1 Yet Tennant does credit the worthy 
in both traditions. Tennant says that Pelaglus stressed one side 
of the truth: "the inalienable rights and responsibilities of per­
sonality. " But he credits Augustine with laying hold on the side 
of the truth which has had the "infinitely greater spiritual fruit­
fulness." Augustine, like Paul, and unlike Pelaglus, recognised 
"the existence of the power of sin as habit, and our inability, in 
spite of formal freedom, to do the things that we would" and "the 
social nature of man and the physical unity of the race." 2 Never­
theless, Tennant maintains that the will is free. It Is affected 
by Inheritance, but it is not in bondage to it.3
Tennant represents those who cannot appreciate the linking 
of culpability— or guilt— with dispositions and actions over which
Reinhold Niebuhr, Human Nature, Vol. I of The Nature and 
Destiny of Man, A Christian Interpretation ’ (Gifford Lectures, 
Edinburgh, Sew York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955)» p« 2^ 7.
F. R. Tennant, The Origin and Propagation of Sin (2nd 
edition revised, Cambridge, University Press7 1906), p. 15, quoted 
in Mary Frances Thelen, Man As Sinner in Contemporary American 
Realistic Theology (New York, King* s Crown Press, p. 17-
-Ecth Pelaglus and Augustine missed the truth held by the 
other, according to Tennant: "Augustine (and after him Schielermacher
and Ritschl) sacrificed the moral accountability of the individual in 
his mistaken conception that racial solidarity in wrong implies the 
inheritance of sin. Tennant claims that the "problem” of sin can be 
solved and the Insights of Augustine and Pelaglus reconciled by seeing 
that whereas inheritance affects our outlook in innumerable ways, and 
may even shape our disposition, it does not control the will itself. 
The will is free." Thelen, ibid.
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the subject-self has no control. Niebuhr, on the other hand, seems 
to misinterpret the obvious capacity of man to assume guilt, even 
for that over which he has no control. Should the fact that he can 
feel guilt mean that he somehow is culpable? With Tennant we contend 
that such a conception of guilt is hardly enlightening. Indeed, in 
the light of depth psychology its logical fallacy is compounded as 
we discover the neurotic, defensive uses to which guilt feelings are 
put. Indeed, the assumption of guilt may on occasion be an expres­
sion of that very arrogance which is the sin with which Niebuhr's 
analysis is most concerned. 1
inhold Neibuhr says: "Yet in the Christian interpretation
of moral evil guilt is attached not only to actions in vhich the indi­
vidual is free to choose a higher possibility and falls to do so, but 
in which higher possibilities, which the individual is not free to
choose, reveal the imperfection of the action which he is forced to
take. Thus the simple moral guilt of conscious evil is transmuted 
into a sense of religious guilt which feels a general responsibility 
for that for which the individual agent cannot be imuedlately re­
sponsible." An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (1935, Living 
Age Books ediHon, Meridian Books, fcev York, 1^6), pp. 75-76.
He goes on to illustrate in terms of international, political, 
and business ethics. These illustrations carry his point quite well. 
Hence he can say: "A general sense of religious guilt is therefore
a fruitful source of a sense of moral responsibility in immediate 
situations.” Ibid.
It is true that Niebuhr's doctrine of sin was not fixed when 
he wrote An Interpre tat ion. In Human Nature (Vol. I of the Gifford 
Lectures, The Nature and Destiny of Man) hestresses sin as pride, 
as pretension. "It'can"be shared by cTEisens in collective national 
pride. Ibid., pp. 208-227. A religious sense of guilt is "a fruit­
ful source of a sense of moral responsibility" in view of this 
phenomenon.
Yet, despite his constructive use of this idea Niebuhr falls 
to relieve the confusion which makes difficult any clear analysis of
9**
Augustinianism represents to us today the emphasis on sin as 
a condition of absolutely helpless entanglement. Allow to man the 
clearest possible vision of truth, goodness, and life, and he, though 
perhaps longing for their reality, will choose falsehood, evil, and 
the way of spiritual death. It is this law within his very "members" 
which drives man away from God. It can be overcome only by a kind 
of intrusion by the grace of God into his life. Even Augustine's 
libel against the human race, coranltted in his treatise on marriage, 
and his persistent near-reduction of sin to "concupiscence," express 
this Insight— affirmed in our time by Freud: Man is basically not,
or not simply, rational. He is an irrational being. Even the 
anti-Freudian Otto Rank affirms the insight, as does C. G. Jung.
Each draws his own inferences from the conclusion.^ Yet, we would
the conceptions of sin and guilt. Is "a sense of guilt" to be dis­
tinguished from "a feeling of guilt”? If ao, our criticism may not
hold. But if one should feel guilty, responsible, blameworthy for 
that over which he has had no control, how can he escape "moral and
religious morbidity"? Niebuhr’s answer may be as in Interpretation:
Moral complacency toward those things over which one has no control 
is even more false to the human situation” (Interpretation » p. 76). 
Again his argument is cogent enough. But there seems to be a thick 
cloud over the whole question in its depth psychological dimension.
It is this cloud which our present study seeks to penetrate. See 
Part Two.
In his Ohe Self and the Dramas of History (Scribner's, 1955), 
Dr. Niebuhr as theologian again '’transcendshimself as psychologist!
*Cf. Ira Progoff, The Death and Rebirth of Psychology (New 
York, Julian Press, 1957)# pp. £$1-2557 £t passim.
Rank taught that one is blessed with "irrational" depths 
which mean spiritual power within himself upon which he can rely.
Apropos of this discussion we quote the following from Carl 
R. Rogers, who, unfortunately, is neglected in our subsequent
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run the risk of Misrepresenting both contemporary theology and depth 
psychology if we tried to distinguish points of view along Augustinian 
and Pelagian lines. As Cherbonnier argues, it is doubtful that the 
real issue is here at all. 1
Nevertheless there is a genuine issue demonstrated in our 
times by the debate between what has been called liberal theology 
and what has been called neo-orthodoxy. 2 For better or for worse
discussions of psychotherapy! "I have little sympathy with the 
rather prevalent concept that man is basically irrational, and that 
his impulses, if not controlled, will lead to destruction of others 
and self. Man's behavior is exquisitely rational, moving with subtle 
and ordered complexity toward the goals his organism is endeavoring 
to achieve.M "A Therapist's View of the Good Life," The Humanist,
195? 9 No. 5# P* 299— quoted by Rogers in Carl R. Rogers, ^Concluding 
Comment” following his "Reinhold Niebuhr's The Self and the Dramas 
of History: A Criticism" : Bernard M. Loomer, Walter M. Horton,
and Hans Hofmann, "Reinhold Niebuhr and Carl R. Rogers—  A Discussion, 
Pastoral Psychology, IX, 85 (June, 1958)* at p. 28.
Progoff, and, according to him, Rank, and to some considerable 
extent, Jung, see the "irrational" in a way that hardly fits the de­
bate implied in Rogers' remarks. Indeed a reconciliation may be 
possible of his views and those of the more "human nature "-affirming 
among depth psychologists and theologians as well. Cf. also, for 
example, among Jung's many writings on the subject, his The Undis­
covered Self (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1958).
^Infra, this chapter.
Representative of a responsible use of this descriptive 
nomenclature is the popular treatment in William Hordern's A Layman's 
Guide to Protestant Theology (New York, Macmillan, 1956), in three 
chapters! ("6). Tlfeo-Orthodoxy! The Rediscovery of Orthodoxy"— in 
which he discusses Karl Barth and Emil Brunner; (7 ). American Neo­
Orthodoxy j Reinhold Niebuhr; and (8). "The Boundary Between Liber­
alism and Neo-Orthodoxy: Paul Tillich"— pp. 118-184. Interestingly,
Hordern follows these with (9). "Orthodoxy As a Growing Tradition"—  
pp. 185-209. Theologians who illustrate this growing tradition are, 
according to Hordern, George Haamar, William Temple, and D. M.
Balllle.
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the participants in the debate have used the old epithetst "Pela­
gian" and "Augustinian."
A persistent tendency, vhich sometimes is laid at the door 
of the Augustinian anthropology-and-soteriology and at other times 
is laid at the door of the Pelagian outlook, is the externalising, 
legalistic, institutionalising, trlvlallslng uses of the "means of 
grace," including the Church, its sacraments, and the Scriptures.
As the Christian movement became Increasingly a quasi-political and 
regimented society, in time recognised as the official religion of 
the Roman Empire, and of the Medieval vorld, its discipline came 
to reflect its current conceptions of sin and justification and, 
vhat is more, to embody them. Exteraalistic, mundane mentality 
persists, even since Jesus' encounter vith it in the pharisees 
and chief priests, in claiming for itself, blasphemously, the 
power of the Keys to the Kingdom of Heaven. We need not refer 
to any one stage in the history of sacramentarian ecclesiology. The 
error is present enough in non-sacramentarian expressions of "God's 
people." "The Church"— or "the true believers"— in the name of God 
listens to confession, absolves and condemns. To be "in Christ," to 
be in a state of grace, is to be among the Chosen, either in the 
visible Church and obedient to it or among the elect— vho discern 
election by their own selected criteria. To be "in sin," hopelessly 
entangled, still writhing in mortal sinfulness, is to be outside 
such a "Church" or group of "the elect." 1
^This point needs no documentation, so patent are the facts. 
Sectarian and pletlstlc exclusivism are not dead. The so-called
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Yet, despite the tendencies, even within Protestantism, to 
externalise, even to trivlallse, Christianity's conceptions of sin 
and justification, there Is a latent, at times dominant, insight 
vlthin the conceptions themselves vhlch can bring a nev liberation, 
a nev reformation, a deeper plunge into the gospel. 1
Reinhold Niebuhr, in his Olfford Lectures, states his correc­
tive anthropology, using the traditional Augustlnlan-versus-Pelagian 
frame of reference. He describes as Pelagian or at least seml- 
Pelaglan such diverse representatives as the following: Friedrich
Schlelermacher, Walter Rauschenbusch, F. R. Tennant, as we have noted, 
and official Roman Catholicism.2
The "heresy" is represented succinctly by Thomas Aquinas in 
the following statement, vhlch Niebuhr quotes: "Sin cannot take avay
entirely from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he 
would no longer be capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible for 
this good nature to be destroyed entirely.”3
Niebuhr’s objection to what he calls neo-Pelagianlsm is that 
its adherents try to steer avay from the logical difficulties and "the 
peril of denying the structure of freedom in the assertion of its 
corruption." He suggests that the arbiter between the two traditions
"Fundamentalist-versus-Modernist" controversy in America, which re­
sulted in church schisms, illustrates the problem vlthin Protestantism.
^This phrase is from Philip Schaff.
^Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, 
pp. 2U5-2U8.
3Nlebuhr quotes this in a footnote (from Summa Theologies,
I, 2, 33, 2), ibid., p. 2k8.
98
should be the truth j whatever is true "to the psychological and 
moral facts In human wrongdoing.”1
It would seem that here the depth psychologists should be 
called In as expert witnesses. Niebuhr's references to them are 
far from exhaustive, although incisive and perceptive.2
Ofcere seems to be no argument against his reiteration of the 
observation that the subjective dimension of "sin" is despair. In­
deed it is possible that this very subjective phenomenon itself is 
what has exercised the winds of both "Augustinians" and "Pelagians” 
down through the years of the debate. Is the despairing self the 
entrapped, entangled, helpless self in Adam? Is the desperate, 
asserting self, the offending guilty expression of this condition?
As we shall see in the discussion to follow in Part Two, 
almost everyone seems to have strong feelings of shame, nonculpable 
shame, produced by the very process of growing out of infancy. It 
may be aggravated by an oppressively shaming environment. In the 
light of this dynamism, does the extreme Augustinian say to the 
shame-ridden that his sense of unworthiness is fully justified?
"You say you are as dung. You are right. You are capable of no good
^Reinhold Niebuhr, ibid., p. 21*8.
^Mary Frances Ihelen, in her thesis, finds Niebuhr's exposi­
tion wanting, for instance, in his treatment of the theories of Karen 
Homey, as she expressed them in The Neurotic Personality of Our Time 
(infra, Part Two)— Thelen, Man As Sinner, pp. iK, 201. For other 
critical, yet appreciative discussion of Reinhold Niebuhr’s treatment 
of other men’s ideas, especially psychologists', see Pastoral Psychol­
ogy* IX, 85 (1958), which designated Reinhold Niebuhr "the man of the 
month."
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In and of yourself." Does the Pelagian, on the other hand, say the 
opposite? "You feel you are worthless and helpless. Actually you 
are not. Be enlightened as to your true worth and possibilities
Either position seems to leave out something essential to 
the actual state of affairs. The "Augustinian" falls to see the 
break In logic between the Inner conviction of unworthiness and the 
presupposition that the subject Is In fact unworthy. Hence such a 
theologian, especlally-as-an-"evangelist," say mistake a pathological 
sense of unvorthlness for an insightful "conviction of sin." The 
"Pelagian" on the other hand fails to credit the inner conviction 
with the substance of reality which it actually has throughout the 
psyche, affecting determinatively the person's pattern of life regard­
less of disguises. Hence the theologian-"evangelist" may be encour­
aging a kind of dishonesty within that veers away from authentic 
selfhood.
If we return to the New Testament, what kind of "evangelism" 
there speaks to the shame-ridden individual? "Neither do I condemn 
thee. Go and sin no more, Jesus said to the woman who was almost 
stoned for adultery.1 What is the significance of the story of the 
woman who loved much because she had been forgiven much?2 What is 
the import of the Zacchaeus incident?3 How are we to interpret the
-krohn 8:11— in a passage which, though disputed, conveys 
sensitively the genius of the Christian message.
2Luke 7 *^ 7 . * 3Luke 19:1-10.
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words of Jesus to the paralytic: "Be of good cheer; thy sins are
forgiven thee" ? 1
Certalnly these Incidents can bear both "Pelagian" and 
"Augustinian" commentary. But they seem on their own to say: "You
are not simply an adultress; you are essentially someone quite dif­
ferent from what the would-be stoners chose to see in you." "You 
are not essentially a parasitic publican." "You are not worthless; 
you still have life and opportunity." Certainly they say more, but 
they as certainly say at least this ouch. Interestingly enough 
Niebuhr says, "It Is not unfair to regard all Christian thinkers 
before Augustine as more or less Pelagian. " 2 It seems more enlight­
ening to say that they represent the truth before the AugustInian- 
Pelagian fission! Perhaps the Christian community held, not a
^Matthew 9:2.
2Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature of Man, p. 2^5 (citing J. B. 
Mozeley, The Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination, p. 125).
Cf.: "The Bible is not Pelagian. The doctrine of 'original
sin' is not merely contained in the myth of the Fall of Adam. It is 
a presupposition of all Biblical thinking. But despite this fateful 
necessity men are held" responsible for their sin. "— Beinhold Niebuhr 
in "Biblical Thought and Ontological Speculation in Tillich's Theol­
ogy," in The Theology of Paul Tillich ("The Library of Living Theolo­
gy, " Vol. I, edited byTharles W. tfegley and Robert W. Bretall, New 
York, Macmillan, 1952), pp. 216-227, at p. 218. Niebuhr's statements 
immediately following this quotation suggest that sin is directly 
and inevitably the resultant of human flnitude, and that the sinful­
ness of it is evidenced by the uneasy conscience which man has in 
any act. This is somewhat like Otto Rank's conception of "ethical 
guilt"— infra, Chapter Five.
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moralistic view of sin, but rather a dynamic faith in victory over 
both guilt and the "power of darkness."-1- Such an intuition is 
strengthened further by the numerous accounts of Jesus' healing of 
demoniacs. The "patients" were victims of evil. It was no less 
evil than if they had been culpable. But their intrinsic vorthful- 
ness before God seems to be assumed in the very narration of the 
events•
Niebuhr acknowledges some truth in the "Pelagian” conviction 
"that actual sins cannot be regarded as sinful or as Involving guilt 
if they do not proceed from a will which is essentially free.'2 Yet 
he insists that "absurd as the classical Pauline doctrine of original 
sin may seem to be at first blush, its prestige as a part of the 
Christian truth is preserved and perennially reestablished, against 
the attacks of rationalists and simple moralists."3 With Kierkegaard, 
he sees sin as both a condition and a qualitative leap. Sin pre­
supposes itself.**
^See Aulen, Christus Victor, pp. 164-167.
2The Nature of ten, p. 245. 3ibid., pp. 248-249.
^Ibid., p. 254. Although Niebuhr stresses self-love, sen­
suality, and, especially, pretension and pride as the modes of 
original sin, indeed, describing these with extraordinary percep­
tiveness as a theologlan-psychologlst, he does teach that the basis, 
the root, of sin is "unbelief." He makes it explicit in passages 
like this 1 "The sin of the inordinate self-love thus points to the 
prior sin of lack of trust in God. The anxiety of unbelief is not 
merely the fear which comes from Ignorance of God." With Kierkegaard 
he sees the anxiety as "the dizziness of freedom" (Concept of Dread). 
Cf. Hans Hofmann's study of Niebuhr's conception of sin, fhe Theology
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Speaking for the orthodox conception of tin, while taking 
note of "the new psychology' as of value to theology but only as 
a method of describing human conduct, £. J. Bicknell, two decades 
before Niebuhr's lectures, says, "Sin is the disorder of man's 
inward being." Human nature oust be remade, refashioned. 'Man 
can no more remake himself than make himself.’' Hie says that faith 
in Jesus Christ is the answer, that being in Christ— which for him 
includes being in the visible Church— is the condition of Justifi­
cation. 1
Despite the dangers of determinism and ecclesiastical exter- 
nalism which may lurk in these statements in Bicknell1s treatment of 
sin and salvation, we note the corrective emphasis on faith as "be­
longing." Alexander Miller, of Stanford University, in his essay on 
Justification, stresses this aspect of belonging. Essentially,
of Belnhold Niebuhr, trans. by Louise Pettlbone Smith, (New York, 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956).
Elsewhere Hofmann says, "'Self-love,' If one should even 
continue to use this highly ambiguous and misleading term, is not 
sin— original or otherwise. Nor is it a mere bad habit of man. 
Niebuhr and other theologians could greatly profit from listening 
patiently to psychopathologists who make clear to us that undue 
self-concern is the symptom for a far more profound lack of self­
realisation and self-confidence. "— Pastoral Psychology, IX, 85 
(June, 1958), p. 2U. Dr. Hofmann is director of the university 
Project on Religion and Mental Health, at Harvard University.
We shall discuss "the complications of self-concern," infra, 
Chapter Nine.
E^. J. Bicknell, The Christian Idea of Sin and Original Sin 
in the Light of Modern Knowledge (London, Longmans, dreen, 1922),
pp. ii3, 115; cf. pp. 50-78, I13-129.
“Christian faith is a natter of he longing more than believing. Of 
course he means belonging in a profound— yet eminently realistic—  
sense
If Christian faith is essentially belonging, "unfaith" is not 
belonging. The condition may be described as tragic and vrong. But 
whether it be sinful— as accountable, culpable— depends on whether 
there is rejection by free choice, of the grace of belonging.
Miller's statement may appear to be in marked contrast to 
the exposition by Bishop Lesslie Newbigin of the Church of South 
India, who says that sin is basically unbelief.2 Actually, however, 
there may not be a real contradiction here, since NeVbigin speaks 
of unbelief as failure to trust.3 in the Christian conception 
"unbelief” is "sin” when it is refusal or failure to trust that 
which is ultimately trustworthy]
Can trustworthy agape be encountered without being actually 
experienced? Can there be belief-as-trust apart from belonging to 
the reality expressed by the agape tou Theou, symbolised in the 
phrase} the Body of Christ? If we are to suppose that one can
^Alexander Miller, The Renewal of Man, "Christian Faith 
Series" (New York, Doubleday, 195$}*
2Lesslie Newbigin, Sin and Salvation (London, SCM, 1956), 
pp. 25ff.
3Ibid. Cf. NeVbigin's discussion of "Justification," p. 10k ff. 
and, under the question; How does what Christ has done for men become 
mine?" "It becomes mine when I become part of this society, this fel­
lowship, He left behind Him to be the continuation of His life on earth."' 
— ibid., p. 93* Cf. also NeVbigin's The Household of God (195U).
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guiltily refuse to trust the ultimately trustworthy, it seems reason* 
able to require first that the ultimately trustworthy must disclose 
itself to him. Failure through ignorance to trust Is one thing. 
Refusal to trust, if by it ve mean a culpable wrongness, must be 
against the Light* This logic seems to press toward the conclusion 
that by definition sin as culpable rejection of agape-and-belonging 
must In some sense be a fall from the grace of belonging! For his 
act to be culpable, the subject must know In his experience the grace 
which he Is refusing. The Christian conception of sin as culpable 
choice does seem to presuppose for the sinner the experience— or 
existential knowledge— of grace. This, though perhaps a neglected 
inference, is an extremely important one. As the Fourth Gospel puts 
it, in the words of Jesus: "If I had not come and spoken to them
they would not have sin. '1 The Light has shone Into the darkness.
It has been experienced as light. This must be true before the one 
sitting in darkness can be regarded as actually culpable in his 
failure to become one of the children of light.2
Justification Is the grace which reaches down to the entangled, 
benighted, isolated, stranded soul of the Individual— and of collec­
tive humanity— to lift it up into a new reality of belonging en 
Christo to ultimate reality, to God.
-^ -John 15:22. "If I had not done among them the works which 
no one else did, they would not have sinj but now they have seen and 
hated both me and my Father.John 15:2Hj Cf. John 9:Ul (RSV).
2I Thessalonians 5:5* Luke 16:8. Cf. II Corinthians k i k ,  6 
and the Jofaannine passages.
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Although contemporary theologians do not all make It explicit, 
they must allow a distinction between culpability and non-culpability 
when they speak of evil or wrongness In the soul of mankind. It makes 
no sense to Invoke gullt-feellngs for non-culpable tragedy. The old 
question about whether the unenlightened heathen are lost’’ comes to 
mind.There the context Is a rather primitive belief that without 
an intellectual acknowledgement of Christ as the Western world knows 
him they are doomed to Hell. Such a belief Is slipping away from 
serious consideration except among " fundamentalist ic" groups. Never­
theless there is a question which our study, among many others, should 
help theology to elucidate and face, namely: Does an experience of
the agape of Ood-In-Christ mean "life" in contrast to "death"— as 
Light to Darkness? Does being without grace, In however large the 
measure, mean "death"— or the failure of the "life" and meaning which 
are the destiny of essential humanity? If the Christian conviction 
Is that these questions must be answered In the affirmative, then 
what can be Its concern as to whether the "being without" is culpable 
or non-culpable? Surely valid Interest Is not for the purposes of a 
kind of spiritual jurisprudence, In which confessed Christians can 
condemn seme of the "condemned already." Such would be contrary to 
the very genius of Christian faith, to the agape upon which It rests. 
Any legitimate concern must be that of applied or practical theology J
*See Edgar P. Dickie, God Is Light, pp. 225-235.
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If guilt feelings can be In any sense a means of grace, a means by 
which the subject may be effectively Invited to trust the ultimately 
trustworthy, then theology must have a clear idea as to what should 
properly exercise them.
To what extent, and in what constructive manner can and 
should one be aware of his own actual guilt in remaining in the 
darkness of despair and self•destructiveneos? If guilt-feeling 
is irrelevant to the Christian understanding of sin— that is, if 
the Christian conception arose without reference to the individual's 
inner capacity to Judge himself, then it would not matter whether we 
say sin or evil. However, since the conception of sin has tradi­
tionally and Biblically evoked the conviction of sin, it seems proper 
to reserve the term for that vrongness for vhlch one can and should 
come to feel guilty. Hence in speaking of evil, theology deals not 
only with sin, even though it may often use the term in a double, 
confused sense. The gospel of Justification is to be proclaimed to 
the condition of both sin and evil, vrongness both blameworthy and 
simply tragic!
Sin as Idolatry
In a recent critical restatement of the Christian conception 
of sin, S. La B. Cherbonnler argues that the Augustine-versus- 
Pelagius controversy was over a question that can be no real Issue 
for our way of thinking. The debate tended to place in partial 
eclipse the Biblical understanding of sin. Sin has been misconceived
—as breaking rules. It has also been misconceived as being intrinsic 
to human nature.1 The Biblical origins do not support either of 
these contentions. Sin as depicted in the Hebrew-Christian tradition 
is clearly idolatry, choosing the wrong god, for worship, adoration, 
devotion, fear. The hallmark of idolatry is ”a hard heart.”
Cherbonnier commends Karl Menninger, a psyeholanalyst in 
America, who seems to him to be an exception among depth psycholo­
gists, for saying that seme forms of guilt should not be eradicated.2 
Christianity should preach confession and forgiveness.
The redemption which the Church offers to all men is deliver­
ance from bondage to the idols which have blinded and enslaved 
them. It liberates by conferring upon them the one thing vhich 
they can scarcely acquire by effort, agape. It thereby hastens 
the day when it will be fully what it already is in part: the
fulfillment of God's ancient promise, "I will take away the stony 
heart out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh 
(Exelcial 36(26).”3
Certainly, as the first commandment of the decalogue clearly 
says, Idolatrous attachment is the sin against God as he was con­
ceived In the Law and the Prophets. The Christian conception of sin 
has characteristically continued the Jewish emphasis on idolatry.
The "sinner” is devoted to a wrong cause, whether it be himself
1E. La B. Cherbonnier, Hardness of Heart, Christian Faith 
Series (Hew York, Doubleday, 195$), pp. ST-14$.
2Ibid., p. 187. Cherbonnier quotes from an article, "What 
the Girls Are Told", by Karl Menninger (The Saturday Review,
October 26, 1953, P* 30).
^Hardness of Heart, p. 188.
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as object, himself in satisfaction-seeking, or whether it be other 
"idols" on this side of ultlm&cy.
However, can we say that idolatry Itself is more than the 
fora which wrongness takes? True, the idol stands in the way of the 
Light* It stands as an obstruction between "God" and man. This is 
the difference between an idol and a symbol* The symbol can be 
transparent* The idol is opaque* The idol is a temporal, finite, 
substitute for ultimate reality. The deeper question which concerns 
us iss What are the dynamics which land persons and societies in 
Idolatry? Idolatry as a category Itself seems but another way of 
denoting descriptively the darkness which we have discussed. Yet, 
perhaps, it does say more. It is possible to make an idol of one's 
conception of the Light which overcomes the darkness, to institution­
alise the Christ, to harden the evangel into dogma, to externalise 
and trivialise the whole event. Indeed this has been done. Yet 
the question persistss From whence comas this objectifying, idol- 
making tendency? Is it substantive wrong? Or is it merely aberra­
tional? Is it somehow a despairing use of the capacity to imagine 
and to symbolise? We shall seek light on this question in our 
inquiry into depth psychology.1
1Infra, Chapters Nine and Ten.
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Expressions; Liberal, Realistic, Corrective
Frederick R. Tennant, early In this century, argued cogently 
for clearing up the terminology. Sin has been virtually equated with 
imperfection. It is properly only accountable wrong against morality, 
says Tennant. Yet, his doctrine of the freedom of the will seems a 
bit too unjust If ledly hopeful in the light of depth psychology. The 
weight of the Christian tradition itself discourages us from defining 
sin simply as accountability before the "moral lav. Nevertheless ve 
can appreciate Tennant's by no means superficial effort to establish 
a workable definition of sin for contemporary Christianity and 
society.1
William Ernest Hocking, in his Human Nature and Its Remaking, 
expresses a theology which has been markedly Influenced by philosoph­
ical idealism. Sin is essentially a denied, of selfhood. The indi­
vidual follows the path of least resistance. For some reason it Is 
easier to deny selfhood than to affirm it. By selfhood Hocking means 
essential humanity.2
Under the Influence of John Dewey's Instrumentalist philos­
ophy Harrison Socket Elliott has called for the repudiation of the
^In addition to The Origin and Propagation of Sin, from which 
we have quoted earlier, he wrote: The Sources of the Doctrines of the 
Fall and Original Sin (Cambridge, University Press, I963 Hha"*Concept 
of 5in (Cambridge,diversity Press, 1912)* and Philosophical Theology, 
els. (Cambridge, tfaivereity Press, 1928-30).
2we follow Mary Frances Thelen's discussion in Man As Sinner, 
pp. 22-27. She considers William Ernest Hocking's Human Nature anf" 
Its Remaking (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, i9iBJ.
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conception of sin. It is untrue to the spirit of Christianity. Of 
course the phenomena are still present in human existence which gave 
rise to the doctrine of sin. But the rubric is outworn. It simply 
will not do for contemporary thinking. He gives a social-psychological 
doctrine of salvation, calling for those social arrangements by which 
security is maintained through the character of the group or inter­
group life. ”1
notwithstanding the growing dissatisfaction with the reitera­
tive use of the Biblical conceptions, especially of sin, contemporary 
theology has for the most part tended to reformulate rather than dis­
card them. For several decades now two other anthropologies have 
been proclaiming a doctrine of "original sin,” of a fall from some 
kind of primordial state of harmony or innocence into a state of 
disorientation and wrongness. The first is Marxism, which sees the 
fall in terms of economic distortion, from which mankind must be 
rescued. Tbs other is Freudian psychology, which sees the fall as 
a racial, parricidal guilt beginning with a primordial herd, from 
which society has evolved. Other anthropologies suggest something 
of a fall. However these two have become dominant Influences in 
secular "theology." Martin Heidegger's concept of ,rVerfallenheit" 
and its influence on theologians like Rudolf Bultmann suggest the 
prominence of the motif in both existent is list philosophy and
^Harrison Sackett Elliott, Can Religious Education Be 
Christian? (Hew York, Macmillan, 19^0), p . 2l^ . kee discussion 
in Thsien, 0£. cit., pp. 27-32.
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"existentialist theology, 7,1 In our study, we shall deal with Freud 
at greater length la subsequent chapters. The Marxian doctrine can 
only be mentioned in passing.
Under the stimulus of vorld events, vhich disappointed liberal 
hopes for the Imminent coming of the Kingdom of God, and under the 
stimulus of secular ideologies, such as Marx's and Freud's and the 
"existentialists'," Christian theologians have been rediscovering 
the insights of the Reformers, of Augustine, and of the Nev Testament 
theologians. We have already mentioned Karl Barth, Relnhold Niebuhr, 
Paul Tillich, and Donald Baillie.
In speaking of the Freudian myth of the fall, Professor David 
Calms, of Aberdeen, says, rightly, that the Freudian idea of the 
original sin as Incest and parricide, along with Freud's later hypo* 
thesis of a primal death instinct, is far fro® being corroborative
■^ See Professor Ian Henderson's Illuminating discussion of 
the issues Involved in Bultmann *s correlation of the Christian con­
ception with Heidegger's "fallenness"t Ian Henderson, Myth in the Nev 
Testament (London, SCM Press, 1952, 5*0, PP* 33-39* Principal refer­
ences are to Kerygma and Mythoa and Heidegger’s Sein und Zelt (see 
Bibliography, infra).
A longer, more recent comparison of Bultmann and Heidegger 
is John MacQuarrie, An Existentialist Theology (see Bibliography, 
infra); Re: Veifallenkeli: ppY 100-ill.
Bultmann's provocative essay on "The Nev Testament and 
Mythology' is nov available in translation (see Bibliography, infra).
Obviously, our study could draw many lines to Heidegger. As 
ve shall see (Chapter Seven, infra), he has influenced depth psychol­
ogy directly (for example, Madard Boss, of Zurich).
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of the state of sin described in Christian theology. 1 Cairns, along 
with Niebuhr, and Emil Brunner, 2 sees perennial truth in the concep­
tion of "original sin" in polarity with the conception of "original 
righteousness." The condition is imperfection, in a certain sense 
of the term. Man's fall into sin is every-man's failure before the 
temptation occasioned by anxiety. It is rebellion against the built- 
in limitations of human life in its temporal existence.3
Niebuhr takes direct issue with the kind of definition which 
Tennant gives. Yet Niebuhr too is concerned with the "moral dimen­
sion" of sin. The individual in fact may be more "moral" than the 
society.^ It is conceivable that he may be more "moral" than the 
"morale" of the society. It Is possible to sin even by refusing
1-David Cairns, The Image of God in Man, p. 232) pp. 223-237*
^or example, Heinrich Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt: "A
Christian Anthropology," trans. by Olive Wyon (London, Lutterworth, 
1939).
^Cf. Niebuhr, The Nature of Man, Chapters 7-10, pp. 178-300) 
Brunner, Man in Revolt, especially as cited in Professor Cairn's 
discussion; Karl Barth, Die Lehre Von Per Versohnung, Die Kirchliche 
Dogmatlk, Vierter Band, frster Teil (Zollikon-Zurich, Evangelischer 
Veriag, 1953)# Sections 59-81) especially "Des Msnschen Fall", 
pp, 531 ff., "Das Problem der Rechtfertigungslehre," jp. 573 ff•, and 
"Die Rechtfertigung alleln durch den Glauben," pp. 679 ff., and the
refreshing Barth essays, "Ihe Humanity of God," and "The Gift of Free­
dom," in Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, trans. by John N. Thomas and 
Thomas Wieser (John Knox Press, Richmond, Virginia, 1980), pp. 37-98, 
at pp. U6-52 and pp. 78-83* Barth continues to see the essential 
humanity only in "the man Christ Jesus." Cf. Cairns, oj>. cit.,
pp. 16U-I79.
**Cf., Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society:
"A Study in Ethics and Polities” (New York, Scribner’s, 1932;.
"on moral grounds" to take responsible action within the dull­
grayness of our existence. Yet as it has already been pointed out, 
acme of the difficulties in such debate are due to the semantic 
confusion, the ambiguity which characterises much of the use of 
such terms as morality and moral, for instance. In our present 
study we are trying to avoid this confusion by distinguishing between 
moral and agapeistic— which refers to the "morality" of the Kingdom 
of God. In ordinary parlance, moral seems more appropriate for de­
scribing the customs and norms of society, derived from its long 
history of trial-and-error wisdom. The law of agape is the substance 
of what we consider the Christian revelation of the "will of God,"
God in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself.
Professor H. Richard Niebuhr, of Yale, comes to grips with 
the problem of relating the two orders I "culture" and "the Christ" 
in his study Christ and Culture. 1 Morality is correlative with 
culture. The Christ is the revelation of the transforming grace of 
agape— and the "law" of agape. Sigmund Freud, as we shall see in 
subsequent discussion, thinks of "the fall" as a fall into culture. 
Culture Itself is collective neurosis.^ However, Christian the­
ology does not say that culture and morality are without the agape.
At the same time it refuses to risk losing its understanding of
Ir . Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York, Harper,
1951).
%his assertion is our inference from his Civilisation and 
Its Discontents, as well as the earlier Totem and ttaboo; infra, 
Chapter i'ive.
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that agape by simply equating it with morality, even vith the highest 
known morality.
Relnhold Niebuhr declares a "moral dimension" for sin. It 
is injustice. He is thinking of justice— mishpat, dikaiosune— in 
its Biblical sense but also in its eminently practical sense.1 He 
is thinking of essential justice as it is Included in justltia 
originali8, the original righteousness, which, for Hiebuhr is a 
here-and-nov reality, not simply a state of soul lost in history and 
pre-history. It is all but overcome by the "second nature," all but 
lost under escapist patterns of response to the fundamental question 
posed by existence. But it is in everyone, while deriving only from 
God.
But aside from its "moral dimension" sin has what Niebuhr 
insists is its spiritual dimension," not that 'Tennant or any other 
serious theologian would disagree. But the question remains open 
as to what this "spiritual dimension" actually is. Niebuhr, resort­
ing to the Old Testament, Pauline, and Augustinlan voluntaristic 
descriptions, calls it rebellion. In the light of the contribution 
of depth psychologists like Otto Rank, we wonder whether a reduction­
ists use of the idea of rebellion may not be misleading. At any
*The Nature of Man, p. 179) The Destiny of Man, Chapter 9, 
"The Kingdom of God and Struggle for J,U8t{ce"r"*( The Nature and 
Destiny, Vol. II, pp. 2**4-286). Cf. Ssil Brunner’s criticism of 
the indefiniteness of Niebuhr's conception of justice, in Charles 
Ksgley and Robert V. Bretall, Relnhold Niebuhr: Afils Religious,
Social, and Political Thought" (fee Library of Living Theology,
Vol. II, Nev York, Macmillan, 1956), pp. 27-33, at pp. 29-31. See 
infra, Chapter Fourteen, note.
Ilk
115
ratei the tradition does support such a usage, even if the insights 
of depth psychology issue a caveat. 1
Niebuhr says that the spiritual dimension of sin is against 
God in the sense of rebelling against the limitations of creature- 
hood. One of these limits, we may infer, may be the inability "in 
this life" to achieve the perfect agape. Hence even to assume its 
perfection in oneself or in some institution is a form of the rebel­
lion which is sinful. However, justice is possible under the aegis 
of agape. Yet it fails under the presumptuousness of pride on the 
one hand, and the twisting by sensuality, on the other.
To avoid the confusion caused by too indiscriminate a use 
of designations like "liberal’* and "conservative" Professor Walter 
M. Horton, of Oberlin, called his first hook Realistic Theology.2 He 
adopts Gustav Aulen’s thesis in Christus Victor and applies it 
"realistically," or "instrumentaliaticallyto use a term which has 
been adopted for our present study. Christ fought and fights the 
power of evil. Christian action must include aggressive attack upon 
the evils in society. Thus does salvation come to mankind. The 
Christian message is of salvation from the power of evil. Those 
who put their faith in the message profess it by helping it in 
its mission. They are to be wise as serpents however, always 
aware of the complexities of modern society and its institutions,
1Infra, Part II.
Walter M. Horton, Realistic Theology (New York, Harper,
193*0.
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In which they are involved as participants.1 Horton seeks light from 
the work of the depth psychologists as he Inquires into the theology 
of human nature.2
Some of the theologians we have considered have been compared 
in a careful study by Dr. Mary Frances Thelen.3 She also discusses 
the thinking of Professor John Coleman Bennett, with whom she see®3
*¥© follow Thelen’s careful study of Horton's theology,
Mary Frances Thelen, Man As Sinner, pp. 117-129.
2Pastoral Psycholo.^, VTI, 68 (November, 1956) calls Professor 
Horton "the man of the month," and Includes an article by him, "A 
Psychological Approach to Theology— After 25 Years (pp. 22-28).
3she includes a study of the theology of Professor Robert 
Lowry Calhoun, of Yale. Like Hocking, he sees sin as an attempt to 
deny, to disobey, the "deepest law of mem's own being.' He says it 
is universal because of man's "more superficial, so-called 'natural' 
inclinations . . . .  toward self-indulgence and self-glorification. ’’ 
Mem needs salvation from his second nature, vhich keeps him from 
loving God and his neighbor aright. Only God can save him, God as 
Love, quickening and guiding his love in return. In the experience 
of salvation, vision and Insight are the dominant means by which the 
grace of God overcomes the power of sin. Like Tillich, Calhoun 
describes this salvation in terms of blessedness.” It is more them 
progress and in some sense less than virtue” because it cannot be 
"sinless" in this life. Justification, in its subjective dimension, 
can be described as "the peace of God which passes all understanding." 
Thelen'e references are principally to essays including, The Dilema 
of Humanitarian Modernism," The Christian Understanding of Man 
(Oxford Conference Book, Chicago, Willett, Clark and Co., 19$B)j 
God and the Common Life (New York, Scribner's, 1935)) and What Is 
j&rn? (Hagen Books on Religion, New York, Association Press, 19377* 
— Thelen, 0£* clt., pp. 129-138.
Cf. John Tulloch, The Christian Doctrine of Sin (Edinburgh 
and London, Wm. Blackwood, 1876}. Principal Tulloch (of St. Mary's 
College, University of St. Andrews) gave these Croall Lectures before 
the Freudian era and before the current wave of theology. Yet, in 
his day, he saw the issue science-or-theology as unrealistic. Both 
science and theology serve (or should serve) the truth (pp. 199-200).
Sin" springs out of the depths of human personality (p. 92). Yet 
man is not a "mere mass of corruption." Despite sin, there is a
to be most in agreement. 1 Bennett, of Union Seminary in Nev York, 
is concerned with the strong ethical imperative "within the gospel.M 
It must not be lost in the rediscovery of the more deterministic 
implications of man’s existence. Yet he "joins with the others in 
a new appreciation of the forgiveness of God which must follow as 
well as precede ethical achievement within the Christian life."^
H. Richard Niebuhr reiterates the insight of Schlelermacher, 
sensing that the theological trend with Ritschl and also with much of 
current thinking has lost something in failing to stress the problem 
of man as man in terms of his "absolute dependence* on God.3 We are 
reminded of the Old Testament emphasis on hesedh and of the hamartlology 
of the Epistle to the Hebrews in Niebuhr’s definition of sin as es­
sentially disloyalty to Him who is wholly loyal and on whom man is 
absolutely dependent.1* He adds to his analysis of sin the
"a divine potency" in man. He quotes F. W. Robertson on "the divine 
order" below the chaos in the human personality (pp. 131-2). Sin 
is inward and experiential. Already in the Old Testament sin is con­
ceived as being "in its nature destructive. It bears death in it as 
its natural working or outcome" (p. 95).
1Ibid., p. 201.
2Ibld.t p. 1*4-8. *aielen cites many articles by Bennett, 
along with the following books: Christian Realism (New York, Charles
Scribner' 8 Sons, 19^1)j Christianity and Our World (Hasen Books on 
Religion, New York, Association Press, 193^17 and Social Salvation 
(New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935). See Thelen, op. cit., ~ 
pp. 139-1^8. ---
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dynamics of "evil imaginations. The reason is led astray by evil 
imaginations, which introduce new corruptions in man’s attitude to 
his life and to the God upon whom he is wholly dependent
H. Richard Niebuhr, like Principal John Baillie and many 
others, urges the corrective function of theology? It tends to 
over-correct, risking the loss of the truth in the error it attacks. 
In our own time perhaps the corrective "Barthian' tendencies may 
stand in need of a corrective which recovers some of the humanistic 
truth in the so-called liberal "error."
In her comparative study of what she calls liberal and 
"realistic" theology on the question of "man as sinner," Miss Thelen 
chides theologians for assaying to use horrowings from the approach 
of psychoanalysis without understanding the content of psychoanalytic 
teaching and its relationship to philosophical anthropology.3
f H^. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New York,
Macmillan, 19^1). We follow thelen’s study to this point: Thelen,
op. clt., pp. IU8-I63. She cites several articles by H. R. Niebuhr, 
along with The Meaning, and The Kingdom of God in America (Chicago, 
Willet, Clark & Co., 1937)•
%f. for instance, John Baillie, "Looking Before and After," 
The Christian Century, LXXV, lk (Chicago, A pril 2, 1953), pp. V00-^02. 
The present writer he3 had occasion to hear Professor Niebuhr recently 
in addresses and forums, in one of which, at Harvard Divinity School,
> in November, 1959, he made "Corrective Theology" his theme.
^Probably we can say with considerable assurance that the 
situation has improved 6ince the mid-forties, when Miss Thelen 
completed her study of the material at hand. Her critical state­
ments are Incidental to her appraisal of what contemparary "American 
realistic" theologians were saying about the problem of man in his 
existence and in his society.— Thelen, oj>. cit., "Reflections at 
the End of an Essay," at pp. 199-203.
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Thelen contrasts "liberal theology" with the subsequent 
correctire theology, which she calls "realistic” as these are 
expressed, especially in recent decades in America.1' Whereas 
"liberal theology" teaches that man finds fulfillment in the ser­
vice of God, "realistic" theology sees God as standing over against 
man in the relationship of both Judge and Redeemer. "Liberal the­
ology" has dropped the conception of original sin and teaches that 
man can either conform to the moral law or at least construe moral 
law in terms of what is actually possible of achievement. "Realistic 
theology," on the other hand, believes that man cannot avoid an 
uneasy conscience in sane form or other and that he must, "within 
his sin," seek forgiveness from God. "Liberal theology" thinks of 
the human will as being free to choose the good, although it is 
tempted by forces which reflect both biological endowment and 
cultural lag. "Realistic theology" insists that there is a bias 
within the will itself which makes yielding to such temptation in­
evitable in every action. "Liberal theology" tends to view sin as 
moral wrongness with a religious reference. Big and little sins are 
to be distinguished. Liberal optimism holds that sin is on the way 
out, since God is curing it in the transformation of individual lives 
and in the progress of society. "Realistic theology," on the other 
hand, sees it as a wrongness in man's relationship to God. It is 
idolatrous presumption. It is to be taken seriously because of the
*Cf. H. Shelton Smith, Changing Conceptions of Original Sin, 
"A Study in American Theology Since 1750 1 (New York,"Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1955)# 2k2 pp.
amount of evil and destruction it causes in the vorld. Sin is at 
least analogous to neurosis as psychoanalysis describes it. Depth 
psychology helps us to a clearer understanding of the sinfulness in 
the Mslns of the righteous."
"Liberal theology's'' doctrine of justification and of the 
grace of God as it brings "salvation’’ holds that the effect is 
transformation— or the traditional conception of sanctification. God 
confers the power to work more valiantly for the coming of the King­
dom. ’Realistic theology, on the other hand, stresses reconcili­
ation as the effect of the saving grace. The experience of grace 
consoles the individual and his society in the failure of their 
best efforts. Moral improvement may be a secondary effect. But 
it is not the primary effect, nor the criterion.
Liberal theology" views social salvation in terms of a 
possible application of the ethics of Jesus to group life. "Realis­
tic theology" sees this as too simple and wishful and thinks that 
it is necessary to proceed, even soterlologlcally, in a kind of 
dialectic between the ultimate goal of love and a realistic social 
ethic which is based on the persistence of power politics.1
The Recovery of Perspective I "Sin," "Righteousness," "Grace"
Reinhold Niebuhr probably exaggerates the positions which 
he seeks to contrast. Yet his rhetorical manner of analysing the
^We refer to the entire study Man As Sinner, especially to 




problem and its attempted solutions has penetrated to a depth vhich 
does seen to be the level on vhich theology should pursue correctively 
Its perennial task of addressing the ’lost." He appreciates "how 
infinite may be the shades of avareness of guilt from the complacency 
of those vho are spiritually blind to the sensitivity of the saint 
who knows that he is not a saint." He chides both "most Pelagians" 
and ’'■any Augustinians" for their failure to see the truth in 
balance. 1 His suggestion for this balance is to be found in state* 
ments like this, reminiscent of the Reformers, Augustine, and Paul:
Man is most free in the discovery that he is not free. ”2 Man's sin 
then is his refusal to recognize his inherent limitations, his essen­
tial creatureliness.^
As we have pointed out, original sin is a meaningful desig­
nation only with respect to an original righteousness. Sin Is a 
fall from man's essential nature. Contemporary theology seeas to 
give this a present significance without getting bogged down in the 
ancient debate about the phylogenetic aspects of some primordial 
racial event.
^The Kature and Destiny, I, p. 260.
2Ibid. Cf. s "Human freedom is the joy whereby man appro­
priates for himself God's election."— Karl Barth, "The Gift of 
Freedom," in The Humanity of God, p. 79.
3cf. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, pp. 77-86. For 
instance, Tillich says, "Sin does not produce death but gives to 
death the power which is conquered only in participation in the 
eternal.” "The structure of finitude is good in itself, but under 
the conditions of estrangement it becomes a structure of destruction." 
— p. 77 •
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Augustine himself affirmed that "esse qua esse honum est. ”1 
This Is the prevailing doctrine of the Hebrev-Christlan tradition, 
Including emphatically, the first chapter of Genesis. Evil Is a 
distortion, though It Is a dynamic distortion, of the good. In the 
beginning, according to the logic of Christian faith, all things 
are good. 2
Acaording to Niebuhr, the original righteousness, In human, 
theological-psychological terms, Is the opposite of the vsinful self” 
vhlch is observed by the transcendent self— the "conscience" (?)•
It Is the "transcendent possibilities'1 regarded classically as ”lav." 
In Christianity It is the lav of agape, the lav of love, as Jesus 
represents It to us, and as he eumarlsed It: ”Thou shalt love the
Lord thy God vlth all thy heart and all thy soul and all thy mind) 
mad thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." The justitia origlnalls 
contains "(a) The perfect relation of the soul to God In vhlch obe­
dience Is transcended by love, trust and confidence") (b) the 
perfect Internal harmony of the soul vlth Itself In all of its 
desires and Impulses") and (c) the perfect harmony of life vlth 
life." 3
him are Indebted to Professor Tillich for this reference.
The thought occurs also In St. Augustine, Confessions, VII, 12.
Cf. Re inhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny, 1, p. 267) Paul 
Tillich, The Theological Significance of Existentialism and Psycho­
analysis,'' in Theology of Culture, edited by Robert C. Kimball (Nev 
York, Oxford University Press, 1959)# PP- 112-126, at pp. 118-119.
2CfGenesis 1:18.
3 Re inhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny, I, pp. 288-295.
The self vhich is essentially righteous is the I of momentary 
self-transcendence. 1 Since Niebuhr in explaining vhat he means cannot 
avoid speaking as a psychologist, we are all the more encouraged to 
inquire of depth psychology what it postulates as the inner psychic 
anatomy” of the self. This we must do before ve are able to go far 
into our inquiry concerning guilt. 2
Probably Niebuhr is quite right in saying that the twin 
conceptions of original righteousness and original sin provide a 
continual corrective both to extreme pessimism and to extreme opti­
mism. "Against pessimistic theories of human nature which affirm 
the total depravity of man it is important to assert the continued 
presence in man of the Justitia originalis, of the law of love, as 
lav and requirement•”3
xIndeed, this is a doctrine of an Uber-Ich. It is not the 
same as Freud's. In fact Niebuhr's conception ofthe I of Self­
transcendence and Tillich's conception of the self vhlck is ec-static 
to itself (Tillich, Systematic. Vol. I, pp. 12^-127) do not enter into 
dialogue with Freud's conception of the superego. The present writer 
has heard Professor Tillich, in conversation, dismiss the Freudian 
concept as virtually untenable. This is not to say that either 
theologian refuses to recognise the increasing general use of the 
term as a kind of synonym for "conscience." She Freudian particu­
larity of the concept is far from their views of conscience, however. 
Cf., Infra, Chapter Ten. Cf. Relnhold Niebuhr, "Human Creativity and 
Self-Concern in Freud's Thought," Freud and the Twentieth Century, 
(Benjamin Nelson, editor, New York, Wsridian feooka, 1957),pp.o9-
276, at p. 263, pp. 266-267.
o'Infra, Chapter Four.
3The Nature and Destiny, I, n. 296.
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The conception of original righteousness is also "in refuta­
tion of modern secular and Christian forms of utopianism, to recognise 
that the fulfillment of the lav of love is no simple possibility. ’'1 
To obey completely the lav of love requires a freedom vhich man does 
not have* Niebuhr credits the Reformation vith the recovery of the 
insight that "the fact of sin is a perennial category of historic 
existence." Divine grace is not an infused power vlthin to 
enable him to fulfill the lav of love, as medieval Roman Catholic 
theology held generally. The Reformers sav "divine grace" as that 
divine mercy vhich brings man's "uneasy conscience to rest despite 
the continued self-contradiction of human effort upon every level 
of achievement.
Professor Tillich, because of vfaat he regards as an almost 
hopeless semantic confusion for the contemporary mind, regrets 
Niebuhr's choice of the term "original sin." Tillich’s construction 
is that the essential I is set over against the estranged 1^ in the 
experience of the moral— ethical— imperative* .3
What Is the gospel of grace to "sinful" man? Even according 
to Reinhold Niebuhr, who seems to be stronger on analysis than he is 
on solution, it is that "God takes man's sin upon Himself and into
xIbld. 2Ibld.. p. 299. •
3w. are relying here on conversation vith Professor Tillich.
He also correlates justification" vith "acceptance of acceptance 
for instance, in Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, 'The Terry Lectures,” 
(Nev Haven, Yale, University Press, 195 £)# pp.”To4-l65. See infra,
Part III. '
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Himself.'^ Justification is not something to strive for) it is 
simply a gift to be accepted. Here again, in our own time, Is 
the doctrine of 'justification by grace through faith." Theology 
must continue to seek out its actual dynamics, in terms of social 
dynamics— the Gestalt of grace, 2 the actual form which it takes 
in its saving work and in terms of psychodynamics and interpersonal- 
dynamics•
1The Nature and Destiny, I, p. lk3*
2"The Gestalt of grace" Is a theological, sociological 
concept used by Professor Paul Tillich and others In the so-called 
Kairos circle" In the Christian socialist movement, which unfortu­
nately was not able to stem the tide of "demonic" Nazism. The 
use of the term suggests the influence of Gestalt psychology. Sea 
Paul Tillich, The Formative Power of Protestantism," in The 
Protestant Era, a collection of essays translated by James Luther 
Adams {Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 19M3), pp. 206-221.
-CHAPTER THREE 
THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTIONS OF SIN AND
 w b m h em m  m m s m as----t................................. ....... ....... — —  
The ConceptIona of Sin and Justification in Relation 
to the Biblical Origins and to the 'Present
As it speaks to the contemporary situation, corrective 
theology finds its way back to the Biblical origins and reviews the 
’ history of its characteristic motifs, including the conceptions of
sin and justification. Its task is perennial. Its essentially 
soteriological concern is always informed by its Christology, since 
this is the elaboration of God's presence, in event and symbol, over­
coming the power of sin-and-evil in human existence. The late 
Professor Donald M. Baillie keeps this basic soteriological concern 
ever in the foreground in his book on the Incarnation and Atonement.
In relating the Christian doctrine of Atonement to the 
problem of human sinfulness and the need for forgiveness, Baillie 
says, after a carefully human consideration of the dynamics of 
forgiving love, "There is an atonement, an expiation, in the heart 
of God Himself, and out of this comes the forgiveness of our sine.
He follows with a historical review of the sacramental 
tradition in the vorld of the Bible. Christianity sees the climax
 ^ *Donald M. Baillie, God Was In Christ, p. 175.
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of this tradition in the Christ-event • There it serges with the 
prophetic message of absolutely free forgiveness, which cases fro® 
a God who actively seeks the sinner to bring hi® to receptive repent­
ance.1 The sacramental message is that "now it is God Himself that 
makes the sacrifice. " The old terms sure used, but now with a radi­
cally nev interpretation.2 The Divine Shepherd goes out to find the 
lost sheep.
The seeking shepherd and the lamb of God are one and the
same. It is love that seeks and love that suffers in the process
of forgiving, of receiving back that which was lost. In the purely 
human sequence, Jesus "vent straight on as the 'friend of sinners, * 
and got deeper and deeper into trouble, until in the end He was 
condemned to death . . . .  He died for sinners: it was his love
for them that brought Him to the Cross."3
The "sinners" who® Jesus befriended and for whose sake he
died were primarily those whom the "righteous" of Israel called 
"sinners.” Yet Christianity sees in his life and death an ultimate 
interpretation: he died for all sinners, for the sins of the whole
world. Even in the thinking of the Apostle Paul, says Baillle vlth 
C. H. Dodd, the sacrifice was not really to appease an angry God.
*Cf. iAtke 15: Jokn 3il6, 17*
'"'God Was In Christ, pp. 171-179• Of course it can be said 
that such a conception of God, as seeking the one estranged from him, 
is also present to some extent in the Old Testament, notably in 
Hosea, also in Jonah.
3Donald BalUie, God Was In Christ, p. 183.
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"God's merciful attitude towards sinners is never regarded as the 
result of the process, hut as its cause and source. 1 Paul's idea 
of the wrath of God was of what can be identified "with the con­
suming fire of inexorable divine love in relation to our sins."
The New Testament is never able to stop tracing upstream the love 
that was shown in the Cross of Christ, to its source "the eternal 
love of God dealing sacrlflelally with the sins of the world* '2
The traditional idea of "Atonement" makes sense only if "in 
the last analysis it is an eternal work of atonement, supratemporal 
as the life of God is, but not 'timeless' as an abstraction is; 
appearing incarnate once, but touching every point of history, and 
going on as long as sins continue to be comitted and there are 
sinners to be reconciled*" The symbol is "The Lamb slain from the 
foundation of the world*"3 Thus we see in Western, Protestant the­
ology a recovery of an emphasis which has been kept vital within
Ibid., p* 188. Cf. C. H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the 
Romans, ’The Moffatt New Testament Commentary Series,^London, Hodder 
& Stoughton, 1952), rei Romans 3*2fc f.: "Being Justified freely by
his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God 
hath set forth as a propitiation (hllasterion) through faith, by his 
blood . * * ." (Baillie, God Was In Christ, pp. 187-189). Re: the
wrath of God— Dodd, Romans, pp. 20“ff. (Baillie, God Was In Christ, 
p. 189)# Baillie also cites Vincent Taylor, Ihe Atonement in hew 
Testament Thought (London, Epvorth Press, 19^6), pp.i$3 f., an#
H. 'temil Irunner, The Mediator, translated by Olive Wyon (London, 
Lutterworth, 193^J, pp. 519 ft.
2Donald Baillie, God Was In Christ, p. 189.
^Revelation 13:8—  See Baillie's note, Note 2, ibid., p. 192.
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Eastern Christianity through the centuries, especially through 
its liturgy,3”
Justification by grace through faith is not self- Justification. 
It is experienced as coming from outside one's self, from beyond. Even 
as the subjective side of sin is despair, so the subjective side of 
Justification is hope. It is hope vhich says that one is being 
lifted up out of his despair and beyond the pover of tragedy and 
evil, not for mere euphoric bliss, but for active fulfillment of the 
meaning of life. Justification is transcending one's despairing 
situation, being borne out of the concentration camp of despair. 
Christian goodness "Is never conscious of its own merit but only of 
God's mercy." 2
More than a historic moment of personal revelation by God 
of his love for man, the Christ-event is a dynamic force. "God 
was in Christ, reconciling the vorld unto himself, not reckoning 
unto them their trespasses."3 The attitude vhich such gospel 
creates within the Individual is described as the "paradox of grace." 
"Because God does not reckon unto us our trespasses, ve will not 
reckon unto us our virtues." The paradox of grace is, in the words
13bid., pp. 196-197.
^Ibid., p. 201. Baillie adds, "©xat is the very secret of 
Christian character."
3II Corinthians 5*19# quoted, Baillie, ibid., p. 202.
130
of Paul, which we hare quoted earlier, "• « • • I, yet not I, but 
the grace of God . . . .
While looking to its heritage, theology must also seek the 
Gestalt of this saving grace even within the so-called secular order. 
In the sore consciously "sacred" or religiously-oriented community 
we are witnessing creative attempts to implement the gospel through 
Agape communities, movements within the Church like the Iona com­
munity, in Scotland, attempts to bring healing to the inner-city, 
like the East Harlem Protestant Parish, in New York, and serious 
grappling with political dynamics in such theologically-inspired 
projects as the Institute of Ethics and Politics, which is centered 
at Wesleyan University in Connecticut. 2 The problem of sin and 
grace extends to these and other expressions of grace-in-actlon.
Our present study seems more in touch with the movement called, 
variously, pastoral psychology, pastoral psychiatry, and pastoral
1I Corinthians 15:10; Donald Baillle, God Wan In Christ,
p. 202.
"It seems plain, then, that there is a quite luminous 
and practical truth underlying the mysterious statement that only 
by the aid of divine grace can a man be free to do and be what he 
ought to do and be. It means at least this, as a mere matter of 
psychological description t that the best kind of living, or the 
finest type of character, does not come through sheer volitional 
effort to realise an ideal, but in a more indirect way, as the 
fruit of a life of faith in God. "— Donald M. Baillle, "Philosophers 
and Theologians on the Freedom of the Will," reprinted from Hhe 
Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. Ho. 2 (June, 1951)# in the 
posthumously published papers: D. M. Baillle, pie Theology of The
Sacraments and Other Papers (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons,
w r ,  p p. w J R v T  W .
2In Middletown, Connecticut, under the leadership of a 
theologian-social scientist, Dr. Kenneth Underwood.
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counselling. However the implications even for so limited s com­
parison as the present one are far-reaching, beyond the simply 
"psychotherapeutic" function of the Church’s ministry.1
Preliminary Inferences I The Relation of the Conceptions 
of ^in and Justification to Bach Other and io -toe 
Ihroblem of Man In Existence and in Society
Our study of the Biblical origins and of the contemporary 
expression of the conceptions of sin and justification leads to the 
following conclusions.
(1) As Professor Edgar P. Dickie, of St. Andrews, puts its 
"It is only from the experience of grace that the depth of sin opens 
up before us. " 2 The conception of sin depends on the concept!cm of 
Justification. Although misery precedes joy In much of human exper­
ience, It is understood as misery when it is contrasted vith joy.
The gospel of justification by grace comes as joy into the midst of 
despair to lift the person into a sense of meaning despite the 
anxieties and ambiguities of his existence.
(2) Justification is by grace alone.- through faith, according 
to the Christian conception. As th. Aegiburg Conf.Mlon puts it:
Hfriting. vhich are representative of this concern for the 
actual, practical, "lmplementaticm&l," incamational implications 
of the conception of justification by grace, or what we have referred 
to as the "Gestalt of grace" in action, are theses H. R. Mackintosh, 
Hie Christian Experience of Forgiveness (London, Nisbet, 1927)I 
D ^ ai'd l T  Baillle T  6od' \SX S  W f s t  — we note especially the 
"Epilogue s The Body of Christ"! and The Theology of the Baer aments 
(Part II, but the other papers as well).
2Edgar P. Dickie, God Is Light (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 
1953), p. 13. ~
h1’God imputes this faith for righteousness in his ovn sight. God 
gives the faith that accepts the justification* The entire event 
of justification is rescue from the outside, as it vere. Rescue is 
first experienced} then it is made a topic for reflection.
(3) Justification presupposes original goodness in the 
"creation" itself; that is, in the essential nature of man as a 
part of creation. Theologians differ as to the locus of this 
essential nature. Sane see it only in the Christ, qualitatively 
different from man's usual nature. Others see it in every man as 
a human being over against his ovn distortion of his "human-hood." 
The original righteousness vhich is the content of justification 
is essential humanity. Christianity undertakes to define the quint­
essence of humanity in the lav of agape and the grace of agape.
It is as Relnhold Niebuhr describes it: (a) the perfect relation
of the person to God in love, trust, and confidence; (b) the 
perfect internal harmony of the person in all his desires and 
impulses; and (c) the perfect harmony of life with life. 2
(*) Justification includes Divine forgiveness for actual 
guilt and Divine deliverance from the power opposed to the original 
righteousness.
1Aua3burg Confession, IV— Henry Bettenson, ed., Documents 
of the Christian Church (Nev York and London, Oxford University 
Press, 19*7)1 P. 297.
4hipra, Chapter Tvo.
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(5) justification is by the Christ-event-and symbol, 1 
by what Donald Baillle has described as the Incarnation and the 
Atonement seen together. As Emil Brunner, in speaking of God's 
self-disclosure, says, "Jesus Christ is what God says to us. " 2
It is in the idiom of humanity that the meaning of Justification 
and sin is disclosed. In the vision of Jesus as the Christ the 
Church sees essential humanity. The three elements of original 
righteousness are present. The center for man's selfhood is not 
himself as an isolated entity. It is God, or ultimate reality. 
Suffice it to say, for our study: It is beyond the person’s own 
plexus of psychic energies, beyond his own subjectivity. He both 
loses and finds himself In relationship. This does not mean that 
he is to lose himself in a kind of nirvana, or death to individu­
ated selfhood. The Christian conception of justification holds to 
both aspects of the fundamental mystery and the fundamental anxiety: 
Man is distinct: yet he is dependent. Justification means partaking 
of a new humanity en Christo.
(6) Sin as offense, or actual sin, is basically a refusal 
to accept Justification by grace through faith. It is a rejection 
of the grace of God. This includes elements traditionally described 
as "unbelief," "rebellion," "rejection of Christ," "hubris" or
^Here the term symbol is used in the sense proclaimed by
Professor Tillich— "The symbol participates in the reality which 
is symboliaed." Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 10. Cf. Tillich's 
discussion of Christoiogical symbols, ibid., pp. 125-130, 136 ff.
% e  are unable to locate the exact reference. However, see 
similar statements in Brunner, The Mediator, pp. 236, 320-1.
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"The pride of life.' "Concupiscence"— the lust of the eye and of
the flesh— is regarded more as a manif©station of the basic offense. 
Blind nature, or "anInal nature," may provide much of the tempta­
tion to sin, but it is not vhat Christianity means by sin, or the 
sin. Sin may be described as (a) self-justification or (b) despair 
of the justification for one's self vhich is possible by grace.
(7) Breaches of moral lav, breaches of the transcendent 
lav of agape, may be regarded as Instances or incidents vithln the 
pattern of rejecting the grace of God.
(8) The practical, psychological use of the conception of 
justification by grace through faith seems to be much as it has been 
suggested by the late Professor Donald Baillie, for example. One 
can go through life (a) with an arrogant fiction of complete self­
reliance, (b) with an irresponsible resignation, or (e) with an 
attitude vhich says, "I, yet not I, but the grace of God. " 1 (a) He 
can try to preempt the place of the Almighty (hubris), (b) He can 
fictionalise his need for reunion and refuse to be an I in any 
responsible sense. Or (c) He can acknowledge both his absolute 
dependence and his solitude— the state of being cut adrift from the 
other— and eomsit himself to the meaning vhich God gives him to see 
in such ambiguous tension and uncertainty. Critics of theology may 
be inclined to suspect in this kind of a solution but another fiction. 




As vith despair (sin) so, vith hope (Justification), a 
'’choice" is involved. Bat if, on reflection, one looks hack upon 
his own choice in itself as the "saving act," he risks a return 
to despair.
Despite the appearances at tints, theology’s guiding con­
cern Is for truth defined as "the ultimately trustworthy," that 
which is trustworthy for human beings! It is only in the interest 
of discovering, rediscovering, explicating and helping to implement, 
this trustworthiness-trustworthy agape— that there is valid reason 
for reiterating and reformulating these twin conceptions of sin and 
Justification.
(9) It may well be that sin as a designation should be 
reserved for "culpable, accountable wrongness." However, Justifi­
cation attacks the larger problem of tragic evil: sin-and-evil,
including both culpable and non-culpable wrongness.1
f^tie traditional distinctions: 'original sin" and
actual sin, ” continue to be misleading, terminologlcally.
PAST TWO
"MAM AS SIMMER" IN THE LIGHT 
OP DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY
CHAPTER FOUR
WHO IS HE?— CAN WE ASSUME A SUBJECT-SELF?
’Our Knowledge of Ourselves in Theology 
ana Depth Psychology
Theologians have inquired into the nature of revelation, of 
God, of nan and society. They have tried to analyse the problem of 
man-in-his-existence-and-in-society and to understand the Christian 
gospel as solution. Their understanding of the psychology of man 
is often profound, though perhaps at times open to the charge of 
being tendentious.
John Calvin begins his systematic treatment of Christian 
faith with a discussion of the psychology of man as it affects and 
reflects theology proper— or "our knowledge of God.n
Our wisdom . . . .  consists almost entirely of two parts: 
the knowledge of God and of ourselves. But as these are 
connected together by many ties, it is not easy to determine 
which of the two precedes, and gives birth to the other.1
Man is conscious of that in himself Which is "something like a world
of misery," a "feeling of Ignorance, vanity, want, weakness, in
short, depravity and corruption." If one remains oblivious to these
■*-John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Bk. I, 




he tends to rest in himself, to imagine himself as self-sufficient.
Bat if he is awake to them he is being led ' as by the hand 7 to seek 
God.1
But Calvin goes on to say that no one ever truly understands 
himself until he has first "contemplated the face of God." Self­
understanding is seeing oneself in contrast to one's understanding 
of God. Hence, by necessity, Christian psychology must derive from 
Christian theology.2
Today, four centuries after Calvin, theologians continue to 
subordinate the study of man's nature to theology proper. It is 
within the context of theology that Christianity describes man's 
condition and behavior by the terms sinfulness, sinful, ginning, 
sinner, and sin. Yet today, as in Calvin's time, we recognise at 
the outset that "our knowledge of God" and "our knowledge of our­
selves" are so interrelated that "it is not easy to determine which 
of the two precedes, and gives birth to the other.”3
Depth psychology suggests some mental mechanisms by which we 
conceptualise God, but it sheds no direct light on what we have called 
theology proper.^  However the various schools of psycho-analysis do 
allege considerable light on "the nature of ourselves." It is upon 
the problem of man-ln-hls-exlstence and ln-hls-soclety that we focus
xIbld. 2cf. ibid., paragraphs 2 and 3, pp • 38-39 •
3supra, Mote 1.
supra, in our Introduction) also, infra, Chapter Ik.
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our inquiry. In what sense la it proper to our understanding of 
ourselves to speak of nan as sinner? We find that depth psychology 
encourages us to appreciate the complexity of the very concept 
ourselves. It forces then the question, 'If sin, who precisely, 
is sinner, sinning, sinful?” It helps us In the finding of the 
question and Its answer.
Both to illustrate and to pursue this dialectic of theology 
with depth psychology our discussion will pursue the questions Who 
is the Blnner? or What is the nature of the subject-self, the I of 
accountability? It is helpful to cite an incident in which easily 
recognisable vrongness as offense is displayed.
One sees a frightful altercation, a one-sided attack, in a 
public place.1 A man-in-sudden-rage knocks another down and uncon­
scious. He continues to pound and kick his victim until the 6lowly 
alerted passers-by force a halt. He then turns an them, with his 
fists clenched. Like Goliath, he is ready to take on anyone else.
What is going on in his inner world? His victim is innocent. 
Why has the man-in-rage chosen one of the crowd and assaulted him 
so viciously, so compulsively, repetitively, tragically?
We are Indebted to the psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan for 
the concept parataxic distortion, akin to the Freudian idea of 
projection.2 The man-in-rage is seeing things! True, his pent-up
^The following is our own "eye-witness report admittedly 
with considerable editorial comment. The altercation was witnessed 
in a Boston subway, on a night in November, 1959*
2Infra, this chapter.
rage can cite a wiap of a provocation in the victim's mild retort 
or rebuke at hia loud behavior* But the victim cannot as himself 
mean this much to his attacker. He is attacked not as he is in 
himself but as he is as an object that represents by projection, 
distortion with dlsassociatlon, some threatening presence already 
in the aggressor's ovn psychic vorld. Comon-sense psychology says 
that one hates vhat he most fears. The victim is seen through the 
distorted lens, the peculiar inner constructs, of the attacker.
This troubled psyche— the inner vorld or "mind” of the aggressor—  
in its inability to contain Itself externalises its conflict and 
casts in the role of villain the handiest person-object present.
To the attacker the victim seems the agent of a hostile vorld. 
"Parataxlc distortion” is seeing things in terms of one's ovn pecul­
iar experience. Borroving from the terminology of rhetoric, Sullivan 
described as syntaxlc the objective sequences of things or events 
as they are. Prototaxie impressions are characteristically the 
earliest infant's mode of experiencing objects and events as unrelated. 
These objects and events as they appear in the individual's ovn 
peculiar, distorted arrangement are parataxlcA "Subjectiven seems 
to be clear enough as a descriptive in many cases. However, it does 
not carry the connotation of pathogenesis vhich such a violent 
Incident suggests.
*Syntaxis, prototaxis, and parataxis are "modes" of experience. 
See, for example, tne discussion of Sullivan's conception in Ruth 
L. Monroe, Schools of Psychoanalytic Btought, "An Exposition. Crltlaue. 




Yet even after we have granted such a description of the attack 
upon an innocent person, how can we get at the rage, its Intensity, its 
obviously murderous telos?1 Ibis kind of question seems to express the 
reason for one's dwelling on such an incident long after witnessing it, 
and indeed during the moment of the awareness.
There can be no doubt, in this instance, but that the man-in- 
rage is actually in the process of destroying his victim when he is 
forced to stop. An elderly woman, one of the more courageous of 
those standing nearest the fray, calls for an immediate cessation of 
his senseless pounding of a victim who may already be dead as far 
as the crowd can see.
’’You have no right to do that,” is the almost curious refrain. 
Yet, how profound a judgment! It speaks the more "syntaxic” valuation 
of this encounter of two worlds, No one has a right to hit another, 
especially when he is down, and never without just cause, such as, 
perhaps, a provocation "syntaxically” at least commensurate with 
the reflexive retaliation. ’’You have no rlgit; you are not justified 
in tearing down the Investment of others; the person of another is 
not yours to destroy. How can you presume to destroy that which is 
not yours evsn to touch?” Obese are the questions of the, alas, too 
weakly protective onlookers, the social milieu around the crime.
term telos is used in the literature of depth psychology: 
B. g«, Ernest Jones, K e  Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, III, p. 272. 
However our own use ot the term telos does not derive directly from 
any of the depth psychologists we have read, so far as we know. (We 
may have been influenced by William McDougall's "hormic” theory.)
Hence, its use generally throughout our exposition and commentary is 
in the interest of our own theologically-oriented description and 
interpretation. Here it means quite simply, intent or goal.
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But the attacker seems not to be asking such questions. His 
rage is saying to all the world, "I an destroying this person-objeet.
I am ready to turn my asserted right-to-destroy upon you I" Here Is 
the acting out of a might-is-right doctrine, however irrational it 
may be In its articulation. Here is an example of the problem of 
evil, certainly of moral evil I
Yet to his own parataxlc vision the man-in-rage is destroying 
a bad and threatening object. At least this is what most depth psy­
chologists seem to be saying. Threatening In what sense? To whom?
Or to what? Even if we take into consideration the biochemical 
effects possibly of alcohol, perhaps even narcotics, if we allow 
for the neurological tensions arising from organic disturbance, 
even if we see the Incident as determined glandularly, we neverthe­
less must recognise that In the "thinking” of the man-in-rage the 
threat is conceived by his whatever-conceives-of-things to be directed 
against his own inner strivings, his own struggling, despised ’self." 
He "defends himself."
To say that he manifests hostility, that his action bespeaks 
hatred is true enough. But what is hostility? Why is it? here 
depth psychology has more than one answer. Yet thers seems to be 
a concerted light in the very recognition of the inner dynamics 
involved.
Freud eventually posed as explanation a primitive death 
instinct.1 The urge to destroy operates as a part of the given in
^Infra, this chapter*
the human psyche, vith ell the force of a need. It Bay be conceived 
ee resistance to change, an urge to return to earlier stages of 
development, eventually to ’’dust*"
v It Bay be aore than aereiy analogous to the destructiveness 
of the Hot es It stalks its prey, falls upon and devours it* It 
aey have been part of the survival equipment of the ea e nan's 
psyche* Destroy to survive!
Certainly sobs such theory of an instinct of destructiveness
seeue to be the sinplest explanation, fcruelly at least* Society’s 
\task vis-a-vis crises of passion be costs alBOSt simply to control 
and channel the Ineradicable aggressive instincts of human beings* 
Against the apostle ue may have to say vith increasing insight,
' Exercise proflteth much! ’ Contrived outlets for aggression must 
be improved and Bede available to all*
The hypothesis of a primitive drive to destroy is regarded 
variously, even by the Freudianss as not proved, disproved, improv­
able, end Improvable.£ Yet all depth psychologists recognise the 
phenomenon of "aggressiveness." Most however regard destructiveness 
as a synthetic impulse. It may be derived from more primitive urges 
that flow together toward asms wrong, perhaps clinically correctlble,
^Patrick Mullahy, who, it la true, cannot be described as a 
Freudian," makes the following statement, which is representative 
of critiques mode by so-called "revisionists ' (and by clinical 
psychologists like Professor H. A* Murray, of Harvard, who la also 
a biologist and physician, who has actually gene through a Freudian 
psychoanalysis)»— "This theory has no empirical proof at all* Vo 
competent contemporary biologist we know of has ever claimed that 
living matter has an inherent tendency to die, In Freud's sense* The
■' Xh3
Ik k
goal. All psychoanalysts recognise the compulsive aspect of rage 
and hostile aggression.
What seems to get lost Is the focus of accountability. As 
ve approach a focus we lose the accountability or culpability! Who 
cosanits sin? In our "street attack” incident the readiest answer
theory is purely speculative, put forth in order to ’explain* the 
enormous amount of aggressiveness and destructiveness vhlch he 
actually observed."— Patrick Mollahy, Oedipus: Hyth and Complex,
"A Review of Psychoanalytic Theory (19^8, New York, Grove Press,
1955), p. 323.
Cf. appreciative treataienta of the Freudian dualism— without 
blanket acceptance of it in the form which Freud gave to it: "Freud
looks deeper into the human predicament than many of his followers 
and critics/1— Paul Tillich (Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 6l). 
Lionel Trilling, in Freud and Tbe Crisis of 6ur Culture (Boston,
Beacon Press, 1956), pp. 25-26; and Will Herberg, Freud, the 
Revisionists, and Social Reality,” Chapter 10 in Freud and The 
Twentieth Century (Benjamin Nelson, editor, New York, Iferidian 
Books, 195Y}, pp. Ik3-l63# especially at p. 157*
For respected, qualified, endorsement of Freud's dualistic 
theory, see: (l) Franz Alexander, "Development of the Fundamental
Concepts of Psychoanalysis,” dynamic Psychiatry (F. Alexander and 
Helen Ross, editors, University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 3-3k, 
at p. 17, where Alexander says that the theory became simply ”a 
philosophical abstraction," valuable in distinguishing two basic 
vectors in the life process (anabolic and catabotic); (2) Karl 
Wenninger, "An Anthropological Note on The Theory of Pre-Natal 
Instinctual Conflict," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis,
XX, 1939, PP. *39-^2.
See also Lewis Samuel Feuer, Psychoanalysis and Ethics 
(Springfield, Illinois, 1955), for s constructive, hopeful, critique 
of Freud’s philosophy of civilisation (pp. 72-115); re: The
Freudian "primitivistic" theory of civilisation (pp. 105-113); 
re: The innateness of "hatred and aggression" in man (pp. 109-113).
A militantly Freudian socialistic, even utopian, philosophical- 
historical study ia that of Herbert Marcuse (Professor of Political 
Science at Brandeis University), Eros and Civilisation (Boston, The 
Beacon Press, 1955)*
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k is: ths man-in-rage, ttes aggressor. Where would society be If this
were not the answer? Bat who la the aggressor— what in hiss is the 
£  of accountability? It is precisely here, as ve enter the strange 
world of his kaleidoscopic selfhood, that ve get lost* Be as a 
responsible self, a "free serai agent, all bet dissolves before
t
our search. Yet, if we withdraw again to the outside where we 
observe his leave off battering hie victim, we see ea apparent 
unity, a nan, reluctantly desisting, facing around to the crowd, 
much In tho wanner of a trapped animal. Hit clenched fists, after 
a long moment, fall* Be heads for the nearest exit* Who drops his
►
flats? Who heads toward freedom from the eyes of the crowd?
Freudians say It la the ego— the agency of reason— recovering con* 
trol after a momentary loss of it to the surging forces of the 
biological organism— the id— perhaps allied with the destructive 
t superego (ths repressed introjestad threatening parent•image).1
These had stormed the capitol and overthrown the executive ego and 
effected a coup cTejt&t. The release of aggressive energy and the 
effect of the eotmter*atlmulus Of the reproving crowd force a raster*
at ion of ego control* Cbvlously this man's ego is relatively weak,
► roMtWy <UvidM er 'sp lit. 8
Karen Homey, Sullivan, and others among the eo*called 
"revisionists" and neo-Freudians f would say that it la the "actual
^Infra, this chapter* 2Infra, p. 166.
/
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self’ or "waking self," who leaves off beating the victim, after 
some kind of coup and restoration.^
Carl G. Jung, of Zurich, who left the Freudian persuasion 
to develop his own metapsychology, would say it is the conscious 
ego with its persona after a violent eruption of unconscious drives 
in assertion of the unconscious ego. There has been a frantic dis­
oriented attempt within the man-in-rage to deflect on to an outside 
object the outraged unconscious* assault. Or the outside world is 
the target for the unconscious* rebellion, since the societal 
environment has been the force shaping the persona in relative vio­
lation of the inner, endqpsychic, life. This has been an incident 
in the painful process of the individual's dynamic self, his psy­
che’s unceasing struggle to become integrated and "individuated.”2
Alfred Adler, who was the first disciple to leave Freud and 
found his own school of depth psychology,3 would see it as a fail­
ure to arrive at a socially approved means of asserting oneself 
against the feeling of inferiority. Ifce now prone victim has been 
appropriated by his aggressor*s fear of inferiority or of the fail­
ure to be superior. The man-in-rage has struck out against that
1Infra, Horney*s concept of "actual self,” Sullivan’s 
concept of Mwaking self,” this chapter.
^Infra, this chapter.
3Adler is discussed at greater length in Chapter Six,
infra.
fear and failure. At the same tine he has made a pathetic hid for 
sciae kind of social recognition of his fiction of superiority.1
Ego-psychologists2 among the Freudians may describe this 
incident in terms of a prolonged identity— or in this particular 
aggressor's psyche, presidentity— crisis, involving the driving 
need to repudiate.
The so-called "English school" of Freudians, led by Melanie 
Klein, would say that this is likely an infantile attempt to rid 
the inner world of a bad object which it had lntrojected— or 
internalised. Ibis acting out is to eject an inner persecutor.
The persecutor stands for death, extinction by mutilation. Tbe 
victim is merely a screen upon whom the aggressor projects his 
own color slide of the "bad mother," perhaps the "cannibalistic" 
images retained from infancy, a "bad object" which carries the 
threat of extinction. Even as a child smashes a toy suddenly 
invested with evil, so the aggressor tries to smash the Innocent 
victim. Sullivan would agree that the victim is experienced, 
through parataxic distortion, as the bad mother— or bad father, 
bad sibling, bad peer, bad significant person.3 Horney could see
^The sources for our exposition of Adler's thinking are 
indicated in notes for Chapter Six.
2Ego-peychologists as represented by Erik Erikson; see infra.
^Harry Stack Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry 
(Washington, D. C., The William Alans on White Psychiatric Founda­
tion, 19^7), pp. 78-79.
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the victim as being cast in the role of the shaming, rejecting social 
environment.1
Probing further into the intra-psychic aetiology of this 
crime, the Freudians would probably relate the near-murder to the 
aggressor's narcissism.2 Since the man-in-rage has been heard 
before selecting his victim to proclaim loudly, "I am going to 
destroy myself,” there is added reason to suspect that the victim 
does actually represent something close to, or substitutive for, 
the aggressor's ovn self-image. Is not this destructiveness of 
an object likely to be self-destructiveness vhich suddenly veers 
avay from the self outward to any object In sight? What makes it 
veer? It is the residual self-love, the primary narcissism, re­
inforced by "secondary narcissism" or emotional attachment to one's 
ovn body. To Freudians, the self-concept is derived directly from 
one's ovn body-coneept as it is formed through experience in early 
childhood and mirrored by the milieu.3
Hence a kind of self-concern forces the rage outvard to the 
near destruction of an innocent person. Then the threat vhich is
^Infra, Chapter Six*
p"Infra, Chapter Nine.
3s«e, for instance, Sigmund Freud, The 5go and the Id. Our 
iamediate reference is to the edition in A General Selection From 
the Works of Sigmund Freud (edited by John Hickman, Psycho-Analytical 
Epitomes No. 1. London, Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho­
Analysis, 1953), pp. 245-27**, at p. 251-
Pioneering work on this relationship was done by Paul 
Schilder. See subsequent references and Bibliography, infra.
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represented by the disapproving onlookers alerts the sane primary 
self-love to spare the victim any further destruction.
Who then is the aggressor? It is the impersonal, misshapen, 
chaotic, aggregation of energy forcing Its way through the censor- 
controls of the socially-avare, waking self. Who Is the victim?
He is a substitute for the aggressor's own self-concept.1
Representative of the kind of understanding vhlch depth
psychology seeks in viewing any such incident may be the following
reconstruction of the event, based on the method of Ian Suttie.
Suttie died before hie collection of papers was quite off the press,
in 1935# The Origins of Love and Hate. He founded no school of his
own. He was hardly given a hearing by the Freudians. He was simply
an independent, though highly respected, psychiatrist and theorist,
\who developed his viewe vis-a-vis, both the Freudians and the 
deviationista.
According to Suttie, love is prototypically the love of the 
mother for her ehild. Rooted biologically in the symbiotic rela­
tionship of parent organism with offspring it is the basis of all 
future relationship for the child. Rage and hatred are derived, 
though negatively, fro® the experience, need, and quest for love.
 ^Self-concept' is our own interpolation here. Freudians 
might not object to its use. Ikey speak characteristically of the 
ego as object or of the "ego-cathexis" (of libido withdrawn from 
outside objects). Infra, Chapter Nine.
2Kfcny of Suttie's emphases—  the mother," striving for 
affection, its relation to fear and hatred— are coming into their 
own within the psychoanalytic movement. Others in their own way 
were arriving at the same type of correctives. Indeed Suttie was 
not unaware of the work being done by Melanie Klein.
1^9
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The venting of rage Is in its prototype a device, however distorted 
and violent, for getting attention. In this Suttie seems to agree 
somewhat with the theory of the Adlerians. However, he says, the 
intention of the child-in-rage is not to gain recognition and a 
sense of power, as the Adlerians say. It is simply to try to 
win bock the love which he feels he has lost. Hence his fear of 
having been abandoned by the source of Love, cut off from the 
springs of life as it were, results in rage and hatred* Hence, with 
the Johannine writer in the Hew Testament, now with the Freudian 
pastor-psychoanalyst Oskar Pfister, with Professor John MacMurray, 
and Indeed with a host of psychologists, theologians, and philoso­
phers, Suttie regards the fundamental polarity as not love and hat­
red, but love and fear, with hatred's being derived from the fear 
of losing or of being unable to regain love!
The attention which a child's rage seeks is of course the 
mother's, symbolically at least. The emotional drama in the back­
ground is typically that of the displaced infant's attack upon the 
mother (hence, society) and her suckling Infant, the usurper, the 
sibling of the child-in-rage• The fundamental desire is for a 
psychic restoration to the bosom of the mother. Otto Rank,
Sullivan, Erich Frame, even Freud (i), each in his own way, among 
the depth psychologists, and Paul Tillich, notably among the
^Infra, Chapter Seven.
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theologians of our tine, stress reunion as a goal or telos of seem­
ingly irrational striving.^
Is the brutal pounding and kicking of an already prostrate 
victim in some sense a bid for the crowd to pay attention to the 
actor, for society whose prototype is "mother” to put down her other 
nurslings and pick him up? Is this not the story of Cain and Abel? 
The victim here is the aggressor's brother-image Abel. "Cain-" or 
sibling jealousy, as Suttie phrased It, Is a paragon of hatred. 
Actually, however, it is love unrequited, simply trying to remove 
what it sees as the obstacle to the restoration of love. !he 
sibling is hated never for what he is in himself but only for what 
he is as an obstacle.®
Is jealous rage not properly described, at least partially, 
as attention-getting and love-seeking in its telos? Certainly the 
loud exhibitionist behavior of the aggressor before he strikes down 
his victim gives credibility to the suggestion that he is bidding 
for the crowd's attention, though obviously, his Inner construct, or
image, of that crowd is distorted. Is it distorted backward toward
    ,        —
4hit emphasis is already present in Tillich's writings.
It will be elaborated in his forthcoming Volume Ihree of Systematic 
Theology, in the Part on Life and the Spirit1’— our reference is to 
his lectures at Harvard, 19&37 , *
A representative statement is; "Love is the power in the
ground of everything that is, driving it beyond itself toward 
reunion with the other one and ultimately with the ground Itself 
from which it is separated. "— Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith 
(Torchbooks edition, Hew York, Harper, 1957), P« lib. 11
2Ian D. Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate, Chapter VII,
pp. 97-H1) also pp. 113-il^ (referring to Freud's own treatment 
of sibling rivalry in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego)) 
p. 130j Chapter IX, pp. 127-150* and passim.
the primal image of the mother— -or nurturing environment? Is he 
acting out a nursery scene, snatching the hated sibling image from 
the mother's embrace as in the phantasy of the child who smashes a 
toy, saying to the mother by his action, ”1 do not want you and* 
him or you-and-toys. I want you wlth-me, me in your arms where he 
is. Can't ytm tea? Can't you set? I'm smashing it, smashing it, 
smashing it."
Destroying sibling images and toys can be a substitute for 
getting satisfaction from the mother. It can be distorted substi­
tute behavior for the very pattern of play which she has introduced 
in her effort to wean' the child. Some may see special signifi­
cance in the fact that the attacker's compulsive kicking was 
dlreated at the victim's mouth.
As we view the many theoretical constructions available for 
our use in the quest for the subject-self of this or any individual 
we may be tempted to give up the proffered "light” of depth psychol­
ogy because of the apparent disagreement. Yet taken even all at 
once the several theories may actually be flowing into a practical 
consensus, which theology may well consult as it approaches the 
problem which it has traditionally called that of ’ man-as-s inner.
^Cf♦ expository studies of the various schools in Hall and 
Lindsey, Theories of Personality. Ruth Munroe, Schools of Psycho­
analytic Thought, Mullahy, Oedipus> Myth and Complex; which ve 
have cited earlier; and Robert S. Woodworth. Contemporary Schools 
of Psychology (Hew York, Ronald Press, 19^). Munroe and Mullahy 
discuss only the schools of ’psychoanalytic" thought. We shall not 
try to duplicate or improve upon the kind of critical evaluations 
they attempt. Munroe's seems to be the most thorough and objectively 
fair attempt to date. Also, by now, there are a number of so-called
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A distinctive feature of Christian theology has been its 
concern, not only vith the obvious, external dynamics of such an 
episode, but vith the interior aspect2 What is going on in the 
inner vorld of the aggressor and of the victim?
As ve have seen, Christian conception* of sin and justifi­
cation describe the tragedy in ssuoh of hussm existence* Certainly 
they can see it ia this incident* Professor Tillich, for example, 
says that the Christian conception of sin Includes basically two 
convictionsi the universality of estrangement and nan's responsi­
bility for it* Zt is nan's self destructiveness, involving self­
loss and vorld-loas.l Be also trains the doctrine on the interior 
situations Sin la "the act In vhich ve turn avay from the partici­
pation in the divine Chround « • • • the turning toward ourselves, 
■ftiHne ourselves the center of the vorld and of ourselves • • • • 
the drive In everyone * * * . to drav as nuch as possible of the 
world Into himself. t-
Professor Reinhold Niebuhr says that the human passions are 
distinguished in their “demonic potencies from those of ordinary
objective studies of Freudian theory* They have gone beyond the 
report of Robert R* Sears, ed., Survey of Objective Studies of 
Psychoanalytic Concepts (Rev York, Social Science ResearchCouncil, 
Bulletin 1, 156 PP« Since our aim is not to establish any
one of these theories or systems and our concern is practical- 
theological, ve shall be content with s kind of cautious journey 
through the theories in search of “light" on the Christian concep­
tions of sin and justification, and now, on the locus of accountable 
selfhood. ^
3-Uslng Tillich's phrasing, Chapter XV. in his Systematic 
Theology, Vol. II, st pp. 69-72, also st pp. f+5, *»7.
?Also quoted in Part One, supra* Chapter Two*
animal life.** Presumably this distinction is due to the very fact 
of humanity— and what ve have called essential humanity, that pover 
of homo sapiens, homo faber, man the rationaliser, the "reasonable,” 
the finder and user of language (!), the self-transcending, 
"spiritual” being. The religious dimension of sin is man's "vill- 
to-pover vhich overreaches the limits of human creatureliness."
The "moral and social dimension" is injustice.3
In the example of a man-ln-rage attacking an innocent victim, 
ve vitness the passions vhich Niebuhr says are overreaching and the 
self-imperialism vhich Professor Tillich describes. The aggressor 
has preempted the place of God in taking authority over the very 
life and death of the victim. Bjr his act of knocking him down, 
beating and pounding him, he arbitrarily Is determining the victim's 
destiny. He decides whether he shall keep teeth in his head, vhether 
his brain vlll be damaged, his ribs broken, and, except for the 
forceful intervention of the onlookers, he is deciding vhether he 
shall continue to breathe. Die concern for Justice is expressed by 
the voice of the crowd. "You have no right!"
-^ Beinhold Niebuhr, Human Nature, pp. 178-179.
2cf. Susanne K. Langer, Philosophy In A Nev Key# "A Study 
in th® Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art New' York, Mentor
Books, 19^8-)j and Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Based on 
the Gifford Lectures, Aberdeen, 1951-2, Chicago, University 
Press, 1958). Chapter 5: 'Articulation, pp. 69-131, Chapter 9*
"The Critique of Doubt," pp. 269-298; and Chapter 131 "The Rise 
of Man," pp. 381-^06. "We owe our mental existence predominantly 
to works of art, morality, religious worship, scientific theory and 
other articulate systems vhich ve accept as our dwelling place and 
as the soil of our msntal development, "— p. 286.
3 Re inhold Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 179.
Examples may be cited which change dramatis personae. We 
think of some lynching episodes, of racial violence, mob-action, 
genocide, where the crovd«in-rage or a whole society-in-rage ration­
alises Its rage as a concern for a brand of ”Justice." The crowd 
and the collective may preempt the place of God.1
In the example we have used, the area of responsibility, of 
accountability, of actual culpability, eludes us when we try to 
bring It to a focus. Who struck the victim? A man whose reasoning 
will or ego may well have had no control over his actions. Who 
dropped his fists and went avay? It was the same man, whose reason­
ing will had been forced back Into control either by his primary 
self-love or by some inner principle of self-preservation, Inherited 
from the centuries of phylogeny. A lav at work In his members was 
finally suppressed by another lav enough for him to stake a rather 
staggered course avay from the continued offense. Ifce lav that did 
the suppressing was probably fear of the consequences, what Freudians 
have called the reality principle.2
Depth psychologists are agreed that the subject-self of 
responsible behavior is the self to which therapy must appeal. All 
psychotherapy is ego-therapy. But where there is "irresponsible” 
behavior as in the example we have described, a realistic,
cogent suggestion of this phenomenon Is In Alan Baton's 
As Blind As Samson Was," Bev York Times Magazine, April 10, i960, 
pp. 9, 10^-109.
2See infra, this chapter.
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responsible subject-self is not in control. Hence in all theories 
we find the same difficulty in any attempt to bring to a focus the 
self of accountability. At the same tine depth psychology nay be 
read in a way that encourages the formulat ion of instrumentalistic
,
conceptions of guilt, as a capacity for guilt-feeling, a device, 
practically a faculty, by which the subject say be helped Into a 
realistic, responsible centerednesc before God and society. Subse­
quent chapters will deal with this possibility.
!Rie light of depth psychology seens to discourage any glib 
talk about sin and sinfulness.1 We can speak sensibly of human 
tragedy, of foul circumstances, and of pathological wrongness. But 
culpable wrongness is a narrow topic indeed. Like Christian soterl- 
ology, depth psychology Is concerned vith greater evil than that 
which can be categorized as accountable, or culpable.
The example of the man-in-rage illustrates the tragic evil 
in which the non-culpable and the culpable are entwined. The scene 
depicts estrangement, both within the self and between It and the 
outside world; It displays disoriented volition. On both sides;
*At the same time we may hope that a deepening theology will 
discourage the kind of suanary dismissal of Christian theology whleh 
ve suspect in the following by the late Ernest Jones: "It is well
known what a central part the conviction of sin plays in religion; 
without it, and the consequent necessity for salvation, the Christian 
religion, for instance, would be well-nigh emptied of meaning.” This 
follows his earlier description of the origin of the "conviction of 
•in" in the child's endeavor :to make all his impulses conform with 
adult standards."— "The Psychology of Religion," in Psychoanalysis 
Today (Sandor Lorand, editor, New Yorl^  International Universities 
Press, 19W), PP. 315-325, at p. 313.
the aggressor's and the victim's, there is tragedy— or the tragic 
element* The episode illustrates also the perennial insistence, 
however faint, on moral responsibility*
Probably the very emergence and re-emergence of the execu­
tive ego— actual self, waking self, conscious ego— carries an insist­
ence on the will-to-be-responsible! Perhaps here we see guilt 
redeeming shams* The very process of assuming guilt, or at least 
of grudgingly acknowledging being beholden to the crowd— to society, 
is an attempt to save the Belf from complete world- and self-loss.
It is almost impossible to avoid tautology in our analysis, since 
we seem to presuppose that which is the object of our inquiry. Yet
we make at least a logical distinction between self— the whole
person— and subject-self, the !I of accountability, which is the 
mooted question* By feeling, or by asserting, guilt— accountability- 
one affirms value and a belief in some underlying meaning to his 
existence* This may be a trembling, wavering, even neurotic asser­
tion* nevertheless it is an assertion of meaningfulness. "That I 
am responsible, that I as an I and I am beholden, if not to
my victim, to the society that holds us both, and to whatever under­
girds us all, this conviction— this faith (?)— is all there is 
between me and dissolution, utter worthlessness, complete self­
destruction* If I cannot feel or assume guilt I am not ][ and I am 
not free!1
The aggressor in this case may have experienced some such 
modulation from a sense of shame and self-loss into quasi-guilt
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feeling, vhlch served him as a salvaging operation. Our only evi­
dence is his bowing belatedly to the will of the aroused onlookers. 
Their perhaps all too passive attitude did contain a protest: "The
individual in society must control his passions because he has no 
right to hurt others with them.* Under this coercive stimulus the 
aggressor again may have invested his victim with his own self-image, 
this time, more favorably to the victim. Now the aggressor has left 
off killing "himself"1 This insight is not too different from that 
of common-sense psychology, as in Adas Smith,1 which understands 
altruistic love in terms of identification and sympathy.
Although this example of a man-in-rage does represent ele­
mental man in his existence and in society it may seem somewhat 
atypical. Certainly it is restrictive, perhaps even for the sweep 
of speculation ve have allowed here. The man-in-rage seemed not to 
be among the sore privileged in society. This very fact, however, 
lets in the vast problem of society's offense against the under­
privileged. It argues also the case in Freud's The Future of An 
Illusion— not that specifically against religion— the thesis of 
philosophers like John Dewey, for exajqple, and certainly of many 
depth psychologists today, namely, that whatever salvation is
^Adam Smith, Theory of the Moral Sentiments (see Bibliogra­
phy, infra). The tendencyto imitate is an early manifestation of 
one’s ability to participate in the feelings of another. This 
sympathy is the psychological basis of moral Judgments, according 
to Smith. We have used the appelative ’’comsson-sensen not as a 
formal designation.
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possible for civilized mankind must come by the strengthening of 
the ego, the waking, perceiving, reflective, ‘prospective' self, 
the reasoning will, in its tasks of integration and control, lhe 
spirit of the enlightenment is still with us even after Freud, but 
not without Freud.
A greater limitation on our example is its failure to illus­
trate poignantly the too frequent immorality of society itself.
What if the crowd's fascination with the crime had prevented justice 
from stopping it? What if the crowd had cheered the man-in-rage? 
People have! What is the explanation when the crowd has approved 
of murder and other un-e^apaistic action and attitudes? Do they 
assume that the victim gets what he deserves? If they do, why do 
they reach their conclusion without 'due process"? Do they ration­
alise outrageous 'approved ’ offenses, including murder? Can they 
sometimes enjoy it as a kind of entertainment, through which they 
can drain off soma of their accumulated hostility? Do they identi­
fy so completely with the aggressor that they show no pity on the 
victim? Can he be so easily commandeered for the role of ‘every­
body's " bad object? Depth psychologists see in such behavior a 
collective use of the mental mechanism" of displacement.1 
Kiey provide us with perceptive means for describing the phenomena 
of racial hatred and persecution, the kind of thing Hitler's group 
psychology represents to us. Here again is the crucifixion!
From whence does the voice of justice come when society 
Itself does not raise it? Is justice Itself relative to a particular
j
1 Infra, p. 138..’
■
culture?1 Or is there a fourth compass to guide us in addition to 
these three: (l) the prevailing cultural tradition; (2) the attitude
of the contemporary society; and (3 ) the "conscience of the individ­
ual?
As we saw in earlier chapters, Christianity is concerned 
primarily with soteriology in terms of such a fourth dimension.
The idea of "The Kingdom of God” is of an order of good, of compas­
sion, of Justice, which is not hound to the particular sores, nor 
to the group and individual consciences. Its law, according to 
Christianity in its genius, is the law of agape, the law of Love. 
However it is effective soteriologically not as law hut as gospel, 
as grace.
The God to whom Christianity in its genius hears witness 
is "The-God-and-Father-of-Our-Lord-Jeaus-Christ." This is the more 
complete symbol for the Deity in Christian faith. This God reaches 
out and saves not only the victim hut also the man-in-rage. Theol­
ogy speaks of grace, of salvation, of Justification, of "the Mind 
of Christ.' But how does this come to the victim and to the man- 
in-rage? How does the saving grace take form in our midst hie et 
nunc?
^Oswald Spongier said: "In the world-as-nature there are
eternal truths; in the world-as-history there is an eternally 
changing trueness.The Decline of the West, Vol. II (see 
Bibliography, infra), p. 2?b. flsewhere £e spoke of Pilate ("World 
of Facts") encountering Jesus ("World of Truths"), pp. 216 ff. But 
cf. Karl Heim, Jesus the World’ s Perfecter (see Bibliography), 
pp. Ik3-U. Heim points out that the two worlds are not the empirical
l6o
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Scree of the "schoolc” of psychology w w  Introduced In our 
diacueelon of the man-in-rage. We may now examine more extensively 
their search for a center of responsibility in the human psyche*
Our treatment of the already ast literature of depth psychology 
runs the risk of oversimplification. This risk Is due not merely 
to the usual limitationa of apace and preoccupation hut also to the 
frequent sent of consistency on the part of the theorists. 1 It is 
not easy to decide whether to treat Freud, for example, as s builder 
of a systematic psychology or as a producer simply of psychological 
fra&sents. He seems at timss to incline markedly toward a system; 8
and the merely metaphysical (Spangler) but the ' oils contrasted
with the * fella hlM —  / .yjj D - ?  I V  — & fl O - S V V  **
"This age as contrasted with the'age to come . . . . (BsjaT ibid., p. lhk).
^Perhaps much of Freud should be read as literature, not even 
as especially "scientific literature, although he had a wealth of 
clinical observation to weave into hit imaginative speculations. 
Increasingly we come to appreciate the truth in Patrich Mullahy’a 
perhaps slightly over-strong statement: ’’Freud was a great literary
stylist* His writing flows smoothly, vividly* It abounds in pic­
turesque imagery* At first blush it seems as if his thoughts are 
expressed with crystal clarity* However, as soon as one begins to 
analyse some of hit fundamental concepts such as libido, instinct, 
affect, psychic energy, one becomes bagged down in a mase of elu­
sive or analogical notions, few of which are defined with any clarity.” 
— Patrick Mullahy, Oedipus: Myth and Complex, p* 3IT.
2Cf. the many "stystsaatlc treatments of tbs subject by 
analysts themselves: for example, Otto Ftnichel, The Psychoanalytic
“  > of Iteurosis (London, Kagan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 19*5)1 •**<>
s own Introductory Lectures, and Hew Introductory Lectures, and
outline
Theory Heuroo  
SSSar* > i l* .», d«jv t£eti 
hie posthumously published, brief, unfinished, yet highly ref;
of hie system," Abrlss Dei Psycho-Analyse, translated by Jamas Btmehey,
Yerk< Bortoc» 19^9). Cf. also tb*curriculum of the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London (Session 1953-
*“ '• Kxcerpts from the
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hence it is legitimate to speak of "the Freudian system." Yet he 
often tends toward a fragmentarian psychology.3*
Sigmund Freud, the "father of psychoanalysis,’ developed his 
metapsychology and his anthropology out of his medical practice 
along with his own reading and research interests. In hla therapy
catalog description of lectures and seminars in the first year 
course are: "The id and primitive functioning within the id
!primary process). The ego and functioning within the egosecondary process). The division between ego and super-ego.......
The pleasure principle and reality principle as principles of mental 
functioning....... The development of Freud*s theories on instinc­
tual drives . . . .  Narcissism and the development of object rela­
tionships. The Oedipus complex. Bisexuality. Pre-genitality. 
Genitallty. Castration complex. Female development . . . .  Theory 
of trauma. Freud's theories of anxiety. Danger. The ego as the 
seat of anxiety. Successful and unsuccessful defence . . . .  
Character formation. Neurotic character. Neurosis and Psychosis.
Metapsychology and psycho-analytic technique.........Symbollsatlon.
Function of dreams in treatmentIt should be noted that the school 
is divided into two schools" of thought. They are able to thrive 
under one roof by ordering two courses: A and B. Our brief visit
to the school in 1953 accounts for our reference to the syllabus for 
that year.
*See Heinz Hartmann, "Psychoanalysis As A Scientific Theory/' 
Psychoanalysis and Scientific Method (Sidney Hook, ed.,— see Bibliog­
raphy, Infra j, pp. 3-57 at p. 4.
Freud seemed to prefer stitching his new theories to the old, 
rather than retracting them. His "needles” are "speculation" and 
"swift generalisation," even by his own admission. For example, we 
find this statement: "Making a swift generalisation, we might con­
jecture that the essence of a regression of libido, e. g. from the 
genital to the sadistic-anal level, would lie in a defusion of 
Instincts, just as conversely, the advance from an earlier to the 
definitive genital phase would be conditioned by an accession of 
erotic components." Ambivalence is probably a state of incomplete 
fusion of these components of instincts— The Ego cirid the Id, 
"authorised translation" by Joan Riviere fLondon, Hogarth and the 
Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 19^9* International Psycho-Analytical 
Library No. 12), pp. 57-58.
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and theory are entwined. It la fair to a ay: Freud's temperament,
hie therapeutic insights, and his theoretical constructions are 
intertwined. 1
He cane to view the patient, ergo the human being, in teres 
of (l) "psychical apparatus,1' (2) "mental qualities," (3) "instincts."
, • -  '  V . t . ' J  •  ’  J  •• .  * '  • . '  W  j  y _  , y  \ - i  : i  . V  -  -  ■' f  4  '  '  v  *' *  •
Also he spoke of quantitative economics, of dynamics (qualitative) 
and of mental mechanisms, especially as ego-defense mechanisms. 2
Psychical Apparatus: The "trinitarian” psychical apparatus
is described as groupings of energy in functional centers, which 
eventually were given these names and descriptions: (l) the id
(das Es), or the basic organlsmlc energy of the evolved human being)
(2) the ego (das Ich), or the emergent "self-conscious” agency within 
the complex inner world of the organism) and (3) the superego (das 
Uber-Ich), which, to Freud, included the conscience— his earlier 
designation for which was "ego ideal," a concept, which has been 
preserved separate from the superego in the thinking of contemporary 
Freudians. It seems generally agreed that the superego Includes the 
repressed, oppressive "conscience."3
iOf course his many critics are quick to say this. But ve 
note that it is recognised by so loyal a disciple as Ernest Jones in 
his three-volume biography: The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud
(London, Hogarth, 1953-)# parsim.
^Although Freud could speak of the "normal over against the 
neurotic and the psychotic, he formulated an anthropology for which 
his analysis of the "neurotic" was normative.
3In The Ego and the Id, Freud gave the third chapter the 
following title: The Ego and the Super-Ego (Ego-Ideal)." Ernest
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The Id is the organism in its most primitive strivings. It 
is the collection of all that has gone before in the evolution of the 
organism from unicellular beginnings. Hence it is a genetic, inher­
ited organisation of instincts. We cannot define it too simply how­
ever, since its definition becomes nebulous when brought into 
relation with the ego and superego, which seem to have almost 
independent strivings of their own. 1 One distinction seems to be
Jones, among others, has preserved the concept of the ego-ideal as 
distinct from that of the superego. Cf• Jones, Life and Work of 
Sigmund Freud, III, pp. 282-3, 3?7, 339# and other references.
There is some debate about whether J. C. Flugel la right in 
calling the conscience' simply "the conscious part of the super-ego" 
(J. C. Flugel, A Hundred Years of Psychology, London, Gerald . 
Duckworth, second edition, 1^51# p. 259). Cf. also Flugel*s Man, 
Morals and Society (same publisher, 19^5)*
Karen Horney'a criticlam of the concept of superego under­
lines seme of the difficulties in any attempt to collate it with 
that of the ego-ideal. In New Ways In Psychoanalysis she suggested 
that Freud had mistaken for a special*"agency within the "ego" what 
is but "a special need of the individual." She later developed her 
own concept of the ideal self," which la a socle tally-imposed goal 
or internalised portrait of what one should be.— Infra, Chapters 
Five and Six and following. Our reference here is to New Ways in 
Psychoanalysis (London, Kagan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1^9), 
ppT £07-231# at p. 216i
An ' orthodox Freudian treatment which Illustrates the con­
fusion of the concept, by differentiating between the "superego" 
and the conscience, is Edmund Bergler's The Superego— with the 
by-line: "Unconscious Conscience— The Key to the Theory and Therapy
of Neurosis" (New York, Grune & Stratton, 1952).
1The following statement from one of Freud s own more lucid 
treatments of this subject Illustrates the problem of precise deline­
ation. K2he power of the id expresses the true purpose of the indi­
vidual organism's life. This consists In the satisfaction of Its 
innate needs. No such purpose as that of keeping Itself alive or 
of protecting itself from dangers by means of anxiety can be attrib­
uted to the id. That tlle business of the ego, which is also con­
cerned with discovering the most favorable and least perilous method
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saade consistently however. Hie forces in the id are "basic to the 
organism as a biological entity. Hie id is a sort of inner dynamo, 
made of the stuff of life itself. Freud's mechanistic, material­
istic bias in biology and physical science accounts for the want of 
dimension in his description of the id.1
The ego is basically id, but it is shaped by external forces, 
or rather, by the interaction of the id with the milieu down through 
the centuries of human development. Hence, the infant seems to be
of obtaining satisfaction, taking the external world into account. 
The superego may bring fresh needs to the fore, but its chief func­
tion remains the limitation of satisfactions. '--Freud, An Outline 
of Psychoanalysis, p. 19*
^Mullahy speaks of Freud's ’'inveterate practice of reifying 
his concepts; 1. e., representing them as a substance. — Mullahy, 
Oedipus . . . ., p. 318*
Cf. Freud's statements introducing the concept of id in his 
reflective summary of his ideas in An Outline: MWe assume that
mental life is the function of an apparatus to which we ascribe the 
characteristics of being extended in space and of being made up of 
several portions— which we imagine, that is, as being like a tele­
scope or microscope or something of the sort......... We have
arrived at our knowledge of this psychical apparatus by studying 
the individual development of human beings. To the oldest of these 
mental provinces or agencies we give the name of id. It contains 
everything that is Inherited, that is present at birth, that is 
fixed in the constitution— above all, therefore, the instincts, 
which originate in the somatic organisation and which find their 
first mental expression in the id in forms unknown to us.” The 
word translated ’instinct" is "Trieb." Strachey says he renders 
it ’instinct'’ with some misgivings.— An Outline, p. 1^ .
Freud. himself came increasingly to emphasise ego-psychology. 
Cf. ’It is difficult to say anything of the behavior or the libido 
in the id and in the superego. Everything that we know about it 
relates to the ego, in which the whole available amount of libido 
is at first stored up."— Ibid., p. 23. We recall that he first 
elaborated his tripartite "self ’ topography in 1923, with Hae Ego 
and the Id. Hie "self up to that time seems to be more Id than 
ego, in fraud's tracing of the exploits of blind ’’libido.^ To be 
sure, the ego is there, often even dominant.
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born with an ego capacity, or embryonic ego, *Eie ego is a kind of 
"head" on the id. It has arisen out of the id to protect its inter­
ests in the face of the demanding outside world; i. e., reality. It 
is a kind of psychic epidermis— indeed, Freud gives it a material­
istic, mechanistic origin. At any rate it becomes, functionally, 
vis-a-vis the irrational id and the coercive-permissive, satisfying- 
denying outside vorld, the executive of the self. It Is not equiv­
alent to the self, as we have seen; it is the deciding, reasoning, 
censor-self. Its task is to deflect the darts hurled from outside 
assailants, to assimilate the stimuli vhich crash into the organism, 
and, at the same time, to control the instinctual forces of the id. 
Such control is necessitated by the restrictive effects of the out­
side. If the task is too great too early, the ego may split, 
resulting in more than one apparent self, as in psychosis. The 
theory of ego-splitting came late in Freud's long career as a 
theorist. It vas his way of dealing vith the phenomena of divided 
Mself-systems!’ as in some psychoses.1
1An Outline, pp. 115-119* W. Ronald Fairbaim, contends 
that the egos (I)' should be defined by the objects chosen in earli­
est infancy. He prefers to the Freudian model, the following 
description of the psychical apparatus: "Central Ego," "Exciting
Ego (the libidinal ego), and the "Internal Saboteur."— Psycho­
analytic Studies of The Personality (London, Tavistock Publications, 
1952;, throughout and pp. i59-l&i*
Cf. Harry Stack Sullivan’s concept of "self system," also 
his view of self-dynamisms— Clinical Studies in Psychiatry (Hew 
York, W. W. Horton, 1956), pp. >1) Conceptions of Modem Psychiatry, 
pp. 20 ff, and passim. .......  ...
Cf. also, Bernard Hart's conception of complex, vhich seems 
analogous to some aspects of the later Freudians conception of the 
splitting of the ego, and certainly analogous to the theories of
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The superego has developed out of the ggo because of intimate 
social factors in the organism's relationship with the environment. 
The individual comes a helpless, uncoordinated infant into an envir­
onment of relatively strong, coordinated adults# He must depend on 
them and adjust his inner strivings to their demands on him. He 
goes through various crises, or complexes, In developing out of 
helpless Infancy into adulthood.1 To Freud the climactic stage of 
development Is that of the young child somewhere between the ages of 
three and five, extending, if unresolved, to the end of one's life. 
This Is the Oedipus situation or complex. According to the Greek 
legend of Oedipus, he answered the riddle of the sphinx and also 
killed his own father Lalus and married his own mother, Jocasta#
The Oedipus phase is analogous to learning the riddle of sex, to 
eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The infant 
has a competitive, incestuous longing for his mother and consequent 
hatred for his father. By phantasy he kills his father and stands 
under the Judgment of an outraged "murdered" father who is actually 
still alive and able to avenge himself by killing— castrating— his 
child. Oedipus veers toward his doom. But he Is rescued, If all 
goes wall, by Identifying with his fathers "I, yet not I, but my 
father-within-mo" is the changing self-concept. The "father within 
me" is the IntroJected father-Image, the threatening, avenging Image
dissociation in Sullivan.— Hart, The Psychology of Insanity (Fourth 
ed., Hew York, Macmillan, 193l)> Chapter V, "CompTexes, pp. 7^-92, 
and throughout (especially his description of dissociation and the 
splitting off of a system of ideas."— p. 67).
^ee Infra, this chapter.
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of the father. It is the father's standards and desires as the child 
interprets thee at this critical juncture. The ego surrenders sobs 
of its sovereignty to this Internalised father-image. It is the I 
vhich sits in judgment on the executive-I.
Later, as ve consider the nature of guilt-feelings ve shall 
consider the foraation of a kind of racial superego as veil as the 
individual 3uperego as Freud vieved the phenomenon of guilt. 1
Henceforth, after the resolution of the Oedipus complex, 
vhich, hy the vay, determines both male and female character forma­
tion, the individual lives the rest of his life as a kind of anthro­
pological trinity: The ego tries to keep order in a field of con­
flicting forces both internal and external: vith the id as the
organisation of irrational drives and the superego the quisling 
vhich links irrational destructive tendencies vith the puerile image 
of the outside authority. The individual is ever in a state aptly 
described by hell, torment, purgatory, familiar symbols of religious 
usage.
Mental Qualities: — Another and complementary vay of describing 
the psyche is by vhat Freud calls "mental qualities." These are the 
unconscious, the preconscious, and the conscious. With the coming of 
psychoanalysis the term unconscious became a positive category. It 
is that greater part of the psyche vhich is beneath the surface, or
•^Sigmund Freud, Civilisation and Its Discontents (trans.
Joan Riviere, London, Hogarth, pp. Iltf, 120.
Infra, Chapter Five. Cf. The Ego and the Id (trans. by Joan 
Riviere, Hogarth and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 19*>9), p. W.
threshold of consciousness. The Iceberg is an analogy. In Tread the 
conceptions of the unconscious and the irrational are closely related. 
Often too, it seems, the topography or apparatus: ego, Id, superego
nay be correlated with conscious, unconscious, and pre-conseious.
But this la hardly clear, since the ego is not only conscious: It
is the id as It has become shaped by interaction with the milieu.
The ego is both unconscious and conscious. Hie superego is uncon­
scious and precoosclons. The preeonscious is readily accessible 
to the conscious. The unconscious Is hidden, kept down by the trap­
door of censor control exerted by the reality principle j 1. e., the 
e®.wmmmm *V. * •- * '• •* . »• . • , - v
The Theory of Instincts:— It is clear that Freud thinks of 
the human psyche as a world of energy. Life, to the mind of Freud, 
la simply the energy of matter In sons special organisation.1
^Freud, An Outline, p. 123*
Of the many passages with vhlch vs can illustrate this 
orientation in Freud ms select this from The Ego and the Id, 
apropos of his hypothesis of a primal death instinct: *As a result
of theoretical considerations supported by biology, me assumed the 
existence of a death-instinct, the task of which is to lssd organic 
matter back Into the inorganic state: on the other hand, ve sup­
posed that Eros alms at complicating life by bringing about a more 
and more far-reaching coalescence of the particles into which living 
matter has been dispersed, thus, of course, aiming at the mainte­
nance of life."
E. B. Strauss la certainly net alone When he says, "Moat psycho­
analytical works give the Impression of being a curious salad of empiri­
cal findings, inferences, Interpretations, philosophical ideas and 
technical directions, and give no clear guidance as to the correct 
category to which the various statements belong. " Introduction to 
Boland Deities, Psycho-analytleal Ifcthod and the Doctrine of Freud 
trans. by f. F. Lindsay, (iioAenJT tfaivcrsity of London" Press,
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Psychoanalysis is dynamic psychology. The ego tries to control the 
Inner personality so as to pernit hedonic, or Instinct-satisfying 
participation in a complex relationship.
... The instincts are described as the forces behind the ten­
sions caused by the demands of the id.^ They are the basic energy 
of the organism, although their form is cast by the whole situation 
of tension. For example, according to Freed, one basic demand of 
the id is to be left alone. This demand is diametrically Opposed 
to the moving, pushing demands of the environment. The instinct 
then behind the tension caused by these mutually exclusive demands 
is Vhat Freud calls "the Death Instinct," at least in his last 
attempt to formulate vhat he meant by this somewhat controversial 
hypothesis. •» ....;. / ,• '• N • .... •
Earlier Freud had thought of the instincts as being basi­
cally erotic, closely related to his concept of libido as
2 Vols., 19^1), Vol. I, pp. v-vi. Cf. Freud’s own appraisal of 
psychoanalysis vls-a-vls "science," and "philosophy."— "A Philoso­
phy of Life, " Lecture XXXV, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho­
Analysis, trans. by W. J. H. Sproii (tfev tork, tf. W. Norton, 1933), 
Chapter 7> pp. 216-2U9 .
^Freud, An Outline, p. 19.
It is difficult to correlate all of Freud's statements about 
instincts.
t P • 20 f • Cf. New Introductory Lectures, Chapter A j 
pp. 146 fr.For example, Freud says, ”fou will perhaps shrug your 
shoulders and say: That Is not natural science, that is the philos­
ophy of Schopenhauer. But, Ladles and Gentlemen, why should not a 
bold thinker have divined something that a sober and painstaking 
investigation of details subsequently confirms?"
life-energy1 whose goal is pleasure. The only dualism in the early 
Freud was that between the id and the ego, between eros and reality. 
Reality was actually in the service of eros. But the later Freud 
introduced an instinctual dualism* eros versus destructiveness.
The erotic instincts are sometimes described as life instincts. 
Freud resented any attempts to de-sexualize his theory of libido. Yet, 
despite his protectiveness of the specifically "sexual’ teloe his argu­
ment tends to support sisqply a somatic, bodily basis for irrational 
striving.2 Libido, therefore, is biological satisfaction-seeking 
energy.
Psychic "Mechanismsw: — Freud discussed the dynamics of emo­
tional and mental life in terms of what he called psychic or mental
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1I. e., before Jenselts dee Lustprinzips (1920), when he
introduced the idea of a primitive death irst5.nct.
In An Outline, he says: "There can be no question of
restricting one or the other of the basic instincts to a single 
region of the mind. They are necessarily present everywhere.
We may picture an Initial state of things by supposing that the 
whole available energy of Eros, to which we shall henceforward give 
the name of libido, is present in the as yet undifferentiated ego-id 
and serves to neutralize the destructive impulses which are simul­
taneously present. (There is no term analogous to "libido" for 
describing the energy of the destructive instinct.)"— pp. 21-22.
% f . Merton Gill, The Present State of Psychoanalytic 
Theory, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 58 (1959), 
pp. 1-8. Dr. 6ill~says, significantly, What is really being 
defended by analysts is not the libido theory as such but the over­
whelming importance of relatively primitive bodily drives in moti­
vating behavior. "— ibid., p. 7 .
172
mechanisms. These, as they are recognised generally by "Freudism" 
therapists today, are as followsj*
(l) Repression. Some conscious desire is denied when it is 
finally conceded to he impossible of fulfillment. It is expelled 
from consciousness into the unconscious, where it strives to get 
back into consciousness. The expulsion from consciousness is known 
as "repression."
^There is no systematic treatment of all of the proposed 
'mechanisms." Our list reflects both our reading and notes from 
seminars conducted by psychotherapists. "Suppression" is perhaps 
not usually included. However it frequently appears as a "mental 
activity at least for the theorist to contrast with "repression." 
For example, it is discussed in Karl Memninger, The Hunan Mind 
(third edition, Hew York, Alfred A. Knopf, I9U8), pp. 277*573.
Monroe's discussion of the mechanisms is especially dis­
cerning.--School^ of Psychoanalytic Thought, pp. 90-95, 21*3-271*
Freud himself gives credit to his daughter Anna for giving 
us our first insight into their multiplicity and their manifold 
significance."— "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," trans. by 
Joan Riviere, reprinted from International Journal of Psycho­
Analysis, 18, 1937 , pp. 373 f£.;'ln Collected Papers, V (London, 
Hogarth and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1956), pp. 316-357, at 
p. 338. The reference is to Anna Freud's influential Ihe Pgo and 
the Mechanisms of Defence (London, Hogarth, 1937)* She lists: 
regression, repression, reaetion-fonaation, isolation, undoing, 
projection, Introjection, turning against the self, and reversal. 
See Munroe'8 evaluative discussion.
Munroe lists: repression, reaction formation, isolation,
undoing, denial, compromise, displacement, rationalisation and 
camouflage, and "character," Munroe, op. cit., pp. 2^3-266.
Healy, Brenner, and Bowers, as early as 1930, listed and 
discussed many of these, referring to them as "dynamisms." They 
Included: condensation, dreanrwork, transference, isolation, un­
doing, unconscious phantasy, and idealisation, along with those—  
except for "suppression"— which we list (see Bibliography, infra).
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(2) Suppression. Whereas repression is experienced as the 
sudden disappearance of a painful tension— like the sudden disappear­
ance of a toothache4 suppression Is voluntarily putting a thought 
out of one's Bind. Suppressed paterial can pop up at any tine.
(3) Sublimation. This is diverting a drive into a channel 
■ore acceptable to the superego (or Ego Ideal) and to society as it 
is reflected by the ego. It is seen, for example, in the profes­
sional boxer, vho in boyhood vas conditioned to expect physical 
buffeting and vho developed a way to express his resultant aggres­
sion. It aay be seen in the school teacher vhoee strong maternal 
drives have not been fulfilled in her ovn home. . •
(k) Displacement. Emotion may be separated from the repressed 
desire. But the detached emotion vhleh it had produced Is attached to 
another goal or object vith vhich it can again sport in the conscious­
ness of the Individual. A common example of this is "kicking the oat." 
A hostile, aggressive desire tovard someone has been repressed; its 
energy has been detached and attached to the nearest object— the cat; 
it emerges in the act of kicking it out of the vay. To Freud, at one 
stage at least, love-as-tendemess vas itself displaced or "aim- 
inhibited" sexuality. 1
(5) Rationalisation. This is a universal characteristic.
It is finding a "good reason" for an action, indulgence of a
Sigmund Freud in Contribution II, "Infantile Sexuality" 
in "Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex," trans. by A. A. Brill, 
The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, at p. 591* Seventeen years
17^
phantasy or allowing a forbidden desire to be fulfilled. It Is 
giving "a reason"— a "justification"— to a Motivation.
(6) Projection. The repressed desire, fear, or hostility 
is projected on to the outside world of persons and objects. It is 
experienced as cosing from the outside rather than from within. An 
illustration of projection is the Mental activity which produced the 
superego, according to Freud. Perhaps a more generally accepted 
illustration is the familiar "ideas of reference" so insistent in 
paranoias "They are talking about ae," which really means, accord­
ing to depth psychologists, "I have desires which I cannot permit 
or admit." By projection these inner desands are experienced as 
though they were suggested by the outside world. In everyday,
"normal! life projection plays an important role. As we have noted, 
it is similar to what Harry Stack Sullivan has called "parataxis •"
(7) Introjgction. This is the mechanism by which one assumes 
the characteristics of another. The objects of the outside world 
are internalized. Introjeetion is complementary with projection in 
the formation of the superego. The "antiphonal” process of pro­
jecting emotional lntra-psychlc reality onto the outside objects and 
introjecting those object*images is the process of ego and superego 
development, according to theorists notably of the "London School," 
led by Mslanie Klein.
after he wrote this Freud was still saying the same thing, even 
though he had already introduced his instinctual dualism:— "The 
Libido Theory" (1922) in Collected Papers, V, pp. 131-135, at 
p. 13^ .
^See infra, this chapter.
(8) Identification. This is more conscious than Introjec­
tion, although, to Freudians, it Involves the saras phenomena. An 
example Is conscious Imitation of another person. Little boys may 
say they wish to be like their fathers. They may act like them. 
Children imitate their parents and teachers. The enpathetlo under­
standing of another's feelings seems to involve a mechanism at least 
analogous to that which we see in the act of Imitating.
Identification Is a term used for both. It is important in 
both aspects especially during the process of establishing one's 
own Identity, one's own self-concept or self-image in relation to 
his environment.
(9) Comport nation. This is a mechanism Important in the 
system of Alfred Adler.1 It is concentrating one's energies
on some goal or desire which seems realisable when contrasted with 
sobs disappointment, failure, or deficiency. A common example is 
the girl who, convinced that she is ugly, becomes a "bookworm."
(10) Syabolisation. This is that mental process by which 
one idea or thing comes to represent for an Individual a whole con­
stellation of things, national symbols illustrate this faculty.
In psychosis a repressed idea may get mixed In with others in such 
a configuration. Thus, for example, a neologism or a persistent 
phantasy may represent a disturbing constellation.
(U) Reaction Formation. The repressed desire or drive 
emerges in the guise of its opposite, which is "approved."
^Adler is to be discussed in greater detail, Infra, Chapter Six.
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(12) Regression. This is going back emotionally to 8one 
former stage of development. A "normal” regression is seen in 
almost any illness because of the relative increase in dependency 
and other factors. 1
Freud's characteristic use of the theory of mental mechan­
isms vas in trying to see behind the manifest behavior and attitude 
and to interpret what he considered resistance to therapy. ' Lgo- 
defense mechanisms” is another term used. Mechanisms serve the ego 
and reality principle in fending off the attacks from the outside 
vorld and in holding back the floodtlde within (the id forces).
With the introduction of the concept of the superego, the picture 
is necessarily somewhat more complicated. Rie superego adds to the 
pressures on the ego, thus requiring use of the mechanisms. 2
If we think of Freud's theories at all systematically, as 
both he and his followers frequently do, then ve must presuppose a 
subject-self, or center of control within the psyche, the ego, vhich
*Cf. Freud's discussion in Mourning and Melancholia, infra, 
Chapter Nine.
Outline, pp. 109-112, 120-12U, describes the ego in 
relation to the id and to the superego in the external and internal 
conflicts. Therapy and the resistances are discussed in An Outline, 
Chapter Six, pp. 61-79* "The ego shrinks from undertakings that 
seem dangerous and threaten unpleasure.at p. 73. In "Analysis 
Terminable and Interminable” (Collected Papers, V, pp. 316-357), 
and earlier papers on therapy and technique, Freud has dealt at 
length with the ego-defenses, or resistances to analysis. Freud 
tended to characterise often serious criticisms of his theories as 
resistances'1. Jones himself vas prone to use this method of 
rebuttal. C. G. Jung, for example, resisted the "truth" about the 
tyranny of sexual striving. Cf. Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund 
Freud, II, pp. 139, 151* Cf. Freud, "The Resistances to Psycho- 
Analysis'1 (1925), Collected Papers, pp. 163-171*.
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tries to assume a responsible attitude toward the outside world and 
toward the world of whirling drives within. It tries to maintain 
Itself both by mechanisms of defense and by integrating— absorbing, 
fusing— the conflicting dynamisms within*1
Yet, the ego of Freudian man seems to act automatically 
according to the rules which the mechanisms imply* Whatever free­
dom there may be is circumscribed indeed. The ego's freedom seems 
to be like that of “unconscious" life— whether in flora or fauna, 
the freedom to be what it la determined to be. Man-in-society is 
like a flower in a weed patch* But his ego capacity is slowly 
mutating toward a strength to withstand the encroachment of society 
and culture until the flower has come to its full bloom (hetero­
sexual and subllmatlonal fulfillment) and can wither and die at its 
own cadence. Such a view is at least analogous to ideas of freedom 
and "Christian liberty" frequent in theology. 2 Christian freedom is
1,1 The Anatomy of the Mental Personality," Lecture XXXI, in 
Hew Introductory Lectures, pp. 82-112. One analogy is reminiscent 
we have quoted from Augustine and Calvin (supra, 
Chapter Two); "One might compare the relation of the ego to the id 
with that between a rider and his horse. The horse provides the 
locomotive energy, and the rider has the prerogative of determining 
the goal and of guiding the movements of his powerful mount towards 
it. But all too often in the relatione between the ego and the id 
we find a picture of the leas ideal situation in which the rider is 
obliged to guide his horse in the direction in which it Itself wants 
to go" (ibid., p. 108).
2The prayer book phrase comes to minds "Whose service is 
perfect freedom."
This idea seems prominent in the thinking of Martin Luther, 
for example (supra, Chapter Two).
Cf. Karl Barth] Human freedom as a gift of God does not 
allow for any vague choices between various possibilities. The
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said to be simply the freedom to serve God— the Kingdom of God. 
Justification liberates from the weeds, so to speak. Sanctification 
is the fulfilling of the destiny of the liberated psuche.
The Way In Vhlch the Self Develops
Freud Insists on the multiple ties vhlch bind the rational 
to the irrational and the spiritual" to the somatic. In his think* 
ing ve do not find an arbitrary dichotomy of soul— psuchc (psyche)** 
and body— soma. He is more Hebraic than Hellenistic In his basic 
psychology. The psyche Is somatic, although it is defined too 
materialistically and mechanistically, as ve have seen. Today his 
successors seem to be moving into a larger frame of reference for 
the complexities of human nature. Taking Freud's conception of 
the ego and its mechanisms and even modulating his theory of psycho* 
genesis, some contemporary ego*psychologiats among the Freudians seem 
to be developing a model for psychology vhlch Is relatively free from 
the deficiencies of the earlier period, vhile still preserving the 
basic realism of a somatic foundation. 2
reign of chance and ambiguity is excluded. For the free God Himself, 
the giver of man's freedom, is no blind accident, no tyrant, He is 
the Lord, choosing and determining Himself unmistakably once and for
all* He is His ovn l av....... Human freedom is freedom only
vlthin the limitations of God's ovn freedom." Karl Barth, "The Gift 
of Freedom'' in The Humanity of God, pp. 77-78. Especially construc­
tive seem to be tvo statements between these that ve have quoted! 
"Human freedom is not realised in the solitary detachment of an 
individual in isolation from his fellow men . . . .  God is pro me 
because He is pro nobis . . . .  Human freedom is only secondarily 
freedom from limitations and threats. Primarily it is freedom 
for. ”~*iblS~
2Ruth Munroe gives a careful account of the tvo directions 
in this ego-psychology. One direction is that followed by Anna
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Man-in-society develops through traumatic experiences or
crises. The firet of these is birth itself.^ "Fundamentalistic'1
Freudian psychogeneeis proceeds according to stages, each of which 
ohas its crisis. Insofar as the psyche is arrested, perhaps only 
partially, at any one stage, it is said to be fixated at, and
Freud, vith emphasis on the mechanisms of defense. The other is in 
elaboration of what Freud called the secondary process”: ‘the
development of those aspects of the ego that seem to derive from 
maturation of the reality-adapted aspects of the organism (rational 
thought and action, perception, attention, memory, cognition, loco­
motion, and the like) and that may be considered conflict-free in 
eseence, however intimately they are interwoven with drives 
(instincts) in the course of living.” Heinz Hartmann and Ernst 
Krl& are leaders of this movement. For various reasons we have ' 
chosen Erik H. Erlkson's writings to Illustrate this emphasis, see 
infra. Our reference to Monroe is Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, 
PP. 89-108.
David Rapaport has done much to bring together the academic 
and the clinical methods in the study of mind and emotion. E. g. 
’Toward a Theory of Thinking," in his Organization and Pathology of 
Thought, Austen Riggs Foundation Monograph, No. One (New York,
Columbia University Press, 1951), Conclusion: pp. 687-730.
A significant article le Rapaport*s ’’The Structure of Psycho­
analytic Theory (A Systematizing Attempt),” in Psychology: A Study
of a Science, III, edited by Sigmund Koch (Hew York, McGraw-Hill,
1959)~ Seealso: Rapaport*s ”Paul Schilder’s Contribution to the
Theory of Thought-Processes,” The Schilder Memorial address, New 
York, 1951* International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXXII, 1957, 
pp. 291-301.
^Freud, Hew Introductory Lectures, Lecture XXXII, at pp. 122 f.
A General Introduction io ftaychoanaiysia, Lecture XXV (1915-1917, 
Permabooks edition, 1953), pp» Mo-^05. Otto Rank is discussed moat 
fully in Chapter Five, infra. He, of course, is credited with the 
theory of Geburtstrauma as the prototypical psychological (as well 
as biological) trauma. The concept seemed to become increasingly 
symbolic (rather than literal) in the later thought of Rank.
20ther terms used with practically the same meaning are 
'complex,” fixation,” and ”stage7w Of course these are to be 
distinguished in their precise meaning within the context of their 
use. However, we read of oral, anal, and Oedipus crises, complexes, 
stages, phases, and fixations.
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characterised by, that stage* Hence, Freudians apeak of "oral 
character," 'anal character,n and so forth. The crises of the 
development of parsonality-cbaraeter-psyehe ares (l) Oral, and 
oral-sadistic, aa sell aa oral-Masochistic, aaaociated with suck­
ling, teething, bitlngj (2) Anal-urethral, also both sadistic and 
Masochistic In its phasesj (3 ) Phallic— for both boys and girls, 
climning In the Oedipus situation or conplex, as we have noted| 
and (k) Genital— separated fro© the phallic stage by a long period 
of latency, corresponding to the childhood and pre-adolescent years, 
when after years of trying to assimilate the trauma of the Oedlpal 
situation, the Individual at last achieves suitable heterosexual 
patterns of adjustment and healthy outlets via hie relatively 
saooth-working mechanism, including notably, subligation. 1
According to classical Freudian theory— that la, Freudian 
theory before the introduction of instinctual du&lisa, 2 psycho­
genesis is supposed to be governed by two principles or rules I 
pleasure and reality* The painful denial of pleasure has been the 
cause of awareness of "reality." The ego serves under the reality 
principle. Each crisis is the height of the tension between pleasure 
and reality at a certain stage In the development of organlaaic van. 
Good to the child mans satisfaction. Evil is the want or denial of
Zaat la: the positing of a primal aggressive aa well as
pleasure-seeking instinct. Freud based hie thesis on the inferences 
he drew fro© what he noted in the so-called "war neuroses (notably 
what has commonly been called shell-shock) in which there were 
re petition-compulsions In dressing and in 'waking*"
satisfaction. Ego-control is simply overcoming evil in the interest 
of the good. This may be simply by holding back the good, defined 
hedonistically, until it can be realized. The feeling of pain can 
be projected and thus vested in outside objects, Which may be in 
fact quite neutral. At the same time outside evil may be intro- 
jeeted with the Images of "bad" or "threatening" objects. Self­
destructiveness may be introjeeted destructiveness. Hostility may 
be projected pain.
According to the later theory of Freud, each crisis is the 
height of the tension between pleasure- and paln-seeklng(1) drives 
within the psyche. The environmental forces interact, allying 
variously with the two inner groupings of impulses: eros and
destructiveness. The e^o is the eros-seeklng-but-reality-aware 
executive. The Guparego is the agent of destructiveness toward the 
ego, while the id is the source of all the energy for the conflict. 
Perhaps Freud's relegating the conscience to the negative category 
of destructiveness may account in part for objections like that of 
Mowrer, mentioned earlier.^ * Yet with Freud, the presence of
^Therapy seeks to release the ego from the oppressive injury
inflicted on it by the superego. But cf. the following later state­
ment by Freud, 'If the patient pats the analyst in the place of his 
father (or mother), he is also giving him the power which his super­
ego exercises over his ego, since his parents were, as we know, the
origin of his superego. The new superego now has an opportunity 
for a sort of after-education of the neurotic; it can correct 
blunders for which his parental education was to blame." Then 
he issues a caveat: "However much the analyst may be tempted to
act as teacher, model and ideal to other people and to make men in 
his own image, he should not forget that that is not his task . . . . 
indeed that he will be disloyal to his task if he allows himself 
to be led on by his inclinations . . . .  he will only be replacing
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life, eros, satisfaction-seeking energy and destruction-seeking 
•ner^ is simply the unavoidable given, endopsychically. The 
organism writhe® in inner tension toward its death because it de­
sires both (l) to be stimulated, hence activated, and (2) to return 
to its original, unstimulated, inanimate state, hence to be destruc­
tive but teleologically passive! 1 Surely whatever made Freud devel-
oop his saga of love and death, of eros and thnnatofl, has been kin 
to that which exercised the minds of theologians like Calvin, Luther, 
Augustine, and Paul,3 when they saw a destructive opposition to life—
| l ,as Zoe --deep within the human psyche. Yet, as Professor Cairns says,
one kind of dependence by another. In all his attempts at improving 
and educating the patient the analyst must respect his individuality." 
— in chapter on 'The Technique of Psychoanalysis," An Outline of 
Psychoanalysis, p* 67.
Ernest Jones correlates Freud's concept of the super-ego 
with Nietsche's '"bad conscience" (The Life and VJork of Sigmund"
Freud, III, pp. 283-284).
^Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle; our reference 
is to the edition in A General Selection 1?ro5Hftie works of Sigmund 
Freud, pp. 162-194, at pp. lfl, 183-1^0. Increasingly Freud seemed 
to assimilate this "speculation into his psychology, although when 
he first introduced it he did say; ”1 am neither convinced myself, 
nor am I seeking to arouse conviction in others, — ibid., p. 190.
Cf. An Outline, pp. 19-24. Cf. also Freud, The Ego and the Id 
(London, Hogarth and Institute . . . ., 19^95V p. 67•
2In conversation sometimes Freud referred to the so-called 
death Instinct as thanatos (according to his biographer Ernest Jones). 
In his published writings he seems to have avoided using the Greek 
term. He simply spoke of "death,' destructiveness,""aggressive 
instincts" or "eros." Cf. Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund 
Freud, Vol. Ill, p. 273*
^Cf. Tillich in Systematic Theology, II, p. 6l.
^Zoe in Biblical theology generally connotes life in the 
sense of essential life, life-from-God, "life in Christ."
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there i« a radical difference between the Freudian doctrine of 
depravity and the Christian understanding of "original sin."1
The human organism's last judgment— or crisis— is death!
The life instinct finally surrenders to the death instinct, thus 
proving the superior strength of the latter. According to the death 
instinct theory, in every case, sooner or later, the dead weight of 
basic matter pulls the aspiring creature down to the grave. Freud's 
reverence for the superior death instlnot seems at times to tempt 
him away from the eroa-thanatpfg dualism to a pessimistic monism in 
which he tries to define life in terms of "death." Perhaps the life 
Instincts too are derived ultimately from the resistance which matter 
offers to the forces that try to shape it. 2
*Supra, Chapter Two. "Freudian man is not fallen; he is 
merely brumal, in the stuff of his nature" (David Cairns, The Image 
of God in Man, p. 232).
2Thls inference can be drawn from numerous passages in Freud's 
writings after 1920. Freud correlated his thesis with the theory of 
alternating love and strife as principles which govern events in the 
life and the universe, according to Empedocles of Acragas, after a 
work by Villhelm Capelle (Die Vorsokratlker, Leipzig, 1935, c. p. 186). 
— "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" CollQctad Papers, V, at 
PP. 3^-350.
In his New Introductory Lectures, Freud leaves unanswered 
the question as to the conservative character of the erotic instincts—  
i. e., whether they to do not "seek the reinstatement of an earlier 
state of things" ("Anxiety and Instinctual Life," New Introductory 
Lectures, p. 1^).
In “ftie Libido Theory," he teaches that they are conservative; 
i. e., that both eros and destructiveness are in their tclos striving 
to return the organism to former state. Death is one form; and repro­
duction is another of the "expression of an Inertia or elasticity 
present in what is organic." Collected Papers, at p. 135* Cf. also 
An Outline, pp. 108-109.
Nevertheless Freudian therapy alms at victory for the life 
forces at least In the measure vhlch they in their teloa seek victory.
Critiques and Modifications of Freudian Psychogenesis
Some depth psychologists depart altogether from the model 
vhlch Freudians use to recount the development of the psyche. Others 
alter it considerably. 1 Yet some model seems to be required.
Jung sees the psyche in continual development to the end of 
its time on earth. Especially valuable seems to be his thesis that 
a major— often creative— change characteristically takes place in 
middle-life, vhen the latent self emerges and often reverses the 
former conscious pattern of life, much of vhlch has been but a 
false front, too adaptatlonal to an outside world, whose partially 
misconstrued pressures have become reduced in their relative strength 
against the inner forces— the libido as elan vital.2
^f. C. G. Jung, 'The Stages of Life,” in Modern Man In 
Search of a Soul, pp. 95-llk.
Cf. Levis Sherrill, The Struggle of the Soul (New York, 
Macmillan, 1952).
2Cf. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (1907). It is not 
quite fair to say that any of the depth psychologists has equated 
libido with elan vital. Yet the analogy with Bergson*s thought 
is possible. 5f. Munroe, oj>. cit., p. 5^1 ff* Jhng thought of 
libido as life energy. He refused to reduce life energy to eros 
as did Freud. Cf. Jung, "Freud and Jung" in Modern Man in Search 
of a Soul (Harvest Books edition), pp. 120-122. Also, Frieda 
ForHham, An Introduction to Jung’s Psychology (a Pelican Book, 1953-), pp. 17 tfT^
Jhng believes there is more to vital energy than mere bio­
logical energy. He refuses Freud’s reduction of the psychological 
to the biological— his derivation of the psychological from the 
biological. Jung uses the phrase to vhich Bergson has given special
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In a later chapter we shall consider Alfred Adler’s view of 
the developing self and its three major crises. He views the infant 
and young child as a unity— psyche and organism— striving for superi­
ority*1
Ian Suttie, whom we discussed earlier, has made a penetrating
critique of Freud's theory of Oedipal conflict. Suttie suggests that
"Laius jealousy" and "Cain jealousy” are equally appropriate for 
describing certain manifestations in child-parents-sibling relation­
ships. According to the Greek legend, Laius had tried to kill Oedipus 
hie son in infancy. Perhaps the male child senses actual Laius-like
envy in his father which is not to be explained by the highly in­
volved theories of the projection and introjection of hostility and 
a regressive Oedipal feeling in the father which projects his own 
father's image on to his small son.2 It is even conceivable that 
the theorist who is attracted by the Oedipus reductionist is being 
motivated by his own Laius feelings toward his sons and his younger 
colleagues. We have already discussed Suttie’e theory of Cain— or 
sibling jealousy.3 Cain in jealous rage killed his brother Abel.
Pertiaps the social crisis is that of psychic weaning, when 
the child envies every person or object which takes any of the mother's
significance, vis., elan vital, and toys with the temptation to 
call it God, in 'Analytical Psychology," Modern Man in Search of 
a Soul, at p. 188.
1Infra, Chapter Six.
2lan Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate, pp. 110-111 and 
elsewhere. Suttie's spelling is TTaios."
See also, infra, Chapter Five, notes.
■a . . ■ . . .Supra.
attention. Most parents of young children and others who tend them 
can attest to the frequency of such "jealousy."^
Suttie, along vith Karen Horney— to mention but one of the 
many other critics, attacks the highly involved, question-begging 
Freudian view of female psychology.^ The orthodox Freudians speak 
of the castration fears of the boy and of the penis-envy of the 
girl, who is all but overcome by a sense of having already been
^Domestic animals sometimes give evidence of a similar 
malady, via., ’jealousy.”
"Jealousy" may not be quite the word for the phenomenon.
As Professor Dickie suggests (in correspondence), it is— or includes—  
plain bewilderment." the child is not accustomed to the kind of 
separation vhich the parents' other interests imply. His vorld 
becomes suddenly strange— or more strange— as he becomes avare of 
the facts of separateness.
%uttie's arguments are in his oj>. cit., pp. 107-111, 
pp. 223-227# and elsewhere. Karen Horney's thought developed.
Her more "orthodox" treatment of female sexuality was a paper in 
1923: Karen Horney, "On the Genesis of the Castration Complex in
Woman," (translated from the German), International Journal of 
Fsyeho-Analys is, V (192^), po« 50 ff. Laier she wrote Flight
from Womanhood" (trans. from the German), ibid. VII* 1926, 
p. 32^ ff. While he commended Horney*s paper of 1923# Fraud took 
issue vith the later one. In typical fashion he had this to sayj 
"Thus, for example, Karen Horney (1926) is of opinion that we 
greatly over-estimate the girl's primary penis-envy and that the 
strength of her subsequent striving towards masculinity is bo be 
attributed to a secondary penis-envy, which is used to ward off 
her feminine impulses, especially those connected with her attach­
ment to her father. This does not agree with the Impressions that
I myself have formed . . . .  those first impulses have an intensity 
of their own which is greater them anything that cones later and
may indeed be said to be incommensurable with any other force.......
And if the defence against feminity is so vigorous, from what other 
source can it derive its strength than from that striving for mas­
culinity which found its earliest expression in the child's penis- 
envy and might well take its name from this?" In the same paper,
Freud criticised Ernest Jones' "The Early Development of Female 
Sexuality" (ibid., VIII, pp. U59 ff.). Freud coraaended the views 
of the vomen-analysts Jeanne Lampl-de Groot ("The Evolution of the
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castrated. Suttie says it is fully as logical, Indeed probably more 
so, to suppose that the Bale's real envy Is of the female * s biologi­
cally superior body. Even Freudians have supposed that the Bother's 
breast Is the first object cathected by the infant, during the oral 
p h a s e W h y  not suppose that the boy Is troubled by "Zeus jealousy"? 
Zeus devoured Mitis In order to bear her child Pallas hlaself •
Pallas eas bom frcn his head, according to Greek legend* The Bale 
Is what he Is In western society partly because of his repressed 
envy of the female because of her biological superiority. 2
By now there are many impressive critiques of Freud's Oedlpal 
theories.3 When ve discuss guilt-feelings, whose prototype he con­
sidered to be Oedlpal guilt, ve shall have to use his frame of
Oedipus Conplex in Women, " ibid., IX, 1926, pp. 332 ff.) and Helene 
Deutsch (Psychoanalyse der vel'bllchen Sexualfunktionen, Vienna, 1925, 
and "The Significance of Masochism in the Mental Life Of Women," 
translated from the Oeraan, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 
XI, 1930, pp. 48 ff.).— Sigafun<i £reud, "Female Sexuality* (trans. \ay 
Joan Riviere, Ibid., XIII, 1932), pp. 28l ff. Homey'a mare liberated 
refutation of Freudian female psychology la Chapter Six of her Hew 
Ways in Psychoanalysis (London, Kiegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 19397, 
pp. ioT-lly• Cf. also Homey, "Ihe Dread of Woman," International 
Journal of Psychoanalysis, XIII, 1932, pp. 348-360) and Homey7 ”ftie 
Senlal oF"the Vagina, ibid., XIV, 1933, BP* 57-70.
^SigBund Freud, Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex.
Our reference is to The Ba3ic Wrlilngs, at p. 635.
2Ian Suttie, loc. cit.
3por example, Suttie, oj>. cit.) Bronislav Malinowski, Sex 
and Repression in Savage SooleTy (19^7, Meridian Books edition,
Nev York, Noonday Press, 195?)]Roland Dalbies, Psychoanalytleal 
Method and the Doctrine of Proud, Vol. II, pp. l84r., ^9?-5l2j 
and Vllllam McDougall, "Psycho-Analys is and Social Psychology 
(London, Methuen, 1936), especially Appendices I and IV, pp. 115-124, 
158-193* Also see McDougall's An Outline of Abnormal Psychology 
(London, Methuen, 1926, 572 pp.T*where he makes his criticism of 
Freud's system, especially at p. 421.
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reference, although critically, of course.^ Suttie'8 critique seems 
to underline the fact that one can 'prove" almost anything hy Greek 
legend juet as one can ‘prove" most anything hy the Bible, as the 
popular allegation has it. Yet something is lost if we deny our­
selves the power of the probing insights and illustration which the 
ancient Greek lore offers. Suffice it to say, nevertheless, it is 
extremely doubtful that what Freud described as the Oedipus complex 
is universal. It is improbable that its presence even in the most 
patriarchal patterns of culture can account fully for the distinc­
tion between female ego and male ego--between the female "bcdy-ego" 
and the male "body-ego,' to use Paul Schilder's terms.2
Harry Stack Sullivan avoids such difficulties in his outline 
of the development of the self system." The stages are as follows:
(l) Infancy, from birth to the maturation of the capacity for language 
behavior; (2) Childhood, to the maturation of the capacity for
^Infra, Chapter Five.
2An example of the use of the term "body ego ' is by Sylvan 
Keiser, "Body Ego During Orgasm," Psychoanalytic Quarterly, XXI 
(1958), pp. 153-166.
Paul Schilder has contributed much to the psychology of 
body-awareness. See The Image and Appearance of the Human Body 
(1935* New York, International Universities Press, l9?6)T
See also Ernest Jones, "Psycho-Analysis and The Instincts," 
reprinted (from British Journal of Psychology - XXVI) in Ernest 
Jones, Papers on Psycho-Analysfs~TFcmrth ed., London, Bailllere, 
Tindall and Cox, 1933j, pp. 203-220, at p. 209.
Also: Arminda A. Pichon Riviere, "House Construction Play,
Its Interpretation and Diagnostic Value," International Journal 
of Psycho-Analysis, XXXIX, 1958, pp. 39-^9• bne’s house-concept 
is related to his three-dimensional body Image: "Our way of repre­
senting our body to ourselves" (p. 39)*
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living vith compeers; (3) Juvenile, to the Maturation of the capacity 
for intimacy vith one'e own sex, isophilic intimacy" j (4) Pro* 
adolescence, to tho Maturation of tho capacity for intimacy vith a 
member of tho other aexj (5) Early Adolescence, to the patterning 
of "lustful behavior**1 (6) Late Adolescence, to Maturity in hetero­
sexual adjustment; (7 ) Adulthood.2
Sullivan cannot be accused of neglecting the somatic and 
the hedonistic criteria so Important to Freud. His outline of stages 
"along life*a vay'’ suggests his guags for enoticnal health. Inter­
personal" is a key concept vith him. Since to him persons are living 
somata,3 " inter-personal is 'inter-organlsmic. The self-system 
is formed by these stages. The determining factors are the milieu 
and the organism s tvo goals: (l) Security and (2) satisfaction-
seeking.^
1‘ Luet' in Sullivan's terminology eeems to be simply "sexual 
desire." It dees not hove a reductionist use. It is merely descrip­
tive of vhat in common parlance is regarded as "sexual' in behavior, 
affect, and attitude. For instance, he speaks of "the genital lust 
dynamism.” Harry Stack Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry 
(second edition, first published in 19^0-19^7,~T953 Y» p •  6j•
2Harry Stack Sullivan, "The Meaning of Anxiety in Psychiatry 
and in Lift,' Psychiatry, XX, 1 (19^6), p. 5*— cited and elaborated 
in Patrick Mullahy, Cedipuai j*yth and Complex (Bev York, Grove Press, 
1955), PP* 301 ff. See Llso, imrry Stack Sullivan, Conceptions of 
Modem Psychiatry, passim.
^For instance, Lecture II "The Human Organism and Its Neces­
sary Environment," Conceptions, pp. 30-56. He suggests early in the 
lecture that his vlev is to be distinguished from that of William 
McDougall, Otto Bank, Alfred Adler, Sigmund Freud, and C. G. Jung—  
ibid.. p. 30. In reading Sullivan ve infer hovever that to him the 
empEasis is on the psychological dynamics of this "organism."
**Sulllvan reiterates his conceptions throughout his papers 
and lectures. He wrote no books as such; though many of his thoughts
To Sullivan the "waking self" and the "self-system51 of vhloh 
it le a part la produced through a continual Interaction of the 
organism with its environment.
Among the Freudians the same kind of insight seems to be 
present in the theory of Melanie Klein. Formerly of Berlin, later 
of London, she is considered a highly imaginative, original thinker 
within the Freudian fold. Yet her theories are quite controversial 
even among Freudians. She shocked the world of psychoanalysis with 
papers, followed, in 1927* t»y a book, on the psychoanalysis of 
children. Freud taught that psychoanalysis was possible only with 
subjects who had passed the Oedipal crisis and become possessed of 
a superego. The therapeutic agent is the analyst's parent-role.
The analyst undertakes to re-form the too oppressive superego— or 
internalised parent. True to Freudian orthodoxy, Klein tried to 
remove the anomaly hy pushing the ontogenesis of the "superego" 
back all the way to the oral stage. Not the father, but the "hated 
breast" is the nucleus of the superego. The "loved breast" is, as 
with Freud, the first good object. 1
(via lecture notes and papers) have been compiled into books edited 
by his students. Another useful volume, in addition to those ve 
have cited earlier, Is Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of 
Psychiatry (New York, Norton, 1953)•
The goals or end states of human behavior are divided into 
two actually Interrelated classes. — Mullahy, Oedipus, p. 280. These 
are satisfaction and security (ibid., and, for example, Sullivan, 
Clinical Studies, pp. £-11). Sullivan is noted also for his recog­
nition of what he terms "the need for intimacy" (passim, especially 
as he describes cases).
1Melanie Klein, Developments in Psycho-Analyais, pp. 278-279. 
Cf. Melanie Klein, Psychoanalysis of Children trans. by Alix
Strachey, London, Leonard ana Virginia Woolf at Hogarth Press & the 
Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1932)—  Part II, especially Chapter VIII,
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A colleague in Edinburgh, a psychoanalytic original thinker 
in his own right, Dr. V* Ronald Fairbairn, has complemented Mrs. Klein's 
theories with an even greater stress on the process of object-eathexis
‘’Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict and of Super-Ego Formation, 1 
pp. 179-209• Representative statements are! "The orthodox view is 
that the formation of the super-ego begins in the phallie phase • . • • 
own observations have led me to believe that the formation of 
the super-ego is a simpler and more direct process. The Oedipus 
conflict and the super-ego set in, I believe, under the supremacy 
of the pre-genital impulses, and the objects which have been intro- 
jected in the oral-sadistic phase— the first object cathexes and 
identifications— form the beginnings of the early super-ego. More­
over, what originates the formation of the super-ego and governs 
its earliest stages are the destructive impulses and the anxiety 
they arouse'' (pp. 19^-195)* Through her breast the mother origin­
ally represented the external world for the infant (p. 208). Later,
In Chapter IX, Klein says that the early ego's two ways of behavior 
are: (l) turning avay from its object, out of fear and out of
desire to protect it from his own sadism toward itj and (2) turning 
towards it with greater positive feeling. "An object-relation of 
this kind is brought about by a splitting up of the mother-imago 
into a good and a bad one." This ambivalence toward objects is s 
further step in the development of object relations, and it is a 
mechanism of fundamental Importance in the child's overcoming his 
fear of his superego by distributing it so that it becomes more 
clearly divided into good and bad components: certain objects are
conceived as good and others, as bad. The good, of course, is 
prototyplcally the good, kindly, protecting, mother.— ibid., p. 215*
Other works by Melanie Klein which inform our exposition 
of her views includes—  Melanie Klein and others, Developments in 
Psycho-Analysis (edited by Joan Riviere, with preface by Ernest Jones, 
London, Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1952); Melanie 
Klein, Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, 1921-1941 (with introduction 
by Ernest Jones, London, Hogarfch and the Institute . . . ., 19^8); 
and other articles by Klein and analysts sympathetic to her views 
as published in The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, London.
^we have already had occasion to cite the contributions of 
V. Ronald Fairbairn, a psychoanalyst, of Edinburgh. Many of his 





Klein's view seerao to be that the twin mechanisms of intro- 
Section and projection effect the construction of the superego, 
and the ego, building them substantially out of the objects experi­
enced from the moment of birth, if not even earlier. The ego in 
effect becomes a world of objects organized by eros and thanatos. 
Thanatos-controlled images are the inner persecutors, the "bad 
mother," iNbad father," "bad objects" that give imagery and symbol 
to the cause of death and destruction. The good objects, split 
images of those experienced in contact with the outside vorld, are 
the life-images, the symbols of love, goodness, purposiveness: "the 
good breast," "the good mother," and so forth.
Although the theories of Klein are sometimes called grotesque, 
by non-Freudians and even by some Freudians, and are scored for "un­
orthodox" stretching of "the system, " they are rich in suggestive
Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality (vith Preface by Ernest 
J one s, tondcrn r9 $a vietook Publications, 1952).
There are significant differences between Fairbaira and 
Klein. For instance, he has never adopted Freud's instinctualism, 
either classical or dualistic. Cf. ibid., pp. 152-153* Hence his 
emphasis is on the object itself (objects themselves) in the early 
experience of the child rather than on the play of the supposed 
"instinctual" energies upon them. There may be a resemblance here 
to Sullivan'8 emphasis on the "inter-personal" (i. e., to the 
"objects" and interaction with them in the shaping of the "self 
system," rather than the organism's "instinctual" drives per se).—  
Cf. Frieda Fromm Reichmann, Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy, 
p. 83 n.
Cf. Klein's criticisms of Fairbalm's views; Melanie 
Klein, Developments in ?sycho-Analysis, pp. 293-295.
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insight.1 Despite Klein's some times perplexing anthropomorphisms 
she does present the reader with a concept of the ego which is at 
least as complex as are its formative encounters with objects which 
satisfy, tease, threaten, and give pain.2 *
Like Melanie Klein, and also Erich Fromm, Karen Homey studied 
under Freud's disciple Karl Abraham, In Berlin.3 Homey came to 
America and before long founded her ovn school of psychoanalysis, 
although she continued for years to be listed as a member of the
^©r instance, see Ruth Munroe, Schools of Psychoanalytic 
Thought, pp. 211-215, especially at p. 215• Cf.“Fhe appraisal of 
Klein1s work in Ires Hendrik, Facts and Theories of Psychoanalysis
(Third edition, Hew York, Alfred A. f e o p f 1958), pp. 270-^2, 3^7 f.
Cf. also, Robert V. White, "Psychoanalysis and Children:
A House Divided," Contemporary Psychology: A Journal of Reviews, III
(Washington, American Psychological Association, 1958), pp. 81-8U.
White speaks of M. Klein's "objectology." He has respect for thera­
pists of the so-called English school in their attempt to feel their 
way into the mind of the infant. But he chides them for their 
insularity (l. e., not feeling a need to learn from Piaget, Anna 
Freud, and Hartmann).
2Indeed, Klein must be distinguished from the ego-psychologlsts. 
The child's psyche is coterminous with his organismic striving. As 
Munroe says, Klein, in effect.- our qualification "largely ignores 
the autonomous institutions of the ego . . . ." Munroe goes on to 
say that she also ignores the institution of the superego. This seems 
incorrect. Yet, as we have seen, Klein has revised the concept radi­
cally.— Munroe, ibid.
3"The outstanding feature of Abraham's work is the amount of 
Interest displayed in all matters concerning pregenital development 
as represented by primitive ego-format ions and early libido imprints." 
— Edward Glover, "Review" of Karl Abraham, Selec r.ei Papers of Khrl 
Abraham, M. D . (trans. by Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey, vitk ~ 
introductory memoir by Ernest Jones, London, Hogarth and the Insti­
tute of Psycho-Analysis, 1927)# International Journal of Psycho­
Analysis, Vol. IX (1928), pp. 12i-l^, at p. l5T
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International Association of Psychoanalysts. 1 She rejected Freud's 
Instinctual dualism, as did the Freudian apostle Ernest Jones and many 
who have been relatively free of charges of deviation ism.2 But Homey,
^It la interesting to compare two obituary articles about 
Karen Homey: the one by Homan Kslnau, in Psychoanalytic Be view,
bO, 1953# PP« 191-193 and that by C. P. Obemdorf, in The"Interna­
tional Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXXIV, 1953# Part l¥, pp. 1^-155• 
Kelman describes her tho ught as developing through her five books*
13ie Eeurotie Person of Our Tlmo (London, Kagan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 
1^37)# develops further Tier already deepening understanding of cul­
tural influences on the neurotic process and their importance in 
therapy. Hew Ways in Psychoanalysis (1939)# elaborated her acquired 
conviction * Sure Prou3T' a ins tinctivistle orientation is too mechanistic 
to explain what is essentially a dynamic process. Sexual difficul­
ties, though often obvious in the clinical picture, cannot be con­
sidered as the dynamic center of the neurosis.
Self-Analysis (same publishers, 19^2) illustrates her vision 
of psychoanalysis as a helping discipline, not merely a theoretical 
system. Our Inner Conflicts; A Constructive Theory of Neurosis 
(same publishers, 1946J "brought together in systematic form the 
directions which appeared in her earlier books. She saw that every 
neurosis, no matter what the symptomatic picture, was a character 
neurosis . . . .  recognised the crucial importance of contradictory 
neurotic trends and the attempts at solution of Inner conflict.’*
Her last book, Neurosis and Human Growth, was subtitled The Struggle 
Toward Self-Ka-alisation tsaac publishers, 1951)* fit loan describes 
it as a statement of Homey*s affirmative belief that man wants to 
grow, is a purposing organism out to realise himself."
Obemdorf, who like Homey, practiced in Hew York, said, 
"Because of her conclusion that neuroses are generated by disturb­
ances in the inner-human relationships, she was moved to write 
several books with popular appeal.” In the last one she appeared 
to return to her earlier thinking, defining a neurosis "as a dis­
turbance in one's relation to self and others'.” Obemdorf, repre­
senting the "orthodox Freudians, nevertheless voices the common 
appraisal of Homey as a clinician. He says, "Notwithstanding her 
defection from the American Psychoanalytic Association there seems 
little doubt that Homey retained a strong devotion to Freud's 
procedure of a thorough-going investigation of psychic conflict and 
did not sacrifice conscientious work with patients to rapid or super­
ficial methods."--Obemdorf, in loc. cit.
2"So far as I know,' says Ernest Jones, "the only analysts, 
e. g. Melanie Klein, Karl Mennlnger and Hermann Hunberg, who still
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like Adler, has been accused of leaving the somatic moorings and 
going off the sociological "deep end." It is true that she came to 
emphasise almost exclusively what now Is the najor stress of many 
Freudians, the executive-self. She refused the ego-ld-superego 
formula as erroneously conceived and spoke of the self, personality 
structure, and trends. By the time she wrote her last book, in 1950, 
she was using a tri-focal formula in her own description of the self. 1 
But conceivably all three foci can be loosely correlated with the 
ego-superego, although the id is perhaps implicit; that is, if any 
good purpose can be served by attempts to correlate differing frames 
of reference. Horney posited for the self, these three aspects or 
agencies: "the actual self," "the ideal self," and "the real self."
Hie "actual self" is the pilot-self, the self in the storm of life, 
at the wheel, steering according to whatever guidance it gets from 
the charts and weather. The "ideal self" is like Freud's earlier 
idea of an Ego Ideal. It is the self which the actual self is con­
vinced by his environment that he ought to be. Emotional illness 
and character disorders result from the imposition of an unrealistic 
ideal self image on the psyche of the individual. The "real self" 
is the actual, realistic, possible self of fulfillment. In positing 
it Horney expresses her hopeful outlook. She is a liberal,
employ the term 'death instinct' do so in a purely clinical sense 
which is remote from Freud' s original theory. "— The Life and Work 
of Sigmund Freud, III, p. 277* .......
•^-Neurosis and Human Growth (Hie U. S. publisher is Norton,
New York, 19^6), pp. 156-I^ tf and elsewhere.
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mellorlstlc, humanistic "theologian," in believing that the person 
is essentially good. Evil cornea from the storm of life and from 
the negative results of other persons' anxieties, the oppressive 
Ideals which are relativist1c and self-seeking in the worst sense.1 
Against the actual, which cannot be avoided, and against the false 
ideal, which say be cured, psychotherapy should evoke, nourish, and 
support the real in the patient.
Horney sees the early, formative, years as important but
not as all important. They establish a pattern, But an adult's
problems are his present inter-personal ones. They are not simply a
regression to unresolved problems of early childhood. 2 Sullivan's 
      -       . .  ,   —    _________
1,1 The ideal self" is also called the pride system. It too 
has inner conflict, not between self-glorlfleatlon and self­
contempt, since these are complementary (infra, Chapter Six), but 
between self-images that vie for answering ike question: "Who aa
IT" The person experiences himself in multiple ways. But they are 
resolved into two: his glorified self and his despised self.—
Neurosis and Human Growth, p. 189. In her last book. Homey presents 
the picture with the self' more as the protagonist, though society's 
role is formative. Cf. Our Inner Conflicts, pp. U6-V7 and elsewhere.
Having introduced what she terms a morality of evolution. 
Homey pictures the child as determined to grow" nin accordance with 
his real self," except for the effect of a variety of adverse in­
fluences. "When summarised, they all boll down to the fact that 
the people in the environment are too wrapped up in their own 
neuroees to be able to love the child, or even to conceive of him 
as the particular individual he la; their attitudes toward him are
determined by their own neurotic needs and responses..........They
may be dominating, overprotective, intimidating, Irritable, over­
exacting, overindulgent, erratic, partial to other siblings, hypo­
critical, indifferent, etc. It is never a matter of just a single 
factor, but always the whole constellation that exerts the untoward 
influence on a child's g r o w t h . Iiourosis and Human Growth, p. 18.
^For instance, Horney speaks of "personality trends," 
"personality structure," even as Freudians speak of "character" 
types (meaning: oral, anal, both "sadistic" and "masochistic").
Horney did not leave the child-ln-the-man out of the picture, but
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view of the psyche has the 3ame flexibility. 1 Certainly Adler (s
odoes. We have noted Jurtg*B view of a never-ending psychogenesis.
Jong depicts a microcosBic psyches the conscious and the 
unconscious. To him the deep unconscious is racial or collective.
It is a dynamic inner "universe" for the individual unconscious.
The self, as we have noted, Is not a static category but a contin­
ual process of integration, what Jung calls "individuation." In 
the whirling, never-ending process of integration are the unconscious 
desires and alas as well as those of the more societally-conditioned 
conscious sphere. Jung's concept of persona is perceptive and widely 
appreciated. Ike persona is the individual's front to the world, his 
aask. Indeed Jung's doctrine of the shadow, and of the an lzna/animus— 
the opposite self-image in the unconscious which maintains a kind of 
antlphonal relationship with the conscious self-image or persona, is 
based cm valid observations of personality trends— both conscious and
her approach became Increasingly neo-Adlerlan rather than neo- 
Freudian, though it does seem to be remarkably similar to the pre­
occupations of contemporary Freudian ego-psychologists (to be 
discussed infra, this chapter). Her enphasis came to be on what 
Freudians terra secondary process"; that is, the accessible modes 
of psychic life (behavior); i. e., ego-paychology.
^Together with Horney, Sullivan has been called "revisionist," 
"neo-Freudian, even "neo-Adlerian," perhaps. He chose to be less 
cosBital about the "structure" of the self; hence his terminology: 
self system," "self dynamisms," and "waking self," and the "not me." 
Sullivan will be discussed further in subsequent pages.
^"Personality, as the complete realisation of our whole being, 
is an unattainable ideal," says Jung. But unattainablllty is no argu­
ment against the ideal, for ideals are only signposts, never the goal." 
— "Ike Development of Personality," (paragraph 291) in volume by same 
title, Bollingen Series XX, p. 172*
unconscious, as revealed in dreams and symbols.1 The woman in a man's 
dreams may represent his mother or sweetheart. But, even more deeply
•^ Munroe, who states a preference for the Freudian approach, gives a more balanced critique of Jung than that of Edvard Glover, 
a Freudian psychoanalyst who takes up the cudgels against Jung in 
Freud or Jung? (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1950).
Of course, the Junglan apologists,'' Jolan Jacobi in The 
Psychology of C. G. Jung (London, Kegan Paul, Trubner, 19^2),
Frieda Fordha»~in An Introduction to Jung's Psychology (a Pelican 
Book, London, Penguin, 1953-)— to name but two— give sympathetic 
and forceful presentation of his insights. The Cutting Lectures 
at Andover Newton Theological School, Newton, Massachusetts, were 
delivered by Carl Alfred Meier, of Zurich, on Jung and Analytical
Psychology, Andover Newton Bulletin (June, 19597Tp~lt5or-----
Dr. Meier was of course stressing the relevance of Jhng’s psychol­
ogy to the practical theology of ministers. Jung himself has done 
this, notably in Psychology and Religion (1938), and in "The Spiri­
tual Problem of Modern TS57 " and Psychotherapists or Clergy", the 
final chapters in Modern Man in Search of a Soul.
Munroe’s exposition and criticisms are in Munroe, oj>. cit., 
PP- 539-57^- The inference of what we regard tbs more circumspect 
critiques of the imposing Junglan corpus of writings is that it is 
not in accord with science to accept uncritically his formulations, 
because actually what evidence he gives (as for instance, for the 
archetypes) could fit other formulations. The fact that some 
symbols seem to have a universality in experience does not neces­
sarily indicate a racial unconscious, for instance (as many critics 
point out, including those cited, and Mullahy, Oedipus, p. 326).
Yet, Jung, in his own, original, unique, and imposing way, has kept 
before our minds the mystery and the depth of the human psyche, which 
he links with the religious idea of soul (psyche0 *
Munroe divides her discussion into two parts, dealing first 
with that which she finds most difficult to understand in Jung's 
writings— viz., what Jung actually means by the collective uncon­
scious and the deep inheritance of mankind" (p. 55*0* She has 
considerably less difficulty in appreciating what she calls his 
subsidiary concepts! his psychic topography, ego-persona over 
against shadow-animus/anima, and the self as the Integration of 
the personality in which ego, shadow, and the collective unconscious 
come together.
As we have said for Freud, we also say for Jung: in much of
his writing he seems to be more helpful to laymen if they read him as 
literature— Jung is "a man of letters.' Of course we must not ignore 
the important fact that hie kind of literature is informed by his 
psychological, therapeutic, religious, and ethical concerns.
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within his unconscious self-process, she represents himself! It Is 
the self which biologically and psychologically is most neglected In 
his waking life.1 She also represents the archetypal woman of the 
racial unconscious. This latter construction stay be rejected or 
held In suspended Judgment. However we are not compelled to suspend 
or to discard Jung's suggestive insights as to the nature of the
. oindividual unconscious.
*Cf. Jung's discussion in Psychology and Religion where he 
interprets ’the woman” in the patient's dream" ( in the edition pub­
lished by the Yale U. Press, 1938), pp. 29-37.
2Ruth Munroe makes this confession: "I began the reading
of Junglan material with an antipathy not uncommon among American 
psychologists, especially those who take their orientation mainly 
from Freud . . . .  The specifically Junglan concepts I knew seemed 
to me mainly mystical balderdash.
". . . . I shall remain critical of Jung's basic theoretical 
position. To my way of thinking he turns important dynamic systems 
into 'universals.He too is a reductionist, though in a plura­
listic manner.
She goes on to say, "What I have learned from the study . . . . 
is the profound importance of the concrete systems he observes . . . .
I came to see Jung's rubrics as creative syntheses of observable 
trends which I might explain differently but which I had to respect. 
Since reading this material, I have developed a few new 'uncanny 
insights' of my own. In trying to get across workable psychologi­
cal generalisations to students of projective methods, I find myself 
consciously inhibiting a tendency to use Junglan concepts. I often 
feel that if they had read Jung I would not have to struggle so hard 
to convey a sense of underlying trends revealed in the test materials 
instead of the direct linkage of test data with behavioral trait or 
identifiable instinctual drive, role, or diagnostic entity which 
students trained in academic psychology tend to expect. The trends 
can usually be explained in other terms, but they lose the vividness 
and focus of the Junglan formulation." The Junglan system as a 
whole, however, she finds too lacking in "the fluidity character­
istic of a developmental psychology.’’— Munroe, o£. cit., pp. 566-7 .
One of the most serious criticisms of Jung--as therapist— is 
voiced by Clara Thompson, for example, in her somewhat sketchy account
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Toward an Integrated View of the Self
The clinical relevance of any psychogenesis or psychic to­
pography is in the attempt to locate or explicate an emotional ill­
ness. Freudians, for example, may see an "oral’’ fixation in the 
alcoholic, as in the manic-depressive. 1 Compulsion neurosis may 
stem from emotional traumata during the 'anal" stage, the time of 
ritual for the child, as parents well know. Sadism, masochism, 
obsessions to hoard, to grasp, to collect, revert to fixations 
during the "anal1 period. ’’Oral sadism" suggests the dental phase 
of orallty. An unresolved "Oedipus complexw may account for obses­
sive rebellion against authority. Humiliation fear and the surging 
hostility which accompanies it hark back to both the "anal" and the 
"phallic..early "Oedipal'i-stages.
of the development of depth psychology. She says, Another unfor­
tunate aspect of Jung's method is the indoctrination of the patient.
If the analyst contributes his associations to the patient's dreams 
and he starts with a theory about collective unconscious imagery, 
the end result will usually be indoctrination of the patient with 
the analyst's theory. ' Thompson agrees that a similar charge can 
be leveled at the Freudians. To 6one extent any analyst has some 
Influence on his patient's associations. "But at least other 
systems do not as actively undertake indoctrination as the Jungian 
method does."--Clara Thompson, M. D., with the collaboration of 
Patrick Mullahy, Psychoanalysis 1 Evolution and Development (New 
York, Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1950), p. 169.
■^ Melanie Klein, and her school have given great emphasis to 
this Freudian hypothesis (after Karl Abraham). Klein considers the 
depressive position (a prototype of the psychosis) as the universal 
"central position’ of the emotional life. In literary dialogue with
V. Ronald Falrbalrn she adopted his view that the primary stage la 
schisold (characterized by the splitting of objects into "good" and 
"bad"). Hence, she now says that the primary phase is both "schizoid" 
and "paranoid." However the central or nodal position is "depressive." 
Her critics object to what they regard unwarranted over-use of the 
analogy of the psychoses in describing "normal" states in infancy.
See references already cited.
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The Freudian psyche is emergent from the scrca. It cannot 
be described In one simple figure or statement. It is multifarious 
and complex. The Freudian man can says "I am all that I have met, 
'cathected,' and taken into myself.” Like the Qerasene demoniac 
he says, "M(y name is Legioni for ve are many."1 With few exceptions 
other depth psychologies seem to agree at least that the individual's 
psychic world is complex.
Psychoanalysis describes the psyche as only partially devel­
oped, even when it is relatively healthy. Everyone’s psychogenesis 
is somewhat stunted by fixations. A person may appear to be "well 
balanced,” integrated, adjusted, until he is hit by some traumatic 
event which forces him back to a phase of his emotional development 
when the affected components of his impulses were fixated on some 
object or solution which is the only one he knows appropriate for 
the kind of trauma he is again experiencing. We may liken the 
Freudian "component instincts,r and their ego to an army, some of 
whose contingents have had to remain behind at various stations 
along the march. Setbacks mean retreat to places manned by friendly 
troops along the route.2
The Freudian reductionism of the psyche to mechanistic systems 
of energy seeking satisfaction by and against whatever objects happen
Mark 5;9-
2cf. Freud, in ''The Theory of Dreams” (1916), Collected Papers,
IV, p. 138; later, in "Hie Anatomy of the Mental Personality,w New 
Introductory Lectures, pp. 82-112. The analogy to the army we shall 
have to refer io our own imagination, although we have the impression 
that it occurs somewhere in the Freudian literature.
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to be in the way leads to a curious explanation even for the dis­
ciplines of psychology and medicine. Even the desire to discover 
the dynasties of the human unconscious, to spin psychoanalytic webs 
of theory in which to trap the impulses for closer examination, is 
a variant of infantile giioalphllla or epiBterrophilla. 1 This is a 
development by displacement of the infant's forbidden desires to 
see and to explore the bodies of his parents. His frustrated energy 
is attached to the socially acceptable exploration of one of the 
many disciplines being plied vlthin society, ftius in its most spec­
ulative moments psychoanalysis assays to explain a Plato, an 
y' Augustine, A  Kant, and a Sigmund Freud.
Despite the intrusion of the grotesque into his brilliant 
probing of the psyche and its genesis Freud has stated with cogency 
the undeniable interrelation of the rational with the irrational.
Otto Rank says that he goes further unfortunately and tries the 
impossible, to render as rational the essentially irrational.^
But Freud has made a lasting contribution to "our understanding of
^Perhaps epistemophilla is the preferred term though both 
have been encountered in the literature. Representative passages 
include; Melanie Klein, The Psycho-Analysis of Children, p. 208.
Cf. Freud, in "Infantile Sexuality," Basic Writings (A. A. 
Brill, ed.), pp. 59^-5> and p. 602. Cf. Freud, CcOLlected Paper?,
Ill, p. 380. The desire to know has been linked with infantile 
"sexual (l) desire to see— scopbophilia or voyeurism. See Jastrow:s 
amusing account and criticism.--Joseph Jastrow, The House that Freud 
Built (London, Rider, 1933)> PP- 197 ff« He discusses Karl Abraham’s 
lengthy disquisition on scoptophilla.
20tto Rank, Beyond Psychology (published privately by Friends 
and Students of the author, Camden, N. J., 19^1), pp. 30 ff. Cf. Rank, 
Psychology and the Soul, pp. 1-12, Vf-48, and elsewhere.
ourselves” in insisting that the process of conscious thinking always 
be seen as Interrelated with the continuous somatic desiring and feel­
ing. Who can dispute the assertion that huaan behavior proceeds 
somatically, even beyond the formative era of infancy? Does anyone 
go without food, drink, sleep, sexual release? How incalculable is 
the determining power of the appetites, the nervous system, the vital 
organismic, biological 'selves" of even the most a o?aa-denying ascetics 
We know, for Instance, that the verbalised descriptions of mystical 
experience depend on the analogy of the biological satisfactions of 
hunger, thirst, muscular tension, warmth, and the desire for Intimacy 
or physical union with another.1
To Freud the basic organism— or id— knows not time. Ihe 
Kantian categories are "graspers” by which the ego learns its milieu. 
Freud could agree with his arch opponent Jung that the past and the 
present are alike to the unconscious.2 A generation to the uncon­
scious is but as a day. It is the ego, the socialised or acculturated
-^ -Merton Gill, The Present State of Psychoanalytic Theory," 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology (Vol. 58, 1959), pp. 1-8.
^In his comparison of Freud with Jung on Religion, Erich 
Fromm, favoring the former as the more constructive, underlines 
the implications of Jung's "doctrine” of the unconscious, especially 
as it veers toward a theology proper of the unconscious.
The unconscious is "not merely a part of the individual mind 
but a power beyond our control intruding upon our minds." Interest­
ingly enough, Fromm likens Freud's ethical Interest, accompanied by 
his devastating criticisms of vhat he sees as "religion," to that of 
John Dewey. Jung's view of the unconscious reflects the attitude 
of William James, who also could compare it vith the God of the 
theologians. We shall deal more with Freud’s view of a phylogenetic
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area of the id, vhich anticipates and reminisces. It is the ego 
that suffers* This is certainly true if consciousness Is a requi­
site for vhat is generally meant by suffering* The ego alone is 
conscious, although it is partially submerged in the unconscious. 
Psychotherapy is essentially ego-therapy. The goal of therapy is 
to strengthen the ego in its control of the irrational id as veil 
as the irrational superego. The e^o is the agency of reason, of 
conscious volition and of planning* It is the executive self, veak 
though it may be. 1
The so-called ggo-psychologlsts among contemporary Freudians 
are trying to maintain Freud's basic insights, vhlle they elaborate 
the study of the ego. As ve have pointed out, this emphasis vithln
memory in the next chapter. Our reference to Frosn s critique is 
Erich Fromm* ’’Freud and Jung" in Psychoanalysis and Religion, 
pp. 10-20, including a footnote, p. 28, res Devey anA James": Freud's
anti-religious 'religious” (qua "ethical”) concern is like Dewey's in 
A Coranon Faith and John Madkirray's in The Structure of Religious 
Experlence♦ Jung, on the other hand, is reminiscent oF William Tames 
and a relativistic, generally approving attitude toward any and all 
religion. Cf. a much more appreciative study of Jung's psychology 
of the unconscious j Hans Schaer, Religion and the Cure of Souls in 
Jung's Psychology* trans. by R. F. C. Hull (fiollingen Series Xbc*T, 
1950), etpecially pp. 32, 36, 37, 57, 197-221.
htt Is important to note that with all their emphasis on the 
inner energies, "instincts,” "mechanisms," "dynamisms" and so forth, 
present-day psychoanalysts do focus their clinical and therapeutic 
attention on the "executor— or executive self— the ego. With some 
qualification this can be said even of Melanie Klein. It Is the 
ego— the "centered self" (to use Tillich's term)— that she is trying 
to help. Nevertheless Klein preserves a kind of pluralistic model, 
vhich may be even closer to suiting the facts of psychodynamics than 
her critics seem to allow. See her remarks apropos of ego-psychology: 
The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child (An Annual publication). VII, 
19T2 7 pp. 51-53 (abstract?? In International Journal of Psycho­
Analysis, xxxiv, 1953, p. 278).
FreudlanistB seems to be assimilating the Insights of other schools 
such as Homey's which have not been using the Freudian frame of 
reference.1
A prominent psychoanalyst among those who are exploring the 
concept of ego-development and seeking correlation and correctives 
from academic psychology ii Erik Erikson, who has recently been 
appointed Professor of Hunan Development at Harvard University,
He has specialized In the treatment of adolescents and young adults 
who have serious emotional problems. In addition to numerous papers 
he has wltten Childhood and Society,2 and a suggestive study of 
Martin Luther. In Young Man Luther, interestingly enough, he, a 
Freudian psychologist, studies Luther's conception of sin and justi­
fication discussing the reformer in terms of psychogenetic crises.3
Erikson presents a refined psychogenesls in an outline of 
seven stages, only three of which are in infancy and early child­
hood, although they are basic hurdles for the emerging ego. There 
seems a reluctance to sake these stages hinge on the precise
^"Far from acknowledging her significant contributions, the 
mood of the ’Freudians’ la to repudiate the Homey approach in toto. 
'Freudian*,' raoatly under the label of ego psychology, are just be­
ginning to give proper theoretical weight to concepts which Homey 
has been shouting from the housetops for twenty years."— Munroe 
(1955)f ££. cit., p. k5&.
2Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York, W. W.
Norton, 1950). He dedicates this fascinating, responsible, fore­
sighted study to our children's children.”
3Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther: "A Study in Psychoanalysis
and History'' (New York, W. Norton, 195$)•
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biological erogenous dynamics depicted in the early formulation: 
orality, anallty, and phallicism. Nevertheless the revised theory 
does not leave the basic somatic, biological ground of psychic devel­
opment. The seven stages are described as follows.
Infancy. The pattern of basic trust and basic 
mistrust is established during early Infancy, when the child is most 
dependent on mothering care.
(2) Infancy. The infantile sources develop for what in 
time becomes a human being's will, in its variations of will-power 
and wilfulness. "The resolution of this crisis will determine 
whether an individual is apt to be dominated by a sense of autonomy, 
or by a sense of shame and doubt."1
(3) The Identity Crisis. This is the "Oedipus" situation.
Love for the maternal person who awakens his senses and his sensu­
ality with her ministrations, and deep and angry rivalry with the 
male possessor of this maternal person" characterise the child at 
this stage.2 During this crisis stage "the child can manage the 
fact that there is no return to the mother and no competition with 
the father as a father" only if and to the degree in which "a future 
career outside of the narrower family can at least be envisaged in 
ideal future occupations: these he learns to imitate in play, and
to anticipate in school.”3
bating Man Luther, p. 255* 2Ibid., p. 113.
3Ibid., p. 258.
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The Identity crisis is long and protracted. It precedes 
the stage of proficiency with sane tool or tools, vhich narks its 
resolution. With Luther, as vith other religious and political 
reformers, the identity crisis is especially prolonged. It is the 
principal subject of the book on Lather.
Whoever is hard put to feel identical vith one set of people 
and Ideas oust that much more violently repudiate another set; 
and whenever an identity, once established, meets further crises, 
the danger of irrational repudiation of otherness and tempo­
rarily even one's ovn identity increases.^
(I*-) Learning, corresponding to latency. The child "becomes 
able and eager to learn systematically, and to collaborate vith 
others," when he develops his sense of industry or work completion, 
his sense of tool•competency, his desire to knov the reason for 
things and to learn to use techniques and tools that will prepare 
him most generally for the tasks of his culture, vith vhich— vith 
whose significant persons— he is coming to Identify himself
Luther's chosen tool, according to Erlkson, was his literacy 
in both Latin and German. His proficient use of the tool of language 
vac not enough however to tide him safely over the identity 
crisis. In finding himself suddenly the leader of a religious revo­
lution he continued his struggle to find his identity.
The three overlapping crises that follow and attend this 
crisis of identity when it is prolonged continued in Luther to 
rage short of resolution. They seem to be an elaboration of the 
Freudian "genital phase.'
1IMd., p. 259- ^Ibid., pp. 258.9.
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(5) Intimacy. A person is driven by the desire-and-need 
to be intimate with another and others. In Luther the dynamism is 
evident in his supreme ability to reach into the homes of his nation 
aa preacher and table-talker.
(6) Oenerativity. Ibis crisis may be fused with that of 
intimacy when the identity crisis is prolonged and sexual Intimacy 
is delayed or denied. It is marked by productivity. Both Luther's 
writings and his fathering of children demonstrate this phase. The 
special hasard of generatlvlty is a resultant sense of stagnation, 
often a sense of futility, of having been drained of life. Brikson 
says that Luther felt this acutely in a manic-depressive form.
(?) Integrity. This is the final crisis short of death.
It is the desired goal of psychotherapy, if not of ethics, for the 
individual. The ego has been striving to bring into its own wield­
ing all the diverse drives and trends which are at work within. Or, 
in another figure, the central ego tries to bring together all the 
ego-fragments. This process corresponds, at least by analogy, with 
the self-process described by thing. Ego strength is measured rela­
tive to the strength of drives and trends at variance in the psyche - 
organism. It is measured by its power to direct and control them.
A so-called 'strong personality” may actually be one whose ego in 
this sense is relatively weak because of the domination of id and
supercigo energies not yet assimilated by the executive, waking,
"prospective" I of awareness.
Erlkson says that he knows of no better term than ego integ­
rity for the condition of one "who in some way has taken care of
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things and people and has adapted himself to the triumphs and disap­
pointments adherent to being, by necessity, the originator of others 
and the generator of things and ideas,” who "may gradually grow the 
fruit of these seven stages': (l) early infancy, (2) infancy, .
(3) identity, (k) learning collaboration and choice of tools,
(5) intimacy, (6) generativity, and (7 ) integrity.*
It may well be that in thia movement within psychoanalysis 
we are witnessing a kind of integrity crisis for the genius of depth 
psychology. The Adlerian individual psychology with its emphasis on 
life style, the Junglan emphasis on life energy and a dynamic self­
hood moving ever toward integration, Horney’s brilliant clinical 
descriptions of neurotic trends revolving about conflicting self­
images (striving for identity!), Sullivan's concept of the waking 
self within the self-dynamism which is shaped by the process of 
inter-organismic— Inter-personal— relations, Frown's emphasis on the 
individual's quest for meaning in his own life, and link's recogni­
tion of the necessity for the ego to implement the expression of 
the self-validating irrational in human nature, and his insistence 
on the ego as will, all these directions in the world of depth 
psychology may be assimilated by ego-psychology within the Freudian 
movement. At least we can say that all these insights seem to be 
in a considerable measure accessible to it and assimilable.
*Ibld., p. 260. Cf. "Eight Stages of Man”— Chapter VII of 
Childhood and Society, pp. 219-23*4— which Erikson lists as:
(!) Trust vs. Basic fas trust; (2) Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt ;
(3; Initiative vs. Guilt; (k) Industry vs. Inferiority; (5) Identity 
vs. Role Diffusion; (6) Intimacy vs. Isolation; (7 ) Generativity 
vs. Stagnation; and (8) Ego Integrity vs. Dsspalr.
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The Optimum of Conscious Subject-Selfhood
In speaking of "Ego integrity" Erikson says that there is no 
clear definition for it. But he ventures to name some of its con­
stituents •
• • • • The ego's accrued assurance of its proclivity for order 
and meaning. It is a post-narcissistic love of the human ego—  
not of the self— as an experience vhich conveys some vorld order 
and some spiritual sense, no matter hov dearly paid for. It is 
the acceptance of one's one and only life cycle as something 
that had to be and that, by necessity, permitted of no substi­
tutions t it thus means a nev, a different love of one's parents. 
It is a comradeship with the ordering vaye of distant times and 
different pursuits, as expressed in the simple products and 
sayings of such times and pursuits. Although aware of the 
relativity of all the various life styles vhich have given 
meaning to human striving, the possessor of integrity is ready 
to defend the dignity of his own life style against all physi­
cal and economic threats. For he knows that an individual life 
is the accidental coincidence of but one life cyale vith but 
one segment of history; and that for him all human integrity 
stands or falls vith the one style of integrity of vhich he 
partakes. The style of integrity developed by his culture or 
civilisation thus becomes the 'patrimony of his soul,' the
seal of his moral paternity of himself......... Before this
final solution, death loses its sting. 1
If Erikson should go on to say vith Paul that the sting of 
death is sin, we would have a good inference for correlating the 
hanartiology of depth psychology vith that of Christian theology. 
Perhaps ve do have something like a doctrine of sin and justifica­
tion in the approach of the e?o-psychologlsts. The tragic, if not 
the sinful, condition is the failure to surmount these seven crises. 
Integration is analogous to "complete ’ salvation and sanctification. 
The e^o of ego integti ty ie the optimum subject-self, or accountable 
according to this philosophy vithin depth psychology.
-Mfoung Mam Luther, pp. 260-261.
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Yet the religious man, "homo reiigiO Ltaus," is likely the 
victim— and/or hero— of a life-long, chronic integrity crisis. 1 
Because of only partially resolved infancy and childhood crises 
and a prolongation of the Identity crisis, the "religious man" 
■becomes older In one respect than his peers, his parents and 
teachers, Suddenly he focuses on shat others take a Ilfs time to 
gain a mere Inkling of perhaps, namely "the guestions of hov to 
escape corruption in living and hov in death to give meaning to 
life." Ve think of the story of the boy Jesus discussing such 
weighty matters with the doctors in the temple. "The chosen young 
man extends the problem of his identity to the borders of existence 
in the known universe' j while others "bend all their efforts to 
adopt and fulfill the departmentalised identities which they find 
prepared in their coomunities. :2
Christian theology may have a question, as does C. 0. Jung, 
for Instance, among depth psychologists, concerning the realism of 
expecting complete integration within the self. Does not existence 
itself, fragmented and ambiguous as it is, with respect to being and 
essence preclude any genuine perfection in the process of what Jung 
calls integration or individuation? He thinks It does.3 However, 
ego-integrity, according to Brikson's own description, eeems &
1Ibid., p. 261. ^Ibid.
3cf. C. G. Jung, The Development of Personality (Bollingen 
Series XX, 17), pp* 179 an£ 196-197* Also, Psychology and Alchemy, 
trans. by R. F. C. Hull (Bolllngen Series XX," 14), 2oo.
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realisable goal, at least logically, since In Its definition It is 
more poetic and carefully psychological than ontological. Neverthe­
less a question remains as to whether the optimum ’'state of soul/’ 
if not the optiiura of subject-selfhood, Is that vhlch Erikson 
describes as ego-integrity. Does this ego of integrity open suf­
ficiently to that fourth dimension with vhlch Christian theology is 
concerned? Without hurou religiosus and his never-quite-resolved 
integrity crisis where would the prophetic element be in society's 
progression? Is agape woven into the life of the coaqpletely self­
contained individual? Is he necessarily a means of grace to others? 
We can see reason for venturing both affirmative and negative answers 
to these questions. Hence ve shall leave them open, at least for the 
time being.
Conclusion: Who is the Sinner?
Can HE Assume a Subject-self'
We return now to our original question concerning the identi­
ty of the subject-self, the 1^ which assumes responsibility and 
accountability. Our special context is the conception of ’man as 
sinner. Depth psychology helps both to raise the question and to 
seek out answers for it: "Who— or what in a person— is accountable?"
Later we shall deal with the matter of culpability, or guilt. In 
the present chapter ve have been inquiring as to the nature of the 
self, the psyche, and the subject-center— if one can be supposed.
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In our opening example of the man-in-rage we confronted the 
difficulties in trying to focus the culpability even for an obviously 
outrageous offense. What in his confused world was accountable?
Our discussion of Freud’s psychology, and of the various 
schools' critical and corrective views, leads us to a choice between 
two "faiths" or working suppositions: (l) A coamitment to the idea
of determinism vhich approaches a degree that denies for all prac­
tical purposes any freedom or responsibility to the waking self 
except possibly the kind of freedom seen by analogy in the flower 
which ’tries" to grow and to "fulfill its destiny" even in a patch 
of weeds j1 (2) A coraaitinant to the idea of a significant though 
limited area of free choice for the waking self, or ego, with the 
accompanying responsibility. Certainly the logic of the Freud who 
posited a primal, victorious death instinct and probably the logic 
even of the earlier Freud, support the first position. The spirit 
of Freud the therapist and "philosopher" and the genius of depth 
psychology in general throughout its various schools favor the 
second "faith." 2
*Cf. Freud's letter to Frederic Van Eeden, December, 28,
191^, quoted by Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud,
Vol. II, pp. 368-369* Freud saw the 'Wii" (the weeds?) as 'being 
from within the payche-soma— the human organism.
Cf. Mark 7I1-23*
^Cf. Harold Palmer, "Psychiatric Prologosmna: A Plea for
the Help of Philosophy," Philosophy (The Journal of the Royal Insti­
tute of Philosophy, London, Macmillan, 1951)# Vol. XXCI, PP* 311-332) 
Vol. XXCII, pp* 39-50.— especially at II, p. U9.
Re: Freud's determinism: cf. Ernest Jones, Review of
M. Hamblin Smith's Ihe Psychology of the Criminal (London, Methuen, 
1922), in The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, IV, p. 3^.
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If ve do assume that there le a centered-self vhich says,
1, vhich rationalises even irrational behavior when pressed for a 
reason, vhich assumes responsibility, ve introduce the problem of 
guiltj of accountable wrongness* As ve explore, with the help of 
depth psychology, the nature of guilt, ve find complications, 
Including feelings of unvorthlness, pervasive anxiety, and the 
danger of falling Into despair— a cooplex phenomenon In itself.
Then ve are pussled still by the problem of hov to interpret and to 
deal vith that non-gullt-assuniing kind of self-assertion vhich can 
be described both by any man's introspective "case study'* and by 
less confessional case study. It is the attitude vhich persists 
In saying, "Myself right or wrongI" Vhat in a person voices such 
a driving conviction? Is it primary narcissism, is it an innate 
aggressiveness Instinct, is it purposive libido, Is it compensating 
energy trying to reverse an inner conviction of inferiority or 
"Myself wrong!" is it the executive self, the ego, perhaps in the 
service of irrational drives?
The problem vhich Christianity addresses soterlologlcally 
is not simply that of the conscious assumption of guilt and respon­
sibility but also that of actual vrongness against rightness as
istm-
As ve explore this problem ve begin vith the subjective 
side of accountability, first with conscious guilt-feelings and 
vith possibly unconscious or repressed guilt-feelings.
CHAPTER FIVE
WHAT IS HIS GUILT? - I - THE NATURE OF QUILT FEELINGS
Conscloua Guilt
What is happening when a person*s conscience hurts him?
Again, we proceed by citing an incident. A two-year-old, 
on being reprimanded at the breakfast table, gets down from his 
high chair crying. Hie protests through his tears, Me good boy2"
Who said he was not? Something in the event of correction itself 
says to him in effect, "You are a bad boy." This he can hardly 
tolerate. He bursts out for all the world to hear, "Ms good boy! ' 1
Meanwhile his father suffers Intense inner pain. The fierce­
ness of his reprimand has more than met the "crime.n He came to 
breakfast irritable. He likens himself to an artilleryman who has 
brought down a sparrow with a cannon bail.
The inner pain continues as the father rides in to work. At 
his machine or at his desk he finds himself coming hack to the inci­
dent. All day long he aannot leave, emotionally, the breakfast table 
where he spoke in anger to his tiny child.
*Cf • a somewhat similar example given by Theodore Relk in 
P is Confessions of An Analyst. Our reference is to the edition in 
The Search Within (New b^rs,' Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1956), pp. 231­
15?.
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How Is the troubled, troubling consclance quieted? Is not 
the problem how to satisfy it? The inner cry is for righting a 
wrong, for justification, if not of the deed, at least of the I be­
hind it. The mechanism of rationalisation is usually in frantic 
operation as the victim of guilt feelings tries to resume his nor­
mal efficiency at his work.
However the justification which guilt feelings seek is not 
a fictional one. They would turn the clock back— indeed, they do in 
phantasy, compulsively, repetitively— and reseat the nan at the 
breakfast table, run the scene again, correcting the reprimand. The 
child would be addressed in a quiet, loving manner. Then and only 
then could the father feel truly "justified" in the sense of being 
made righteous in the situation. The portrait of his injured infant 
son persists before his mind's eye. "If only I had not been so 
harsh J If only I could go back and do it right.!" Are not these 
what his conscience is exclaiming? Regret in sons situations may 
even turn into remorse.
Obviously he cannot go back to the event and undo it. What 
then can he do? He will try to be especially loving to the boy when 
he goes home tonight. He will make a kind of reparation, a restitu­
tion, hence an expiation. The making of restitution, while never a 
perfect "justification," Is as near as one can come to it on his own.
In the evening when the father sees his son again and in his 
own way does the work of reparation, thus showing his son that he 
does love him— and thus probably re assuring the small boy that he is
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accepted 'by his father ae "good” instead of "bad," he is rewarded by 
the son's affection— tantamount to forgiveness. The son is accept­
ing him as the "good" father. How like the child's spontaneous 
outburst of the morning, "He good boy," is the father's work of 
reparation! It seems to express, "I am a good father." In his 
psyche the image of his injured son is close to his own damaged 
self-image.1 The son's accepting him as the good father is the 
forgiveness sought, even as the father’s accepting, attentive, 
demonstration to the son is the forgiveness-reassurance desired by 
the son, at least at the moment of injury. Ihe day's soothing 
events, possibly including his mother's comfort along with the 
continual distractions of the nursery, may seem to have done the 
Job already. Yet even the mother's help can have been but the ad­
umbration of the desired reconciliation with the father.
Freud's Understanding of Quilt
Freud as an anthropologist supposed guilt to be universal, 
specifically Oedipal guilt. We may regret that he spelled out the 
nature of guilt in so reduetionistic a manner,2 but we can hardly
^f. typical Freudian discussions, such as Ernest Jones' ‘
"The Significance of the Grandfather for the Fate of the Individual" 
(1913), and "The Phantasy of the Reversal of Generations ' (1913),
Chapters 27 and 28, Papers on Psycho-AnalysIs (Fourth edition, London, 
Bailliere, Tindall, and Cox, 193o), pp. 525-530.
^We shall not attest to better the critique of H. L. Philp, 
Freud and Religious Belief (see Bibliography, infra), 1956. He attacks 
vith cogency and vigor Freud, not as psychotherapist, but as anthropol­
ogist and "philosopher of religion.” It is not surprising that Ernest 
Jones saw this book as "an extremely adverse criticism." He even
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study his "findings” on the subject of guilt and guilt-feelings 
without the Oedlpal frame of reference. He speculated that it 
was not merely individual, but racial, in its genesis. In Totem 
and Taboo, he relates these tvo primitive institutions to the ori­
gins of religion and morality.
He likens the totem sacrifice and meal directly to the 
Christian service of Communion and the theology it represents, 
even as he relates the acccopanying taboo directly to Christian 
ethics. Of course, Christianity is not alone in this regard. To 
Freud all religion and all other "compulsion neuroses" are directly 
related to the primitive drama reenacted in the customs of totem 
and taboo.1 Superstition is a vestige of primitive taboo.
For us the meaning of taboo branches off into tvo opposite 
directions. On the one hand it means to us, sacred, consecrated: 
but on the other hand it means, uncanny, dangerous, forbidden, 
and unclean . . . .  taboo expresses itself essentially in pro­
hibitions and restrictions. Our combination of "holy dread” 
would often express the meaning of taboo.2
The basic taboo is against incest vlth the mother or father's 
wife* All other taboos stem from this one. The origin of the taboo
likened Phllp's "sweeping condemnation" of Freud's psychology of 
religion to a similar appraisal" by someone of Darwin s On the 
Origin of Species.— Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud *
■J J P *  '* 1 T J**    1 1    ■ '■■■■  ■■ —  .1. mMTTi mm . ■III# P* 362•
^Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo (19HO: - With some apology 
we are using the English translation ‘by A. A. Brill. The "authorised 
translation," is by James Strachey. Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: 
’Seme Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Ravages aS3 
Neurotics, ” (New York, W. W. Norton, 1952, London, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1950). Of course BrillU earlier translation was with Freud’s 
approval. It is in Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, pp. 805-930.
%auic Writings> p. 821. Cf., Totem (Strachey), p. 18.
was the primal father's own will. Incest is integrally related to
murder, within the racial psyche. In discussing the evolution of 
culture, Freud says:
We have spoken of the hostility to culture, produced hy the 
pressure it exercises and the instinctual renunciations that it 
demands. If one imagined its prohibitions removed, then one 
could choose any woman who took one's fancy as one's sexual 
object, one could kill without hesitation one's rival or who- ’ 
ever interfered with one in any other way, and one could seise 
what one wanted of another man's goods without asking his leave: 
how splendid, what a succession of delights, life would bei True, 
one soon finds the first difficulty: everyone else has exactly
the same wishes, and will treat one with no more consideration 
than one will treat him. And so in reality there is only one 
single person who can be made unrestrictedly happy by abolish­
ing thus the restrictions imposed by culture, and that is a 
tyrant or dictator who has monopolized all the means of power; 
and even he has every reason to want the others to keep at 
least one cultural commandment; thou shalt not kill.1
In his anthropology Freud conceives of just such an arrange­
ment In the primal horde. The primal chief or father holds down the 
sons. Tfteir own desire for hie power, specifically for his women, 
is forbidden on pain of death. This is the forbidden fruit. Hence, 
the primal taboo is against incest: against playing the role of the
father-chief in the fundamental expression of life, sexual love with 
the father-chief' s women, the mothers of the conanunity. The incest 
crisis in the dawn of human society, along with the repetition of an 
incest crisis in the psychogenesis of every individual who develops 
beyond the ’phallic" stage, accounts for the prevalent association 
of sin with sexual offenses and desires.
Sigmund Freud, The Future of An Illusion (1927), trans. by 
W. D. Robson-Scott, International Psycho-Analytical Library, Ho. 15, 
editor: Ernest Jones (London, Hogarth Press and the Institute of
Psycho-Analysis, 19^9)# PP* 25-26.
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Furthermore, the primitive desire to commit incest, essen­
tially an offense against the tyrant-father, is equivalent to par­
ricide, since its fulfillment would require the father-chief's 
removal. Freud sees, not only in the behavior of other mammals, 
but in Hebrew, Greek, and Persian myths, and in the practice of 
taboo and totem ritual in primitive societies, a compelling witness 
to an early murder of the father of the race and the emergence of a 
society of brothers. According to Freud’s speculation, parricide 
occurred for every race. The original sin was murder of the father.
It was followed Ummdiately by the fear of retribution. The father 
image could not be killed. It remained— and has remained— to haunt 
the imagination of the sons. In order to ward off the threat of 
retribution, the sons consolidated their fraternity and formed a 
father-worshipping cult in an attempt to appease him, to undo the 
murder. The father was identified with a certain animal, the totem 
animal, after which the tribe was likely named. By projection the 
animal and its image were invested with deity. Henceforth the father- 
image— or totem— was viewed with ambivalence: (l) reverence and
even tenderness; and (2) the old hatred of the domineering, restric­
tive tyrant. In other words, the father-image is approached with 
guilt-conditioned emotions and also with renewed hatred. This 
ambivalence of emotions is seen in the totem, which includes: worship,
sacrifice of the totem animal, festivities in which taboos are tempo­
rarily removed, and then a reinstatement of the taboos and fear of 
the totem. The sacrifice of the animal serves a double purpose.
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First, it is a reenactment of the primal murder* Second, it is 
retributive execution of one of the sonata representative "son —  
on behalf of the father, the avenging of his murder, the appeasement
of the projected fear as though it were the wrath of the tribal
father-god, ever-present in pursuit of his parricidal sons.^
In the community of brothers two taboos form the basis for 
"morality.' Freud expounds his theoryi
One day (in a mythical if not a historical sense) the 
expelled brothers joined forces, slew and ate the father, and 
thus put an end to the father horde. Together they dared and 
accomplished what would have remained impossible for them singly.
Perhaps some advance in culture, like the use of a new weapon,
had given them the feeling of superiority. Of course these 
cannibalistic savages ate their victim. This violent primal 
father had surely been the envied and feared model for each 
of the brothers. Now they accomplished their identification 
with him by devouring him and each acquired a part of his 
strength. The totem feast, which is perhaps mankind's first 
celebration, would be the repetition and comsemoratlon of this 
memorable, criminal act with which so many things began, social 
organisation, moral restrictions and religion. 2
The brothers had both hated and loved the father, because he 
too was an object— indeed a prominent one— for libido attachment from
•^ Cf. Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karaaagov, trans. by Constance 
Garnett (New York, Kie Modern Library J. J*reud wrote a preface to Die 
Urgestalt der Bruder Karamasoff, a supplementary volume to the com­
plete German edition of Dostoyevsky's works ("Dostoevsky and Parri­
cide, Freud, Collected Papers, V, pp. 222-2^2). Actually Freud did 
not allude as much as we might expect to Dostoyevsky s striking pre­
corroboration of hia own parricidal motif. Hanns Sachs, of Berlin 
and later of Boston, says that Freud'a aloof attitude toward 
Dostoyevsky, whom Sachs greatly admired, was due not to any lack 
of appreciation for the profundity of Dostoyevsky's intuitive psychol­
ogy but rather to Freud’s dislike of self-laceration.— Hanns Sachs, 
Froul, Master and Friend (London, Imago, 19^5), pp. 10U-105. Cf. 
also TheodorReik, Prom Thirty Years with Freud (London, Hogarth 
Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysts19^ -2), pp. 1^2-157.
2Ba8ic Writings, pp. 915-16; Totem (Strachey), pp. lUl-2.
earliest infancy. When the sons had satisfied their hatred by re* 
moving him and had carried out the previously frustrated wish by 
devouring him— identifying themselves with him by literally incor­
porating his body, their suppressed tender impulses began to assert 
themselves. The crime was in many respects a failure. But failure 
is more conducive to moral reaction than success, says Freud.
The suppressed tenderness emerged in the form of remorse, 
whose acute expression was in conscious guilt feeling.
The dead now became stronger than the living had been, even 
as we observe it today in the destinies of men. What the father's 
presence had formerly prevented they themselves now prohibited 
in the psychic situation of "substantial obedience' which ve know 
so well from psychoanalysis. They undid their deed by declaring 
that the killing of the father substitute, the totem, was not 
allowed, and renounced the fruits of their deed by denying them­
selves the liberated women. Thus they created two fundamental 
taboos of totemlsm out of the sense of guilt of the son, and for 
this very reason these had to correspond with the two repressed 
wishes of the Oedipus complex. Whoever disobeyed became guilty 
of the two only crimes which troubled primitive society.*
Here Freud quotes his principal authority among the outstand­
ing anthropologists recognized at the time of his writing Totem and 
Taboo. W. Robertson Smith, in (Hie Religion of the Semites, says, 
Murder and incest, or offences of like kind against the sacred law 
of blood are in primitive society the only crimes of vhich the com­
munity as such takes cognisance.
1Baslc Writings, p. 917; Totem, p. 1^ 3•
^Footnote, ibid. A recent edition of Smith's work is 
W. Robertson Smith, The Religion of the Semites (1889, 189*0, 
Meridian Library, Wo* k (tfew York, Meridian iBooks, 1956), 507 pp. 
Freud refers to p. U19. Smith adds, ve should note here j "The 
offenses of man against man are matters of private lav, to be set­
tled between the parties on the principle tff retaliation or by the
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Incest prohibition had another strong support, besides the 
desire to appease the dead father.
Sexual need does not unite men; it separates them* Though 
the brothers had joined forces in order to overcome the father, 
each vas the other's rival among the women. Each one wanted to 
have then all to himself like the father, and In the fight of 
each against the other the nev organisation perished. Feu* there 
vas no longer any one stronger than all the rest vho could have 
successfully assuned the role of the father. Thus there tots 
nothing left for the brothers * if they wanted to live together, 
but to erect the Incest prohibition— psrhaps after isany difficult 
experiences— through which they all equally renounced the vosen 
whom they desired, and on account of whoa they had m o v e d  the 
father in the first place.*
Thus exogamy and prohibition of murder, the deteminaats of aorallty,
according to Freud, have their basis in racial guilt.
Fraud accepts Robertson Smith’s observation that the old 
totem feast returns In the original form of sacrifice.
The ireanlng cf the rite la the same: sanctification through
participation In the common meal. The sense of guilt, vhich can 
only be allayed through the solidarity of all the participants, 
has also been retained. In addition to this there Is the tribal 
deity In whose supposed presence the sacrifice takes place, vho 
takes part in the meal like a member of the tribe, and vith whom 
identification Is effected by the act of eating the sacrifice. 2
The idea of God is primarily the father~lmage, according to 
Freud. Here it la Interesting to notice that Freud’a thought holds
‘ • . • \V 1 .. r . * . f* } ** .*•* • *  k • •»/ •* . * >• ‘ V. • Wpayment of damages." However, murder and incest have a community and 
religious consequence. Smith, on. cit., pp. U19-U20. Cf. more recent 
anthropological studies such aa Malinowski'a Sex and Repression In 
Savage Society, cited earlier; Ruth Benedict's Patterns of Culture 
{"193** J# faov York, Mentor Books, 19**6> Margaret Mead » Ccmlng Age 
in S&zaoa (1920, London, Penguin, 19^3); Growing Up in Nev Guinea 
TT930, Penguin, 19^2); and Sex and Tempermenti in Stree Primitive 
Societies (1935# Kev York, Mentor, 19$0J.
•^Baalc Vrltings, p. 917| Totem, p. lM*.
^Baaic Writ,lugs. p. 919; Totem, p. 1^ 7*
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to a primal monotheism, vlth polythelia coning only vlth the growth of 
culture. 1 In hit last book, Moses and Lonothalsm, Freud discusses 
the genesis of the Hebrew and Christian religions. He assumes after 
a atatenant once made, and possibly later effectively retracted, by 
S. Sollin, 2 that Hebrew faith developed out of the assassination in 
the wilderness of the great leader and father*Inage Moses.
It would be worth while to understand why the Monotheistic 
idea should nake such a deep tnpreselon on Just the Jewish people, 
and why they adhered to it so tenaciously. I believe this ques­
tion can be answered. The great deed and nisdeed of primeval 
tines, the aurder of the Father, was brought hone to the Jews, 
for fate decreed that they should repeat it on the person of 
Moses, an eninent father substitute. It was a case of acting 
Instead of renenbering, something which often happens during 
analytic work vlth neuroties, They responded to the doctrine 
of Moees— vhlch should have been a stInulus to their nemory—  
by denying their act, did not progress beyond the recognition 
of the great Father and barred the passage to the point where 
later an Paul started his continuation of prinaeval history.
It can scarcely be chance that the violent death of another 
great nan should becone the starting point for the creation of 
a nev religion by Paul. This was a nan vhon a snail nuaber of 
adherents in Judea believed to be the Son of God and the 
premised Messiah, and who later on took over sone of the child­
hood history that had been attached to Noeee . . . .  Ve do not 
know if he was really the great nan vhon the Gospels depict or 
whether it was not rather the fact and the clrcunstances of his 
death that were the decisive factor in his achieving importance.3
The tvo religions are different In that the Jewish expression 
of monotheism amounts to a denial— a repression— of parricidal guilt, 
a self-Justification, While the Christian faith looks back to the
Sigmund Freud, Moees and Monotheism, trans. by Katherine 
Jones (Hew York, Alfred A. &epf, 1^9),"p. I3k.
%f. Ernest Jones account in Life and Work of Sigmund Freud,
III, pp. 363-37k.
^Freud, Moses and Monotheism, pp. lkk-5.
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death of "the Son of God" as the enduring sacrifice vhich appeased
the Father by giving life for life. The Son bore the guilt of the
rece on the cross. Freud who himself suffered bravely as a Jew, 1 
in the somewhat anti-Semitic culture of Vienna and later in the 
encroaching anti-Jewish hysteria of Hitlerism, wrote, toward the 
end of hit eighty-two years:
Uhe poor Jewish people, who with its usual stiff-necked 
obduracy continue to deny the murder of their "father, ' has 
dearly expiated this in the course of centuries. Over and 
over again they heard the reproach; you killed our God. And 
this reproach is true, if rightly interpreted. It says , in 
reference to the history of religion; you wont admit that
you murdered God (the archetype of God, the primaeval Father
and his reincarnations). Something should be added, namely:
"It is true, we did the same thing, but we admitted it, and 
since then we have been purified."^
The Christianity vhich Freud describes is principally its 
expression in Roman Catholicism, as would be expected since he lived 
a member of the Jewish minority in a Roman Catholic country practi­
cally all of his life. The Christianity he observed seemed to 
re-introduce the "mother goddess which the Hebrew religion had 
discarded.3 Also, It seemed to regard sexual desire as evil In
^ee, for instance, S. Freud, An Autobiographical Study, 
trans. James Strmchey (London, Hogarth and 'the'Lis t itute of'Taycho- 
Analysis, 1935)# P* 1^ # vhere Freud reminicises about his experience
on entering the University of Vienna, made unpleasant because I was 
a Jew.”
2Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p. 1^ 5* Cf. also, at p. 215.
% *• c * G. Jung, Psychology and Religion, West and East 
(Bollingen Series XX), pp. 6^.-3.
Freud seems not to have seen the significance of the Virgin 
in the same way as Jung. He viewed the phenomenon of religious 
experience through his patriarchal lens. Jones says he was from 
hi3 youth up a natural atheist. "— Jones' chapter on Religion in
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itself, in insisting on the celibacy of the priesthood and in defin­
ing sin as originating in sexual lust. In his last writings Freud 
reaffirmed his convictions expounded a generation earlier in Totem 
and Taboo, Moses and Monotheism is an elaboration of the theories 
In the former work, especially as they relate to Judaism and Chris­
tianity. But his interpretation of Christianity is expressed suc­
cinctly in the following quotation from the earlier treatment.
In the Christian myth man's original sin is undoubtedly an 
offense against God the Father, and if Christ redeems mankind 
from the weight of original sin by sacrificing his own life, he 
forces us to the conclusion that this sin is murder. According 
to the law of retaliation which is deeply rooted in human feel­
ing, a murder can be atoned only by the sacrifice of another 
life) the self-sacrifice points to blood-guilt. 1
Here Freud has a footnote which calls attention to a theory 
in the realm of psychic economics— further developed, notably in
Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, IH, pp. 3U9-37U, at p. 351* Cf. also, 
Ian Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate, pp. 137-138, 157.
Cf. Otto Rank, pie Trauma of Birth (New York, Robert Brunner,
1952), the chapter on "Religious Sublimation," especially pp. 121-123. 
When Rank wrote this book (Qeburtstrauma, 1923) he was still within 
the good graces of Freud. The attitude toward the "mother goddess"
(of whom the Virgin Mary is a symbol) is patriarchal; the father 
image for deity is prior— see Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis 
of the Ego— 1920, trans. by James Strachey (London7 Boni & Liveright, 
n. 377 also included in A General Selection from the Works of Sigmund 
Freud, edited by John Rickman, previously cited, pp. I55-5VTJ. Pi is 
work was written before Freud had completed his structural model, in 
Pie Ego and the Id (1923)*
Cf. also, "A Religious Experience” (1928), Collected Papers,
V, pp. 2k3-2U6; and Freud's preface to Theodor Relkrs^Das ftitual, 
"Psycho-Analysis and Religious Origins" (1919)# trans. by James 
Strachey, Collected Papers, V. pp. 92-97*
1Basic Writings, pp. 92k-925; Totem, p. 151*.
Mourning and Melancholia.1 "The suicidal impulses of our neurotics 
regularly prove to be self-punishments for death wishes directed 
against others"2 By reverse reasoning Freud follows the means of 
reconciliation to the crime which must ultimately demand Buch ex­
piation.
The death of the Son implies the death of the Father by 
the hand of the Son.3 The initial, and later suppressed, role which 
Jesus played, then, was that of usurper.1* Only by elaboration is 
he placed in the role of savior. He is savior by virtue of being 
victim. Nevertheless, Jesus is given a dual role in the ordeal of 
the cross. He is both the hated father-image and the usurper-son 
giving himself up to the retributive wrath of the father. In this 
dual role in vhich he receives both the hostility and the narcis­
sistic identification of the worshiper, even as the totem animal—  
the lamb (?), and the human sacrifices before him, he brings to a 
common focus the dual forces of existence: aggression and fear,
murder and remorse, death and libidinous sympathy— life, hatred and 
love, sin and justification.
^This paper has been cited before: Mourning and Mtlancholia
(1917, in A General Selection, at pp. 152-15$).
2Basic Writings, p. 925 n.j Totem, 15^ n. After he introduced 
the hypothesis of a primitive death instinct, Freud regularly ascribed 
this phenomenon to the operation of this inner force. Mourning and 
Melancholia, like Totem and Taboo antedates his theory of an instinet- 
ual dualism.
1Basic Writings, ibid., Totem, ibid.
4Ibid., and Mosea and Monotheism (1938), p. 1^ 0.
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This paradoxical reenactment of parricide in the form of 
fratricide in the crucifixion is followed by the emergence of the 
suppressed Impulses of tenderness. This accounts for the ambiva­
lence •
The reconciliation with the father it the more thorough be­
cause simultaneously vlth this sacrifice there follows the com­
plete renunciation of woman, for whose sake mankind rebelled 
against the father. But now also the psychological fatality of 
ambivalence demands its rights. In the same deed which offers 
the greatest possible expiation to the father, the son also 
attains the goal of his wishes against the father. He becomes 
a god himself beside or rather in place of his father. The 
religion of the son succeeds the religion of the father. As 
a sign of this substitution the old totem feast is revived 
again in the form of coasmnion in which the band of brothers 
now eats the flesh and blood of the son and no longer that of 
the father, the sons thereby Identifying themselves with him 
and becoming holy themselves. Thus through the ages ve see 
the identity of the totem feast with the animal sacrifice, 
and the Christian eucharlst, and in all these solemn occasions 
ve recognise the after-effects of that crime which so oppressed 
men but of which they must have been bo proud. At bottom, 
however, the Christian communion is a new setting aside of 
the father, a repetition of the crime that must be expiated.
We see how well justified is Fraser's dictum that ’the 
Christian communion has absorbed within Itself a sacrament 
vhlch is doubtless far older than Christianity. ’1
If not compelling, Freud's account of Christian theology is 
at least impressive. Were it convincing to theologians they would
IBasic Writings, p. 925) Totem, pp. 15^-5* (Freud quotes 
from Sir James Frazer^s The Golden 'tough, third edition, Part V, 
London, 1912, Vol. 2, p.TO*
Cf. also Moses and Monotheism, pp. 21*1—215.
Cf* A. N. Prior, "Can Religion Be Discussed?" in Antony 
Flew and others, New Essaye in Philosophical Theology (New York, 
London, Macmillan, l9$5 J# PP» 1-li. nKabbi,T Duncan, a 19th cen­
tury ’Scottish Calvinist” who has been compared with Karl Barth, 
said that sin "designs delclde” and seeks "to slay Being at Its
roots". Says Prior, "A better description of parricide could hardly be found" (p. 7 n.).
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immediately redefine, not only their conceptions of identification 
with the Son but also the Pauline idea of 'en Christo. We shall 
not take time to elaborate the anthropological theories offered by 
Jbng and Rank1 and their lnpllclt recognition of innate conscience, 
or capacity for guilt. We have elaborated Freud's theories not 
because they are true. In fact they can be questioned at many 
points and often refuted outright. 2 Highly speculative Is his loose
*For Instance, in Jung's Psychology and Religion: West and
East (Bolllngen Series XX), Part Two; and Rank*a earlier writings 
and his Psychology and the Soul, and Beyond Psychology.
^Notably by Bronislav Malinowski, as we have noted.
Of course Freud's speculation tended to stloulate anthropol­
ogical research. The late Geza Roheim (in Psychoanalysis and Anthro­
pology, New York, International Universities Press, 1950, and other 
works; i s  outstanding as a research anthropologist vho has tried to 
adhere to the Freudian theory of the universality of the Oedipus 
complex. In 1935 Suttie described his approach as ’applying the 
Oedipus 'blinkers' to research.* (Suttie, 0£. cit., p. 137).
Obviously, there can be more than one Interpretation of 
puberty rites. Although Suttie's treatment at times seems to be 
a bit disjointed (partly because the volume is made up of perhaps 
somewhat hastily assembled papers, which were written over a period 
of thirteen years), he offers, nevertheless, alternative theories 
to balance what he calls "patriarchal” (Freudian, Oedipus-complex- 
universalistic) Interpretations. For example, why cannot the so- 
called "horror of menstruation" apparent among men in some cultures, 
be explained not in terms of ’castration fear" but in terms of 
"reaction formation" of basic envy (of woman)? Even patterns which 
show no taboo on menstruation— as that of the Aranda tribe, which 
assert that men can bear children, that Include ritual bleeding 
from a subincision of the penis, vith women excluded from the ritual 
are interpreted by Roheim as castratlon-anxiety, homo-sexual dis­
placement of Incestuous love for the mother. (Roheim, Australian 
Totemism). But J. C. Flugel*e review of Roheim's later War Crime 
and the Covenant, Journal of Clinical Psychopathology, Monograph 
Series, Wo. 1 (Mont ice Y., Medical Journal Press, 19^5)#
calls attention to Roheim's moving away from his former adherence 
to a phylogenetic bias (with Freud) and, specifically, to the
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logic In tracing back from the idea of human sacrifice to a primal 
murder. Certainly capital punishment has often enough been given 
for lesser ’crimes,' to the disparagement of humanity, to be sure.
It is interesting to note that Freud actually believed his 
highly speculative theories, although he recognised them as specu­
lation.^ He saw in them symbolic truth beyond possible historic 
truth. Judged by his own logic— and theology proper— Freud's 
theory of racial guilt, lncestual and parricidal, and his interpre­
tation of ritual and sacrament within Christianity are a projection 
of his own repressed desire to kill and eat his own father and to 
avoid suffering by Identifying with a brother-image victim of the 
father' 8 retaliatory wrath. 2
reviewer’s opinion that Ian Suttie himself "holding as he does that 
the social impulses are in some way derived from or connected with 
dependence on the mother, seems to stand very near to Roheim. In 
Suttie's works, as in this recent book of Roheim's, the mother as­
sumes a relatively much greater importance than she does in most 
of Freud’s work."— International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXVII, 
19^6, pp. 159-161. ..‘
Another "freudian’ anthropologist is Abram Kardinor. Cf.
The Psychological Frontiers of Society (New York, Columbia University 
Frees, 19^5, Interra::Voral Uhiversities Press, 1950)•
■^ f. Last paragraph of note, Basic Writings, p. 916; Totem,
p. 1*2.
2This statement may seem almost presumptuously bold. But it 
represents almost countless appraisals by critics, along with the so 
obvious inference from Freud’s own "hermeneutics." One of the many 
biographies which his followers do not seem to appreciate is Helen 
Walker Puner's Freuds His Life and His Mind- "A Biography" (London, 
Grey Walls Press, 19^9)- Cf. tones' criticisms of this book, The 
Life and Work of Sigaund Freud, I and II, passim; e. g., I, pp. 8 n., 
2$ n.; II, p. 38677l$ps. Puner goes so far as to suggest that Freud's 
preoccupation with Moses, who was 'really a gentile," suggests that 
subconsciously Freud fancied himself ’a gentile prince," so great 
was his resentment at being of a minority community. —  Puner, og. cit.,
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Sin and justification in the more explicit "theology" of 
Freud may be described as follows j Quilt is basically Oedlpal,
pp. 186-187; cf. also, pp. 118-120. Even Joseph Jastrov halts at 
the work of one he regards "a aore extreme, a less restrained, 
Freudian than a aore responsible representative of the movement, 
Charles E. May Ian's The Tragic Complexes of Freud— Jastrov, op. cit., 
pp. 220 ff. (our quotation: p. <?£? n.).
A recent, rather devastating criticism of Freud Is by Erich 
Fromm in Sigmund Freud's Missions "An Analysis of His Personality 
and Influence, World Perspectives, Vol. 21, (New York Harper, 1959)* 
This psychoanalysed, former Freudian, says that Freudians themselves 
repressed their ovn ambition to conquer the vorld vlth a messianic 
Ideal cf salvation, "and thus were caught in ambiguities and dis­
honesties, vhlch are bound to follov from such repression" (p. 109). 
They assumed an "authoritarian," "fanatical," posture with their 
limited scientific data (limited in validity to but a certain section 
of middle-class society, p. 110). Fromm regards the Freudians as 
generally blind to vhat he calls the "social unconscious," while 
Marxists have been blind to individual motivations (p. 111).
Nevertheless, ve have seen how Tot^ r., Moses, and other writ­
ings including Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, reflect 
an awareness of a social ''memory. ’1 Fromm goes on~To say that "psy­
choanalysis became a substitute satisfaction for a deep human yearn­
ing, that of finding a meaning to life, of being in genuine touch 
with reality. It became for many (especially in urban upper and 
middle classes) a surrogate for religionI (pp. 111-112). By now 
western thought is impregnated with Freud's discoveries. Indeed 
the Freudian movement has been a part of the liberating movement 
within our culture; it has thirst for truth (p. 115). Freud him­
self was limited by his ovn peculiarities of temperament. Fromm 
sees Freud's preoccupation with the so-called Oedlpal formula even 
for female psychology as due in part to his native lack of under­
standing of women. This "puritan type" man regarded as a scienti­
fic study of women what actually was but his own "naive rationalisa­
tions of male prejudices" (p. 31)* Freud lacked any genuine 
appreciation for the meaning of love for one's neighbor; vis., his 
argument in Civilization and Its Discontents is that it is against 
reason to love one1 s neighTTor as one’s self1. Frown notes also that 
he had an egocentric preoccupation with his ovn death (citing, for 
instance, Jones' biography of Freud, I, pp. 190-192).— Frona,
Sigmund Freud1s Mission, p. 37.
Alluding again to our statement in the text above, ve sense
in Freud's own writings that he would be the last to deny his own
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both for mankind and for the individual. Guilt feelings are already 
in the individual psyche at birth, 1 although they become acutely 
activated during his own encounter vith forbidden desire and hatred 
for authority. Society as veil as the individual tries by ritual to 
win freedom from the fear in guilt. In their compulsive religious 
practices they both reenact their sins and achieve a kind of tempo­
rary feeling of atonement. Justification cooes by "keeping the 
feast," vhether in the observance of the communal sacrament or in 
private phantasy.
In the individual, atonement vith the parental images is 
effected by psychic incorporation, or introJeetion. The introjected 
disapproving, threatening images form the nucleus for the 1 vhich 
transcends, often uncontrollably, the 1 vhich is supposed to be in 
rational control. The introJected norms of society are the inner 
moral lav, the conscience. Much of any individual^ behavior can 
be described as his attempt to satisfy his inner, introJected, critic.
Although ve do not take as scientific truth Freud's specula­
tions about the nature of guilt and its universality, ve do see
Oedipus complex. But our question would be: Did he go deep enough
to find that trauma or "repressed” complex against vhich his "Oedi­
pus guilt" protected his ego?
^dhis is an unavoidable inference from Freud's Totem, Moses, 
and similar writings. Ve do not seem to be able to separate their 
theses from the more clinical writings,’ since he tended to carry 
over his doctrines from one context into another; 1. e., psychoanaly­
sis itself became for him a method of "research" as well as a tech­
nique of therapy. Cf., Infra, when we discuss his first criticism 
of Otto Bank's theory of Geburtgtrauma.
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in them the extensive implications of hie system, the range possible 
for his own "gnosiphilia." They tell in grandiose chords his saga 
of human and racial psychogenesis.
Conscious guilt may become repressed, unconscious, after the 
ego has given up the attempt to make restitution. Being the seat of 
reason, the ego may be forced to recognize under the law of the real­
ity principle, that any further quest for restitution and justifica­
tion is futile. Yet psychic economics will provide some expression 
for the irrational, unconscious guilt, even if it is simply in the 
form of periodic acute attacks of anxiety, or, worse, a sudden ex­
plosive, perhaps destructive bursting forth of the damned up energy. 
Mechanisms of displacement, sublimation, and projection may be used 
for the control of repressed guilt and its frequent companion hos­
tility. We have seen how Freud utilised these concepts of mental 
mechanisms in explaining the origin of religion and culture. Com­
pulsion neurosis is a way of controlling the tension between inner 
drives and outside "reality." By compulsive, substitutive behavior 
the individual and the society are held together, by corporate 
expression in alternation, both of the sin and of the "Justification," 
both the offense— hostility— and the "resolution1 of guilt-feelings.
Despite the restrictive frame of reference in which we find
: t , , ' }  - *'• . ; x '
Freud's doctrine of sin and guilt, we see a perceptive delineation 
of the components in guilt feeling. It is composed of (l) the fear 
of being destroyed, of self-loss, of muti3.ation, of retaliation by
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the offended one— or by the powers that pursue his interests j (2) the 
fear of object loss; that is, the loss of the loved image of the 
person-object offended; and (3) compulsion, often oppressive and 
'sadistic/' toward the ego; As "repetition compulsion" in re* 
enacting the offense, it may be interpreted as a form of hostility. 1
1Indeed, even before he Introduced the more controversial 
death instinct theory, Freud taught consistently that hatred pro­
ceeds love for others, that love for others (regardless of how low 
or high one's view of "love" may be) comes only after his self­
love. Introductory Lectures (1915-17j A General Introduction, 
pp. 211-^it). ............
Because he came to view the "repetltlon-compulsion" as the 
behavior of the death instincts, Freud qualified a theory of Melanie 
Klein, Susan Isaacs, Ernest Jones, Theodore Reik, and Franz Alexander, 
that "privation, thwarted instinctual gratification results in a 
heightening of the sense of guilt or may do so," by saying that such 
a rule can apply only to the aggressive instincts! He came to view 
the origin of guilt feelings as restricted to the aggressive— death, 
destructiveness— instincts.— Civilization and Its Discontents, 
pp. 130 n.-131.
We quote, as representative, the following statements con­
cerning guilt feelings: "First of all, when one asks how a sense
of guilt arises in anyone, one is told something one cannot dispute; 
people feel guilty (pious people call it 'sinful1) when they have 
done something they know to be 'bad*. But one sees how little this 
answer tells one . . . .
"What is bad is, therefore, to begin with, whatever causes 
one to be threatened with a loss of love; because of the dread of 
this loss, one has already committed the bad deed or only intends to 
do so; in either case the danger begins only when the authority H*a 
found It out, and the latter would behave in the same way in both 
cases." This is the state of mind which we call a "bad conscience." 
— ibid., pp. 106-107.
Later there is a passage which also suggests— though in a 
rather negative and perhaps depressing way— the psychological per­
ceptiveness of the Sermon on the Mount. "TSie more righteous a 
is the stricter and more suspicious will his conscience be, so that 
ultimately it is precisely those people who have carried holiness 
farthest who reproach themselves with the deepest sinfulness. This
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Guilt, even for Freud, presupposes love, although It le eros, libi­
dinous object-oathexis. Guilt feelings acknowledge the claims of a 
relationship which has been violated. Guilt feeling is a confluence 
of other feelings or emotions t specifically, love, fear, and possibly 
hatred. If Suttie and others are right in deriving hatred from fear 
or the loss of love the simple definition of guilt as "fear of the 
conse<juences" may not be far from being the correct formulation.1
means that virtue forfeits some of her promised reward; the submis­
sive and abstemious ego does not enjoy the trust and confidence of 
its mentor, and, aa it seems, strives in vain to earn It . . . .  A 
relatively strict and vigilant conscience is the very sign of a 
virtuous man, and though saints may proclaim themselves sinners, 
they are not so wrong, in view of the temptations of instinctual 
gratifications to which they are peculiarly liable— since . . . .  
temptations do but increase under constant privation, "— p. 109.
"Renunciation of gratification does not suffice here, for 
the wish persists and is not capable of being hidden from the super­
ego . . . .  Feelings of guilt will be experienced, and this is a 
great disadvantage economically of the erection of the super-ego, or, 
as one may say, of the formation of conscience. Renunciation no 
longer has a completely absolving effect; virtuous restraint la no 
longer rewarded by the assurance of love; a threatened external 
unhappiness— loss of love and punishment meted out by external 
authority— has been exchanged for a lasting inner unhappiness, the 
tension of a sense of guilt.'— p. 112.
"In the beginning conscience (more correctly, the anxiety 
which later became conscience) was the cause of instinctual renunci­
ation, but later this elation is reversed. Every renunciation then 
becomes a dynamic fount of conscience; every fresh abandonment of 
gratification increases its severity and intolerance."— pp. 113-111*.
Melanie Klein, of course, agrees with the theory that hate 
precedes love.— E. g., The Psycho-Analysis of Children, p. 193.
lcf* infra» especially as we review Karen Korney's views, 
and the conception of guilt in Otto Rank's thinking, a conception 
which is correlative with his theory of anxiety.
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:The consequences' are, prototypically, the loss of the love 011 
vhich one depends for his life— or for vhat he deems his life.
Authentic Quilt Feelings, Pseudo-Guilt,
ancL Pathological Guilt
Leaving the Freudian frame of reference, ve nay welcome the 
comparatively simple de facto definitions of guilt provided hy 
Harry Stack Sullivan, for instance. First, he takes care to dis­
tinguish guilt from vhat he calls "subllmational or rationalistic 
guilt," vhich he regards merely as a defense against some other 
distress. To Sullivan genuine guilt feeling Is, hy definition, a 
gnawing, sleep-disturbing kind of awareness of having committed an 
offense against one's own "personality organisation. 1 Genuine 
guilt feeling is awareness of an actual "crime in an Interpersonal 
sense," an injury felt hy the self-dynamism. The waking, conscious, 
active person is the sum of all his interpersonal relationships.
Life consists of relationships. We may 3ee a resemblance here to 
the thought of Martin Buber, in I and Thou.3- Quilt is the awareness 
that one has actually done something or failed to do something and 
thus threatened the security of these relationships in their external 
and internalized form. 'Thus described, guilt oust he dealt with
^f. 'In the beginning is relation, says Dr. Buber.— Martin 
Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (Edinburgh, T. & T.
Clark, T93TT* p. 18.
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realistically In terns of the actual offense. Genuine therapy cannot 
gloss over its importance.
Freudians too have recognised a pseudo-guilt fron which they 
distinguish a more authentic guilt. Guilt, focused compulsively or 
obsessively upon trivial natters, is a symptom of a deeper distress. 2
It is pseudo- or ’'subllmational" and '’rationalistic" guilt. 
Hortatory ethics and religion, programs of careful indoctrination, 
political, confessional, social, and cultural, often evoke, enlist 
and exploit it. It is used in erecting an elaborate, often decep­
tive, superstructure which serves functionally as an easily avail­
able exteraalistlc "conscience" for the individual and for the group. 
If a certain "authority" decrees a course of action as right, it is
■^Harry Stack Sullivan, Clinical Studies in Psychiatry, 
pp. 112-115* Cf. Karen Homey, ?he Neurotic Personality of our 
Time, p. 257*
2preud speaks of the ego’s taking flight into neurosis, being 
on good terms with the neurosis, being protected from a worse ill by 
a neurosis. Hence, it would follow that neurotic guilt— i. e.,
'guilt " as in compulsion-neuroais — would serve the ego as a defense 
against some worse ill. However, Freud came to view guilt— as self- 
condemnation— as the behavior of the death instincts, which of course 
war against the life instincts. It is a bit difficult to correlate 
"guilt" as neurotic defense of the ego with guilt as evidence of 
continued self-destructiveness. Pertinent references include; 
Introductory Lectures, A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis 
(Hew York, Permbooks, 1953)* PP* ff*] PP« &T-&91
’Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices" (l$6t Collected Papers,
II, pp. 25-35J and Inhibition, Symptoms and Anxiety (192$), trans. 
by Alix Strachey, International Psycho-Analytical Library, No. 28 
(also, now, Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, 
XX, London, Rogartfi and tfee Institute, ±9^9). Cf.i A. A, Brill, 
Freud*s Contribution to Psychiatry (New York, Norton, 19^4), 
pp.~lk-0-181*, 201 ff.j J. C. Ftugel, Man, Morals and Society (London, 
Duckworth, 19^5 )l Karl Wenninger, Man Against Himself (New York, 
Harcourt, Brace, 1938); Love Against Hate (same publisher, 19^2).
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Ipso facto right. To do vhat is forbidden by the external authority 
is ipso facto wrong. Such a use of the human capacity for guilt 
feeling is degrading. It is guilty in Itself of offending against 
vhat ve have described as essential humanity*
Here the insight of Freud in relating ccsqpulsion neurosis 
and ritual seems to toll like an unrelenting bell. Generally, depth 
psychology also recognises the inevitability of ritual and its health­
ful properties* Yet the inference is also clear that the human psyche 
can lose itself tragically in trlvlallsing the capacity for guilt 
feeling, in dulling and varplng a basic tool.
It seems that no depth psychologist vho treats this phenom­
enon of guilt feeling and avareness deals simply as a therapist vith 
it. In fact psychotherapy Itself implies a certain faith and soteri­
ological commitment, as ve have noted*1, Freud pressed his speculative 
inquiry all the way to a primal "theology" vith an original racial 
guilt of Incest and parricide. Sullivan speaks of "crimt in an 
interpersonal sense," allowing for his concern vith guilt a bracketed 
range, to be sure: The right is the harmony possible for this pa­
tient's interpersonal relationships and for his resultant "self­
system. "
Karen Horney and Erich Fromm are avowedly informed by a 
hopeful Weltanschauung.2 They are by no means alone in such a
^Supra, Introduction*
%ee for example, "A Morality of Evolution," (Neurosis and 
Human Growth, pp. 13-16). Frons’s writings proclaim this Weltanschauung.
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quasi-theology. Indeed, as ve have eald earlier, every theorist 
is implicitly a theologian, although he may disavow the designation.
According to Freudian therapists, a strong, healthy, waking 
self or ego is relatively free from guilt feelings. Yet they do 
not teach that these are to he eradicated once and for all even in 
the healthy-minded. Indeed, an apparent absence of the capacity for 
conscious guilt feeling is a fairly sure mark of immaturity.1
Horney has been especially helpful in elucidating the nature 
of pathological guilt, at least In its more conscious and accessible 
manifestations. She sees the psyche as "personality structure."
The actual self tries more or less futllely to divert "the urge to 
grow" from the distorting mold vhich society forces upon it, into 
its "natural" direction. She assumes that this potential real self 
is the right one for the individual. His fall into "sin" is his 
being squeezed into a societally-determined mold.2 The tragedy is 
that he feels guilty for any resistance to that artificial selfhood 
and for any failure to satisfy its demands. Hence the conscience 
itself is distorted, wrong, in urgent need of salvation, of recon­
struction. The most far-reaching offense of all is that committed
^Aa ve have noted earlier, the Freudian study of "character" 
is via the model of psychogenesis, or stages of libido-cathexis, 
developed by Karl Abraham and others. By "immaturity" we mean a 
character-type which is pre-Oedlpal, or fixated before either the 
crisis or the resolution of the so-called Oedipus complex. Vith 
Klein and her collaborators, of course, this complex is established 
much earlier (although "the superego", the agency for "guilt" seems
to be another "flower" but of the same namei); ft child is capable
of guilt feelings quite early comes to mind.
^Romans 12:2a (trans. by J. B. Phillips).
by society and especially by those who of necessity shape the lives 
of others, when they inculcate unrealistic, irresponsible norms or 
Ideals. Yet the offense is committed unconsciously by action, atti­
tude, and word. The moat guilt-ridden person may in fact be the moat 
e inned-against•
As Erikson, of the Freudian school, says, in his work on
Luther;
The most deadly of all possible sins is the mutilation of 
a child’s spirit; for such mutilation undercuts the life prin­
ciple of trust, without which every human act, may it feel ever 
so good, and seam ever so right, is prone to perversion by de­
structive forms of conscientiousness A
Karen Horney agrees with Freud that guilt is produced by fear. 
But she disagrees with his elaborated theory and with his concept of 
a nuclear agency of guilt in the superego. She distinguishes, although 
none too clearly, between the dynamics of "normal moral strivings" and 
the "tyranny of the should." 2 Perhaps her best contribution to the 
subject is her keen description of this tyranny. She scores the 
Freudian theory for its adoption of the common view that the inner 
dictates are the inner construct of morality in general. Ccamands 
for moral perfection cannot be separated from those, Just as insist­
ent, that argue no moral aim, such as for example, unconscious 
arrogance's pressure that may say, "I should always get the better 
of others." "I should be able to paint without laborious training
^Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther, p. 70.
2hO
2Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth, p. 73*
and working." "I should he ahIs to get away with anything.nl To 
disobey the shoulds is to feel guilt, as "fear of the consequences." 
Quilt is basically anxiety, for Homey. One's security is threatened, 
his over-all satisfactions are apt to be cut off. Is such seeurlty- 
defenslveness possibly a partial answer to our persistent question 
regarding the "Myself right or wrong" mentality?2
These coercive forces, the shoulds, whose real nature is 
never clearly discerned by the person vho is enslaved by them, re­
ceive various patterns of obedience. Horney describes these accord­
ing to the types of personality organisation she has noted in her 
patients. They are: (l) the expansive types, vho are bent on mastery
at all costs: (2) the self-effacing types| (3) the resigned types, to 
whom the idea of freedom has special appeal, Who rebel actively or 
passively against all demands upon them: and (4) the alternating 
types vho vacillate between self-castigating goodness and a wild 
protest against any standards, constantly shuttling between "I 
should" and "Ho, I van*t."3
Internal conflicts, derived formally from early environmental 
pressures may appear again as external social conflicts. The feeling
^Ibid.i and pp. 64-85.
2A question vhich vill be dealt with further in Chapter Nine,
infra.
^Horney, ibid., pp. 76-78*
2k\
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of galIt is but a symptom of a deeper emotion, the fear of rejection, 
of separation, of the return hy one’s own action or neglect to an 
intolerable basic anxiety due to the earliest trauma of separation 
and its many recurrences.
The Nature of Quilt, According to Ian Suttie and Others
Ian Suttie developed his theoretical psychology from his own
\keen observation and research but vis-a-vis the Freudian theories. 
Hence, as would be expected, he pursues Freud in the kind of spec­
ulation we have dealt with at length earlier in the present chapter. 
Religions may derive from Oedlpal guilt and expiation, but primal 
matriarchal religions reflect Laius and Cain-type guilt and appease­
ment by offering up innocent infant-Oedipus and Abe 1-sibling victims 
in trying to maintain or to regain security and love.1
With the increasing recognition of the formative effect of 
mother-images, both good and bad, nowadays guilt feelings are de­
scribed, not simply in terms of ambivalence toward the father figure, 
but also in terms of the fear of the "bad mother" and the loss of 
the "good mother." In the spirit of the critique offered by Suttie, 
depth psychology is rediscovering the matriarchal springs of culture. 
"Woman" is not, as for the early Freud, merely or predominantly a 
sexual object.2
1Ian Suttie, Origins of Love and Hate, discussed supra,
Chapter Four. ------------------
% f . John Klauber, "Review" of Paul Halmos, Solitude and 
Privacy: "A Study of Social Isolation, Its Causes and Therapy’'
(London, International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction,
2^3
Suttie*8 portrait of the infant in hie dilemma during the 
crisis of psychic weaning suggests that guilt feelings occur in some 
such manner as this: "If I do not love her then she will increasing­
ly refuse to let me share with him (the sibling) in her love and care.' 
The child cannot endure such fear* Yet he finds it difficult to 
control his rageful way of bidding for her love, his Abel-murdering 
way of trying to get back into his mother's good graces* Rage is 
self-defeating* Every instance of its failure causes fresh regret.
He blames himself for the loss of the mother's cherishing love, 
especially when this seems to occur directly as the result of his 
censured behavior.
The child is faced with the problem of learning the riddle 
of "psychic weaning*" His problem is to understand and to adjust to 
the calamity which it seems to be. His sources are limited as he 
tries to work out a solution* Obviously he needs all the help his 
mother and the nurturing, loving environment can give him* "If 
only I had not done this or that then she would have taken me up 
and loved me* Something is wrong about me. How else can the
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952). Klauber pays tribute to Suttie.—  
International Journal of Psycho-Analys is, XXXIV, 1953* PP« 339-3^ *0- 
Cf. Freud's own correlation of Mother image with "Mother Earth" 
and "Death. ’ This is done strikingly in "The Theme of the Three 
Caskets" (1913)* Collected Papers, IV, pp. 2^4-256.
The constructive approach, which we have described, is il­
lustrated in such works as theses John Bowlby, Child Care and the 
Growth of Love (based on his report to the World fiealth Organiza- 
tlon on Maternal Care and Mental Health, 1951* London, Penguin Books,
1953); and Margaret A. kibble, ftie Rights of Lxfants (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 19^3). tt. also, Rene A. Spits, "The 
Psychogenic Diseases in Infancy, "— The Psychoanalytic Study of the 
Child (New York, International Universities Press, Vt, 1^1),
pp. 255-275.
impoverished self of the Infant account for his change of status
vith the nother?
C-ood and evil are learned in this crisis of psychic weaning. 
"Good and evil must he agr good and evil." The infant lives in an 
undifferentiated vorld. Even the mother image is merged vith the 
"mothering" image of the father and of other significant persons.
"I and my mother are one." 'There is no I apart from her. This 
symbiotic union is broken, and society is born anev. The infant is 
forced to differentiate, to conceive of life in terms of "you and 
I." This is painful. The I retains mother images ; indeed they are 
its portrait of itself. He experiences the mother increasingly not 
simply as the warm, nurturing, loving Influences of his milieu, but 
as a complex image. The mother of reality is not simply love and 
adoration of him. She has other interests as veil. He can either 
invest her vith the predominantly good Images he has of her as she 
vas experienced before psychic veanlng began, or he can invest her 
vith the predominantly bad ones. Hence the primal conscience is 
shaped according to the Infant's reflected pattern of vhat mother 
likes and vhat she does not like.
The more he thinks of his real mother as good, the more he 
vill look for the evil— the cause of dissatisfaction— vithin. The 
more he thinks of his real mother— and mother surrogates— as bad and 
denying tovard him, the more he vill look for the good vithin himself, 
vhere he has retained the good mother image.1
^Admittedly our construction here is a "variation on a theme 
by Suttie." However it seems justified by the following references: 
Origins of Love and Hate* pp. 38-571 61-67; 129-132; and passim; but 
especially at p. Suttie differs with the Freudians in saying
2kh
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Regardless cf the explanation, evil, by definition, nay be a 
force out aide the self or a force inside. Although in everyone it 
la both ’frees the outside vorld” and "fro* within, " there la cons id* 
arable variety in emphasis. Its individual definition nay veil be 
one of the indices by vhich ve distinguish temperament. 1
If the outside vorld seems so hostile that no effective good 
mother image is internalised, the individual so deprived even of 
minimal loving care may be doosnd to a hate-ridden, enemy-collecting 
existence, vith rage as his vay of life, because hostility more than 
love has been the order of the day from his birth. In him guilt 
feeling vill be almost entirely lacking because he has knovn so 
little love. 2 He has never achieved enough trustfulness to be able 
to experience the more complex emotion of guilt*feeling.
that love precedes hatred in the development of the child. The 
child needs to give (p. 53).
^We are aware of the analogy here to C. G. Jung's psychology 
of types (Psychology of Types, trans. by H. Godwin Baynes, New York, 
Harcourt, Brace, 19oT^ Although psychologists differ widely in 
their appraisal of this theory of Jung's, the terms: introvert, ex­
tra vert, and "amblvert” are now a part of the language. The more in­
troverted person, for instance, is likely to be one whose early 
experience of the outside vorld vas such that he soon tended to look 
for the ’good" within; hs was thrown back upon himself. Cf. Freud's 
theories of narcissisms infra, Chapter Nine.
^Nowadays especially, this construction of the theories rela­
tive to love and guilt feeling represents something of a consensus 
except among the instinctual dualists. Yet, even — eng them the 
theory persists that the only antidote to hostility is love. Cf. 
Melanie Klein and Joan Riviere, Love, Hate and Reparation (London, 
Hogarth, 1937)> and works cited earlier.
Cf. also the following succinct statement which offers a 
window through vhich ve nay appreciate Mrs. Klein's system: "Fantasy
is the mental corollary to the instincts (Susan Isaacs). Like the 
instincts, fantasy operates from the onset . . . .  The building up of 
a vorld of good and bad internal objects leads to Internal persecution
2*6
Otto Rank’s Understanding of Guilt
The prototypal event vhlch sets the pattern of tension vlth* 
in the psyche is separation. All the schools of psychoanalysis seen 
to support this assertion. It is cardinal in the doctrines of Horney, 
From, Sullivan, Suttie, and Otto Rank. Guilt feelings Include the 
fear of another separation, fron a loved object or constellation of 
objects— mother, father, and the objectified self. The fear of 
separation also includes the fear of pain and extinction (destruc­
tion). Melanie Klein's writings emphasise this aspect of the fear.1
Ve have seen how basic is the concept of guilt in the thought 
of Freud, and of other depth psychologists. It is, if anything, even
as veil as to internal riches. This influences ego development in 
general.
"The internalised objects felt by the young infant have a 
life of their ovn. Persecution, suspicion, trust, and confidence 
result fron their interaction. All three regions of the Bind, id, 
ego, superego, exert their influence on each other fron the begin­
ning of life. — "The Mutual Influences in the Development of Ego 
and Id— Discussants, " abstracted by V. Hoffer (fron The Psycho­
analytic Study of the Child, VTl) in The Internet lonalJournal of 
Psycho-Analys is, XXXIV, p. 278.
Cf. also, vhat seems a most constructive discussion fron a 
contemporary Freudian viewpoint: Michael Ballnt, "On Love and Hate,"
International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXXIII, 1952, pp. 355-362. 
Baling, who reflects also somewhat the influence of Sandor Ferencsi, 
suggests a reexamination of the status of the death instinct. Love 
is primary. "Hate is a measure of inequality between object and 
subject| the smaller the inequality, the more mature the subject, 
the less is his need for hate."— at p. 359.
^Melanie Klein, The Psycho-Analysis of Children, pp. 18U- 
185J Developments in Psycho-Analysis, pp. £757 J and elsewhere.
more developed and instrumentallstic in the rather involved and pon­
derously articulated thought of Freud's brilliant erstwhile disciple 
Otto Bank.
Freud took a special Interest in young Otto Bank, while he 
was attending a technical school In Vienna. Freud saw narked per­
ceptiveness in hln and helped see him through the University, Where 
he specialised in social studies and philosophy. He was considered 
the Intellectual giant of the Freudian "twelve" after the defection 
of Jung. He became a lay analyst and contributed journalistically 
to the cause, especially of relating psychoanalysis to cultural and 
anthropological studies. He was the editor of Imago, the journal 
devoted to such Interests, and was on the editorial staff of the 
International Journal of Psycho-Analysis.
However, by 1925, Bank, like predecessors: Adler, Arng, and
Wilhelm Stekel, 1 was the center of controversy within the inner circle 
of Freud's apostles. The final break with the master himself was 
delayed until early in 1926. Arch-Freudians like Ernest Jones have 
analysed Bank's growing independence in theory and his "defection" 
in terms of his own neurotic Oedlpal striving with the father figure. 
Freud had taken a paternal Interest in him, and Bank had been among 
Freud's closest associates for over a decade. But many less committed
^Wilhelm Stekel has a rather "bad press" among some Freudians 
like Ernest Jones (in contrast to his "good press" among others, like 
A. A. Brill). The reader does take comfort that there are other rep­
resentatives of depth psychology besides Stekel, when he reads his 
autobiography, for instance. The Autobiography of Wilhelm Stekel, ed. 
by Ehill A. Gutheil (New York, Liveright, 1950) .
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observers outside the circle of Freudian solidarity sure impressed vith 
the content of Bank's thinking vhich excited the controversy and vhich 
continued to grow and stimulate discussion. His so-called vill-therapy 
developed into something of a school on its ovn. He vas striking out 
in directions, vhich now, among the ego-psychologists, for instance, 
can be regarded as "orthodox.”
We can begin to appreciate the emotional as veil as intellec­
tual dimensions of the separation of Bank from Freud in the corre­
spondence quoted by Ernest Jones in his biography of Freud. On 
February 15, 192^, Freud addressed a circular letter to all members 
of the central committee of the International Psychoanalytical Associ­
ation, to try to quell the Berlin-centered (Karl Abraham, especially) 
dispute over Bank— and at that time, over Sandor Ferencsl, also.
Ferencsi vas a pioneer psychoanalyst in Budapest. He has had a 
great influence on various thinkers in the field, including Ian 
Suttie, Freud himself, Jones, Klein, Homey, and Bank.3* Freud vrote 
concerning a book that the two men had written together and the most 
recent book by Bank himself, in vhich he had suggested the experience 
of birth as the basic psychic trauma. Here is a significant paragraph 
from the letter.
Nov for the . . . .  Incomparably more Interesting book, the 
Birth Trauma by Bank. I do not hesitate to say that I regard 
this vork as highly significant, that it has given me much to
^Sandor Ferencsl, Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, trans. 
Ernest Jones (Boston, Bichard G. Badger, 1916;# and Further 
Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psycho-Analysis, com­




think about, and that I have not yet cone to a definitive Judg­
ment about it. Ve have long been fanlllar with vonb phantasies 
and recognised their importance, but in the prominence Rank has 
given then they aohleve a far higher significance and reveal in 
a flash the biological background of the Oedipus complex. To 
repeat it in my ovn languages some instinct must be associated 
vlth the birth trauma vhlch aims at restoring the previous ex­
istence. One might call it the instinctual need for happiness 
(Gluckstrleb), understanding there that the concept "happiness" 
is mostly used in an erotic sense. Rank now goes further than 
psychopathology and shovs hov men alter the outer world in the 
service of this instinct, whereas neurotics save themselves 
this trouble by taking the short cut of phantasylng a return to 
the womb. If one adds to Rank's conception the one of Ferencsi, 
that a man can be represented by his genital, then for the first 
time ve get a derivation of the normal sexual Instinct vhlch 
falls into place with our conception of the world.1
Freud goes on to discuss Rank's divergence from his ovn vlevs. 
But he chooses to keep the matter open for discussion.
I derived the barrier against Incest from the primordial 
history of the human family, and thus sav the actual father the
real obstacle, vhlch erects the barrier against Incest anew . . . .
He (Rank) refuses to consider the phylogenesis, and regards the
anxiety opposing incest as simply a repetition of the anxiety 
at birth, so that the neurotic repression is inherently checked 
by the nature of the birth process. 3he birth anxiety is, it 
is true, transferred to the father, but according to Rank he 
is only a pretext for it. 2
In this statement ve can see the line of Freud's Increasing disagree­
ment vlth his disciple, later elaborated in Hemming, Symptom und 
Angst.3 Ve see also an example of the way Freud linked his specula­
tions concerning racial guilt vlth his theories of pathogenesis.
-^Ernest Jones, Ihe Life and Vork of Sigmund Freud, Vol. Ill, 
pp. 59-63t at pp. 61-62.
2Ibid.
3Translated: Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety (also, there is 
an edition entitled Ihe Problem of Anxiety), which has been cited 
earlier.
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In August, 1924, Freud wrote to Ferencsi, during one of the 
crises In his relationship vith Bank:
I simply don't understand Bank any longer. Can you do any­
thing to enlighten me? For fifteen years I have known him as 
someone who was affectionately concerned, always ready to do 
any service, discreet, completely trustworthy, Just as ready to 
receive new suggestions as he was uninhibited In the working 
out of his own Ideas, who always took my side in a quarrel and, 
as I believed, without any inner compulsion to make him do 
so . . .  . Vhich is the real Bank, the one I have known for 
fifteen yercs or the one Jones has been shoving me In the past 
few years
Bank moved to Paris, later to the United States, where he 
became a leader In his own right of a "school of psychoanalysis. 
Careful, appreciative evaluations of his thought and Influence have 
been made by Ruth Munroe, 2 who Is also appreciative In her treatment 
of Freud and other theorists, and by Ira Progoff, among others.3
Progoff considers Bank's Psychology and the Soul, written in 
1929 and 1930, an important statement of a system of thought which 
interprets both man and culture within a single historical frame­
work. ^ The book presents a problem to the reader because of its 
form and style. But the insight may be profound. Bank goes "beyond 
psychology" In the sense of moving beyond vhat he considers the 
"futile attempt" to rationalise vhat is essentially Irrational. It
1. Ernest Jones. Jonas, Life and Work of Sigmund 
Freud, III, p. 69.
2Ruth Munroe, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, 1955#
PP* 575-600.
3Ira Progoff, The Death and Beblrth of Psychology, 1956, 
pp. 168-253.
**Xbld.. p. 208.
Is beyond the grasp of mere reason.1 Mental processes are mysterious, 
beyond our probing. Freud violates the mystery, the essentially 
"spiritual." However Bank does not treat the terms irrational and 
spiritual as synonyms. The "spiritual" should have primacy over the 
"irrational' and the "rational." Its manifestation in the psyche is 
in the "will to believe." Bank at times speaks of this "third prin­
ciple" as the "will to immortality." It moves beyond Individuality.
The artist-life is the proper condition of health for the individual 
as for the society. By this Bank seems to argue for recognition 
and affirmation not only of one's human nature with all its mystery 
and potential but also of the shared humanity, that of the community, 
or potential community, of mankind.2 Alfred Adler, on a consider­
ably less profound level of insight, argued for community feeling.3
Bank has had considerable influence on social psychology and 
social work because of his emphasis on the sociological dimension 
and his insistence on love— agape is the term he uses!—  as the thera­
peutic agent in psychotherapy as in social melioration.1 In this he 
vas in agreement, quite Independently, with the British psychiatrist 
Ian Suttie, as vith his ovn former associate Ferencsl. However Bank
Ifiince it cannot be gathered into "rational"— "reasonal"— form.
^Cf. Bank, Psychology and the Soul, pp. 91-93; Beyond 
Psychology, pp. 17-^1; 271-291; Progoff, 0£. clt., p. 2*557” "
3Infra, Chapter Six. We are reminded also of systems of 
ethical mysticism such as that of Albert Schveltser.
^For instance, in Beyond Psychology, p. 175.
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developed the concept further, using Insights not only from felloe- 
therapists but from philosophers like Buber1 and the theologian
oAnders Hygren.
Like Adler, Bank views the Individual in a vay often described 
as "holistic."3 He treats the psyche as a unit, even though he seeks 
to avoid oversimplification of that unity. This is In contrast to 
Freud1s multiple-foci conception of the self, which eventually could 
posit the splitting of the ego. It contrasts also vith the multi­
farious psyche depicted by Klein and Falrbalrn, although their empha­
sis on the splitting of Images may not be Incompatible vith an over­
view such as Bank's.^ Bank's presupposition also may be contrasted
^Rank says, for Instance, "The ego needs the Thou in order to 
become a s e l f ibid., p. 290.
gIbid., p. 175 • Among other Christian scholars quoted is 
T. V. Manson.
3The term derives from Jan Christian Smuts' Holism and 
Evolution (New York, Macmillan, 1926).
^This movement in psychoanalysis has come into its own, so 
to speak, since the "Ranklan schism." His criticism vould perhaps 
be that Klein and Falrbalrn too have tried to rationalise the ir­
rational in terms of objects. "The whole question of psychological 
therapy resolves itself, in the last analysis, to the philosophical 
problem of a deterministic versus a vltallstlc point of view."—
Beyond Psychology, p. kj. He regards Freudian therapy as determin­
istic.
However Bank traces the neurosis back to the trauma of birth, 
even as Klein has tracked the so-called Oedipus-produced superego 
back to the first fev months of infancy. Falrbalrn sees litileedi- 
flcatlon in this psychogenetlc schema, preferring to see the stages 
of ego development in terms of the object-relationshlps without de­
pending on the libido and instinct theories (e. g., instead of "oral" 
phase, why not "breast phase"? Psychoanalytic Studies of the Person- 
allty. p. 155 f.).  “ -----------------------
Contrasts are suggested by the interpretation of dreams vith 
reference to objects and the "irrational." The Freudians,?in dohtrait
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with Sullivan's view of the "self system" or "self dynamism" with its 
"waking Self " determined by social interaction. Rank, like Jting, 
assumes a mysterious depth for the self of every person, even though 
circumstances may prevent a true development of the potential for 
individuated selfhood.1 The important aspect is the volitional.
Rank thinks of the ego as the will.
The theories of Rank are of Interest to us in this stage of 
our inquiry not primarily because of his relationship with Freud nor 
because of his holistic presuppositions, although these facts are 
relevant. But he is Introduced because of hie strong emphasis on 
what he termed ethical guilt.2
to Rank and Jung, leave little room for the so-called "spiritual."
This contrast extends perhaps to Include Klein and Fairbairn on the 
"Freudian' side. For Instance, Fairbairn says that Melanie Klein's 
Influence helped him to come to regard dreams and waking phantasies 
as endopsychic situations dramatised— involving both relationships 
between ego-structures and internalised objects, and interrelation­
ships between ego-structures themselves. His theory developed to 
Include the ideas of splitting objects.— Fairbairn, 0£. cit., p. 170 
and following.
Rank's holism, despite his leaving the celling open to the 
sky, so to speak (i. e., the "spiritual") is seen in his concept of 
will. He defines it as "an autonomous organising force in the indi­
vidual which does not represent any particular biological impulse 
or social drive but constitutes the creative expression of the total 
personality and distinguishes one individual from another."— Rank, 
Beyond Psychology, p. 50.
1Ibid., p. 209- There are many passages vhlch make the point.
20tt© Rank, Truth and Reality, edition in Will Therapy and 
Truth and Reality, trans. Jessie $afx (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 
19^57 pp. 209-305) - The Birth of Individuality”! "Creation and 
Guilt"; "Happiness and Redemption," edition cited, pp. 209-220; 
292-305. Will Therapy, "Separation and Guilt," edition cited, 
pp. 71-85* Bunroe ks discussion is especially helpful. She relies am 
a disciple of Rank, F. B. Karpf‘s The Psychology and Psychotherapy of
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Bank believed that the telos for the human being is to become 
individuated. The trauma is separation: at birth and later at wean­
ing and at other stages of development, Geburtstrauma is the basic 
injury, the matrix of anxiety. But there is within the very nature 
of the separated one a capacity and potential for relative independ­
ence and self-reliance. From his very formation as an embryo he has 
been destined not only to separation but to individuation. Individu­
ation and Independence are as much a part of the logic of human exist­
ence as are union and dependence.
The tragedy is that narrow is the way and few there are who 
find it. Many go so far, only to come pathetically short of the 
possibility implicit in their nature. Those who miss the way range 
from "average men" to neurotic, psychotic, and psychopathic.
The sleet, as it were, are those who are creative in their 
response to the challenge of individuation in the midst of separation
Otto Bank (New York, Philosophical Library, 1953)> clinical writ­
ings by fcankian therapists, including works of the late Jesse Taft
(The Dynamics of Therapy in a Controlled Relationship, Macmillan, 
19:??, an^ Family dasevork an% Counseling: A Functional Approach,
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 19^).--Munroe, 
op. clt., pp. 575-598.
Cf. Sf&ren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread (l814i), trans. 
Walter Lovrie (Princeton, N. J., Princeton IT Press, 1957)# especi­
ally re: "the dread in which the Individual posits sin by the
qualitative leap; and the dread vhich entered in along with sin, and 
which for this reason comes also into the vorld quantitatively every 
time an individual posits sin" (p. ^9); "The relation of freedom to 
guilt is dread 0uaxiety{7 because freedom and guilt are still a 
possibility" (p. 97# cf* infra., Chapter Seven). Kierkegaard's 
treatment of anxiety and guilt is both 'psychological’' and "ethical." 
Here he stresses his psychological Interest (at p. 105). One is
(becomes?) vhat he does. There is dread in the doing.
anxiety. Rank call* these the "artist” type.1 The "neurotic" and 
the "artist" are alike in one respect. Both recognise the awful 
fact of separation from the womb and from "the herd." The "average 
man" somehow falls ever to assimilate this fact. He rejects the 
truth in the fact of separation and the implicit possibility of 
individuation. He is unable to stand "ethical guilt." Thus Rank 
explains both mob psychology and slavish conformity. The "average 
man" escapes the terrifying awareness of his separateness by incor­
porating unreflectively the views of his society, regardless of what 
they happen to be. He cannot bear the thought of being in any sense 
cut off from the fictional unity which he supposes in society. Here 
we are reminded of recent tracts for the times, notably David Riesman's 
study of the individual and the crowd.2
Rank's theory developed in much greater depth than his 
Influential technique in therapy, which he called Will therapy.3 
His emphasis on the will, on the conscious mind, and on a much 
shorter term for analysis than is common among Freudians, is
1Rankls intellectual history is marked by a preoccupation 
with the "artist." His first book was Per Konstler (1907)• Ee 
prefers this designation for the most healthy humanity because it 
conveys (or can convey) "a sense of creative integration as the 
highest goal of man" (Munroe, 0£. cit., p. 586).
2For example, the popular volumes The Lonely Crowd (by David 
Reisman and others, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950). Ve 
shall not list the growing number of books which have been much in 
vogue in the United States.
3lhis seems to be Ira Progoff's opinion, which we tend to 




reminiscent of Adler's therapy, which also was appreciated by many 
social workers, who must bring "therapy" to those who cannot afford 
long courses of treatment.1
Psychogenetlcally the will emerges as counter-will. Here 
there seems to be a correlation with the infancy crisis posited by 
some contemporary Freudian ego-psychologists.2 Counter-will emerges 
with the small child's discovery of his power to say No and to 
frustrate the desires of his environment, his society, which, to 
Bank, is the will against which he develops his own.
As the infant grows he gradually abandons his efforts to 
recreate through phantasy his recent lntra-uterlne state. He grad­
ually coves to experience himself as a totality. This self as the 
I of self-recognition is what Bank seems to mean by the Will. As 
it emerges it is largely negative, behaving vis-a-vis the will it 
experiences from the outside.
Not only can he say No to others, he can refuse his own im­
pulses. Hence we may understand the frequent cutting off of the 
nose to spite the face" behavior of small children. What is happen­
ing is the fascinating development of individuality. Thrown more 
and more on his own by the fact of increasing relative separation, 
the small child begins to rise to the occasion, to assume responsi­
bility for his own actions. He is becoming, however gradually, a 
person in his own right in the world of personality where he finds
^See Munroe, oj>. cit* pp. 588-59^. 
“Supra, Chapter Four.
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himself. Rankian therapy values the counter-vill for individuation 
above the goals of "personal happiness' and "social adjustment” vhen 
these are based on the illusion of the "average man" pattern. Ther­
apy has a higher calling than to turn out "average men." Service 
to the highest human value vill be in a kind of psychic obstetrics: 
bringing into the vorld of reality, creative individuals vho are 
villing to take the risks of anxiety and guilt.
Vhat is the role of guilt feeling in the process of individ­
uation? Rank says that any assertion of counter-vill necessarily 
arouses feelings of anxiety, specifically guilt. Guilt feeling is 
essentially fear of separation. Guilt feeling is at once inevitable 
and healthy if the person is to fulfill his destiny and become indi­
viduated .
Like Harry Stack Sullivan, Rank takes pains to distinguish 
vhat he means by guilt feeling from other phenomena that bear the 
same label, ftie necessary guilt incurred by allowing the counter- 
vill to develop is to be distinguished alvays from that feeling vhich 
one has vhen he has committed an act considered wrong by society's 
code or even by his ovn. This latter guilt, vhich characteristically 
is in the service of conformity, is moralistic guilt. It also is 
inevitable because of the fact of relationship, of being in society, 
whose collective vill is represented in both code and conscience.
But ethical guilt is a much deeper problem. It accompanies 
any expression of one's ovn vill as it distinguishes Itself from
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that of the environment or of any important segment thereof. But 
the constrictor can reverse itself) ethical guilt is felt also vith 
any compliance vith the outside vill vhich abrogates the counter- 
vill, the vill of the developing Individual, vhich need not remain 
negative.
Does Bank give us another insight into the question about 
that persistent attitude Which can be expressed as "Myself right or 
vrong— Ityself el way8 right"? Possibly. True enough, such an inner 
assertion can be experienced In a vay vhich suggests that to deny it 
would be to surrender to guilt. One can feel guilt even when he does 
vhat he knovs is right in terms of vhat society vills or desires. Is 
this because his guilt dynamism is more oppressive when he goes 
against his own ’’counter— 'will than when he goes against society?
Quilt feeling is unavoidable if one is either self-assertive 
or self-denying. It represents the tension between separation and 
union. Union was and is "good." But separateness has its blessing 
also and its opportunities. To offend either principle is to be the 
victim of the appropriate anxiety: separation from others or separa­
tion from one's own developing individuality. Hiat individuality 
soon comes to represent quite an emotional investment. It has come 
to stand for both security and meaning to one's existence.
The injunction of a responsible ethics, as veil as that of 
Ranklan therapy, may bet Take courage and live vith "ethical guilt.
We recall Martin Luther's insightful dictum: "Therefore sin bravely."
Significantly, to Rank, the greater sin is to refuse to risk the
•. Ts . 1 V2r*^ '--.v.,’ ■’>• ••’ A'’ \  . '* iji * * a*: v "• ' y ‘%* ’
anxiety of separation, the inevitable guilt one feels if he tries to 
become what he by nature is destined to be— an individual. Rank's 
soterlologlcal concern is to save both the neurotic and the average 
van from the fate which G. B. Shaw has described as simply being 
lived by one’s life. Salvation is unto life: life as lived by the
individual in responsible relationship with others. Is this not at 
least analogous to the "life and life more abundantly” which is the 
reason which the Fourth Gospel gives for the soterlologlcal coming 
of the Christ?1
Like Homey, though philosophically more profound, Rank Is 
reminiscent of the apostle Paul, in the twelfth chapter of Romans, 
where he enjoins men not to be conformed to this world— not to be
psqueesed into its own mold, as the Phillips translation has it.
Yet Paul and Indeed Christianity say more: "But be transformed
by the renewal of your mind that you may prove what is the will of 
God, what is good and acceptable and perfect/' Another will is 
introduced!
Toward Integration of Depth Psychology1s 
Understanding of Guilt
Contrary to the opinion of some commentators, including 
theologians,3 depth psychologists, generally, do regard guilt feelings
*Cf. John 10:10. ^Romans 12:2a (Phillips trans.).
^For example, Cherbonnier, who calls Karl Wenninger an 
exception to the rule in contending that some guilt feeling cannot 




seriously as inevitable for anyone vho mist struggle vith his exist­
ence as an Individual. Hovever the voice of psychoanalysis Is by no 
aeans univocal and clear on the subject, as ve have seen. Yet the 
tendency nowadays Is to discuss the natter vith greater care for 
constructive distinctions: between pathological guilt, pseudo­
guilt, and authentic" (Sullivan) or 'ethical"(Rank) guilt. Even 
orthodox Freudians like Edmund Bergler, find themselves positing two 
consciences: the oppressive sugerego, and the "conscience."1 Ernest
Jones insists that good Freudian theory never dropped the concept of 
Ego-Ideal, distinguished from the negative superego dynamism which 
Freud later Introduced. Bergler treats the superego as the repressed
conscience, the unconscious "devil" in everyone. The pre-Oedipal
oidentifications vith good objects form the healthy conscience.
Again, ve find In the writings of the Freudian ego- 
psychologlsts, the tendency to Include Insights that In former years, 
vere developed as correctives at the price of schism.
Erik Erlkson reiterates the vlsdom of the "oldest Zen poem": 
"The conflict between right and wrong Is the sickness of the mind.“3
^Edmund Bergler, The Superego: "Unconscious Conscience—
The Key to the Theory and Therapy of Neurosis."
^Either under the rubric of "ego-Ideal" or, in the Kleinian 
frame of reference, under the rubric of "good objects."
^Erlkson quotes from Seng-ts'an, Hsln-hsin, Ming. In Allen 
W. Watts, The Way of Zen (Hew York, Pantheon Books, 1957)— 'Young 
Man Luther, p. 2t>3*
But the conflict rages in everyone* Hence the question is not 
whether conscience, hut what kind* The child is hound to develop 
ideas of good and evil. The answer does not lie in attempts to avoid 
or deny a sense of badness in the child. "The denial of the unavoid­
able can only deepen a sense of secret, unmanageable evil. The answer 
lies in man's capacity to create order which will give his children 
a disciplined as well as a tolerant conscience, and a world within 
which to act affirmatively.11
The Identity crisis involves not only love, fear, and their 
combining in guilt, but also compulsive hostility which strikes out 
often offensively, as in familiar episodes of juvenile violence, and 
less tragic youthful aggression against both Ideological and human 
targets. Erikson explains some of Luther's verbal excesses by this
pgeneral observation* He calls it 1he necessity to repudiate.c It is 
a part of the individuation process*^
The need to repudiate li the reverse side of the need to 
devote oneself* The small child— like the adolescent— is looking 
for a way of devotion* His repudiating behavior is often but a 
part of this process of testing the possibilities for identification* 
In trying to resolve his "identity crisis," which continues often 
through the years of adolescence, the individual devotes himself,
1Ibld.
"Supra, Chapter Five.




perhaps hy fits and starts, to a variety of causes. He nay change 
quickly from one loyalty to another, repudiating today vhat he would 
have given his life for yesterday. The need to repudiate nay persist 
into the twenties and beyond. It manifests Itself even vhen there 
nay he no explicit ideological commitment or interest. This offers 
explanation for the sometlaes puzzling phenomenon of young people 
offering devotion to individual leaders and teams, to activities 
and techniques that call for sacrifice and concentration, vhich 
■ay seen to the objective observer to be hardly worth such effort.
At the sane tine the youth vho is still struggling vith his identity 
problea is likely to shov "a sharp and Intolerant readiness to dis­
card and disavow people’1 including, at tines himself. "This repu­
diation is often snobbish, fitful, perverted, or simply thoughtless. 1,1
Erlkson illustrates the point with prominent examples like 
Augustine and Freud, vho chose moratorla of the resolution of the 
crisis, vho "do not necessarily know that they are narking time be­
fore they cam to their crossroad, vhich they often do in the late 
twenties, belated just because they gave their all to the temporary 
subject of devotion.” We recall that Freud vas a laboratory physio­
logist, more or less deliberately putting off the completion of his 
medical training. "Rie crisis in such a young man's life nay be
^rik H. Erlkson, Young Man Luther, pp. ^2.^3.
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reached exactly when he half-realises he Is fatally overcoHsltted to 
vhat he is not.”1
In his attempt to achieve identity, the individual often 
settles for a time of diffusion of role, a diffusion of identity. 
During this period he may feel that he is consltted to a cause vhlch 
will catch his whole being up into its meaning and fulfillment. 
Luther's calm period, according to Erikson, was right after he vent 
to the monastery. We are reminded of the guilt feeling vhlch Bank 
says is inevitable in the process of individuation, as ve read 
Erikson's description of Luther during this era of diffused identity.
Most of all, this kind of person must shy avay from inti­
macy. Any physical closeness, vlth either sex, arouses at the 
same time both an impulse to merge with the other person and 
a fear of losing autonomy and individuation."2
Ideological leaders, who are likely to be among those vhose 
Identity crisis is prolonged, seem to be "subject to excessive fears 
vhlch they can master only by reshaping the thoughts of their con­
temporaries; vhlle those contemporaries are alvays glad to have 
their thoughts shaped by those vho so desperately care to do so."3 
Here the light of ego-peychology seems to turn upon that larger 
context of evil in society, the 'Kingdom of Evil.” Perhaps our 





does not miss this one, even In his study of Luther, who was spirit­
ual leader for the same ethnic coununlty four centuries earlier.1
According to Erlkson, who offers inpressIve documentation 
for his thesis, Hitler was suffering from an unresolved Identity 
crisis, in which the negative aspect of the devotion-repudiation 
dynamism was dominant, and tragically, due to the times and
^Ibld., pp. 105-109* See Erik H. Erlkson, "Hitler's Imagery 
and German ¥outh, ' Psychiatry, V., 19^2, pp. **75-93, reprinted in 
Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray, editors, Personality: In Nature,
Society, and Culture (Hew York, Alfred A. Knopf, 19^8, London, * 
Jonathan 6ape, 19^9). Erlkson says here that "Hitler's adolescent 
imagery attracts: first, chronic delinquent adolescents. Not too 
numerous, they are the Nasi sub-leaders. They will live and die 
for an order that justifies and glorifies their type. Second, a 
crowd of once good and friendly— in faet, too good and too friendly—  
Germans in whom no one suspected a poisonous complex of suppressed 
adolescent rebellion: Hitler 'freed1 them. Third, a mass of neither
good nor bad people who want bread and a spectacle. They had blindly 
believed in the German sergeant's obedient world. When that world 
was defeated, they found their revolutionary energy paralysed and 
poisoned. They could not kill aristocrats. Hitler gave them the 
Jews Instead. Fourth, a small but Influential group whose burgher 
sense of values is offended by the spectacle of Hasism but who would 
not dare to raise their hand against a leader who resembles the pure 
knight, whom they wanted to be, way back, in— later betrayed—  
adolescent dreams.
’The leading group, however, in party and army is probably 
untouched by this imagery. They constitute a very small group of 
cynlcist8, Machiavellls German style, who use the ideological fool­
heartedness of all the other groups and flatter themselves that 
they are using Hitler himself. ’— Kluckhohn and Murray, Personality, 
pp. 507-508.
See also Chapter IX, "The Legend of Hitler's Childhood," in 
Erlkson*s Childhood and Society, pp. 28*1—315 •
Cf. Karl Heim's Sprunt Lectures (1935)# The Church of Christ 
and The Problems of the Day (New York, Charles Scribner*s Sons, 1935),
Fp. r/2| see especially chapters: (II) "The Hew 'German Faith'";III) "Lather and the Problems of Today"; and (V) "Christ, His Church 
and the World."— pp. 21-72; 97-12*:.
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circumstances, vas allowed to harness itself to a powerful potential, 
the German nation. Hitler's childhood reveries were dominated by 
the impulse to tear down and rebuild. From the age of fifteen to 
nineteen he was preoccupied specifically with the idea of tearing 
down certain buildings in his hometown of Lins and rebuilding them 
according to elaborate plans whleh he himself drew up. He was 
especially Interested in destroying and rebuilding the opera house 
there. In fact, it has been discovered, says Erlkson, that he had 
returned to this specific preoccupation shortly before his death.
He was emotionally and psychologically back where he was at fifteen, 
drawing plans for a new opera house in Lins. Germany had come under 
the tyranny of a disturbed fifteen-year-old boy who was devoted to 
his own cause of rebuilding an opera house after he had destroyed it 
— after he had satisfied his urge to repudiate it. The fact is all 
the more painful when we realise that Hitler turned to matters polit­
ical only after he had been refused admission to a school of archi­
tecture in Vienna.
If Otto Bank is right, guilt feeling is prominent; indeed 
it is the basic emotion in the person as he struggles for identity. 
Here we are cautiously aware that two different frames of reference 
are Involved, the Freudian and the Banklan. But identity, comple­
mented by crises of intimacy, generativity, and integrity, resembles 
what Bank calls the struggle toward individuation. The unresolved 
identity crisis Involves a prolonged and painful failure to resolve 
guilt feelings.
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The parental environment provides the first image for identi­
fication striving. Does devotion to the Image entail guilt because 
of the offended ego, or that particular segment of ego which feels 
negated by any compliance vith the parent-image? Repudiation results 
from the coup effected by this guilt. The anti-parent ego wins only 
partial control. The individual is both "the elder brother" and the 
prodigal. "The younger son" has asked for his portion of the inheri­
tance. Guilt is felt because of the segment of ego which represents 
a llbldo-cathexls of the parent image. The "elder brother"— the 
"parents' own child"— is also offended by the repudiation of the 
image. The analogy is to the union-versus-individuation tension 
within the self, the Janus-faced guilt.
Generally, depth psychologists seem to agree that for man- 
ln-soclety some guilt feeling is inevitable, and that regardless of 
whether it is to be regarded as good, bad, or indifferent in itself, 
it must be utilised therapeutically, even instrumentallstlcally, in 
the directions: (l) of integration within the individual and
(2) of relationship— if only as "adjustment"— with the social 
milieu. Guilt is a form of fear or anxiety. It presupposes a prior 
relationship, hence, in some measure, love. Guilt feeling asserts 
for the subject that he is beholden to someone or to society, if not 
to God. The implications of Rank's theory, and also of Horney's, is 
that failure to become one's "individuated" or "real" self is a 
tragic wrong against whatever is ultimate in terms of human value.
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It Is against "God." Whether It Is accountable or culpable depends 
on whether the Individual has to some extent chosen against Individ­
uation and "reality."
Quilt Feelings, Complications, and Accountability
In lnqulrlngj "What is the nature of guilt?" we have been 
sifting the various "answers" as to the nature and significance of 
guilt feeling. Theology's concern is with actual guilt or accounta­
bility regardless of Shat nay be the inner conviction of the subject- 
self. However, as we concluded in an earlier chapter, our instru- 
Bentallstlc concern with accountability, in the interest of soteri- 
ology, Involves the analysis of the subjective, interior dimensions 
of guilt feeling, along with other dynamisms involved.
We have now to probe further into the emotions of guilt and 
shame, distinguishing them from each other as we can. Wien we must 
search out in more detail the pervasive fear— or anxiety— and the 
implications of this fundamental dynamic. Such a study will bring 
us into the psychology of despair, a condition in whleh destructive 
emotions seem to have done their lethal work almost to the finish.
Meanwhile we keep in mind the problem of man as sinner in 
the larger context of evil and tragedy. From whence do offenses 
come? It Is Imperative that we see the Individual's responsibility 
in terms of the social evils which can be cast out only "by much 
prayer and fasting" and by perceptive social action. The effectual, 
fervent prayer of the "righteous man” which avails much Involves a
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commitment to social action, to practical "social" work, even to 
political Involvement both in legislation and in the enforcement 
of a critically Christian concern for Justice and agape.3-
l-This perspective for our study is restated because of the 
somewhat valid criticism that along with an increased emphasis on 
pastoral psychology there may be a lessening of activistic concern 
with matters social and political, in the Church. Furthermore, 
deterministic Freudianlsm may well be conducive to reactionary 
polities and even to quietism.
See the "debate": Robert E. Fitch (a professor of Christian
Ethics), "To Fee the Foul Disease" arguing that the tendency of 
secularism within and outside the Church, Including the Influence 
of works like Fromm’s The Art of Loving, is to apotheoslse 'the 
ego, 1 to glorify self-love and self-centeredness, versus Earl A. 
Loomis (Director of Union Theological Seminary's program in psy­
chiatry and Religion), The 'Foul Disease* is No Respecter of 
Persons: A Reply to Mr. Fitch," in Christianity and Crisis,
XVTII, 8, May 12, 1950, PP« 63-68. Cf• our discussion infra.
Chapter Hlne•
Also cf. Philip Rieff, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist.
(New York, Viking, 195*0* "Freud undermined the anelent concern 
of a political philosophy and substituted for it the inquiry of 
a political psychology, asking In what manner and degree must the 
individual be constrained vlthin his social relatione," Italics 
are ours (at p, 256),
CHAPTER SIX
WHAT IS HIS GUILT? II THE COMPLICATIONS OF SHAME 
The Contributions of Alfred Adler
As ve have seen, guilt feelings are a fusion of fear, love, 
and hatred-turned-inward. They are a compulsion to make restitution, 
to effect a restoration, to "be Justified." lbs theorists ve have 
discussed In the preceding chapter have recognised guilt feelings 
as important In the aetiology of emotional Illness and In psycho­
genesis, the actual formation of the vaklng, socially-avare,
"prospective," self and vhat Sullivan refers to as the "self dyna­
mism" or "self system."
Alfred Adler, the first disciple to leave Freud, had a con­
siderable Influence on psychotherapy, educational psychology, and 
social vork, especially In the United States and In Great Britain—  
where he died, while In Aberdeen for a series of lectures.1 His 
thought continues to thrive In the vork of Rudolf Drelkurs, for 
example, of Chicago. Dr. Drelkurs says there are five assumptions 
or distinctive features to Adlerian psychology today. Ifcey are:
(l) "The social embeddedness of man," In contrast to assump­
tions of a simply hereditary and biological basis for an anthropology.i
*6ee Phyllis Bottoms, Alfred Adler: Apostle of Freedom (London,
Faber and Faber, 1939# 2nd edition, 19^6), pp. 176-200j IjCSHFj and 
p. 2^1 ff. Also: Levis Way, Adler1 s Place in Psychology (London, Allen
269
270
(2) "Self-determination and creativity," in opposition to 
"mechanistlc-deterministio concepts/' vhether they are focused on 
environmental or hereditary causality.
(3) "Subjectivity of perception,' in opposition to absolutism, 
vhich depends on authority."
(^) "Teleo-analytic interpretation of behavior," in opposition 
to "a causelistic evaluation of behavior."
(5) "The holistic approach," in opposition to "reductlonistlc
«1efforts to explain man by any one of his partial attributes.
Because of Adler's apparent neglect of an explicit emphasis on 
guilt feelings as such, his doctrine of psyche and character should 
be re-examined. Vas his an Important counter-insight that led him 
avay from the guilt-oriented Freudian model of his timet2
& Unvin, 1950)| Ruth Munroe, o£. clt, Part Three, especially 
pp. 333-3^3) 370-380) 1*23-^ 38; 50>5ll.
■^Rudolf Drelkurs, "Are Psychological Schools of Thought 
outdated?" The Journal of Individual Psychology, XVI, 1, i960, 
pp. 3-10, at p. i7
2A significant statement vhich Freud made vith respect to 
Adler's major emphasis and his ovn constructions on the theme of 
guilt is the follovlng:
"The sense of inferiority has a strong erotic basis. The 
child feels itself inferior vhen it perceives that it is not loved, 
and so does the adult as veil. The only organ that is really re­
garded as inferior is the stunted penis— the girls' clitoris. But 
the major part of the sense of inferiority springs from the relation­
ship of the ego to its super-ego, and, like the sense of guilt, it is 
an expression of the tension betveen them. The sense of inferiority 
and the sense of guilt are exceedingly difficult to distinguish."
Rev Introductory Lectures on Fsycho-Analysis, p. 93* The present 
chapter is focused on the very attempt-to-distinguish, vhich Freud 
called "exceedingly difficult." Though our task is difficult, it
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Adler approaches the aetiology of neurosis vlth a sense not 
only of biology but also of sociology. Though he calls his psychol­
ogy "Individual,” his a 1st in therapy is to bring the patient into 
social equilibrium.3'
Adler's writings consist largely of addresses and monographs, 
all illustrating the same clear-cut hypotheses. Ve can see the point 
at once vhen ve approach Adler's work, more so perhaps than in any of 
our representative psychologists. He can say, in one brief prefacej
Individual psychology covers the vhole range of psychology 
in one survey, and as a result it is able to mirror the indivis­
ible unity of the personality . . • • ve modestly lay claim to 
the formulation of fundamental principles vhlch have hereto 
never found expression in psychological literature . . . .  all 
forms of neurosis and developmental failure are expressions of 
inferiority and disappointment......... We Individual psychol­
ogists are in a position, if a proper procedure is observed, to 
get a clear conception of the fundamental psychic error of the 
patient at the first consultation. And the way to cure is thus
opened.^
In searching out the basic causes of neurosis, Adler presup­
posing the essential unity of the human psyche, perceives the infant 
organism as it must compare Itself vlth its towering environment.
need not be made more so by phallic, Oedlpal, and superego "blinkers" 
which Freud seemed to be wearing in this passage (1933)*
3-Our discussion of Adler relies on works vhlch are cited in 
footnotes. Recently there has appeared a valuable compendium of his 
thought. It too has been consulted. The Individual Psychology of 
Alfred Adler: "A Systematic Presentation in Selections from His
Writings^ edited and annotated by Heins L. and Rovena R. Ansbacher 
(New York, Basic Books, 1936), 503 pp. Significantly. Chapter 5 1* 
entitled "Social Interest," and the final chapter (19) is "Problems 
of Social Psychology."— pp. 126-162; hk6~k6k.
^Alfred Adler, The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychol­
ogy, trans. by P. Radin (London" Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 
pp. v-vi.
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The feelings of discomfort, the "fear of degradation/' of "lack of 
knowledge and orientation," the feeling of want, the frustrations 
related to using the sense organs and mechanisms of speech, lack of 
cleanliness, relative invalidism and the consequent fear of death are 
added up to make what he calls the feeling of being beneath, the feel* 
ing of uncertainty. These negative emotions are what compose the 
"infantile feelings of inferiority. " 1
The infant-child-adult is striving in a social milieu. Ibis 
very fact means that he is working to overcome, to compensate for, that 
inner awareness of being "beneath others." "I am vulnerable to acci­
dent, illness, open abasement." Hence, as he is hurled forward in a 
developing life, he should become, through the very process of growth 
and imposed adjustments, actually less inferior, at least to the infan­
tile state. Yet he maintains an unrelenting inner sense of inferior­
ity! It is a feeling of dependence Which he somehow rejects as de­
grading dependence.
Naturally, normally, inevitably, the infant will feel weak and 
helpless. But normal, healthy growth should mean normal and healthy—  
non-neurotic— adjustment to life. Adler was concerned as a physician 
with the healing of neurosis. Yet he produced In his "philosophical"—  
psychologic "fragments" an anthropology based on the supposed univer­
sality of the feeling of inferiority.
Adler's early research into the problem of organic inferi­
ority was recognised by Freud himself as an important contribution
^Alfred Adler, The neurotic Constitution trans. by Bernard 
Glueck and John Lind (New York, Moffat Yard, 1917), p. 73.
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to the nev "science" of depth psychology.1 The master felt, hovever, 
that his erstvhile disciple had substituted the appendix for the body 
of the truth, vhen Adler began to spin his inclusive theory from the 
research. Adler, in turn, felt that Freud had failed to see the 
"lowest canton denominator" of the causes of neurosis as the sense 
of inferiority.2 Adler became a "depth psychologist" of "the 
shallows," in the eyes of those vho considered depth psychology by 
definition a probing of the deep unconscious. Adler felt that for 
the therapist's purposes the unconscious expressed Itself clearly 
enough in the conscious and in the pattern of life of the patient.
^Thls praise is limited indeed! In his critical "demoli­
tion" of Adler as "depth psychologist," Freud does actually include 
this phrase: "his valuable studies about the inferiority of organs."
"Hie History of the Psychoanalytic Movement (l9lfc), Basic Writings, 
pp. 931-977# fit p. 985*
2For example, in "Psychical Hermaphrodlsm and the Masculine 
Protest,1 Individual Psychology, pp* 16-22.
3cf. the contemporary mood in counseling psychology, opposing 
depth technlquesAnot necessary and unrewarding (to be referred to in 
Part Three, footnotes). Contemporary ego-psychology, indeed much in 
the mood of contemporary "depth psychology," suggests a shift away 
from concentration on the unconscious as such. Even Freud came to 
regard it as but a partial category. (Supra, Chapter Four).
The more serious counter-charge made by the Freudians against 
their critics— vhether Adler, or those present-day counseling psy­
chologists vho deplore the time-consuming "depth" techniques— is 
that the sacrifice of depth" means losing the perspective of the 
"primary process," the endopsychlc vorld of personality. Adler, 
Homey, revisionists, and even the Freudian ego-psychologists—  
according to instinctuallsts like Melanie Klein— risk losing sight 
of vhat Freud gave the rather non-descriptive, Indeed, non­
psychologic, name Das Es— the id.
Yet, Otto Rank, vho gave up the Freudian nomenclature, seems 
to be not so vulnerable to a counter-charge, despite the similarity 
of his short-treatment therapy to that of Adler.
2Tfk
This feeling of inferiority le linked vith the fact that 
the individual le psychically bisexual vhile desiring to he wholly 
masculine. Here ve see in Adler the same disposition ve saw in 
his fellov Vlenese, Sigmund Freud. Both are temperamentally patri­
archal rather than matriarchal in their approach to sex differences. 
Adler links inferiority vith femininity while Freud links fears 
and envy vith the lack of a penis in the girl and the threat of 
castration felt hy the boy. 1
Today as ve read Adler, and to seme extent even as we read 
Freud, we wonder how really necessary is this emphasis on the superi­
ority of the male, for the actual application of any particular 
aetiology of neurosis. As we have seen, Ian Suttie, Karen Horney, 
and others emphasise the positive aspects of femininity.
We may better appreciate the thrust of Adler's emphasis on 
inferiority feeling and superiority striving if ve are not distracted 
hy his naivete vith regard to the adjectives "feminine" and "mas­
culine . "2
1 Their most fundamental point of agreement, ve recall, was 
on biological "organic inferiority." Adler, Understanding Human 
Nature trans. hy Walter Beran Wolfe (London, Alien and Unwin, I927-),
pTTJS.
^Cf. S^ren Kierkegaard's circumspect use of the vonanllness- 
manliness" polarity in Sickness Unto Death (Anchor edition), pp. I83-U 
note. This work vill he cited infra, Chapter Eight.
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This is not to ignore hi* anchoring his theory In biological sources
of inferiority feeling. During his research into the causes of the
common phenomena of infantile "pretending" to be ill he had it 
"regularly and inexorably" forced upon his attention "that the pos­
session of inherited inferior organs, organic systems and glands 
with internal secretions, created a situation, in the early stages
of a child’s development, whereby a normal feeling of weakness and
helplessness had been enormously intensified and had grown into a 
deeply-felt sense of inferiority. " 1
The feeling of inferiority— based on the awareness of 
constitutional-and-psychic-inferiority demands a compensation before 
the tribunal of what Adler calls "ego-conaclousness." An Imagined 
goal is established, which he calls s "fiction." 2 It evolves, along 
with self-awareness. This goal is implied in the child's need for 
security, for love as tenderness.
^dler, Individual Psychology, p. 18. Cf. The Neurotic 
Constitution, Chapter I, pp. 1-Jfc.
2Adler was influenced by reading Hans Vaihinger's Philosophy 
of 'As If' (Berlin, 1911)j so much so that the Ansbachers have in­
eluded selections from Vaihinger's book in The Individual Psychol­
ogy of Alfred Adler, pp. 77-07* They say that lb is impossible to 
gain a full understanding of Adler without a knowledge of Vaihinger's 
fictionallsm (p. 76)* "The main influence on Adler was to provide 
him with a philosophic foundation for his developing subjective 
finallsm" (p. 77)* Vaihinger's approach is somewhat like James' 
pragmatism and John Dewey's instrumentalism (p. 87).
Cf. a theologian's review (and critical appraisal for 
theology) soon after the publication of The Philosophy of As If;
Karl Helm, "Zur Philosophie des Ala-Ob" (1912), in C-laube und 
Ltben (Berlin, Furche-Verlag, 1926), pp. 63-72.
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The child has found a meaning In life towards which he 
strives and whose still indistinct outlines he is forming, 
and starting from which he derives that quality of prevision 
which is calculated to direct and give worth to his actions 
and impulses A
Life and growth mean that there Is a special force at work, 
bent on making compensation. This force is that which Hietssche 
described as the "will to power."2 Adler's eminently pragmatic 
system sees the dynamics, not in terms of libido, life and death 
impulses, pleasure-versus-pain antinomies. He sees it in terms 
of what he considers every mortal's preoccupation: solving his
problem of inferiority, the negative conviction about his own worth. 
This is the problem regardless of how it may manifest itself.
Instead of outlining an elaborate series of psychogenetlc 
stages, Adler suggests three crises for the life of the individual. 
These three ongoing crises are actually the same crisis. They are 
Interrelated, representing the triple encounter of the individual 
vith his environment as a whole, vith his family, and vith himself. 
They are: (l) the crisis of establishing oneself In a meaningful
relationship with society; (2) the crisis of establishing oneself 
in a love relationship; and (3 ) the crisis of establishing oneself 
in an occupation which assures one of significance .3 Success in 
mounting these hurdles is determined somewhat by the individual's
^Thc Neurotic Constitution, p. 52. 2Ibld., p. 2A.
^Following a suggestion made by Professor Dickie (in a 
letter to the present writer), we note the three Christian doctrines 
vhich speak to these three (Adlerian) crises: (l) The Kingdom of 
God: "relation to society"; (2) u y k  1 "love relation­
ship”; and (3) Christian vocation: significant occupation."
early introduction to society, "love," and tools in early childhood 
where he finds himself within a "family style of life." Neurotic, 
psychotic, and criminal behavior Indicate failure to mount one or 
more of these related crises. It is common for one to find his 
meaningful relationship vith society only as he imagines and delimits 
society vithin his ovn mind. It is common for one to try at least in 
the Imagination to alter the loved partner, even to substitute phan­
tasy or compulsion entirely for reality in the sphere of "love." It 
is common for one to plaoe highly unrealistic constructions upon his 
ovn occupation in life. 1
Adler became a social ideologist, a "preacher." He worked 
toward the goal of social 'inter-cooperation,” mutually edifying 
love relationships, and progress-making occupation for the patient 
and for mankind. By temperament he vae optimistic, positive, con­
structive. Nevertheless he realised that society measured by his 
Ideals vas sick.
Adler believed that the will to power, the drive for compen­
sation, could largely be transformed by therapy into the vill to co­
operate. Human beings should learn to strive for the happiness of 
others. He thought there vas lasting wisdom in the Biblical
*Cf. his discussions in such popular treatments ass Alfred 
Adler, The Science of Living (1929# London, George Allen and Unvin, 
1930), Chapters fX,“5T, )tt, and XII, pp. 199-262; What Life Should 
Msan to You, ed., Alan Porter (London, Allen and Unvin, 1932), 
3I£ptersT7 XI, and XII, pp. 252-286.
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aphorismj "It is more blessed to give than to receive. ' 1 Through 
education and re-educative therapy cooperation can transplant superi­
ority striving.
As ve have seen, the fiction established by the Infant ego 
as a much-to-be-desired reversal of Inferiority is superiority. The 
goal is seen in the vision of an ideal self— the "self ideal," vhlch 
stands for a continual feeling of being above. These feelings of 
being above are composed of such vished-for attainments as Joy, 
victory, knowledge, wealth, art, cleanliness, life envisioned as 
immortality, and esteem. 2
The ego refuses to take its situation lying down, so to 
speak. While the Infant maintains a measure of the eternal, real 
and physiologically rooted "community-feeling " from vhlch "are 
developed tenderness, love of neighbour, friendship and love," he 
cannot bear the feeling of inferiority which seams to be his lot .3 
This painful and negative feeling takes different forms with dif­
ferent individuals, according to the nature of the organic inferi­
ority, the neurotic compensations sought by members of the family—  
often at the infant's expense, and the general impact of the initial 
encounters with the environment. The sense of inferiority thus 
objectified in the individual's own infantile idiom declares its
^Acts 20i35* Cf. Adler, Understanding Human Nature, p. 211, 
and Chapter III, pp. 33-^3* et passim.
C^f. the diagram in The Neurotic Constitution, p. 73*
3Individual Psychology, p. 9*
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opposite simply by removing the negatives. "Whatever I am not I 
shall be," expresses at once the goal and the lust for power.
Hence the style-of-life manifests the "as if" attitude vhich demands 
the fruits of superiority even though it has never been achieved*
This goal is a fiction, a positive image created out of a 
negative reality. The Infant is in fact Inferior to the adult.
What is more, everyone, the adults included, is more or less infe­
rior to his fellovs in some regard. There is no denying this. Nor 
can it be denied that everyone rebels invardly against his inferi­
ority. It may not be too oversimplifying to suggest that this inner 
rebellion finds unmistakable expression in a relentless drive for 
mastery, a lust for pover vhich must be understood in the context 
of the individual's own private vorld of inner conflict. But, 
according to Adler, such pover-erased rebellion, however it may 
be disguised in neurosis, psychosis, criminality, or inoffensive 
complacent dream-world satisfaction, is in fact trying to establish 
the ego in the haven of the self ideal, to uproot inferiority-feeling 
and to plant a certainty of superiority. This superiority is in form, 
though not in essence, "over others." It is a vision of a triumphant 
opposite to the inferiority vhich terrorised the infant. But its 
sweep fells "others" along vith the despised image of one's own 
inferior self. Hence it is anti-social, detrimental to the oosmton 
good) it is the very source of social evil.1 Adler's optimism is
^Ibid., p. 8. Cf. What Life Should Moan to You, p. 69, 
where Adler makes a characteristic statement, accenting the posi­
tive aspects of both superiority-striving and "cooperation."
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that although such a motivation la practically universal, its evil 
effects do not have to dominate the individual. The community feeling 
should be evoked to counteract then successfully*
He tells us that ve must face the fact that "this fiction of 
a goal of superiority so ridiculous frog. the view-point of reality, 
has become the principal conditioning factor of our life as hitherto 
known.
Although, according to Adler, the setting up of the flation 
does introduce hostility and aggressiveness in our nature, the 
results are not altogether negative* It "teaches us to differenti­
ate, gives us poise and forces our spirit to look ahead and to per­
fect ourselves." Ve coapare this statement with one by a Freudian, 
Margaret Harries, in an article on "Sublimation in a Group of Four- 
Year-Old Boys"J "The impulses originally causing the children to 
indulge in unacceptable behavior are the same ones whleh later pro­
vide the driving force of their socially acceptable and enjoyable 
activities, namely, the aggressive drives and the pregenital com­
ponent instincts." 2
To Adler the individual evolves and becomes caught up in a 
plan of life, or "life style," which is a concept similar to Horney's
“•Individual Psychology, p. 8.
^Margaret Harries, "Sublimation in a Group of Four-Year-Old 
Boys," The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child (London A Hew York, 
International n^lveriBi£les“^ feessTT V H fT55S, pp. 230-2*0.
Cf* Individual Psychology, pp. 32-50.
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later suggestion: "personality structure.'' It is chosen in infancy.
Its notivc force is the lust for mastery, the will to poser.
The therapist should be able to fit the symptoms of his 
patient into a "plan of life," which spells out the nature of the 
inferiority and of the imagined goal. Armed with such knowledge 
the therapist attempts to re-educate the patient, carrying him 
back— as in other kinds of "psychoanalysis — to the origin of the 
neurosis, where he can see with adult eyes the infantilism of the 
inferiorities felt and feared at the dawn of ego-consoleuBness.
The patient, all the while feeling the encouraging support of his 
therapist-friend, should then be able to recognize his self-ideal 
as a simple goal of superiority, utterly impossible of achievement. 1
lrThe Ansbachers say: "Adler introduced the term 'guiding
self-ideal * in 1912 in The Neurotic Character fUber den nervoeen 
Charakteri Grundxuge einer verglelchendcn"jndlviAual-^3yehologle 
unci IsycSotherapig (Wiesbaden: Bergmann. 4th ed., Annick, Bergmann, 
1^28)--translated The Neurotic Constitution^ where, to all appear­
ances, he used it interchangeably with the fictional goal.
In 1914 Freud formulated his "ideal ego" in "on Narcis­
sism: An Introduction," trans. by Cecil M. Baines, Freud, Collected
Papers, IV, pp. 30-59# at P* 50-51 and following.. ®ie "ego-ideal*' 
is the ego of perfection, to which narcissistic love is attached, 
and "over which his conscience keeps guard" (p. 53) vhlch later 
became the super-ego (Supra, Chapter Five, this dissertation).
Adler acknowledged this by inserting the following statement in a 
revision of fhs Neurotic Character: "A replacement [of the eelf-
idealj by *ego Ideal ’ as Freud attempts would have to be rejected 
on several grounds" (the German edition, p. 4l).
To Adler the "self ideal" was an integrating principle for 
the personality. He chose not to regard it topographically, as
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Re-education weans a revising of the life style or plan for 
living. There is a change in the inner economy* Energy that was 
used in self-seeking is diverted into seeking the happiness of the 
group vith vhich one identifies himself. The former goal of indi­
vidual superiority is replaced vith the more attainable goal of 
social constructiveness, of finding one's place in the larger des­
tiny of community. Fiction, according to Adler, is replaced by 
reality.
As ve have seen, the manifest neurosis is but an expression 
of the vill to pover, vhich has been excited by infantile feelings 
of inferiority and is directed toward an impossible superiority.
Ttlis is true regardless of hov the neurosis may be classified, 
vhether, to take a fev examples, as compulsion neurosis, hysteria, 
or melancholia. Also, both psychotic and criminal behavior reflect 
the dynamism of lust for pover.
Freud came to vlev his own emerging concept (191^1923— toe Ego and 
the Itt).
Adler discusses his therapy in many passages • He said he 
sons times used the following method, because he regarded the patient 
in terms of his total social situations, not as the sole— isolated—  
object of therapeutic concern. "I tell them, 'You can be cured in 
fourteen days if you follow this prescription. Try to think every 
day hov you can please same one! See vhat this means to them. They 
are occupied with the thought Hov can I worry some one!'"— Vhat Life 
Should Msan to You, pp. 259-60.
Adler also published volumes of case histories, nowadays, 
see toe Journal of Individual Psychology, founded by Rudolf Drelkurs, 
now sifted by Heinz and Rovena Ansbacker. toe Journal is devoted to 
"a holistic, phenomenological, teleologlcal, field-theoretical, and 
socially oriented approach to psychology and related fields" (para­
graph, back of covers e. g., Vol. lU, 1953).
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Depth psychologists sees to see compulsion as a "basic phe­
nomenon in all neuroses, not merely in the so-called ’compulsion 
neurosis." In every neurotic sufferer there is an inner sense of 
being consaanded. 1
In the Adlerian man emotional conflict rages on two fronts.
It is the tension between the individual and his environment, and 
vithin the self between the lust for power and community feeling.
Adler taught that the conflict could be resolved, at least 
in a measure, by ministering to the Infant vithin the psyche. He 
can be given the security for vhich he feels he must contend, the 
security represented by his fiction of superiority. Such therapy 
is by personal encounter, which may be Interpreted as the comsu- 
nity1 s meeting vith the individual and bringing about the reconcili­
ation so deeply needed.
By implication therefore the original alienation of the 
self is from his social environment. Hostility and aggressiveness 
are directed against the environment to which the infant feels in­
ferior. Ihls Inferiority feeling has its biological and organic 
basis, but it Is social in its implications. The goal of superi­
ority is the vision of turning the tables, reversing the positions.
It is the fiction that the last becomes the first and that the first 
becomes the last, that the inferior, Insecure Infant becomes the
*Cf. Adler's thinking on compulsions "Compulsion Neurosis" 
in the Individual Psychology, pp. 197-207j Compulsion in other neuroses 
and in "normalr‘ conditions i& discussed, for example, in "Melancholia 
and Paranoia" (ibid., pp. 2U6-262) and "Nev Leading Principles for tbs 
Practice of Individua1-Psychology ’ (ibid., pp. 26-20).
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superior, secure "adult” who can look down upon that environment 
which formerly looked down upon him. The same energy of life gives 
force to both sides of the inner conflict. The solution is to over­
come the fiction with the fact. But the fact must be the practical 
undoing of the terror and tyranny of the inferiority feeling. We are 
reminded of the later, Freudian thinker Melanie Klein who teaches 
prevention of neurosis by early environmental support and strength­
ening of the "love instincts" in their struggle with the "death 
instincts. 1 Adler, of course, tried to steer away from an instinc­
tual dualism. His polarity was of goals. When he first broke away 
from the Freudians their emphasis was on the healthful effect of 
giving optimum environmental support to the "pleasure" Instincts 
to enable the child to become as friendly as possible with reality.
We have noted also how Suttie stressed the necessity of overcoming 
with reassuring love the hatred excited by psychic weaning. It
■klf. for instance, Melanie Klein’s representative essay, 
which brings together almost unbelievable anthropomorphisms, gro­
tesque constructions from so-called "play analysis," and the llfe- 
and love-affirming orientation of her clinical work, in 'The Early 
Development of Conscience in the Child (1933)# reprinted in Contri­
butions to Psycho-Analysis, pp. 267-277, and in Psychoanalysis today 
(Sandor Lorand, ed.‘, New York, International Universities Press, 
1944), pp. 67-74. Mrs. Klein says that psychoanalysis should bring 
personality and character development to the healthy genital level 
with a mild (not overly severe, not overly sadistic) superego, which 
by its nature is "sadistic" toward the ego (Psychoanalysis Today, 
pp. 72-73)* She then preaches a kind of gospel of psychoanalysis, 
envisioning what it can do for character and for the world. Its 
work of lessening infantile anxiety "not only lessens and modifies 
the child's aggressive impulses but leads to a more valuable employ­
ment and gratification of them from a social point of view . . . .  
the child shows an ever-growing, deeply-rooted desire to be loved 
and to love, and to be at peace with the world about it" (ibid., 
pp. 7“t-75).
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seems a bit sore difficult to cosrpare Adler vith Bank, In this regard. 
Is Adler'a power-seeking neurotic, when converted, not likely to he 
something like the 'average nan" who Bisses the vay, along vith the
neurotic?
Adler’s theory sees man's basic Inner problem of living as 
an eBotional conflict between his Inferiority feeling and his com- 
ounlty feeling. To Adler, the social philosopher, the ^ood, obvi­
ously, is whatever makes for both Individual and social well-being.
The inferiority feeling complains that an offense of privation has 
been coomltted against the self at the very dawn of life. Measured 
by the principle that reality delineates the good, the self ideal, 
with its goal of superiority, Is evil, practically in the same sense 
In which Christianity has traditionally spoken of sin as self-seeking 
Instead of fCLngdcM-of-God-seeking. Adler says it is wrong because 
it is fiction over "reality.” But he ascribes to his idealistic 
vision of coHBunlty the quality of reality rather than fiction, 
even as Christian theologians consider the Kingdoa of God as a 
symbol for ultimate reality as far as Qowunlty Is concerned. Ve 
may go even further and call the fictional superiority-striving, 
evil because it is ultimately, and logically, suicidal toward the 
potential self, the justified self, which requires no defense before 
God. The will to superiority, the will to power, is destructive of 
the "essential humanity" which is "accepted in the beloved." 1
^Ephesians 1:6.
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It 1b perhaps even too easy to translate Adler Into Christian 
theology. The "neurotic life style” Is analogous to the "state of 
sin," to the "Adamic nature." Conversion to consBunity-constructiveness- 
seeklng is like conversion or accepting Christian justification and 
entering the process of "being saved" or sanctification. By receiv­
ing insight and being re-educated the individual leaves the fictional 
pattern. He learns to accept both his weaknesses and his strengths 
and to give his all to the good of a nuch greater cause.
It Is often said that Adler vas a 'one-idea-only" theorist.
But It is an idea that under saae guise or other Is being given 
prominent place in the systems of the various schools of depth 
psychology, as ve shall note. The understandable tendency of these 
schools is to credit Adler vith insights vhich they consider as 
properly belonging to their ovn frame of reference.
The "inferiority feeling" so important to Adler Is due pri­
marily to an early sense of deprivation. Every person seems to be 
oppressed somewhat by his relative weaknesses as he becomes increas­
ingly av&re of himself as distinct from the other. Ve have already 
discussed the classical Freudian doctrine of female psychology as 
determined by penis envy— a sense of organ privation, and the re­
joinder by Suttie that It is as reasonable to suppose that male 
psychology is determined by "Zeus" envy of the female's "superior" 
anatomy. To Freudians male psychology is determined by the boy's 
awareness of his inferiority vhen he compares his body vith that of 
his father. They stress that the crisis of late infancy does Involve 
an acute sense of privation, of organ inferiority.
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In waking to life the nascent ego witnesses a power of the 
environment which seems to increase while his own seems relatively 
to decrease. His omnipotence phantasies appear increasingly to he 
mere phantasies. Growing in realism means being pared down in power 
and glory. There Is a sense of loss. This is evidenced clinically 
by the frequent allusion to childhood memories that feature some­
thing’s being taken away. A part of the price of maintaining and 
further developing a sense of I-nass, or individuation, is to mourn 
for the loss of something. "There hath past away a glory from the . 
earth. " 1
*Rie Significance of Shame Feelings
The emphasis of various schools of depth psychology on the 
primacy of separation as the formative cause of emotional conflict 
suggests a sense of deprivation as well. Perhaps hopefulness 
itsslf and preoccupation with "new heavens and new earth" is explained 
at least partially by the memory of a state before the near-crippling 
awareness of privation.
If we follow Melanie Klein, Freud himself, C. G. Jung, with 
his belief in determinative archetypes, and Rank, in their contrast­
ing ways, we place the primal sense of privation no later than the 
very moment of birth. Freud and Jung, with their growing belief in 
a phylogenetic "fall," seem to imply that the deprivation feeling 
is written into the embryo-psyche itself.
^William Wordsworth, Odei Intimations of Immortality from 
Recollections of Early Childhood, if.
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Although she is often referred to as "neo-Freudian," it is 
appropriate in one sense to speak of Karen Horney as "neo-Adlerian.' 
Her thinking is often associated vith that of Adler, although she 
has taken pains to try to distinguish their positions. To her 
the "basic anxiety' is not a sense of organ inferiority or body in­
feriority, vhich uust be overcome even if through the plying of a 
fiction. The basic distress is separation anxiety, but in a social 
sense.
Ian Suttie propounded a similar vlev. In fact his discussion 
of the problem seems to preserve the somatic, or biological, factors 
Bore explicitly,perhaps resulting in a more balanced picture of the 
genesis of separation anxiety. 1
1In terns of the schools" and their leaders, Suttie's 
constructions sees conducive to a creative blending of Freudian, 
Adlerian, and Kleinian Insights. The biological is not left out 
of the picture; nor is the psychological reduced to mere biology.
The mother perhaps is dominant over the father-image as the father 
is over the mother in Freud's system. The crisis of psychic weaning 
is described in such a vay as to suggest that Suttie vas in dialogue, 
at least privately, vith Melanie Klein. Unfortunately, Suttie’s 
manner of annotation and documentation (in Origins of Love and 
Hate) has not made it easy to track down all of his allusions. 
Clearly, he does acknovledge Freud (vhom he nevertheless takes to 
task In many areas), Adler and Ferenczi. Klein is also mentioned 
in his book.
Dr. J. A. Hadfield, another eminent British Independent 
psychopathologist and theorist, has written a helpful preface to 
the vork. Dr. Suttie's introduction, though brief, is a helpful 
direction, also. See, for instance Hadfield, Psychology and 
Mental Health, A Contribution to DevelopmentalTsychology (see 
Bibliography, infra), I£$0, at pp. £3 fr., where he discusses his 
own selectiveness.
In a letter to the present writer, dated 29th August, 1953* 
Mrs. Jane Isabel Suttie, herself a psychopathologist, said:
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Horney published her first popular presentation of her views 
two years after the publication of Suttie's book, which, as we have
"I knew he considered "The Origins of Love and Hate" merely 
a preliminary sketch for a such more systematic exposition of his 
views; it was In fact largely a compilation and restatement of all 
of his earlier papers of any importance and he had intended a much 
more consistent and extended treatment of his philosophical and 
psychological Interests in a second book.
"Until he had actually got down to the drudgery of compo­
sition my husband was not a fluent writer, and as his time was 
always fully occupied in the clinical work he had not, up to his 
sudden and brief last illness, sketched out on paper matters that 
would already be shaping themselves in his mind. With you I 
deeply regret that this would have been so."
It is significant that eighteen years after it first appeared 
In Britain, Suttie's book was published also in the United States.
1x1 Pastoral Psychology (Great Heck, N. Y., IV, 1953-195*0 it was 
hailed as a revelation. Cf. "Review," by Paul E. Johnson, Professor 
of Pastoral Psychology, at Boston University (Ho. 38, pp. 63-6*0; 
and the article based on the book (by its title) by Ashley Montagu 
(Ho. 39, pp. **6-^ 8).
Cf. early reviews: Karin Stephen, in The British Journal
of Psychology, Medical Section, XVI, 1936-37# PP* 1^ 9-ifel. ^or 
instance, the reviewer re g re ts that Suttie*s criticisms, though 
many are penetrating, are apt to be seen in the form of a personal 
attack on Freud himself and hopes that psychoanalysis will not be 
deterred from benefiting by them.
Roger Money-Kyrle, A Freudian analyst, reviewed the book in 
The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis (XVII, 1936, pp. 137-138). 
At the end the reviewer says: Dr. Suttie * s book will be well re­
ceived by all who wish to under-estimate the extent of infantile 
sexuality and aggression: at the same time, psychoanalytical theory
is admittedly tentative in many ways, and his criticisms are near 
enough the mark to stimulate research."
John Rickman, in his "Obituary: Ian D. Suttie" (British
Journal of Psychology, Medical Section, XV, 1936, p. 265), speaks 
61 liis "almost boyish gusio,” "passionate advocacy of ideas." "To 
vigour of mind and power of penetration was added an almost feminine 
delicacy of appreciation, supported by a shrewd understanding of 
human nature." He had "deep affection for his colleagues and his 
patients." His book— to whose publication he looked forward (in 
hospital)— appeared a few days after his sudden death. His wife 
helped him much in its preparation. It was but part of a larger 
scheme they had in preparation (says the review).
pointed out, never received ouch attention from the Freudian analysts.^ 
It seems to be relatively unknown to "revisionists" in America, includ­
ing Homey* Hence ve consider the tvo presentations separately.
Homey taught that the basic anxiety is caused by the experi­
ence of being rejected by the parent or parent-surrogate. A pattern 
of rejection-feeling is determined by the primal experiences of early 
childhood and also by subsequent experiences of feeling rejection.
The psyche internalises this rejection, even though it may be actu­
ally a subjective misconstruction of the remembered event vhlch 
symbolises it. Here, without elaborating them, Homey leaves room 
for possible theories of phylogenetic and somatic factors in the 
aetiology of "neurosis•" Her reforming seal led her to stress the 
inter-personal aspects of the experience from cause to cure. Harry 
Stack Sullivan also emphasised the role of the "significant persons" 
as they wittingly or unwittingly help shape the personality of the 
infant-child-Juvenile-adolescent. 2
The Idealised self image formed within the psyche, accord­
ing to Homey, is analogous to Adler's "fiction" of superiority.
Her idea of trends, personality type, and personality structure 
suggest his concept of life style. Ve can see Adler's influence in 
Bank and in the ego-psychologists who use such terminology as "style 
of life."
Admittedly vs risk oversimplification in any attempt to cor­




and Suttie. But since our concern is vith possible insight for a 
theological perspective, ve take the risk. All of these psycholo­
gists find a distress vlthln the psyche vhich underlies the "faculty" 
of guilt avarensss. It is logically and psychogenetically prior to 
guilt feelings, though it has a profound, and often distorting effect 
on their nature.
Adler sees this underlying dynamism as the feeling of inferi­
ority. The infant ego inevitably cones to the conclusion that he is 
deprived to begin vith, inferior, hopelessly behind even as he enters 
the race. Soaehov convince the psyche ef nan that he is worth some­
thing though inferior to his composite milieu and you solve his 
problem and the problem that he is for society. Do this for enough 
persons and the problems of soclsty are solved. Overcome that curi­
ous threat vlthln man due to his one-talent kind of perspective. 
Provide the security vhich inferiority feeling seems to threaten.
Then and only then vill he be able to live creatively but realis­
tically— instead of fictionally— vith his awareness of deprivation.
Horney stresses rejection as the operative form of the depri­
vation. Man is built to endure the thousand natural shocks that 
flesh is heir to. He cannot endure the Insult of parental rejection 
that may be added to the injury. What does this rejection do? It 
threatens his security. This is in the sense of at-one-ness vith 
his milieu. Because the milieu Is overwhelming in its magnitude 
and power, his being cut off from it is tantamount to being put 
out vith the rubbish. He is rubbish, s mere nothing, worthless!
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The Freudians see the same phenomenon in ths failure of the 
ego to surmount any one of ths crises of infancy. Sis threat is 
always to the organism from forces that would destroy it either 
from within or without. Quilt characterises the Individual who 
has at least partially resolved the oral— trust-mlstrust— and the 
anal— autanomy-degradatlan— crises and entered the phallic—  
lnltlatlve-gullt— phase, the identity crisis. Generally, a failure 
to overcome crippling guilt with a strong life style of healthy Ini­
tiative, failure to emerge whole from "Infancy" Into "childhood," Is 
due to previous failure to win through on trust over mistrust Or,
If that hurdle has been fairly well made, failure to win the battle . 
for will power over the sense of shame (inferiority.) and doubt.
The ego has fixated Itself at some earlier stage. In Melanie Klein's 
world of split objects, failure to overcome evil objects with good 
objects In the inner pantheon results in despair, or pessimism, a 
sense of futility. Indeed, often, a driving, terrifying sense of 
futility.
Hence, the privilege of being able to feel what these psychol­
ogists call ^allt Is open only to those who have not been overcome by 
Insecurity and shame. Reverting again to the helpful latticework 
provided by the ego-psychologlsts, ve may say that a protracted iden­
tity crisis reflects the fact that the obstacle shame has never been 
successfully removed from the path to meaningful identification and 
Integration of the self. Internalised ego-ideals dominate a weak 
ego. Some apparently selfless persons are "leanera," who try,
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perhaps not quite consciously, to be a part of someone else's psyche, 
someone else's destiny, because their ovn is so impoverished.
Rank, Suttie, and Jung, each in his ovn way, emphasize the 
basic trauma for the psyche as separation: from symbiotic union,
and vlthin, from the basic structure of selfhood (Jung). Jung, 
like Homey, sees society as the agent of the separation. Rank 
emphasises the event of birth. Suttie places the greater emphasis 
on "psychic weaning, " as does Melanie Klein, and most of the stu­
dents of the psychoanalytic treatment of the child. 1 Intimacy needs 
are fundamental. Separation from warmth, from physical closeness to 
a "mothering" Influence, is formative in the extreme. 2
mean to include here also the specialists in therapy 
for children who adhere more to the approach of Anna Freud and 
to the ego-psychologlsts.
By "psychic weaning" ve mean here, rather loosely, the trans­
ition from almost complete dependence on "mother" and "mother- 
substltutes" to a relatively greater independence. In Rrikson's 
terms it is the transition from the stage of trust-distrust pattern­
ing to that of inltlative-doubt.
^Cf. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, an annual which 
ve have already cited.  .
Studies are being made of the effects of so-called "group 
upbringing." Anna Freud— vith Sophie Dann— has studied the apparent­
ly successful identification of six orphaned children vith each other. 
— "An Experiment in Group Upbringing" (ibid., VI, 1951, pp. 127-168). 
This is a fascinating study of the anomalous experience of six Bull­
dogs Bank children (refugee-orphans), in their relationships and their 
oral satisfactions, stability in their relationships and their sur­
roundings. Though far from being healthy youngsters, they are sur­
prisingly "neither deficient, delinquent, nor psychotic" (p. 168).
Cf. Harry F. Harlow, 'Love in Infant Monkeys," Scientific 
American, Vol. 200, Ho. 6, June, 1959, pp. 68-7 .^ Experimental 
psychology— by this example— suggests formative "social" effect 
of early "mothering." 15le monkeys vere studied in their response
29^
Sullivan says that the "waking self" cannot accept as truly 
a part of the self dynamism dissociated "shameful" or "not me" ele­
ments left along the trail of "development. " 1 As Patrick Mallahy 
faithfully expounds Sullivan's view:
Hie self may he said to he made up of or at least circum­
scribed hy reflected appraisals. The child lacks the equip­
ment and experience necessary for a careful and unclouded 
evaluation of himself. Hie only guide he has is that of the 
significant adults who take care of him, and who treat and 
regard him In accordance with the way in which they have 
developed from their own life experience. Hence, the child 
experiences himself and appraises himself In terms of what 
the parents and others close to him manifest. By empathy, 
facial expression, gestures, words, deeds they convey to him 
the attitudes they hold toward him and their regard or lack 
of It for him. 2
The child "naturally" accepts these attitudes as they are conveyed, 
because he Is not yet equipped to question or to evaluate them 
objectively. If the significant people express a respecting, loving 
attitude toward him he will have a similar attitude toward himself.
If they are derogatory and hateful, then he will acquire a derogatory
to a "cloth" dummy-"mother" and a "wire" dummy- 'mother." The monkeys 
that were deprived of early mothering (that Is; for 250 days after 
their birth) showed less marked preferences before their separation 
from the dusmles and no significant preference after three months' 
separation (actually a slight preference for the wire dummy). Yet 
monkeys reared with both cloth and wire dusmles and nursing bottles 
displayed as much Interest In the doth 'mother' as they did In 
another monkey. Monkeys reared with no mother found both dummies 
less' interesting them another monkey.
*Cf. Mullahy, Oedipus: Myth and Complex, p. 29^.
Sullivan, like other depth psychologists, has pursued the 
psychology of shame considerably further than the pre-Freudian In­
tensely Introspective "depth" psychologist S^ren Kierhegaard, who 
nevertheless was no stranger to the ' shame dynamism" £our term, 




and hateful attitude toward himself." Bull!van believes also In the 
ongoing formative power of subsequent experience. Perhaps this can 
be especially significant for theology as It addresses Its Inquiry 
to the problem of Implementing "saving grace" for those who In early 
life may have been "scared out of" authentic selfhood. Nevertheless 
the general prognosis Is that throughout his life, unless extra­
ordinary circumstances and a forceful change In the pattern of the 
Inter-personal relations Intervene, the child will carry to ths end 
of his existence the attitudes toward himself which he learned In 
early life.
Freudians see the psyche's front to the world as shaped by 
Inner drives In their reality-conditioned effort to wrest satisfaction 
from the milieu. A persistent sense of unworthiness may well indi­
cate that In Infancy and early childhood the developing individuated 
self-image was subordinated to a reflected Image of society. The 
greatest fear for such a person Is the fear of humiliation, which 
spells abandonment. Humiliation experience elicits the greatest 
rage.
Jung's persona is the self in Its attempt to be acceptable 
to society. It emerges from the tension between the soclety-lmage 
and the unacceptable self-image much as Adler's "fiction of superi­
ority" is derived from Inferiority feeling*"1
1 The process of civilising ths human being leads to a com­
promise between himself and society as to what he should appear to 
be, and to the formation of the mask Cthe persona J behind which 
most people live.”— Frieda Fordham, An Introduction to Jung*s 
Psychology, p. 1*7.
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!Rie "average man’ type as veil as the "neurotic” type, in 
Rank’s system, fail to develop a healthy individuated will not simply 
because of the painfulness of "ethical guilt" but also because of an 
instilled conviction of shame: "1 am nothing, absolutely nothing by
myself alone; therefore I can find meaning only in being bound inex­
tricably, by identification, to society or, by a fiction of reunion, 
to 'my mother's * body."
To Homey, the real self. Integrated and whole, is denied 
fulfillment because of internalised rejection: a sense of unworthi­
ness, shame! To Adler, an individual's life style is a pursuit of 
a fiction derived from his sense of inferiority: a sense of unworth­
iness, shame. To Jung, an individual's persona is his makeshift mask 
which protects him from being discarded by society: a sense of dan­
ger in asserting his real self (process) in the face of a powerful 
society which rejects it as unworthy, shameful. To Freud and Freud­
ians, the very process of ego formation may be effectively stunted 
by being flooded vlth a sense of shame before it is far enough along 
to channel such degradation into some other dynamism, such as guilt. 
The shame-driven may avoid a consciousness of inner persecution by 
losing himself in some other identity. Should this identity fall 
him and force him back upon his "shameful" self, he could break, even 
suicidally or psychotically. His own ego Is undeveloped. It may be 
a mere puppet government, so to speak, in abject service to some 
expression of the outside world. In some cases this outside center 
may be a narcotic ring, or other demonic structure. He may be little
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more than id thrown on the mercy of the court of 'the world.” Though 
weak in ego— or T'egu consciousness" — he may be overridden with dis­
torted ego-idealsj the infantile reflection of his society. He tries 
to satisfy them under fear of abandonment. Hie dominant infantile 
hostilities may never have been curbed adequately (by guilt). Hence 
he may easily be a man-in-rage.
nevertheless, aham-a in a measure— and everyone has it in a 
measure— can work for good. For Instance, in reading the autobiogra­
phical writings of Albert Schweitzer, a man who is universally es­
teemed as a credit to humanity, one is struck by the recurrent theme 
of shame. In his Memoirs of Childhood and Youth, a book which re­
sulted from a request made by his psychoanalyst friend Oscar Pfister, 
he recalls many instances of feeling acutely ashamed.^ When (me 
feels ashamed, consciously, he is 'ashamed11 of soms impulse or deed, 
and, sometimes, of just being vhat he pictures himself to be. 2 
This feeling is often quickly caught up in the larger dynamism of 
guilt, which seems to assert a power— fictional though it may often 
he— to rectify the "wrong."
In some cases, the shame ’fixation" may be at a stage of 
relatively positive, benign ego-developaent. The young child may 
have identified with the nurturing, generally satisfying image of
•^Albert Schweitzer, Memoirs of Childhood and Youth, trans. 
by C. T. Campion (London, Allen and Unwin, 1924), for example, at 
pp. kl, hk.
2cf. John Masefield, The Everlasting Mercy (Jhne, 1911):
Saul Kane says after his encounter with MrsT haggard:
. This old mother Bade me see 
The harm I done by being me."
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hit environment, the "good objects.” His failure, whether by a fear­
ful refusal or by want of opportunity, to introject a more threaten­
ing image, means that he has halted, in the process of identification, 
before having to make an acute acknowledgement of any psychic separa­
tion frees the parental, nurturing, social environment. Hence, he goes 
through life trying not to appear to that environment as the bad, un­
worthy, kind of thing that should be abandoned, cut off from the land 
of the living. His defenses against this fear may include hostile 
attacks vhich are awkward cries for help, for continued nurture and 
sustaining love. Here Suttie seems especially perceptive in his 
derivation of rage from the intolerable fear of separation and 
abandonment. Horney, among others, posits the interaction of an­
xiety and hostility. The shame-driven individual may range in 
personality type from the "socio-path”1 to the self-effacing, altru­
istic angel of mercy in our society. Shame, like guilt feeling, 
cannot be the end of our research into the subjective dimension of 
”sin and evil.” Other factors determine their genesis. However 
these forces work in concert with the dynamism of chsme, the feel­
ing of inferiority and unvorthinees.
As he nears utter despair, the shame-driven, in hie protests 
against abandonment and fatal separation, may become bitter, antagon­
istic, rageful in his actions and in his verbalizations. He seems 
to be saying to the whole world: "You have no right to abandon me.
I am worth something. I will not let you abandon me. I will make 
you hold me/’ Since he has not developed the faculty of relatively
*-A term, which is used by some social psychologists.
nature "guilt feeling, " 1 vhlch la closer to the "adult" attitude, 
he cannot do what society expects of him and he genuinely repentant.
Oullt feeling presupposes relationship, reciprocal love, and the 
specific fear of separation by what one does rather than by what one
is.
Shame feeling also reflects an early experience of love, but 
it harks back to earlier childhood. Hence the love is less ego­
conscious.
We are tempted to Introduce here some of the more publi­
cised criminal cases of the present time. One example suggests a 
shame-driven mentality, despite the frequent use in news stories of 
the adjectives: "egotistical," "arrogant" and "self-centered" in
describing the criminal.2 From our understanding of the facts in 
his case, he could be spared capital punishment by a personal plea 
for clemency. For several years now he has refused to use this com­
paratively simple device. He has chosen rather to attack his rather 
monolithic image of society. In this long maneuver against the sen­
tence of death he has performed an almost unbelievable feat in becoming 
highly skilled in the knowledge and use of legal procedure. Without
S^orae psychotherapists have described the social deviant as 
having a "Swiss cheese" type superego, that is, a conscience (unconscious 
conscience?) with lacunae.
2since the writing of this paragraph, the Caryl Chessman case 
has reached its tragic denouement (May 2, in San Quentin Prison, in 
California, after the Supreme Court of that state rejected in a vote 
of four to three, his last appeal to it). Actually Chessman's many 
attempts to escape the death penalty apparently never included any 
hint of penitence” or personal appeal for "mercy." The tragedy
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presuming to judge his case for him and for society, and without pre­
siding to he able to analyse him through the news accounts, by any 
of the techniques represented in the theories we have been reviewing 
here, we can at least see in his situation the suggestion that shame 
feelings nay work deep within the unconscious, deeper in the psyche 
than specifically "guilt feelings•” Distrust of life and of others 
works on a deeper level still.
Speaking of the difference between the "guilt-driven” and 
the "shame-driven" neurotic individual, Dr. Gerhart Piers, in a 
careful study of the problem, says, "Guilt-engendered activity is 
at best restitution (sacrlfloe, propitiation, atonement) which rarely 
frees, but brings with it resentment and frustration rage which in 
turn feed new guilt into the system." He contrasts with this, shame- 
engendered activity.
which was dramatised so throughout the world can hardly be regarded as 
unambiguous. We allude to the case here not to discuss the issue of 
capital punishment, nor even the shortcomings of a judicial system 
that could have allowed twelve years to transpire— admittedly on the 
prisoner's own initiative— before execution of so lethal a sentence. 
The man Chessman is representative of the failure of love, finally 
of society's love* he was rejected— officially, fatally— as a "bad 
object." The slang expression, actually heard in some of the lay 
discussions of his case, west "He Is a bad egg." Society— indeed, 
the individual in inter-personal relations— does tend to discard 
so-called "bad eggs."
The present chapter argues that social deviates are not 
worthless though, deep within themselves, they feel that they are; 
in a psychologically profound sense, they are no more sinful—  
guilty— than the society that condemns them. (They have what psycho­
analysts call "character disorders'); and Christian theology, in its 
genius, especially in the light of depth psychology, sees then as 
victims (although agents as well) of the denonlc" (in Tillich's 
sense of the tern).
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The shaase-driven individual has better potentialities as to 
Maturation and progress* His primary Identifications may be 
healthier to start vlth, his later identifications nay permit 
him to proceed from the original images to siblings, peers, and 
broader aspects of the social environment* If his ambitious 
drive is coupled vlth creativeness, it may actually lead to a 
spontaneous curing of the original narcissistic wound. The 
guilt-ridden person introjeets and expels ("extrojects" )j the 
shame-driven identifies and compares* Whereas the shame-driven 
might be propelled beyond his natural limitations and break, 
the guilt-ridden as a rule vill not even reach his potential­
ities. 1
Such a comparison represents the kind of distinctions vhlch 
today's Freudians are seeking in their study of the ego. The ’shame 
type ' individual is marked more by the pre- 1 identity crisis situation," 
vlth possibly less of an identity (Oedlpal?) problem than the £ guilt 
type*" Adlerian man, if forced into this frame of reference, is 
"shame driven." However, he represents a competition-oriented cul­
ture* Indeed Milton Singer suggests that so-called shame" type 
cultures can be as industrious as so-called "guilt" cultures*2
It Is one thing to be shamed out of existence, shamed out 
of authentic selfhood and individuation, shamed out of the possi­
bility of constructive initiative, and quite another to be forced 
to recognize the fiction in striving for superiority (Adler)* Depth 
psychologists seem to be agreed that as a matter of fact almost
^Gerhart Piers and Milton Singer, Shame and Guilt (Spring­
field, Illinois, Charles C. Thomas, 1953)/ P* 28•
^Perhaps Max Weber's thesis (res "The Protestant Ethic") can 
bear sons re-study in the light of recent studies of shame and guilt, 
notably this one, which in many respects, Is pioneering, especially 
in insisting on a distinction— often glossed over— between guilt 
and shame. Cf. Ibid., pp. 76-79*
See Helen Merrell lynd, On Shame and the Search for Identity 
(Nev York, Harcourt, Brace, 195877 and passim"! She calls
attention to this distinction made by Piers (also by Franz Alexander)—
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everyone does retain some sense of shame. As we have seen, it may 
be present even in those vho hare little sense of gnilt. By reaction 
formation and compensation the shame-driven may ply an oppressive 
fiction of glory and superiority* This may accentuate his tragedy 
and society's. In some cases the fiction may mitigate the tragedy, 
but rarely without some risk to society’s health*
Erlkson tries to take us all the way back to the crisis of 
early infancy in the story of Martin Luther. His saving faith was 
possible, Erlkson surmises, because he retained a basic pattern of 
trust established during the earliest stage of development. This 
vas before either the predominantly shame-producing or the predomi­
nantly guilt-producing events of later infancy and early childhood. 
Nevertheless the man Luther seems to have made his way to some de­
gree past the bogs of shame and guilt. According to Erlkson, he
which seems to be obscured by the definitions of Freud, Ruth Benedict, 
and othersj viz., "Shame occurs when a goal « . . .  is not being 
reached.* "Guilt anxiety accompanies transgression! shame, failure.M 
(Piers and Singer, oj>. cit., p. 11, quoted by I^nd, at p. 22).
The older clinical and anthropological use of the concept of 
shame in contrast to guilt stressed the external cause of shame and 
the internal dimension o f guilt. Piers rightlyInsists that shame 
is also essentially internalistic• Thus, ve are all the more Inclined 
to see in Alfred Adler's corrective an implicit awareness of the error 
in the Freudian distinctions. Shame is felt not simply because one's 
nakedness is being viewed— or may be viewed— with scorn, not simply 
because one is being subjected to ridicule, but because an inner 
identification, a goal is threatened. Erik Erlkson seems to be 
employing the same corrective vhen he stresses the conflict between 
initiative and shame (and doubt) in the so-called anal stage of 
libido-cathexes (psychogenesis).— supra, Chapter Four. Yet the 
distinction is by no means clear, even in Erlkson. Cf. Young Man 
Luther, p. 256.
never arrived at that inner serenity vhich characterizes integra­
tion of the conflicting forces within. But there was an abiding 
trust in the smiling mother-image.1 Of course ve cannot validate a 
psychoanalytic study of Luther. However we can appreciate its lucid 
expression of the growing faith among psychoanalysts in the possibil­
ity open to mankind via patterns of basic trust. 2 Man may yet mature 
to meet the awful challenge of his situation. Depth psychologists, 
as veil as theologians, seek for the struggling self-within-the 
morass-of-mind a foothold;
Theologians vill not settle for a reductionists by means of 
any kind of psychology or psychologizing, of the religious truth to 
which they are committed. They are on firm ground when they define 
truth as trustworthiness— the Hew Testament ’alethela. They do not 
have to say that the ' God’ of Martin Luther was in the end his smil­
ing mother-image, but they can see in such a suggestion at least the 
challenge to the institutions and associations of religion to im­
plement their gospel by taking care to be the agents of trust- 
instilling love, to reverse over-shaming tendencies in any who 
perhaps unwittingly allow themselves to be those "by whom offenses
^"I have implied that the original faith which Luther tried 
to restore goes back to the basic trust of early infancy. In doing 
so I have not, I believe, diminished the wonder of vhat Luther calls 
God’s disguise. If I assume that it is the smiling face and the 
guiding voice of infantile parent images vhich religion projects onto 
the benevolent sky, I have no apologies to render to an age vhich 
thinks of painting the moon red. Peace comes from the inner space. '1 
— Erikson, Young Man Luther, pp. 265-66.
^Perhaps new cogency is being given to the Christian under­
standing of faith as trust.
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cone," and to provide graciously for responsible, realistic identic 
fication, intimacy, generativity, and integration.
The shame-driven is propelled by a sense of unvorthiness, 
which is suppressed only as he loses himself in his ego-ideal.
Hence his object relationship may in some cases well be more posi­
tive in the sense which Dr. Piers suggests. He looks to his ideal 
rather than to his impoverished ego for his sense of value. Much 
then depends on the nature and content of the ideal.
In contrast, the guilt-driven is more inner-dlrected. His 
troubles are due to his having gotten his own way as it were despite 
the disapproval and threats of his environment. Ihe young Oedipus, 
for instance, has pitted himself against his father-image for the 
possession of the mother-image. In the process he feels as though 
he has lost the "good father' and Is pursued ever by the "bad father." 
He is a marked lad. He is Impelled to restore relationship with his 
father, to enjoy the "grace" of being with the "good father." He 
must appease the offended father. According to Freud, he does this 
by "incorporating" him, by identifying with the threatening father 
in his real or supposed ire at him his Jealous son. But, In phan­
tasy at least, like Jacob, he has already stolen Essau's birthright. 
Incidentally, the Freudians have not overlooked this Biblical analogue. 
Essau is treated as a father-figure in conflict over the mother. 1 
In Suttie's spirit, we can make the appropriate criticism and
-^Theodore Reik, "Ifce Wrestling of Jacob, ” Dogma and Compulsion, 
pp. 229-251# especially pp. 2U5-2U6.
suggest that here again despite its obviousness is an expression of 
sibling- or Cain-jealousy.
The "guilty" one has asserted himself* He has tried to 
force the outside vorld to conform to his values* Since he "loves" 
that society and feels beholden to it, vhen he sees that his bold 
assertion has backfired, he tries to make amends. Life vae better 
on the other side of the offense* But the true self spoke first*
The social self speaks out later, as guilt feeling*
By contrast, "Enoch walked vith God"! Does he represent 
the more healthy among the shame-driven, whose shame has been 
fostered by a benign, instead of an evil, influence?1 Such a shame- 
driven person early recognises his own Inadequacy and seeks his 
values from the outsIda-egog as it were* His selfhood derives from 
what he early perceives in significant others about him.3 In Freud­
ian terms, he can best continue with "mother" if he never yields to 
the temptation to vie with "father," but chooses rather to walk with 
him always as a son*
Taking the insights of the many schools together, we con­
clude that the dynamism of shame should be distinguished from that
^Genesis 5 Perhaps Enoch is more a symbol of the 
triumph of trustfulness.
Sigmund Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of 
the Ego, along with William MacDougal's criticism of it; Psycho­
Analysis and Social Psychology (London, Methuen, 1936).




°f guilt. Regardless of how repressed or disguised it may be, a 
pervasive sense of being inferior or worthless is due to an early 
internalization of privation and rejection, which operates as self­
degradation and self-rejection. It is fought to a truce, charac­
teristically, by a style of life which assumes the opposite, superi­
ority and glory, or else loses the "self" in some other "self," 
ideal, or cause. Quilt, on the other hand, is an awareness of 
having offended against a relationship of reciprocal love, with 
the consequent danger of retaliation in kind. It operates as a 
compulsion to reconstitute the situation as it was before the of­
fense, to undo the wrong, to make restitution. The characteristic 
fear of shame is of being abandoned. The characteristic fear of 
guilt is of being mutilated— it is a more melodramatic view of 
abandonment perhaps; at least this is the picture which the 
Freudians draw for us. Both shame and guilt as conscious emotions 
seem to presuppose at least a rudimentary experience of love as 
reciprocal trustfulness.
CHAPTER SEVEN
WHAT IS HIS GUILT? Ill THE COMPLICATIONS CP ANXIETY
In guilt feeling, vith its ”1 an sorry I did that) I oust 
sake restitution:" anxiety is present vith its "Something disastrous 
nay happen!" Guilt says, "Disaster awaits if I do not make restitu­
tion." Shame says, "Disaster awaits if I assert myself as worthy in 
and of nyself alone." The ego or the self of self-awareness feels 
that it cannot endure the consequences. Guilt predicts nutilation 
as well as separation. Shame predicts abandonment, "being cast into 
hell." Beth are forms of separation anxiety. Both may be present, 
as in the commonplace illustration of guilt feeling with which we 
began the opening chapter on the nature of guilt. 1 The father's 
painful "conscience" over the treatment of his small son, Included, 
no doubt, feelings of unvorthlness• Indeed, it is fair to say that 
guilt feelings contain some degree of shame, whereas shame feelings 
may not always be accompanied by that sense of responsibility and 
compulsion to make restitution vhlch characterise guilt.
Psychoanalysts generally acknowledge non-neurotic anxiety, 




ve shall review their varying use of the term before ve examine the 
implications for theology.
In A General Introduction to Psychoanalysist his first series 
of published introductory lectures, Freud says:
We believe ve know vhat this early impression is which is 
produced as a repetition in the anxiety affect. We think it 
is the experience of birth— »an experience vhich involves just 
such a concatenation of painful feelings, of discharges of 
excitation, and of bodily sensations, as to have become a pro* 
totype for all occasions an vhich life is endangered, ever 
after to be reproduced again in us as the dread or 'anxiety' 
conditions. The name Angst • • • .--angustiae, £nge, a narrow 
place, a strait— accentuates the characteristic tightening in 
the breathing which vas then the consequence of a real situa­
tion and is subsequently repeated almost invariably with an 
affect. It is very suggestive too that the first anxiety 
state arose on the occasion of the separation from the mother.
We naturally believe that the disposition to reproduce this 
first anxiety condition has become so deeply ingrained in the 
organism, through countless generations, that no single indi­
vidual can escape the anxiety affect.^
To Freud, at the time of his first Introductory Lectures, 
normal anxiety Is the affect commonly called fear which one has 
vhen acutely avare of danger. The prototype for the physical re­
sponse is the affect which the infant has as he is born, experiencing 
the painful separation from the mother. Neurotic anxiety is "expec­
tant dread," without an appropriate conscious danger situation.
Increasingly, Freud stressed that the ego is the place of 
fears. 2 It develops in the Interest of life-preservation and is
A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis (Permabooks edi­
tion), p.~U04. C^. New Yntroductory lectures, pp. 121 ff.
2See Sigmund Freud, "Female Sexuality” (1931), Collected 
Papers, V, pp. 25^, 266. Cf. C. G. Jung, Modern Man in~Search of a 
Soul, p. 123 (in the essay on "Freud or Jung'1), where Jong agrees 
vith Frend that the ego is the place of fears.
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governed by the reality principle, the natural cause for what ve 
call reason. The ego ia the place not only of fears, but of "reason­
ableness," created, ve recall, from the Interaction of organiamic 
striving vith a rewarding-punishing milieu.
Although Freud was critical of Rank's constructions upon 
the birth trauma, he sav in it the prototype for both normal and 
neurotic anxiety. Although the general disposition is phylogeneti- 
cally determined, specific anxieties are learned. The cardinal 
'learned anxiety" for Freud vas castration fear or fear of mutila­
tion. The learned anxiety vhich causes a psychosis may be some 
over-powering "pre-castration" fear: if during the oral phase,
possibly the fear of being eaten or of being left to starvei if 
during the later infancy phase, possibly the fear of being flushed 
down the drain as nothing but a despised object. Melanie Klein 
seems to be true to the Freudian logic when she describes basic 
anxiety as the fear of extinction (by being eaten, smashed, torn to 
pieces, split up, and so forth), especially since she elaborates 
the theory vith the benefit of Freud's theory of a primary death 
instinct, vhich was formulated after his first Introductory Lectures. 1
The fear of expulsion or abandonment is also a fear that 
precedes the childhood, Oedlpal-fe&r which focuses on the threat
•4>ee discussions cited under notes, supra, this chapter.
Also, Melanie Klein, in works cited: e. g., v,6n the Theory of
Anxiety and GuilV' Developments in Psycho-Analysis, pp. 276, 278-9; 
pie Psycho-Analysis of Children,“ pp. io^-lBf, lo$, 193; Early 
Development of Conscience in the Child,H Psychoanalysis Today, Sandor 
Lorand, ed., pp.
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of mutilation. Mutilation fear, rejection fear, the tense of In­
feriority , privation awareness, and extinction fear may all be 
derived from separation anxiety. Neurotic anxiety is fear of muti­
lation. It Is typically Oedlpal fear, with perhaps complementary 
fears of being discarded. At times, in reading Freud, one feels 
that he is really saying that Oedlpal fear is actually all the 
former fears rolled into one. Ne stresses that the ego can appre­
ciate a state of separation as well as a suffering of pain. It 
cannot be genuinely occupied vlth a fear of death as such, because it 
has never experienced it. It has experienced pain and separation.
Hence Freud prefers these foci for anxiety. Neurotic anxiety was 
at some time a real fear of a specific danger. This traumatic fear 
has continued to be active within the unconscious.
Freud did not have simply one use for the term anxiety. He 
came to speak of it as a warning or signalling mechanism in the ego- 
dynamlsm which helps it mobilise resistance. Thus, one feels anxious- 
restless, fearful— when the outside world, perhaps even as represented 
by the psychotherapist, seems to be making some demand on the ego 
which it is not accustomed to facing head-on. A person feels anxious 
when repressed drives press back against the ego, threatening to 
overthrow its control. These Insurgent forces may be allied ld-and 
superego-organised energy. The ego serves the psyche in the face 
of outside reality. It continues its struggle in order to try when 
possible to satisfy the inner demands. Like politics, the ego’s 
practice is the art of the possible."
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Freud, whose insights seen at times to come close to found­
ering on the Oedipus complex upon vhich he Insists, teaches that 
castration fear develops into fear of conscience. The ego that has 
navigated safely between the Seylla of shame and the Charybdls of 
Oedipus guilt, fears the anger, punishment and loss of love which 
are continually threatened by his own Uber-iohj the superego.*
Does repression create anxiety, or does anxiety Itself do 
the repressing? Freud changed his mind about the role of anxiety 
in repression. He came to feel that anxiety creates the repres­
sion, in the service of the ego.^
.. ^Perhaps, again, we should take care to distinguish Freud's
Uber-ich from other conceptions: For instance, the I_ that transcends
itself, in Relnhold Niebuhr's thinking, is an over-lj yet it is quite 
different in concept from the superego in Freud--Supra, Chapter Two.
Neither is Freud’s superego equivalent to the "self” as 
defined in Pereival M. Syzncnds Ths Ego and the Self (Hew York,
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951)- See the review by Hyman S. Llppman 
in The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, XXI, 1952, PP* 56^-6. Freud's 
I-over-I is ^uneonsclousu and hostile to the ogo. Nevertheless, we 
have seen hov the Freudians have tended to keep his earlier concept 
of ego-ideal" along side the later, sadistic superego. Perhaps 
the ,JselfM wkich Symonds describes, the transcending I which Niebuhr 
describes, and the conscience (transcendent) as described by Tillich 
and Donald Baillie— Infra Chapter Fourteen— can be correlated better 
with the Freudian conception of ogo-Ideal. Yet, in our opinion, 
there is no single Freudian concept which approaches an adequate 
accounting of this phenomenon, viz., the-self-transcending-itself.
Our discussion, however brief, lakes this into account in the Con­
clusion, infra, Chapter Fourteen.
%Tte discussion in Ernest Jones' biography is helpful as 
we try to follow the "vicissitudes” of Freud's theories of anxiety. 
Jones, Life and Vork of Sigmund Freud, III, pp. 25^-257.
Dr. Charles Brenner suggests what he calls a "minor revision" 
of the theory of anxiety offered in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety 
(Freud's final stance with regard to ■bhe subject):
(l) Anxiety is an emotion (affect) vhich the anticipation 
of danger evokes in the ego. (2) Anxiety as such is not present
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Rollc May, in his study of The Moaning of Anxiety, sees 
as especially important in Freud’s views on anxiety the emphasis 
on tho child's fear of the loss of the mother and her love, by 
separation.1
To Alfred Adler, anxiety had at least two meanings. As 
the Ansbachers say, Adler's use of the term was usually in describ­
ing a conscious symptom, such as a phobia. He could also speak 
of anxiety as a device, or means, for gaining power over others.
An example is a wife’s sudden ’anxiety neurosis" by which she
pgained control over the activities of her husband."* Adler taught
from birth or early infancy. In such very early periods the in­
fant is aware only of pleasure or unpleasure as far as emotions 
are concerned. (3) As experience Increases, and other ego func­
tions develop (e. g. memory, sensory perception), the child 
becomes able to predict or anticipate that a state of unpleasure 
(traumatic situation) will develop. The dawning ability of the 
child to react to danger in advance is the beginning of the spe­
cific emotion of anxiety, which in the course of further develop­
ment ve may suppose to become increasingly sharply differentiated 
from other unpleasant emotions."— Charles Brenner, "An Addendum 
to Freud’s Theory of Anxiety," adapted from a paper read before 
the New York Psychoanalytic Society, Nov. 28, 1950, The Interna­
tional Journal of Poycho-Analysis, XXXIV (1953)> ParE I, pp. IB-2k, 
at pp. “
iRollo May, The Meaning of Anxiety (New York, Ronald Press, 
1950), pp. 112-127•
2$y her ' anxiety neurosis” she succeeded in hindering her 
husband's business and gaining his greater attention to herself. 
Adler goes on to say, strangely enough, "But she paid for this 
success by very painful anxieties, so much so that her husband 
had been able to persuade her to come and see me." The italics 
(underlining) are ours.— Problems of Neurosis; a Book of Case- 
Histories (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner,*~1929 J, p. i$k, 
quoted in Adler— Ansbacher and Ansbacher, oj>. cit., p. 30^ .
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that fearfulness could be overcome "solely by that bond which binds 
the individual to humanity* Only that individual can go through 
life without anxiety who is conscious of belonging to the fellowship 
of man. " 1
Freud occasionally spoke of the feeling of helplessness. 2 
Adler spoke of the feeling of "not being able/ relating it to 
a n x i e t y * 3  Freud's anxiety was a dynamism which defended the ego 
against this feeling of helplessness.
C* 0. Jung sees anxiety as basically the conscious ego's 
reaction to the invasion of the conscious mind by irrational forces 
and archetypal images with which it is not prepared to cope. Jong 
criticizes Freud for stopping at the question of Nicodemus. The
Understand 1 ng Human Nat lire, p. 238, quoted by May in The 
Meaning of Anxieiy, pT iJ4.
2As for instance, in Inhibitions, Symptom and Anxiety, where 
he elaborates the distinction 'between the helplessness and the vague 
fear— or anxiety, which serves as a warning to protect oneself against 
the fall into helplessness (via trauma). See Jones' discussion, Ihe 
Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, III, pp. 2 5 5 - 6 .
3Adler, who taught "the dynamic unity of mental disorders" 
(which is the title to a chapter in the Ansbachers' book), said that 
the compulsion neurotic is really trying to protect himself from 
anxiety (i) because he "has a feeling of insecurity and inadequacy, 
a feeling of 'not being able.'"— Compulsion Neurosis (1931)# Inter­
national Journal of Individual Psychology, II, h (1936), pp. 3-10# 
quoted in Adler— Ansbacher and Ansbacher, ©£. cit., p. 305*
**C. G. Jung. Modern Man in Search of a Soul (in the essay 
on "Freud and Jung"), pp. 122-1257
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resolution of anxiety Is In a kind of nev birth, by vhlch Jung means 
the reconciliation of the conscious vlth the unconscious vorld, a 
never-ending process of Integration, of dynamic selfhood In vhlch 
it is nevertheless possible to make great, transformational, prog­
ress. *
Karen Horney posits as a ’’basic anxiety" vhlch underlies . . 
neurosis and other emotional disturbance, the fear of separation, 
caused by the experience of "rejection." She distinguishes this,
-^ See also Rollo May's discussion of Jung on anxiety.
Anxiety Is the ego's "fear of the dominants of the collective un­
conscious." It Is the Individual's reaction to the invasion of his 
conscious mind by irrational forces and images from the collective 
unconscious, says May, relying on Goodvln Watson's formulation of 
Jung's concepts. — May, The Meaning, pp. 136-7*
See for example, Jhng's entire discussion of western relig­
ious ritual (specifically, the Mass): "The Sequence of the Transfor­
mation Rite," Psychology and Religion; West and Ea3t (BollIngen 
Series XX, 1958), pp. 208-296, especially under ftie Psychological 
Meaning of Sacrifice" (pp. 252-273)— also to be contrasted vlth 
Freud's treatment of the sacrifice in Totem and Taboo (supra,
Chapter Five). Anxiety Is not the explicit themed She ego Is to 
the self as the "moved” is to the "mover" (p. 259 )> as the son 
(Isaac) to the father (Abraham). Cf. S^ren Kierkegaard's Fear 
and Trembling, vhlch deals vlth the theme of the near-sacrtFTce of 
Isaac, but from a different angle, though Implicitly not so dif­
ferent from Jung's use of the story perhaps! In religious sac­
rifice, the self sacrifices the ego to the larger reality! Jung, 
ibid., (pp. 261 ff.).
Hov does Jung mean "ego"? The following quotation illus­
trates his usage: "It is the self that causes me to make the
sacrifice, nay, more, It compels me to make it (p. 26l). It is 
because Jung cites "Abraham's sacrifice of his son and "Christ's 
decision In Gethsemane" that angst seems to us an implicit theme.
It Is more explicit in Jung's "Psychological Casmentary on 
’The Tibetan Book of the Dead," Jung, ibid., p. 521, vhere Jung says, 
"Fear of self-sacrifice lurks deep in every ego, and this fear is 
often only the precariously controlled demand of the unconscious 
forces to burst out in full strength."
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however, from angst der iCreatur, one's natural" dread before the 
obvious pover and mystery of nature and the other. The situation 
of "normal anxiety" is helplessness, or utter dependence, together 
with the awareness of the danger of being removed from that upon 
which one depends. The implication therefore seems to be that 
even the non-neurotic anxieties are basically separation anxiety.1
The basic anxiety which underlies neurosis, however, is in 
its incipiency a vound to the spirit of the young child. It is not
1 Karen Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, pp• 9^-95• 
Cf. Schlelermacher's emphasis on faith as absolute dependence.
Cf. also Paul Tillich's three classifications of anxiety in 
The Courage to Be (pp. 32-63, and throughout). His analysis of the 
subject has ISeen applied to therapy.— Hanna Colm, "Healing As 
Participation," Psychiatry, XVI (1953)# PP* 99-1H and R* D* Lalng,
"An Examination of Tillich's Theory of Anxiety and Neurosis,"
British Journal of Medical Psychology, XXX, Part 2, pp. 88-91*
Laing says, for instance, that in clinical terms, the threat of 
annihilation Is closest to the "threat of non-being' (Tillich).
— at p. 89*
Mary Frances Thelen cosmandi Reinhold Niebuhr's insight that 
anxiety is the temptation" to sin, as "the most significant advance 
in the doctrine of sin in his Gifford Lectures. But he is mistaken 
in contrasting his view too categorically with that of Horney (Man 
As 8inner, p. 183). The same may be said of Tillich's perhaps too 
hasty dismissal of Homey's "basic anxiety" as not "basic."— our 
reference here is to colloquium discussions with Professor Tillich. 
Though he has a high regard for Dr. Homey's work (ho was a personal 
friend; he conducted her funeral, 1952), he regards her definitions 
of anxiety as failing to distinguish properly between "norsal 
("existential") and "neurotic" anxiety. Niebuhr's complaint was 
that her formulation limited anxiety to a sociological causality 
and significance. Actually, at least according to our reading of 
her works, and, apparently, also according to Dr. Thelen*s, Homey'e 
appreciation of anxiety is deeper, broader, and more complete than 
these distinguished critics seem to allow. (The references in 
Niebuhr are: The Nature and Destiny of Msn, Vol. I, pp. n. and
192. These, in the light of her writings even to that date, 1939# 
seem indeed to be rather glaring misconstructions of her over-all 
meaning).
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a once-and-for-all experience, but a pattern, which is shaped in 
early childhood. This basic anxiety is repressed. MThe more 
unbearable the anxiety the more thorough the protective means have 
to be."*- Horney*s views on this seers consonant with those of the 
•go-psychologists among contemporary Freudians. The threat to the 
ego's defences is the underlying anxiety and basie hostility which 
it generates.2
As we have seen, the trauma is rejection. Hence the basic 
anxiety coincides with a feeling that the world is hostile. We see 
here a view which correlates reasonably well with the teaching of 
the ®go-psychologists, as represented by Erik Erikson. The first 
stage or crisis of infancy determines the pattern of trust-mlstrust. 
We find the same insight elaborated by Melanie Klein, in her own 
distinct way. The question is not: "To be or not to be?” but
"To trust or not to trust? Is the world basically trustworthy or 
untrustworthy?” The basic anxiety which pervades any neurosis is 
the traumatlcally Induced fear that the world is hostile. It amounts 
to a conviction that it is. Yet, at the same time, it is a frantic
denial.3
Horney recognizes the drive for superiority which Adler makes 
the dynamism for all neurosis. But she sees it as one of two domin­
ant patterns, the other being the craving for affection. Indeed, 
the underlying drive is for affection, even when the pattern has
■^Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, p. 93*
2Ibld., p. 96. 3ibid., p. 89*
developed far away from any apparent concern for It* We recall 
Suttie'e reduction of the problem to the desire for affection and 
love• ^ for Horney, the basic anxiety asks: "An I loved?" It does
not begin as for Adlerf with the convictions "I am deficient." The 
sequence of convictions is, rathert "I an not loved) therefore I Mat 
be deficientThen it has no difficulty in finding foci for lta 
feeling of re jectlon-ergo-def latency. The neurotic la like a drowning 
man la hla preoccupation with being m &  acceptable self. Thi» preoc­
cupation, along with the dammed-up hostility, accounts for the neurotic's 
characteristic "disregard of the other's personality, peculiarities, 
limitations, needs, wishes, developments• J Because of his own de­
ficiency of love he cannot love hla neighbor as he loves himself.
He hates himself, blaming it for the primal rejection and cumulative 
pattern of rejection vhlch its very aspect seemed to invite. He 
seeks for himself and for the view of others another "face," a good­
ness which he can never find. He Is hard cm himself) he is hard on 
others.
Melanie Klein believes that a child a an be helped to overcome 
his fear of being destroyed. What she recosamnds is a kind of love—
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*Tbld., pp. 95-100, 105.
p  .V • .^Suttie, op. sit*, especially at p. h9. Suttie says, Instead 
of seeking other peoples’ love for the sake of the power It confers 
upon us of getting them to do things for us . . . .  it often comes to 
be the other way about. We get them to do things, perhaps needless 
things, for us in order to be assured of their love." Suttie’S cor­
rective here to Adler seems no less telling than his challenge tc 
Freud's constructions*
t ; ^Horney, The Neurotic Personality . . . .pp. 110 f.
'agape (?)— therapy. As she puts it, the child's instincts can be 
placed under the sway of his life-and-love instincts by the environ­
ment's tipping the scales in favor of then in their battle with the 
"death instincts." Horney distinguishes "norslal, frcei "neurotic, 
but her writings leave one guessing as to whether there can be any 
qualitative distinction. In Klein's system there is no such problem. 
Since patterns of trust and mistrust are woven by a dynamic interplay 
between the organism and the milieu, hostility seems to come from 
within the psyche Itself, though of course it may be vitiated by too 
much outside hostility.1 The infant is bom "with a chip on the 
shoulder," so to speak. But he also wears a smile. Perhaps Klein's 
view blends with the idea of angst der Kreatur. At least, this seems 
to be what she is elaborating, not exclusively abnormal" anxiety.
The Infant cernes into the world crying for oxygen. He needs 
warmth, like that in the womb. As he develops, each area of his 
appetite needs satisfaction, including the natural drive to exercise 
himself against (l. e., the "death instincts"); he meets negation, 
hence "evil." Anxiety is the fear of the bad external and
•^ It seems true that Melanie Klein, like Freud, tends to reify 
emotions•
Ihe analysis of small children between two-and-a-half and 
five years clearly shows that for all children in the beginning ex­
ternal reality is mainly a mirror of the child's own instinctual 
life . . . .  If . . . .  I were asked to give in a few words a valid 
generalisation for the psychoses, I would say that the main groupings 
correspond to defences against the main developmental phases of 
sadism.”— "®ie Psychotherapy of the Psychoses" (1930), reprinted in 
Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, pp. 251-253* at p. 251. See also 
"the Oedipus Complex In the Light of Early Anxieties" (19^5), ibid., 
pp. 339-390) and works cited previously.
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internalized "objects." Hostility is both the exercising against 
"objects" and the projection of anxiety.1
It is interesting to note that Klein Bakes the life forces 
dominant. She offers a corrective to the easily pessimistic tendency
oof the death Instinct theory, she adopted from Freud. Freud's idea
1See works by Melanie Klein, cited earlier.
Also, see the discussions on anxiety by a student of Fair* 
bairn's. Dr. Henry Guntrip: Psychotherapy and Religion (New York,
Harper, 1957), Part I - "Anxieiy, * pp. I7-8ST" TTTeflecta the influ— 
ence of both Dr. Falrbairn and Melanie Klein, along vith others. The 
study shows a knowledge and understanding of a vast literature on the 
subject of anxiety, together with the author's ovn clinical experience 
and insight. The over-all description which Dr. Guntrip gives for 
’The Nature and Origin of Anxiety: Needs and Fears" seems to support
the reconstruction ve offer here. Of course, like Falrbairn, he 
places the emphasis on the object-ego encounter, rather than "personi­
fied" instincts (Melanie Klein).
^See, for instance, Melanie Klein, "On Theory of Anxiety and 
Guilt," Developments in Psychology, pp. 271-291. She says that "the 
death instinct (destruction impulses) is the primary factor in the 
causation of anxiety." There is continual interaction between "libido" 
and "aggression." Healthy weaning and education results in mitigation 
of aggression (thanatos). "Anxiety arising from the perpetual activ­
ity of the death instinct, though never eliminated, is counteracted 
and kept at bay by the poser of the life instinct" (p. 291). Never­
theless it is doubtful that one has to adopt the same view of the 
instincts (in the Freudian and Kleinian sense of the term) in order 
to derive helpful insight from Mrs. Klein's elaborations of her clin­
ical observation.
See Marjorie Brierley, Trends in Psycho-Analysis (London, 
Hogarth, 1951), where she offers critical evaluations of the work of 
Melanie Klein, and also of theories such as those of Dr. Falrbairn.
To the latter's stress on "object-seeking" libido she offers the 
corrective: "object-relation-seeking,’ (in "Psycho-Analysis and
Integrative Living," Ibid., pp. 180-293, at p. 209). Relative to 
Klein's pioneering, if not revolutionary, theories, she makes the 
following statement: "If ve cannot be bound by an Old Testament
according to Freud neither can ve profit by a Gospel of the Good 
Object." She says Klein's theories should be tested carefully, but 
appreciatively, before a final evaluation can be made. She argues 
against a dogmatic acceptance of anyone's theories. See pp. 57-89J 
our quotation Is froa p. 89.
of salvatlon-by-sublimation is reminiscent of Schopenhauer's doctrine 
of ’’contemplation" as the vay "out of," or perhaps more fairly, the 
vay "through," this existence.^
Otto Bank also rejects the logic of pessimism. He says that 
his ovn thought vas to Freud's negative voluntarism as vas Nietzsche's 
to Schopenhauer's and to that vhich Bank sees as "Old Testament" 
negative voluntarism. Bank takes care to distinguish his concept of 
vill from that of Nietszche, however.^  We recall his defining 
genuine "guilt” as ethical guilt." Bank vas dravn to an 'agape1stic 
ethic.
To Bank, the basic anxiety is modulated into two forms of 
fear, vhat he calls "death fear" and "life fear." This primal ambi­
valent fear "is derived on the one side from the experience of the 
individual as a part of the Whole, vhich is then separated from it 
and obliged to live alone (birth), on the other side, from the final 
necessity of giving up the hard von wholeness of Individuality."
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^Bee Sigmund Freud, "The Libido Theory" (Collected Papers, V, 
at pp. 132-133).
"Sublimation" of course has its limits (Sigmund Freud, A Gen­
eral Introduction to Psychoanalysis, 35^ F.» 3^*5) Nev Introductory 
Lectures, pp. ifrff-Ifoi An Outline of Psychoanalysis, pp. 31-32 and 
passim. Cf. his discussion in ,v6n"Tarcissism,: (Collected Papers, IV, 
pp. Si-2).
20tto Bank, in Truth and Beality, Will Therapy and Truth and 
Beality, trans. Jessie Ta^t^ pp. ££6-227.
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This necessity of self-loss as Individuality-loss Is death Itself. 
Unlike Freud, Rank can conoeive of a genuine fear of death.1 '’This 
universal human primal fear vhlch varies only in accordance vith 
life age and difference of sex, seems to lead to tvo different life
forms vhich are conditioned hy the manner in vhlch the individual
..2can solve this part-whole problem.
Rank's concern for individuation corresponds somewhat vlth 
Horney's for the real self. His appreciation for the fear of lndi- 
vlduatlon seems to be larger in dimension than either Adler's idea 
of basic inferiority feeling or Horney's concept of basic anxiety.
Yet her hypothesis of a neurotic displacement of the real self" by 
idealised self-images or the "ideal self" because of rejection-feeling 
seems consonant enough with Rank's doctrine of "average man" type, 
"neurotic" type, and ’’artist” type. The "average man” settles 
perhaps for a more ’’realistic” ideal self,” namely, that vhlch is 
merely reflection of the countenance of society. He surrenders his 
selfhood to his particular society. The "neurotic" tries ever fran­
tically to identify vith some impossible "ideal-self" imposed on him 
by early experience vhich denies to him both wholeness and
^Melanie Klein also conceives of a genuine "death fear,’ the 
fear of extinction. Cf. the discussion in Guntrlp, 0£. cit., p. ^1 f. 
Characteristically, Guntrlp modulates it into an instance of that 
anxiety vhich is our reaction in the face of any threat of destruction 
of the possibility of good-object relationships, either by the de­
struction of ourselves or of our love-objects and the experiencing 
of the loss of good-objects coupled vith being left at the mercy of 
inescapable bondage to persecuting bad-objects."
^Rank, Will Therapy . . . ., p. 13^ .
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individuation. The "artist" accept* the challenge of his ’real self” 
at all costs, but not without anxiety. He fears the loss of society 
and the loss of his real self. But he takes the risk and lives 
creatively, ever aware of the risk which life is, vith death inevi­
tably in the offing.
Harry Stack Sullivan, vho is noted for his relative success 
in vork vith schizophrenics, seems to have held his theories always 
close to his clinical practice. He tried to avoid too elaborate a 
metapsychology. Although Sullivan was influenced by Freud, he pur­
posely chose his ovn vocabulary. To Sullivan, anxiety Is a term 
simply denoting apprehension of danger." In neurosis it is appre­
hension of disapproval in interpersonal relations. We recall that 
to Sullivan the personality is essentially an interpersonal phenom­
enon. Anxiety arises out of the infant's apprehension of disapproval 
by "significant persons" in his interpersonal world.*"
Sullivan's special contribution to the topic of anxiety is 
his emphasis on its effect on awareness itself. Security, based 
on non-separation from the personal environment, is the driving
lnOne fears a punch in the nose, atomic bombs, the loss of 
a job in depression." One gets anxious vhen he anticipates, whether 
rightly or not, that the regard of another person vill decrease, that 
his regard and respect for you vill becosm less, or that one's ovn 
regard for oneself vill decrease. Anxiety is related to the loss of 
esteem for one by oneself or by others. — Patrick Mullahy, in "The 
Theories of Harry Stack Sullivan," The Contributions of Harry Stack 
Sullivan, edited by Mullahy "a symposium on interpersonal theory in 
psychiatry and social science" (Nev York, Hermitage House, 1952-53), 
P- 33.
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concern of the developing waking self” vlthln the self system.
The anxiety of Infancy and early childhood both shapes the "self 
of "self system," and sets the pattern for attentiveness and selec­
tive inattention.'^
The Swiss Freudian psychoanalyst and pastor, Oscar Pfister, 
vas in a unique position as clergyman and member of the International
Psychoanalytical Association. He was a close friend of Freud himself.
oPflster has made a voluminous study of Christianity and anxiety.
He brings to the study considerable knowledge of both Christian the­
ology and the psychoanalytic movement.3 Two notable differences
■^See Rollo May's discussion in The Meaning of Anxiety, at
pp. 1^9-150.
Cf. also, the highly respected work of Frieda Fromm-Reichmann 
(of the "Sullivan School )• She speaks of the "fear of psychological 
death," and correlates it with Tillich's fear of 'non-being, '1 and 
Kurt Goldstein's fear of "nothingness" (Human Mature in the Light of 
Psychopathology, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, iy4o7 'Ifoe Organ­
ism, Kev York, American Book, 1939)- —  "Psychiatric Aspects of Anxiety, " 
in Clara Thompson, et al., eds., An Outline of Psychoanalysis (New 
York, Random House,~^e"ltodern Library, 195577 PP* 113-136, at 
pp. 119-120; 123-125. Cf. also Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Principles of 
Intensive Psychotherapy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press', ±95077
20skar (Oscar) Pfiater, Das Christentum und die Angst, 19^, 
trans. Christianity and Fear by W. H.^Johnston (London, George Allen 
and Unwin, 589 pp.
3At one time he vas offered a chair in theology at the 
University of Zurich. Apparently he kept up a running debate with 
Freud regarding the nature and uses of religion (see Ernest Jones'
The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Vole. I and II, passim). Freud 
tolerated Pfisier* s role as a clergyman, but he professed not to be 
able to share his view of "the sublimation" he (Freud) called "relig­
ious." A revealing passage from their correspondence is from Freud 
to Pfister, in October 19l8j Freud first praised, then criticised 
Pfister's book, Just published, Was bletet die Psychoanalyse dem 
Eraieher? (Leipsig, 1917)*
"How, praise is always short; strictures have to take longer.
I am dissatisfied vith one point: your contradicting my sexual
vith Freud allow him to venture an original psychoanalytic theory of 
anxiety and its meaning in the history of religion and culture.
We recall that Freud at one time regarded anxiety as trans­
formed libido, or aim-inhibited erotic energy. He later chose to 
think of anxiety as though it were practically an ego-mechanism; it 
is not the repressed but the represser.1 Pflster accepts the eros- 
reality polarity and rejects the instinctual dualism of Freud, as
theory and my ethics. I grant you the latter; ethics is far from 
my interest and you are a pastor. I don't cudgel my brains much 
about good and evil, but I have not found much ''good" in the 
average human being. Most of them are in ay experience riff­
raff, vhether they loudly proclaim this or that ethical doctrine 
or none at all. That you cannot say out loud, perhaps not even 
think it, although your experience of life could hardly have 
been different from mine. If ve must speak of ethics I admit 
to having a high ideal, from vhich most people I know sadly 
deviate.— Quoted by Ernest Jones, in The Life and Work of Sigmund 
Freud, II (Appendix), p. .1*57.
Freud, in a lucid paragraph, then defends his component- 
or partial-instincts theory against any attempt (including Pfliter’s) 
to think of libido without correlating it to the "erotogenic zones." 
(pp. ^57^58).
Though Pfister replied to this and to other criticisms and 
continued to make his ovn interpretations and applications of the 
psychoanalytic doctrines, the correspondence offers good background 
for our understanding his study of anxiety vls-a-vie his mentor of 
Vienna.
^In A General Introduction (the First Introductory Lectures) 
Freud distinguished neurotic anxiety' from normal anxiety (Twenty- 
fifth Lecture, edition cited, p. U05). Anxiety is one form which 
repressed (dasBoed up) libido can take as it presses against the ego 
(p. Ul7 and passim; pp. U05-U18). ’’There is only one unconnected 
thread, only one gap in our structure, the fact, vhich after all can 
hardly be disputed, that 'objective anxiety* must be regarded as an 
expression of the ego's instinct for self-preservation.” (p. Itl8).
By the time Freud gave his Nev Introductory Lectures, over 
fifteen years later (i. e., from 1915-17 to 1933) his theory of
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did Suttie. Then, he chooses to broaden the meaning vhlch Plato gave 
the tern and vhich he finds In the Gernan word Liebe.
Pflster places the psychoanalytic concept of angst into 
context vlth the Johannine love-versus-fear theology, eptitonlsed 
in the text: There is no fear (phobos) in love (agape): the per*
feet love casteth out fearj because fear hath tornent. He vho feareth 
is not made perfect In love."1 Pflster says that the tvo chief causes 
of anxiety are (l) an interference vith wthe impulse tovard love in 
general, ” and (2) ”a sense of guilt (a special form of this inter­
ference) in particular." The offenses against humanity due to 
anxiety as it has tried to lose itself in hostility have resulted 
primarily from the damming up of "primary, moral or of religious 
love as veil as inhibitions of self-love, love of others, and love 
of God.”2
Pflster couples guilt vith love because of the dominance of 
love in the emotion of guilt. Christian love, agape, is the proper
anxiety had Indeed unraveled and changed, as ve have noted (Supra, this 
chapter). Pflster'§ treatment of the subject seems more to presuppose 
the older theory; vis., that of anxiety as transformed libido ("trans­
formed love"?).





answer to anxiety. Such love Includes reverence. It la not in the 
radical contrast suggested hy Anders Nygren in Agape and Eros.
Pfister finds Emil Brunner's Eros and Liebe more helpful to his 
thesis.1 Whatever fault there is "does not lie vith original Chris* 
tianity," he says, "but in its neuroticisation at the hands of neurotic 
Christians, vhether theologians, clerics or laymen, and in the de­
sublimation vhich occurred even vhen neuroses were absent."2 Through 
the centuries crimes in the name of Christianity, including Geneva's 
burning of Servetus, have been committed by vay of defences against 
the free flowing love dammed up by erroneous dogma about the vrath • 
of God.^ Dogmas tend to hold back love and to defeat the gospel.^
Another Freudian, Theodore Relk, has written a commentary on 
the phenomenon of dogma. According to Relk, "dogma," as rigid, 
prepositional adherence to religious symbols, is a compulsive effort 
to overcome religious doubt. "It is a reaction phenomenon, a means 
of repressing impulses of filial rebellion and revolution and a 
compromise formation for their repression and fusion with veneration
1Ibld.. pp. 515-518. 
gIbld.. pp. 57^-575•
3Ibid., pp. 210-215, 268-269, *.53-l*-5lt.
14Ibid., p. 572 and paa.la.
*and love*’ Reik’s doctrine is more consistent than Pfister*s with 
Freud's own "aetiology" of religious phenomena.
Despite the brilliance of Pfister*s work, the term angst, 
rendered fear in the English translation, does at times become 
elusive of precise definition. Generally, it seems to mean fear 
of danger, especially from within because of an erroneous conviction 
about reality. Hence the anxious ego is aware of the reality of 
neurotic hostility in the vorld and of hostility in general. It is 
governed by such "neurotic" realism. But the healthy ego should be 
aware of the reality of pervasive love— "the love of Christ" I— in the 
world and thus be governed by that reality. The ego should be free 
to allow the id (?) forces of love to express themselves even as the 
paragon of such ego-strength and outgoing love, Jesus, did. Hence 
Pfister, while using a Freudian frame of reference, speaks nonethe­
less as a liberal Christian theologian. Man is by nature good and 
genuinely loving* It is his acculturation that has made him fearful 
and hostile toward others.
Unanswered seems to remain the question: Why does society
fall short of complete freedom in allowing love to express itself? 
Freud himself "answers" the question by restricting the id energy of 
"love" to (l) desire for pleasure from objects (object-cathectlng, 
object-appropriating, even as hunger is food-consuming) and (2) that
^Theodor Reik, Dogma and Compulsion (Hew York, International 
Universities Press, 195i)TpP• 56-JtT
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detire when sometimes fused with still another dynamism at work in 
the organism, namely, 'deathfulnese," vhich destroys and exploits
n n lagainst the interests of llfefulness.
Both the somewhat Freudian Pflster and the independent theo­
rist Ian Suttie consider anxiety to be the source of hostility, as 
do Karen Homeyf and others. They see the polarity of good and evil 
in terms of love and hate. This conviction is expressed eloquently 
and somewhat cogently in Pflster•■ work on anxiety and Christianity.
Hollo May, an impressively literate psychotherapist of Hew 
York, carries his study of the meaning of anxiety also beyond the 
range of clinical concerns• To psychoanalytical evaluations of the 
phenomenon he adds those which have been made recently by cultural 
anthropologists, historians, learning theorists like 0. Hobart Movrer 
who, characteristically, places the problem of neurotic anxiety in 
its cultural and historic nexus, relating it "specifically to man*s
^Freud's description of aros seemed to veer slightly away 
from a crassly materialistic, mechanistic, hedonistic model. For 
Instance, in An Outline of Psychoanalysis, he says that its aim "is 
to establish ever greater unities anl to preserve them thus— in short, 
to bind together; "— p. 20. His having Introduced instinctual dualism 
accounts in part for the modification of his descriptions of erotic 
aims. Even before he posited his theory of the death instinct he was 
saying that hatred was prior to love, as we have seen. This destruc­
tiveness (then) was Inherent in the erotic libido. The du&llstic 
theory allowed for a fusion of the binding and destructive elements 
in instances of "love," and "hate."— Cf. 'Instincts and Their Vicis­
situdes" (1915* Collected Papers, IV, pp. 60-83), and 'The Theory 
of the Instincts (in Freud, An Outline, pp. 19-2*0.
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distinctly® problems of social responsibility and ethics, 1 and 
theologians like Paul Tillich.2
May treats of the theories of Erich Fromm, as a cultural 
interpretation of anxiety, although he is a psychoanalyst. His 
numerous writings, including Escape From Freedom, The Sane Society, 
and The Art of Loving, stress the cultural determination of anxiety. 
The distress which contemporary culture causes or tends to confirm 
is basic individual isolation, despite the many "groupish ' manifes­
tations which may seem to argue to the contrary. For Fromm, as for 
others, the "basic anxiety" is separation anxiety. Like Bank, how­
ever, he calls for courage to become individuated in responsible 
relationship.3
The Meaning of Anxiety, pp. 102-111, quot., p. 105.
Subsequently Dr. Mowrer has written with appreciation of 
Hollo May's study. See 0. Hobart Mowrer, The Problem of Anxiety,’
IV - "Fear and Anxiety, Normal and Neurotic," in his book, Learning 
Theory and Personality Dynamics (New York, The Ronald Press, 1956)7 
PP* at pp. $50-7. Significantly, Part I of this paper by
Mowrer is "A Quilt Theory of Anxiety," in which he insists that 
anxiety comes, not from acts which the individual would camsit but 
does not, but from acts which he has committed but wishes that he 
had not. It is, in other words, a "guilt theory" of anxiety rather 
than an "impulse theory" (p. 537)* Cf. J. G. McKenzie, Nervous 
Disorders and Character, pp. 76-77, where an experienced psycbologist- 
and-mlnlster says there can be no advance in psychotherapeutic theory 
until the neurotic's need for moral security and religious assurance 
is more widely recognised;
Part II of Mowrer's paper deals with "Kierkegaard on Anxiety" 
(pp. 5**0-5^ 5)» Part III treats of "Freud's 'Two Theories of Anxiety'" 
(pp. 5*^ 6-550).
^For instance, The Meaning of Anxiety, at p. 193*
3May, ibid., pp. 169-176. Cf. this statement by Fromm, "The 
awareness of human separation, without reunion by love— is the source
Agreeing with Karl Mannheim, and Abram Kardiner?* Hollo May 
asserts that the ’quantity of anxiety prevalent in the present 
period arises from the fact that the assumptions underlying modern 
culture are themselves threatened."2
May distinguishes between "normal' and "neurotic” anxiety.
Yet he defines anxiety generally as apprehension aroused by a threat 
to some value which one holds essential to his existence "as a per­
sonality." Man can live without neurotic anxiety, but not without 
normal anxiety.3
In a later book Dr. May says succinctly, "Anxiety is the 
human being's basic reaction to a danger to his existence, or to 
some value he identifies vith his existence. This statement re­
flects May's increasing interest in what is being called ’existen­
tial analysis."5
of shame. It is at the same time the source of guilt and anxiety." 
— Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving (World Perspectives, IX, New York, 
1956), p. 9- Other work- are listed infra, Bibliography.
*May, The Meaning of Anxiety, pp. 177-109. He refers to 
Kardiner's "Anxiety and Western Manx’s Psychological Growth Pattern" 
in Psychological Frontiers of Society (19^0). His reference to 
Karl Mannheir. is chiefly to hls"Han and Society in an Age of Recon­
struct ion.
^The Meaning of Anxiety, p. 188; p. 221.
3Ibid., p. 227. See also pp. 19^-7•
**Rollo May, Man’s Search for Himself (New York, Norton, 1953),
p. M).
For instance, Dr. May has helped to introduce so-called 
existential analysis to readers in the United States. See May, et al., 
eds., Existence (New York, Basic Books, 1958). ...
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This trend in depth psychology follows the pioneering work 
of the Swiss psychiatrist, Ludwig Binswanger. Although he was a 
respected member of the Freudian international association of psycho­
analysts and a close friend of Freud himself, he biased a path of 
his own. It is said that he is the only radically differing theorist 
Who could continue in the good graces of Freud.^ From their first 
acquaintance they respected each other's originality, without expect­
ing too much in the way of that type of agreement which is essentially 
compliance.
In some respects Binswanger's approach to therapy parallels 
that of others, including American theorists, notably Harry Stack 
Sullivan. However Binswanger was more in touch with currents in 
philosophy, being influenced most by the kind of philosophical exis­
tentialism propounded by Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers (who himself 
is a psychiatrist) after S^ren Kierkegaard.2
Binswanger Bpoke of the patient's Umvelt, MitweIt, and Eigen- 
velt. Later he largely replaced these categories with existential
lp>id., pp. UQ, 121 ff. (the latter reference is in III A 
Clinical Introduction to Psychiatric Phenomenology and Existential 
Analysis/1 by Hernri F. Ellenberger).
2Ibld.
An important book, expounding the existential analysts' 
approach to dream psychology is Medard Boss, Per Trams Und Seine 
Auslegung (Bern und Stuttgart, Verlag Hans Huber, l9$>3)» He acknowl­
edges his debt to Ludwig Binswanger. 'Die Moglichkelt, eln solchee 
Wagnis su unternehmen, verdanke ich der Ause inandersetsung mlt dem 
daselnsanalytischen Denken Martin Heideggers'’ (p. 8).
See also: Boss, Psychoanalyse und Daseln Analytik (Bern,
Verlag Hans Huber, 1957)*
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modes -•reflecting the existentialists’ dacein. These modes are as 
follows j (l) The dual mode, which is somewhat like Sullivan^ ’need 
for intimacy in inter-personal relations and like the intimacy need 
and concurrent intimacy crisis, stressed hy Erikson among the
Freudian ego-psychologists, and much like the I-Thou relationship 
which Buber considers as basic; (2) The plural mode, vhieh is con­
sciousness of being one among many, with resultant patterns of com- 
petiveness, and (3) Hie anonymous node, which is characterised by 
broken Identity, depersonalization trends, and the like.1
This movement in depth psychology derives from pre-Freudian 
Swiss psychiatry, Freudian psychology, as well as the philosophical 
existentialism, mentioned earlier*
Hfce ’existential anxiety,” or, as we prefer to call it in 
this paper, ’the fundamental anxiety, 2 is born of the risk of 
existing as a human being. It is more than merely analogous, per­
haps, to the derivation of the German word for it, angst, from the 
Latin word for narrowness. "Strait is the gate, and narrow is the 
way that leads to life” is still the Christian insight. Does funda­
mental anxiety bespeak the way to authentic life?
The ’existential analysts" consider the therapist's task:
(l) to investigate the entire structure of the patient's existence
■4fey et al., Existence, loc. cit.
2The term fundamental anxiety is used for two reasons:
(l) It points to the fundaaental mystery of man's existence. (2) It 
is fundamental to man as man: the anxiety that is peculiarly human.
in order to help hi® determine its basic meaning and direction;
(2) to understand the various worlds in which he lives; and (3) to 
give hi® the biographical kind of psychoanalysis, which the Freudians 
stress.1
We recall William James' analysis of the why of religious 
institutions: "The warring gods and formulas of the various religions
do indeed cancel each other, but there is a certain uniform deliver­
ance in which religions appear to meet."2 It consists of two parts: 
the problem and the solution. The problem is 'an uneasiness— a sense 
that there is something wrong about us as we naturally stand."3
This is akin to that restlessness of which Augustine spoke 
in his Confessions: "Our hearts are restless till they find their
rest in Thee.'^ It is also like the "inner world of misery" which 
Calvin described.5
Existential fear seems to be like Tillich's "fear of non­
being.' Tillich's conceptions of anxiety and courage- are influential
•^ May, et al., lac. cit.
2Williem James, The Varieties of Religious Experience,
Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, 1901-02 (New York, Random House, Modern 
Library, 1929), pp. **97-8.
3Ibld.
’Augustine, Confessions, I, 1.
3Supra, Chapter Four.
6See Tillich, The Courage to Be, and other works, including 
lectures and essays on Christianity and psychotherapy, for instance 
in Pastoral Psychology, passim; for example, "The Theological Signifi­
cance of Existentialism and Psychoanalysis," in Tillich, Theology of 
Culture, pp. 112-126.
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on psychotherapists, Including Rollo May, and others especially of 
the ’school of thought founded by Harry Stack Sullivan.
Something of "the fundamental anxiety' seems to be what 
Joseph Haroutunian, a Presbyterian theologian, is depicting when he 
says that man's awareness that he has had a beginning and will have 
an end conditions and qualifies his total existence.
I was born. I was not, and then I was. I am, but I was 
not. I am, but I shall not be. Having not been, I am; I am 
cooing to be what I was not; I am cooing not to be what I was;
I am coming not to be; 1 virtually am not. I was not, and I 
shall not be. I am as he who was not and shall not be. There­
fore, I act necessarily not as I-am-and-vas-and-ever-shall-be, 
but as I am-and-was-not-and-shall-not-be.
Rollo May, extrapolating from case studies, theorises that 
'neurotic anxiety” arises not from rejection alone, but from rejection 
in contradiction to expectations. Subjects who experienced, unmis­
takably, rejection by their parental milieu, have been known to be 
relatively free from "neurotic anxiety." Victims of this distress 
are likely to be persons who feel rejected but for some reason con­
tinue to expect to be accepted. 2
What we have called "the fundamental anxiety” born of existence 
itself has in it the element of expectation. Anxiety presupposes hope,
^Joseph Haroutunian, The Lust for Power (Hew York, Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 19*9)# PP- 50-51*
Cf. also the view of Martin Heidegger, which is a stimulus 
to so-called "existentialist theology.”
2Rollo May, Ihe Meaning of Anxiety, pp. 235-355» especially
at p. 3*3*
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even as guilt presupposes love, and shame presupposes trust.^ How­
ever, in examining these three psychological phenomena, we realise 
again that anxiety is pervasive. Shave feelings are a form which 
it takes. Guilt feelings are a form of anxiety. Guilt awareness 
is complicated by underlying shame and Mistrust.
Probably no one can do "Justice" to the fundamental anxiety 
who has not been given the grace of trustfulness. If there has been 
little or no experience of the trustworthiness necessary for the 
human infant to grow on, then it is doubtful that he can even con­
front the fundamental mystery and the anxiety which is the strait 
and narrow path toward Indlvlduated-life-ln-coenunity. He oan hardly 
develop beyond being anxious about vhat he will eat and vhat he will 
wear. Hov can he be concerned for the Kingdom of God?
In that Johannine dialogue of Jesus with Nlcodemus, vas 
Jesus not saying, "Go all the way back to birth and start over again"?2 
Certainly he was saying this in some sense. Hie Synoptics emphasise 
the requisite: Become as little children. Does not the Christian
soterlology teach that one must be established in a pattern of basic 
trust in order to be made wholeJ Does not Christology say that here 
in the Christ, and en Christo, is trustworthy love, alethela and
^Supra, Chapters Five and Six. Mrs. Lynd (after a discussion 
of Erlkson’ 8 views) says, rightly, it seems, "In shame there is a 
doubt, a questioning of trust. Shame may be said to go deeper than 
guilt: it is worse to be inferior and isolated than to be wrong, to 
be outcast in one's ovn eyes than to be condemned by society.”— Helen 
Merrell Lynd, 0£. cit., p. 207* She goes on, then, to discuss vhat she 




agape? In telling hie disciples not to be anxious about what they 
vill eat or what they will wear Jesus tells them to seek the Kingdom 
of God and simply to expect that their security will be provided. He 
does not say that the Kingdom of God Is an alternative to any and all 
anxiety. Is he not rather announcing that it is the only concern 
worthy of essential human nature? It Is as though the invitation 
were worded: Channel all your anxieties into one great anxiety.
Man is invited to live with and through his anxiety, anxiety more 
profound than 'neurotic" anxiety.
In the Fourth Gospel Jesus prays that his disciples will be 
' one1'— at one— with each other and with God even as he is at one with 
God, whom he addresses as 'Father." He says that he and the Father 
are one. The meaning seems to be: I and my Father are at one."
No guilt separates him from the Father.^ rG]_orify the son."3 There 
is no shame. Yet, according to ancient Christian affirmation, he 
took upon himself the 'guilt” of mankind and endured the "shame” of 
the cross. 11 Shame is in polarity with glory. As we noted in Part 
One, Jesus' guilt" before the self-righteous leadership of his people 
was his friendship for 'sinners.' His legal "guilt," technically, seems 
to have been what was then construed as a kind of illegal" assertion. 
Ihe "reality” which he represented vas put to the test.
1-Luke 12:22-^0, which includes also the motif of expectancy.





In the prayer to which we have referred, not only does Jesus 
pray for the at-oneness of the disciples, but he prays not that they 
be removed from "the world*1 but that they be kept fron "the evil." 1
Surely the evil is not individuation as such, involving as it prob-
•t M Pably does, the kind of guilt feeling which Otto Bank describes.
The evil, for Jesus, is the kind of vrongness that was about to cru­
cify him and the kind of evil vhich tempted him before he was taken 
by the crucifiera. It is the evil (l) of trying to live by somatic 
satisfaction alone, (2) of worshiping one's own self-image, or any 
other image on this side of ultimacy, and (3) of insisting on ab­
solute verification before commlting oneself to 'the Kingdom of God.^
Here, the evil, including life-negation and meanlng-negatlon, 
is not the tribulation— the tragic element in existence (?). Jesus 
said: "In the world you shall have tribulation. But be of good 
cheer: I have overcome the world.” The evil is in being overcome 
by the world, refusing— or failing perhaps non-guiltily— to partake 
of that triumph which Jesus represents. Tribulation occasions 
anxiety. But anxiety per se is not the evil, not even the subjective 
evil. The evil is in settling for the negative possibilities, a 
wrong use of, or response to, the fundamental anxiety. Surely, 
speaking quite objectively and perhaps even extra-psychologically, 
we can say that the evil is in avoiding for oneself the narrow gate
xJohn 17:15.
ocT3aat is: guilt anxiety, vhich accompanies deciding and
acting either pro or contra the emerging, individuated will.
Supra, Chapter One.
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that leads to life, and, what is more, in diverting one's neighbor 
from that way, and, still more, in failing to seek the neighbor who 
has somehow missed it, to help him find the way and to endure.
CHAPTER EIGHT
WHAT IS HIS QUILT? IV
m y sa o K  w tbbpo*
Whereas anxiety Is that restlessnsss of spirit vhich says, 
"Something disastrous may happen," despair is the conviction that 
"something disastrous has happened." Guilt, fallen into despair, 
says, "No restitution is possible." Shame, When lost in despair, 
is the conviction: "There is no worth in me, nothing far me, or vith
me, or around me." Despair is hopelessness. It is the triumph of 
distrust.
Sjrfren Kierkegaard, who had much to say about sin, anxiety, 
and despair, defined sin as despair, the guilt before God. "Sin is 
this: before God, or vith the conception of God, to be in despair
at not vllllng to be oneself, or in despair at willing to be oneself. 1,1 
It is despair at the limitations vhich one faces in any direction as 
he tries to realise— fulfill— himself as a person. The despair "of 
weakness" refuses the risk of separateness, or individuation. This 
is the theory which Otto Rank elaborates. The despair "of strength" 
is a defiant willingness to be "individuated" to the extent of
-^S^ ren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, trans • by Walter 
Lovrie, Anchor edition, Fear and freabling and The Sickness Unto 
Death (New York, Doubleday, 195*0# P* £o87 — — •
339
denying dependence, inter-dependence, relationship. 1 Ibis oust be 
the ’despair" which motivates the Adlerian man of "a neurotic style 
of life.”
One aspect of the fundamental anxiety says, "I risk being 
separated. ’ The despair which refuses to risk becoming individuated, 
says, "I am destroyed if I am separated; therefore I cannot be sepa­
rated • The anxiety says, ”1 am dependent although forced to assume 
independence." The despair says, "If I assume independence, I am 
completely stranded; being thrown on my ovn I am nothing. There Is 
nothing in ms to contain, nothing upon which to rely." Despair Is 
the painful affirmation of nothingness— or acquiescence in a kind of 
nihilism. The fundamental anxiety also says, 'I must become myself, 
individuated; or I will be swallowed up, lost, put out of control 
like an aircraft without a pilot." The despair says, "Any softness 
toward others or toward the importuning of community-feeling or the 
claims of existing in relationship means being swallowed up, lost, 
put out of control like an aircraft without a pilot." Hopelessness 
can be destructive of both individuation-potential and coamiunity- 
potential.
The clinical terms which suggest despair include depression 
and depressive state. Mrs. Klein makes the depression state pivotal 
in the formation of the ego-superego structure of the individual.
The Infant's anxiety is like that which is seen in the depressive 
syndromes of both psychosis and neurosis. It Is superimposed on 
both paranoid and schlsoid characteristics. The paranoid depression
3^0
3Ul
is a kind of daspairing sense of persecution by the "bad objects11 
vhich have been internalised—  introjected— in the first few months 
of life. Klein adopts V. Ronald Falrbalrn's conclusions as to the 
primacy of a schisoid stage, in vhich the objects are split. 1 The 
depressive state is that in vhich the evil seems to be victorious 
over the good, or, in Klein's system the death instincts threaten 
supremacy over the life instincts. Hence, depression is anxiety 
nearing despair. 2
1Su£ra; W. Ronald Falrbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of the 
Peraonallty, cited previously. Melanie Klein, Eotes on Some Schisoid 
Mechanisms, ’ Developments in Psycho-Analysis, pp. 292-320, and other 
papers.
2Mrs. Klein calls the depression state "nodal” or "central" 
in the development of the personality.— "A Contribution to the Psycho­
genesis of Manic-Depressive States," Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, 
pp. 282-310. See also "Some Theoretical Conclusions Regar5Tn^HbEe ' 
Emotional Life of the Infant," Developments , pp. 198-236.
Of course Klein is unrelenting in her brand of InstInctuallsm. 
At least, it does convey "dynamistlc" psychology. For example, ve 
quote:
"The fluctuations betveen the depressive and the manic posi­
tion are an essential part of normal development. The ego is driven 
by depressive anxieties (anxiety lest the loved objects as veil as 
Itself should be destroyed) to build up omnipotent and violent 
phantasies, partly for the purpose of controlling and mastering the 
'bad,' dangerous objects, partly in order to save and restore the 
loved ones."
She says that both destructive and reparative omnipotence phantasies 
are at eork from the beginning and pervade the life of the infant—  
"Mourning and Its Relation to Manic-Depressive States," in Contri­
butions t pp. 311-338, quoted at p. 316.
Recently she has written, for instance, "Part of the death 
instinct vhich is retained in the ego causes aggression to be turned 
against that persecutory object." Interaction of life and death 
instincts governs the vhole of mental life. The^statement refleets 
the necessity of communicating her Insights vis-a-vis the ego- 
psychology vlng of Freudism psychoanalysis.—  Mslanie Klein, "On the
In dealing vith this subject, Karen Horney looks for Insight 
in philosophy, if not theology. She draws upon Kierkegaard and 
Professor John MacMurray, of Edinburgh, and states that despair is 
fundanentally 'at being ourselves.” The only true significance 
possible to our existence is nto be ourselves fully and completely. "*• 
Horney describes "hopelessness” as the painful failure to 
realise this significance. Despair then is "an ultimate product of 
unresolved conflicts.” She depicts an inner war between contrary 
Impulses and self-image • There is no victory for the will to become 
one's true self. With Kierkegaard she describes the man who may 
seem to function normally although he really is in despair. 2
One pattern which despair takes is what Homey describes as 
resignation. It is portrayed in John Marquand's novel So Little 
Time and Charles Jackson's The Lost Weekend. The latter depicts a 
man who tries to lose himself in alcoholism.3
Another pattern of despair is what Homey describes under 
the "rubric” of destructiveness. As we have noted, she feels that 
both of the Freudian theories as to the Instincts are inadequate for 
explaining the dynamics of this phenomenon. Destructiveness is a 
pattern established in an individual by the societal influences which 
he experiences as rejection. The destructive individual has been
Development of Mental Functioning," International Journal of Psycho- 
Analyais, XXXIX, 1958, pp. 8U-89, at“8*T:
1John MacMurray, Reason and Emotion (London, Faber A Faber, 
1935), quoted in Our Inner Conflicts, p. 183.
deprived of a healthy, objective self-appreciation. Horney sees the 
mental mechanisms at work in the interest of maintaining somehow 
one's impoverished selfhood vis-a-vls his social milieu. Despair 
can be destructive of others. It is present, obviously, in sadistic 
trends. Varieties include: striving to enslave others, to play on
or with the emotions of others, to exploit, to frustrate others, to 
disparage or humiliate others. A ready example of this type of 
despair is Ibsen's Hedda Gabler. 1
This despairing, destructive, person, according to Homey, 
is one who has been overcome by the feeling of being left out, for­
ever excluded, defeated, and at the same time, not able to become 
resigned. Instead of despairing at becoming himself, he despairs 
at not becoming himself. He becomes utterly resentful.
Hence he starts to hate life and all that is positive in 
it. But he hates it vith the burning envy of one who is withheld 
from something he ardently desires. It is the bitter, begrudging 
envy of a person who feels that life is passing him by." 2 Horney 
relates hopelessness to Hletszche's Lebensneid. The destructive 
man-in-despair is trying to realise himself destructively through 
others. He has nothing to lose, he "reasons" he can only gain, 
according to his desperate logic.
Barely, however, do sadistic tendencies characterise the 
total outward personality. They can be mixed with manifestations of
the Inner fear of their destructiveness. We recall the mechanism of 
reaction-formation. Sadistic impulses can be so repressed that the 
person may lean over backward, so to speak, to avoid frustrating 
others•
In her later work, Neurosis and Human Growth, Homey speaks 
of self-hate and self-contempt as she elaborates her doctrine of the 
idealised self-image. This "self hatred" is essentially the same 
"destructiveness" which she has described in her earlier writings as 
sadistic and despairing, when it is turned against the self. It 
corresponds to masochistic trends.
The self-accusations appear similar to "normal" guilt feel­
ings. But they are greatly exaggerated. They are manifestations of 
despair. Their "neurotic" focus on externals indicates their true 
purpose, which is to protect the actual self from complete submersion 
in despair, from complete debilitation by the oppressive self images. 
Hence, the self-accusations may assume every listener to be a jurist, 
as it were.
Homey's picture of despair shows one who hates himself not 
simply because his self-reproach may be in part valid. Instead, he 
accuses himself because he hates himself. 1 This, as we saw earlier, 
is internalised rejection, self-rejection derived from actual— or 
felt— rejection by the societal environment.^




One self-accusation may follow another, says Horney, listing 
examples as followss
He does not take revenge; therefore he is a weakling. He 
is vindictive; therefore he is a brute. He is helpful; there­
fore he is a sucker. He is not helpful; therefore he is a 
selfish pig . . . .  If he externalises the self-accusations 
he may feel that everybody is imputing ulterior motives to 
everything he does. This . . . .  may be so real to him that 
he resents others as unfair. In defense he may wear a rigid 
mask so that nobody will guess from his facial expressions, his 
tone of voice, or his gestures vhat is going on within him. Or 
he may even be unaware of such externallzatlons. In his con­
scious mind then everybody is very nice. And only during the 
analytic process vill he realise that he actually feels under 
constant suspicion. Like Damocles, he may live in terror lest 
the sword of seme severe accusation fall on him at any moment
Horney takes up where she feels Erich Fromm left off too soon 
in his "analysis of K in Kafka's The Trial.2 We may be inclined to 
extend her criticism to the K in The Castle, though the K there may 
represent a somewhat stronger initiative. Fromm points to the lack 
of autonomy, the dullness in K's drifting, guilty existence. K is 
always looking for someone else to solve his problems Instead of 
turning to his own resources. He should feel the guilt projected in 
the continual imminence of the trial says Fromm, he is guilty; The 
guilt is precisely that which has already been suggested in our 
study. It is his failure to accept the fundamental anxiety as a
-^Neurosis and Human Growth, p. 129.
2Ibid., pp. 129-130. Homey refers to Front's discussion 
of Kafka In Man For Himself.
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part of the given and to take It on into authentic involvement in 
the life that la possible.
• *v ' r ’• * y'$ ,v' w $ £  v j  . -i f I  - * ; w K , •l: . . * ’But Horney completes the literary diagnosis of K, saying of 
Frans's analysis; "It leaves out the point that Mr. K*s very atti­
tude toward his guilt is in turn unconstructive, and it is so because
H 2he deals with it in the spirit of self-hate, though not apparently.
Despairing "guilt and/or "shame" is self-hatred. At base 
self-hatred is "neurotic pride,H according to Horney. It is casti­
gation of that self which has been rejected by the self which aspires 
to acceptability and glory.3 The person who is propelled by "neurotic 
pride" may see® the personification of hubris. Actually, however, he 
is a vlcti® of "society’s” sin. Self-accusation tries to rid the 
self of its perhaps "real image. It inveighs against the mirrored 
likeness in the name of the romantic portrait painting which it falls 
to resemble. Neurotic pride smashes the mirror and sees the "self" 
only as the portrait.
Hubris refuses to accept the implications of the fundamental 
anxiety, specifically, the facts of dependence and relationship, 
along with the potential for individuation. Denied most consciously,
-^ Horney, ibid. ©iis, our own construction, seems fair 
although Horney and frromm do not speak of 'fundamental anxiety."
Existential anxiety may indeed be a preferable phrase.





defiantly, is the desire— and need— for union* This is the despair 
of defiance" to use Kierkegaard's terminology.1
In her last book, Horney again discusses both resignation 
and destructiveness patterns. To the alcoholics and to Hedda Gabler 
she adds the State in George Orwell's 1981- as conveying what she sees
pas the self•demolishing potential of the oppressive idealised images.
Self-pity may at times be a warning against the tragedy of 
despair. The actual self may be protesting, "Unfair;" This may 
well be the case when such self-pity appears in dreams. Again, ve 
may be reminded of the dreamlike tales of Franz Kafka. Horney would 
agree with both Freud and Jung and definitely with the existential 
analysts, but in her ovn vay: "In dreams," she says, "ve are closer
to the reality of ourselves. "3
Probably Horney voices something of a consensus from depth 
psychology as she closes her discussion of self-hatred.
Surveying self-hate and its ravaging force, ve cannot help 
but see In it a great tragedy of the human mind. Man in reach­
ing out for the Infinite and Absolute also starts destroying
1The Sickness Unto Death, edition cited earlier, pp. 200-207* 
Kierkegaard has had profound influence on contemporary philosophy 
and theology, and, increasingly, ve can now add, on psychotherapy.
Neurosis and Human Growth, pp. 1U6-151*.
3Ibid., pp. 152-3* If Horney is right here, ve should place 
different constructions (from those ordinarily placed by the "reason­
able prudent man") on the phenomenon of self-pity, "— viz., that it 
is half scandal." More accurately, authentic self-pity is the 
expression of an inner protest against despair*
3^8
himself. When he makes a pact vith the devil, vho promises him 
glory, he has to go to hell— to the hell vlthin himself.1
This is the hell from vhich depth psychologists as therapists make
it their business to save their patients and clients. It is this
torment vhich Dr. Albert Ellis rightly insists on regarding as the
state from vhich salvation— as rescue— is needed.2 Stirring up the
fires of such hell can hardly be a technique In the deliverance.
Obviously, Dr. 0. H. Mowrer does not regard a certain sense of guilt
as the torment.3 Bather, authentic guilt-feeling is the victim's
grasping upward for a saving hand, perhaps.
Christian Theology'e Understanding of Despair 
in the tight*-of Siepth Psychology
If it is desirable, frost the standpoint of Christian theology, 
that a person be able to maintain a responsible relationship vith 
society— and certainly it is according to the very genius of Christianity, 
it is— then absolute despair is the last precipice.
Depth psychology, especially as actual therapy, recognises utter 
hopelessness, regardless of hov it is manifested, as the last stop be­
fore either suicide or a psychotic break vith reality. In Horney’s 
last book she follovs her discussion of the more accessible despair, 
vith a description of self-alienation. This term is expanded
1Ibid., p. 15^ .
2Supra, in the Introduction.
3cf. discussion supra, Introduction.
3^9
to apply to conditions short of amnesias, depersonalizations, and 
other distortions. The nerves are cut between the real self and its 
front to the world. The actual self becomes increasingly lost in 
its fictions. 1
We recall the Freudian observations which led to the positing 
of a splitting of the ego and the Kleinian conceptions of fragmented 
images "incorporated" from childhood. We begin to appreciate Jung's 
complex diagram of selfhood and his and Otto Hank’s perceptive empha­
sis on the determinancy of the irrational.
The therapists of the many schools see the same phenomena of 
brokenness. Sullivan Interprets psychosis as a falling back into 
prototaxic modes of perceiving and behaving. He also sees the self 
system as divided into dissociated "selves" each considering the 
others as not me.
Karen Horney equates the loss of the real self with what 
Kierkegaard called "the sickness unto death. ' Yet hopelessness is 
sickness, not death, hut moving toward death, death to the real 
self, to the potential that has been given to the human soul, the 
psuche.^  Theologians go further than the depth psychologists and
horney, Neurosis and Ifiaaau Growth, pp. 155 f•
G^upra, Chapter Six; cf. Mullahy, Oedipus, p. 29^ .
C^f. Jung's correlation of the psyche with the psuche, of 
theology.— E. g., Modern Man In Search of a Soul, pp. 201-£ ( The 
Modern Spiritual Problem"'); cf. Ibid., pp.“l8l ff. ("Ike Basic 
Postulates of Analytical Psychology ); and excerpt (quoted from 
Jung' 8 Allgemeine Gesichtspunkte zur Psychologie des Traumas, 
p. 178) in Psychological 5eflections (Bollingen Series X3&l), p. 8, 
fourth reference.
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speak of the death of the possibility of essential humanity. Despair 
moves in depth through intensifications of guilt, of shams, of anxi­
ety, toward utter distrustfulness.
Little wonder, therefore, that Christian theology continues 
to insist, like an ever tolling bell, that the alternative is faith 
as trustfulness.1 However, it bases its message not on the need which 
despair enunciates. It tolls its invitation because it is convinced 
that there is gospel: the grace of trustworthiness has come for all
mankind. Beyond merely proclaiming such a reason for trustfulness, 
essential Christianity seeks to implement the gospel, to serve the 
trustworthiness hy being an instrument for its taking form, for its 
Gestalt In the lives of human beings. 2
The Christian Gospel is s ringing affirmation that it is 
possible for one to live with anxiety in hope rather than without 
"anxiety" in some kind of despair. Ihere Is little expectation in 
despair. Anxiety is the question. Despair is its negative, life- 
denying answer. Hope is its affirmative, life-affirming, answer. 
Perhaps culpable wrongness when present in the phenomenon of despair 
is in the mode of answering the question posed hy anxiety. Despair 
both as resignation and as destructiveness is the judgment, the 
krisis: Light has come into the world.3 Do some continue in the
^This is consistent of course with "faith" as ‘commitment."
Cf. J. H. Oldham, Life Is Commitment (New York, Harper, 1953)*
2Supr3, Chapter Two.
30ur allusions here are to Johannine passages, predominantly, 
and to the discussion of them in Chapter One, supra.
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darkness of despair because they "love" It— they are Mcathected” to 
"bad objects'*— rather than Light, because they have "lost themselves' 
in evil, In deathfulness? The only answer seems to be, In its origi­
nal profound and spiritual— pneumatic— sense 2 Back to the vombi You 
must be born anew, established in a pattern of basic trustfulness.
You must know vhat it is to be loved, to be in "symbiotic union," in 
order that you may be a child of Ood-vho-is-Agape. Ve note that the 
injunction to Nicodemus is not that one must be reunited to "the 
mother" without an ensuing separation. "You must be bora . . .
One must go through the trauma of separation again and vith renewal 
in trustfulness, venture through the narrow gate of his fundamental 
anxiety— receive and accept the invitation to a pilgrimage. 1 In 
another Johannlne passage, as ve noted earlier, this insight is 
expressed! "We love Him because He first loved us." Vith the elab­
orated insights of Suttie, Pfister, Homey, Hank, and the whole 
psychoanalytic movement, ve cure encouraged to see the practical agent 
of salvation as love, agape. So-called "spiritual regeneration" 
must surely mean, in its proper Christian usage, an actual "Justi­
fication” -as -acceptance of the rejected-despairing self. The 
despairing one must be lifted up out of the miry clay and have his 
feet set upon a rock. The essential self must have his vay estab­
lished. 2
^Cf. John Baillie, Invitation to Pilgrimage (New York,
Charles Scribner's Sons, 19^5).
2Cf. Psalm kO.
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If anxiety is the questioning by the basic human possibility 
as it confronts the ambiguities of existence— Daseln1— and despair 
is the wrong answer (according to Christianity), then the heralds of 
the gospel— as the good news of hope— must understand the question 
in its situational idiom, its existential dimension and translate 
the message into the vernacular, if they are to make it plain. In­
terestingly enough the theological ''answer," the "Christian answer," 
has always been, in its genius, not a prepositional, textbook-type 
answer but a reverent, responsive, concern for the person who asks. 
The gospel is, in a profound sense, good news of how to ask the 
questioni The soterla which Christianity proclaims is deliverance 
from the kind of bondage which either cowers before the question or 
seeks to evade it. 2 The agape Tou Theou en Christo enables the 
individual to face the question of meaning, the question posed by 
anxiety, and to camslt himself to hope as the answer, symbolised in 
the phrase: "The Kingdom of God"— He Baa lie ia Tou Theou.
Our study of despair adds to such a challenge one further 
observation. It is an insight not peculiar to depth psychology, 
although it Is forcefully employed by it. Despair is never final 
so long as there is life. Even suicidal phantasies show a wish to
Ipaseln as used by Heidegger seems to be close to what we 
mean here, although our less formal use of the term "existence" is, 
loosely, "life," "living," "situation."
-To become as a little child— to enter the Kingdom of God- 
must surely include becoming trustful enough to be a questioner, one 
who asks the questions of meaning and purpose.
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be born over again.^ The tendency nowadays in psychotherapy is to 
regard no psychotic as completely inaccessible. Perhaps no psycho­
pathic character, no so-called socio-path, is inaccessible to the 
gospel of life and meaning. 2
-^Regarding suicide, a contrary view is that of Joachin 
Flescher, who says that although suicide is associated with return 
to the womb, the underlying cause is the death instinct: She ’Pri­
mary Constellation' in the structure and Treatment of Psychoses, '1 
Psychoanalytic Review, hO, 1953, pp. 197-217, at p. 2lU. Such a 
construction depends, of course, on acceptance of Freudian instinc­
tual dualism.
Cf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, edited Eberhard Bettige,
New York, Macmillan, 1955, P* 1231 and the perceptive discussion by 
Clyde A. Holbrook, Faith and Community, "A Christian Existential 
Approach (New York, Harper, 1959), pp* 18-19.
2Addenda to our discussion, thus far, of the meaning of
despair:
In Otto Rank's frame of reference, both the average man and 
the neurotic seem to be despairing types.
In the Blbllcal-Chrl8tian conception of sin we can discern 
that which may be described as "the will to estrangement.” But, at 
the same time, we see that which may be described as "the will to 
parasitic dependence.” Biblical-Christian "virtues" or states of 
"rightness" if not "blessedness,” Include what can be appropriately 
called "individuation," on the one hand, and "relationship," on the 
other.
Relnhold Niebuhr discusses one form of sin as despairing 
escape into sensuality. (The l.ature and Destiny of Man, I, 
pp. 228-2^0). Karen Horney discusses sensuality as a strategy for 
avoiding the "basic anxiety" (The Neurotic Personality of Our Time,
pp. It7-l6l, and in later writingsJ.
Professor Tillich discusses the meaning of despair (Systematic 
Theolog-- Vol. II, pp. 86-90) in terms of suicide, and the symbols of
the wrath of God" and "condemnation."
Much more can be said about suicide, especially in its prob­
able psychological correlation with the desire for re-birth. Both
Of course the condition of those who are gravely injured 
mentally, perhaps organically, gives us pause. They pose another 
problem to our analysis. It seems proper to describe their condition 
as tragic, despair which is not culpable so far as they are concerned, 
except for whatever free choice there may have been which was "proxi­
mate cause" of their condition. Even were there culpability, it would 
now be in the past tense and therefore at an end. As we saw earlier, 
the genius of Christianity— of the Christ, Ho Soter— is not punitive.
It is "soterial." Hence the culpability and non-culpability of victims 
of despair should be of interest to theology only for helping it to 
understand the way of soteria. The non-culpable Instances of despair, 
along with all other instances, partake of the '"darkness" of vhich 
Christianity speaks.
In those who are accessible at all to depth therapy despair 
is never absolute. The most resigned, the most destructive, the most 
despairing among men that breathe, is still "in the game" for some 
"reason." There is still enough of an affirmation of fundamental 
anxiety to keep him in the quest for hope. While there is life there 
is hope. Whereas despair cries— or moans—  Castastrophe has struck!"
sensuality and suicide can be studied in relation to the dual processes: 
individuation and relationship.
Making yet another observation on this general theme, ve may 
see in the drama of Jesus' fateful encounter vith his arralgners and 
crucifiers: the courage of individuation-in-relationship opposed by
the will-to-parasitic-dependence (the sin that kills the prophets?), 
rationalising Itself as righteous indignation" against a will-to- 
estrangement" (the alleged crime of the Prophet? Cf. Jeremiah).
Thus to characterise the encounter does Involve gross oversimplifi­
cation, perhaps. Nevertheless, it is suggestive of some truth.
35^
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life Itself seems to go cm saying, "Perhaps some hope will cone to 
me redemptively and save me fron utter meaninglessness I" Merely 
continuing to exist says this such.
CHAPTER NINE
WHAT IS HIS GUILT? - V - 
THE COiiFLICAIIONS OF SELF-CONCERN
Since the conception of sin has expressed itself often with 
reference to ''self-centeredness," "self-love," and "self-conceit,"* 
our inquiry takes us to depth psychology for possible correlation 
here* What is the phenomenon of self-concern? We have already con-
f-#-r *. % " ‘ ’ '' ■ . ' ►V* V ‘ ; ' V *fronted it in our analysis of guilt feelings, shame, anxiety, and 
despair. It seems to be expressed in the attitudes: "Myself right
or wrong!" and "Myself always right! " 2
Classical Freudianiso gives pretty much the following 
description of self-love* It is "primary narcissism" augmented 
by "secondary narcissism." Borrowing the term from Havelock Ellis, 
Freud views narcissism as erotic love for the self— the physical, 
organisraic, self. Primary narcissism is considered normal and im-
V . r ' M  - • !1  • f  - * ; : .V f ^ yV-  *> .*• . .V  '* * '■
pllcit in being an organism. It is the organism's instinctual
*Supra, Part One, passim.
Also, for example, Paul Ramsay, in Basic Christian Ethics. 
(Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1954), p* 291 (Sin means anxious 
self-centeredness or self-centered anxiety).
2cf. recurring allusions to this question, beginning in 
Chapter Four, supra.
3 a *The Freudians took this term over from Havelock Ellis,
Cf. Havelock Ellis, Psychology of Sex (1933), A Mentor Book, (New York,
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concern with its own satisfaction* Secondary narcissism is "erotic 
involvement with oneself resulting from interference in the develop­
ment of the love impulse toward others," according to Clara Thompson's 
glossary definition.* Freud spoke of this kind of narcissism when 
he construed a person's self-concern as tantamount to sexual attach­
ment to one'6 own body as though it were an outside object. The 
theory has been refined to mean attachment to one's own ego--more or 
less as "self image" derived from one's "body concept"— or body 
image— first established in infancy and early childhood.
Freud considered narcissism as the libidinal complement of 
what is popularly called "egoism." Its force varies with the indi­
vidual. A person may be markedly "egoistic," but with a relatively 
strong libidinous attachment to outside objects. His narcissism is 
chiefly of the primary type. Another "egoist" may have a relatively 
strong libidinous attachment to himself--to his own body, "body-image" 
(body-ego) •2
In discussing "narcissistic" symptoms especially marked in 
"normal" persons during a situational neurosis, Freud says, "Certain 
conditions— organic illness, painful excesses of stimulation, on
New American Library, 1938), pp. 102-103, where Ellis himself reviews 
the evolution of the term and its use by himself and later by Freud 
(1910) and Rank (1911).
*Clara Thompson, "Glossary" in An Outline of Psychoanalysis, 
(Modern Library, 1955), pp. 615-19, at 617.
^Freud seems not to have used the term "body ego," though it 
does not seem to be heterodox.
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infloooBCory condition of an organ— 'have clearly the affect of 
loosening the libido fron its attachment Co it# objocts. The libido 
vhich hae thus boon withdrawn attache* itsolf again Co the ago in tbd 
foro of a stronger iaraXoQoe of the diseased region of the body. '1
A* aoe made ubdi Frond wrote both before end after his intro­
duction of Instinctual dualtsa, one gets the Impression that such 
okbocato doecriptione of ago*4ynaoie* ore at their bags attoyta to 
systematise an unavoidable ae«nptioBt or presumption, about the 
'loan individual.14 He does soera Co hove an ingrained self-concern.
If this should ever deport fron a person it could be at Che ooocafc 
of suicide, 1C would seen. Fraud discusses this question specifically
in ’Motirning end ttelencbolv*".
indeed it nay be confusing. A# we have noticed, it is close 
to Che concept of 'body image," Sunra. rhcpfer Four-
Foul Schllder, who was s creative associate ef Freud, has elaborated 
this concept. CEbo .Ips^a jggd /cpoagance o£ j&g Huqap Body, end other 
works).
Cf. Freud's sooa-orioptod psychology, for oetnopio in ‘foe 
Interpretation of Dgo.irx, Brill's translation in
grqud at y. 2JG£.; (Xftllao <^ g Pavchn-toelygln. pp. 23 
(narcissi— ), p. 24 (  ’the whole body is an emtogsnic mu"), pp. 89­
91 (narcissistic end object cathexes in « d »  infancy), pp. 112­
114 (effects, good and 111, of mpmasloo of too instinctual dononds).
It baa only boon within fairly recant years, to a large 
part as a result of the work of Schildor,.,.*that the 'body tenge' 
has aaoqoad a role of hposteco in psychological chinking, the 
body iaegQ is now felt to be on integral aspect of the pc&ESoa's 
concept of solf eariLofccmco in relation Co the world.m — Helen D. 
Sargent and Ernest A. lliroch, Projoctiva Methods" in L. A. Fa&nlngton 
and Irwin A. Bat,, ad.., £& .& £!&&«& f & ' & ’JgfiC. 2nd
edition, (Mbs York, the Bonaic Fraos, 1954), at p. 205.
tamd, a SaemtiL. Sttads s s l SMtslMlMrtf f -  p. 426;
see also pp.
We have come to recognize a self-love of the ego vhich is 
so immense, in the fear that rises up at the menace of death 
ve see liberated a volume of narcissistic libido which is so 
vast, that we cannot conceive how this ego can connive at its 
own destruction..... Now the analysis of melancholia shows 
that the ego can kill itself only when, the object-cathexis 
having being withdrawn upon it, it can treat Itself as an object, 
when it is able to launch against itself the animosity relating 
to an object— that primordial reaction on the part of the ego to 
all objects in the outer world.*
After 1920, when Freud introduced the concept of a primitive 
death, or destructiveness, instinct, it is hardly accurate to assume 
that his explanation of self-love continued to be simply as it was 
stated over a presupposition of hedonistic monism. However he 
did not repudiate the earlier theories. They seem to be the accepted 
doctrine among Freudians today. After he posited an instinctual 
dualism within the psychic dynamism, Freud assumed that the so-called 
libidinous forces, the sexual, erotic, instincts, oppose the organism's 
bent toward death. As they persist in prolonging the journey toward 
death, they are narcissistic. As they attach to the ego— or self- 
concept— as object, they are narcissistic in the secondary sense.
The Ego and the Id vas the definitive work in which Freud 
modulated the concept of the "ego-ideal" into that of the superego, 
making the latter a structure within the psyche, with relative 
autonomy and independence from the ego. 2 As we have seen, it is
^Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," "A General 
Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud, John Rickman, ed., 
pp. 142-161, at 152-153; also, Collected Papers, IV, pp. 152-170, 
at 162-3).
‘"“Discussed supraa Chapters Four and Five.
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not always clear vhether he Intended to fuse hie earlier doctrine 
ego-ideal with superego. Nevertheless his first enunciation of 
the superego doctrine does seem to supersede the former postulate.
Freud vent so far as to say, "It would be possible to picture 
the id as under the domination of the mute but powerful death-instincts, 
which desire to be at peace and (as the pleasure-principle demands) 
to put Eros, the Intruder, to rest; but that would be to run the risk 
of valulag too cheaply the part played by Eros.'5* As we have noted 
many of Freud's followers halted before the dualistic concept. Never­
theless, they generally do employ the term superego, although it was 
formulated in the framework of instinctual dualism. Perhaps it is 
not logically dependent on the theory of Instincts. However the 
superego was defined by Freud as the inner agency-or organization- 
of the death instincts. Ve infer that they have found their "embodi­
ment" in the milieu in the threatening, oppressive, "father," both 
individually and phylogenetically.
A study of Freud18 posthumously published An Outline of 
Psychoanalysis suggests that toward the end of his life he was still 
trying to bring together the theories which were propounded before 
and those bom after his positing of an instinct of destructiveness.
He describes the instincts in terms of drives which become fused into
Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id (London, Hogarth, 1923) 
pp. 37—88.
2See supra. Chapter Five; also Freud, An Outline of Psycho- 
Analysis, pp. 92, 112f.
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more complex dynamic patterns. He described "sexual life1* in terse 
of "component Instincts *”1
In the end, the dictineticnr between eros; and ciestrucfci veriest 
sees to he sore poetic than coldly scientific— or pseudo-sdientific• 
The one sewi-bopefti.l passage in Civilization and Its Discontents? 1s 
the following "recitative”f- / ■, • ’ • * \T- •■* • *\ ^ •’
. The fateful question of the human species seesft to se to he 
whether and to what extent the cultural process devgloped In it 
will ouaeeed in mastering the derangements of -a communal life 
caused hy the human instinct of aggressies and self-destruction.
• \ In this connection, perhaps tho phase through which we are at 
this moment passing deserves special interest. Men have.brought 
. their powers of subduing the forces of nature to such a pitch * 
that hy using them they could now very easily exterminate one 
another to the last van. They know this— hence arises s great 
part of their current unrest, their dejection, their stood of 
apprehension. And now it say he expected that the other of the 
two 'heavenly forces,' the. eternal Sros, will put forth his 
strength so as to maintain Massif alongside of hie equally 
immortal adversary.3
"Component instincts" are the "partial instincts" or drives 
implicit in the erotogenic zone® of the body— the sensitive organs 
of the organism, notably: oral, anal, and genital, according to Freu
For example, looking--ecoptophilia or "sexual gazing — even includes 
sexual motivation. "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," 1915.- Collect 
Papers, IV, pp. 60-83, at pp. 72-76. Also, see "Psychogenic Visual 
Disturbance According to Psycho*Analytical Conceptions, ,3 1910, trans. 
by E. Colburn Msyne, Collected Papers, II, pp. 105-121.
The instincts "represent the somatic demand® upon mental 
life, "— An Outline of f gycnoanalysie, p. 19. Also p. 2k, As w® have 
noticed earlier, '^fcSBd-sd^i deethfyl components to the pictu;
of dynamic mental life. i-
‘-These became the governing polarity in Freud ’ s thought after 
he b^ cfase firmly convinced of an crgeniswic drive toverd death— -i. c t 
the death instinct(<»)• That thefee two forces are often described as 
plural reflects and 'component" consideration ve have noted in the 
footnote above. ■,
: S^igaiond Freud, Civilisation and Its Discontent, 1929
(London, 1930), pp. lk3-kT '
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The inference of instinctual dualism is that the destructiveness of 
self-concern derives from a deep irrational force.
Vhat seems to survive the most rigorous critical examination 
of Freud's psychology and logic, is the clinical phenomenon itself.■■■■’■■ " : •' ... . s / ;• ' ' • .
Indeed, it is the near universal phenomenon expressed in the atti­
tude of the individual} "Myself right or wrongJ" It may or may 
not be accomplished by what Freud calls "secondary narcissism." But 
primary self-concern— regardless of whether the term "narcissism" 
is accepted for it— is presupposed by every school of psychoanalysis. 
Such concerns seems to be implicit in the psyche-soma, the human 
organism itself.
Freud related pre-verbal autistic "thinking" to the phe­
nomenon. The infant has vhat he called "omnipotence" feelings and
iphantasies. Harry Stack Sullivan describes the "prototaxlc,"
2autistic, pre-logical mode.
No phychologist seems to dispute the supposition that the 
infant is at first not able to differentiate between himself and
*Cf. "One of the Difficulties of Psycho-Analysis" 1917, trans. 
by Joan Riviere, Collected Papers. IV, pp. 347-356. In this intriguing 
little paper, written before he arrived at his instinctual dualism 
(life and death), Freud describes three historic occasions or move­
ments which have wounded the narcissism--self love— of mankind:
(1) Cosmological (Copernicus); (2) Biological (Daxvin); and (3) 
Psychological— i.e., psychoanalytical (Freud, ve infer, although 
the only name he mentions in this section is that of Schopenhauer, 
whom he regarded as the most prominent of the predecessors of psycho­
analytical Insights— "whose unconscious 'Will' is equivalent to the 
instincts in the mind as seen by psycho-analysis"— p. 355).
^Supra, Chapter Four.
his envtromnsnt,. H© has nz development concept of himself aft dif- *; '
ferentiated from the milieu. Psychologically, therefore, he continues 
in s quasi-symbiotic state. Events simply happen in his vorld. He 
Is feiragry* Be Is fed. He is cold. Be is earned, eventually.
Hunger— eating, collnsc#— var-mfh, thirst—  <ju«nchmg-of-thirst, in 
short, nurture and biological satisfaction, along vith their oe- • .j
casional privation, art tvtm to the normal Infant the near-total 
of experience until ho reaches a certain plane of avareness. Ob­
jects and perrons gradually do emerge from this field. He grasps 
thes? ; withdraw* from them, and relates himself to them In varying
■ .•* • "t>» «*» ' • . • ’ ' • ■.vaye. Seme he assimilates vithia his oor. psychic vorld. Others he 
rejects, resists, sometimes without success, since they may be imposed ' 4y. 
on him. The autistic mbdc of nthic<ciag,n the mode of protctaxis, 
is probably vhat one is re-experiencing, resorting to it, perhaps. , .
vhen he is dravn by ”magle«w It Is the matrix for belief in magic.
The Jtangtan concept of intro-''era ton let at least •uttvvu&t in correla- 
tiom vith Freudian theories of primary autism vith Its omnipotence v  
neattOity.^
- Hfany *tndl«i— including m ^ i I M  objective studies — ean bo
cited. However, from her vast ellnlsal undertaking of children,
Melanie Els in ^akea an Interpolatlve judgoent: ”1 believe that babies
have altogether more intellectual capacity than Is aaaumsd.”— "Weaning" 
in JOha Rickman, ed.. On Bringing Up Children (London, Kagan Paul,
Trench, Trubaer, 1938, pp. 31-567 at PP* 5^-55).
^Thia resembles Piaget’s ”ego~eentri*a": its cause and its effects
on learning. The ego-centric child is a neglected child, In not being
properly introduced to other centers of Interest Jean Piaget, The
language and Thought of the Child, 2nd edition, 1930, trans. Marjorie
Oabain (Rev York, Meridian Books, 1955)*
Probably auch insight, even in Freudian terras, except for the 
mechanistic, materialistic crudities with which they abound, is one 
of the most helpful to Christian theology as it addresses the problem 
of "raan-as-siimer." The understanding of primary aelf-eoncern, and 
primary autism, bears directly on the hubris, or "Lucifer" mentality, 
which says, "I will be like the Host High." It elucidates the more 
overtly affactional forms of self-love, the covert forms, the persis­
tent, underlying concern which defends against the threats of 
starvation, separation, and abandonment. . It is that deep motivation 
for warding off censure, rejection, privation. It is self-concern 
which is patent in the attitude: "I must be satisfied, secure, right
at all costa— at least 'right' in the sense of being 'right1 in order 
to be secure. I am what 1 am. I want what I want when I want it. I 
oust be in a position to endure— and conquer— this or that situation."
Tempting though it may be, to define this aspect of human 
nature as the culpable wrongness of persons— sinfulness— is both log­
ically and psychologically unrewarding. True, even Freud, the man, 
seemed to regard narcissism— presumably "secondary narcissism"— with 
less patience than he had for other weaknesses. 1 Yet, the omnipotence 
feeling and the patterning of behavior which one sees in unattractive 
"selfishness" and "egoism" is logically no more blameworthy than 
attractive-object-adoring, rather than self-as-object-adoring
*Cf. Ernest Jones, "Obituary of Hanns Sachs," The International 
Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXVII, 1946, pp. 168-9.
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behavior. Object-adoring may veil be object-consuming. We think of 
"Uncle Screwtape" who could close his letters to his nephew Wormwood 
vith both '‘Your affectionate uncle," and "Ravenously yours." The 
"egoist" who "loves" others as objects more than himself as object 
may actually be far more dangerous than the person who is lost in 
erotic self-appreciation. The latter is more like a vegetable. The 
former is like a ravenous wolf or a roaring lion.
The Christian conception of sin is addressed, not so much to 
the question, important though it is, as to who is the more dangerous 
to society, but to the question: Wherein is the wrong and how can it
be righted?
Probably the depth psychologists are right in assuming that 
"primary narcissism"— or some aspect of Horney's "urge to grow," 
Jung's self, with its life force, Rank's counter-will, Suttie’s sol­
ipsist but potentially social self, 2 Sullivan's waking self and self­
system—  Is intrinsic to human nature. Probably they are right in 
describing erotic "self-love," and much of what we commonly call 
"self-seeking," even "pride," and "egoism," as but the symptoms of 
early environmental disturbances which somehow have forced the inno­
cent, deprived infant to retreat into himself or else to fixate on
1»C. S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters (Hew York, Macmillan, 
1945), passim.
2Ian Suttie, objecting to Freud's hypothesis of a primary 
narcissm, prefers a primary solipsism, marked simply by the inabil­
ity to discriminate between "self" and"other* "— Origins of Love and 
Hate, pp. 30 ff.
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object-relations that are detrimental to himself and to the health 
of society.^ The self-adoring and the object-exploiting individuals 
are pitiable. They may function somewhat helpfully within society, 
but they do not represent its optimum health. Though their attitude 
is wrong, they are not paragons of sinfulnessI They cannot be proper­
ly blamed for circumstances, aetiological and psychogenetic, over 
which they have had no control. Theirs is an imposed, infused wrong­
ness, ugly though it may be.
This Is true in any abstract consideration of the phenomenon. 
However, in the concrete instances of such wrongness, there is no doubt 
some culpability. But it is so limited in its actual scope that it 
would seem a travesty against the truth to call what they represent 
the essence of what is meant by sin as accountable wrong.
Therefore we are forced to conclude that, if we admit as 
insight the weight of depth psychology, and indeed of practically 
any responsible developmental psychology, ve cannot properly define
*For an engaging and lucid exposition of applied Freudian 
psychogenetic theory, see 0. Spurgeon English and Gerald H. J.
Pearson, Emotional Problems of Living (New York, Norton, 1945).
For example, the authors describe a ''brilliant," 'dependent1 type, 
who, though he makes a good first impression, falls to 'War well" 
with his acquaintances because of "the dependent attitude which arises 
out of the oral phase of development when the needs of the infant 
child have not been sufficiently gratified, have not been given enough 
friendly attention by the mother or nurse."— Ibid., pp. 26-27.
Cf. "The Study of Character,M including selections from Freud, 
Adler, Karl Abraham, Erich Fromm, Homey, Viola Klein, and Clara 
Thompson, vhich illustrate both Freudian and "revisionist" approaches 
to the subject— Clara Thompson, at al., eds., An Outline of Psychoanalysis, 
Chapters 17-24, pp. 277-418.
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sin as "self-love" or "selfishness" per se. These may be manifesta­
tions of the effect of the offense committed by the child's milieu. 
They are not the wrong for which the subject himself can be held 
accountable.
This insight of depth psychology also weakens the time- 
honored reduction of sin to idolatry, if by it is meant idolatry, 
per se. Idolatry is analogous to, if not psychologically derived 
from, the infant's relation to the objects of his slowly objectified 
milieu during that stage of "autistic," "pro to toxic," "pre-logical/ 1 
thinking, when everything that happens seems to happen by magic. 
Idolatry, like "egoism" partakes of omnipotence yearning, of super­
stition, of often tragic immaturity in one's understanding of his 
milieu, of the objects and images which are its very countenance, its 
visage to the seeking infant. The infant's world is physiognomic, 
highly personal, but without the realism which can come only with 
development•2
*Cf. Lucten Levy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality, trans. Lilian 
Clare (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1923), pp. 59f£, and his earlier 
work: Les Fonctions Mentales Dans Lea Societea Inferieures (1910).
As Professor Edgar P. Dickie comments (in a letter to the 
present writer), Levy-Bruhl overstated his case. If the primitive 
man had been completely alogical he would never have survived. The 
term "pre-logical" is suggestive, however, for attempts to describe 
not only the "mentality" of the primitive but also that of the young 
child.
2Heinz Werner, The Comparative Psychology of Mental Develop­
ment, (Mew York, Harper, 1940), p. 262; and the discussion of 
Werner's "physiognomic" stage: Gardner Murphy, Personality,
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Omnipotence feelings and yearnings, superstition, incantations, 
over-iirvestment of objects, and the like may be "neurotic," but they 
are nostalgic, regressive, or fixated and cannot properly be regarded 
as accountable wrongness in themselves. Unless Christianity means 
merely a kind of symptomatology when it speaks of sin, these are not 
the sin of irxoanity.
Self-concern and immature relationship with the world of 
objects provide complications for our inquiry into the nature of 
actual guilt— before God, self, and neighbor.^ Earlier we met the
A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure (New York, Harper,
1947), pp. 266,268, 336, 358, 365, 387, and 994.
See also Werner's op. cit, revised edition (Chicago, Follett 
Publishing Co., 1948), pp. 382-3 et passim.
Also Harry Stack Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of 
Psychiatry edited by Helen Swick Perry and Mary Ladd Gawel (New 
York, Norton, 1953), pp. 145-148.
*C£. The "debate" between Erich Fromm and Paul Tillich over 
the use of the term "self-love," Tillich argues for "self-affirmation" 
or "self-acceptance" as less ambiguous phrases than "self-love."
Fromm counters with a vigorous defense of his terminology, appealing 
to the Biblical conception of a proper "self-love" implicit in the 
"Love" commandment: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." See
Paul Tillich, "Erich Fromm's The Sane Society," Pastoral Psychology,
VI, 56, September, 1955, pp. 13-16, at p. 14; Erich Fromm, The Art 
of Loving (New York, Harper, 1956), p. 57n, "Self-love," in the sense 
argued by Fromm, Implies the kind of self-transcendence which seems 
to be characteristic of the human "self-consciousness" in which one 
can look on oneself as a person, even as he con regard others as 
persons outside himself.
See Fromm, Man For Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology 
of Ethics (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949); especially a 
selection published in Clara Thompson's An Outline of Psychoanalysis, 
pp. 320-337. Like Horney, and perhaps in contrast to Relnhold 
Niebuhr, Fromm argues there that 'the failure of modern culture lies 
not in the idea that moral virtue is the same as the pursuit of self­
interest; not in the fact that people are too ouch concerned vith
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complications of shame feelings vhich have been imposed on the 
subject-self. As Reinhold Niebuhr and others argue, anxiety may be 
the occasion or temptation for sin. However it is inevitable if 
one is to become essentially human. It is the operative force in 
both shame and guilt feelings.
We have suggested that a wrong response to the "call1' of 
anxiety is a form of despair. To the extent that this response is 
a free choice to despair when to hope is possible, it can properly 
be described as culpable. Instrumentalistically speaking, ve 
may be able to say that if one has chosen to despair he may be open to 
being "convinced” of his "sin" and moved to change his heading, to 
accept the grace of basic trustworthy agape. In principle, his trust
their self-interest, but that they are not concerned enough vith the 
interest of their real self; not in the fact that they are too selfish 
but that they do not love themselves "- -Thompson An Outline, p. 336 
(ve have omitted italics). See Man For Himself. pp. 119-140.
Fromm takes to- task, not only Calvin and Luther, but also 
Immanuel Kant. Here Fromm tries to distinguish categorically 
"selfishness" from "self-love."— Fromm, ibid., pp. 129£f. The 
selfish person does not love himself; he hates himself. Correlating 
this "doctrine" of Fromm vlth that of Horney, we can say that 
"selfishness" is s form of despair— or an attempt to escape the 
ravages of despair-at-being-oneself. The selfish person is a victim 
of a deep inner hopelessness. Fromm describes Peer Gynt's devotion 
to He tosfc the self vhich he sought (again ve are within the
Nev Testament thought). "To thyself be true" vas twisted and lost 
in a way of life that read, "To thyself be enough." Love of things 
and of fancies— grasping for objects— is tantamount to rejection of 
one's real self— as of no intrinsic worth. Hence it is lost.
See also Alexander Reid Martin, ”Why Psychoanalysis?" in 
Are You Considering Psychoanalysis?, Karen Horney, editor, (New York,
I Jo r ton, 1946), pp. 1*5-36, at p. 55.
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and commitment will then be not 'ego-centric ; but '’Kingdom-of-God" 
centered. In fact, he vill have two foci of concern: himself and ’’the
Kingdom of God.”
Although the subject-self has no choice in the matter of 
intrinsic self-concern nor in much of the twisting of that concern 
by a nightmarish introduction to the vorld of events and objects, 
his accountable offense is always committed in the supposed interest 
of his self-concern or in despair of that interest. The story of 
Adam's fall into sin suggests that "the serpent," some outside or 
"transcendent" evil force or principle, deceives self-concern into 
choosing a way of despair over a way of hope. The deception is in 
the very guise of hope.l
1Supra, Chapter One. The serpent is depicted as being more 
subtle than any "wild creature" in the garden. ; He tempts Eve to eat 
of the forbidden fruit, telling her that it will open up to her a 
fuller life Instead of ushering her to death. Perhaps there is an added 
lesson here that the "food" to which she was tempted was a kind of 
despair, or despairing self-loss, in the supposed interest of finding 
a more adequate (less dependent.) selfhood, which proved illusory.
— Genesis 3.
CHAPTER TEN
"MAN AS SINNER" IN THE LIGHT OF DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY
From our study of "mem am sinner" In the light of depth 
psychology ve can make the following Inferences for the Christian 
understanding of sin.
(1) There Is within the complexity of the self-dynamism 
(Sullivan) that whleh ve can assume to be centered subjectivity 





reasoning (and rationalising) 
managing (a kind of vigil which ever attempts 
to control the situation).
The situation" for this subject-self is a dynamic field which
Includes impulses from vithin the organism, vithin the psyche, and
8tinuli-demands from the outside, together with the Interaction of
these two "fronts." Hence, we may say, by way of supposition of
course, that there is within limits for almost everyone a "self’ -
a subject-self, capable of making choices, assuming responsibility
for them, and of trying to reconstruct 'the situation."
(2) Guilt feelings are anxiety, love, and possibly hatred- 




(3) The capacity for assuming responsibility and for feeling 
guilt is affected by a distinct dynamism vhlch ve have called shame, 
an inner conviction of unvorthiness or inferiority, vhich derives 
initially from an early sense of privation or rejection.
(H) Both guilt feelings and compulsive shame feelings 
involve anxiety, vhlch is a pervasive fearfulness. Fundamental 
anxiety is that vhlch seems inevitable in the risk of life itself.
Its tvo aspects are: fear of separation— individuation— and fear
of (re)union— responsible relationship.
(5) Despair is the refusal, failure, or inability to endure 
anxiety. In terms of the fundamental anxiety it is refusal or 
failure to endure one or both aspects of the risk of becoming an 
individuated person in responsible relationship vith others.
(6) So-called "self-love," "egoism," and "selfishness are 
derived (l) from intrinsic, hence non-culpable, self-concern and
(2) from immaturity in one's relations to "his objects," to the 
milieu of early childhood, hence also largely non-culpable.
In terms of the Freudian theory of psychogenesis: despair
harks back to a fundamental pattern of distrust. Shame reflects 
fixation during the "toddling" stage. Guilt patterns suggest later 
infancy and early childhood formations of character. Anxiety is 
present vhere there is even rudimentary trustfulness. Hence it 
pervades the dynamisms of shame and guilt.
Although ve can distinguish these various emotional "dyna­
misms" or conditions ve knov that they are often not experienced as 
being distinct. Shame feelings more often than not reinforce guilt
3T3
feelings. Distrust predisposes the subject-self to immaturity, to 
jtess and possibly to distorted guilt. Despair Is present to a 
degree In almost any instance of 6hame or guilt. 8eIf-concern is 
a basic determinant in the whole process.
In any "style of life” the goals and hopes suggest the nature 
of the despairs, as Adler pointed out in his doctrine of inferiority- 
feeling and superiority-striving.
Depth psychology helps us distinguish between authentic 
guilt feeling— as awareness of having done wrong, willing to make 
restitution, to become reconciled— and shame feeling, which bespeaks 
a deep wound within the psyche. Capacity for what Sullivan calls 
genuine guilt feeling, and, more profoundly, for what Bank calls 
"ethical guilt,” can be a means by which a person grows in realistic 
freedom and responsibility*
To despair at individuation is wrong with respect to the 
possibility. Ve can say it la culpable, or accountable, wrong only 
to the degree in which it is a vay chosen in relative freedom by 
the subject-self•
To anyone who answers the call to individuation there seems 
to be no vay of avoiding anxiety. Indeed the fundamental anxiety 
bespeaks a fundamental mystery, the fundamental mystery into which 
science and scientific psychology cannot find a sure route (Bank). 
The fundamental anxiety asks the question to which there is no 
textbook answer. The question Itself insists on reverence before 
the mystery, the mystery of existence, of the meaning of the
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possibility and of ths unknown. Ibis anxiety seems to point ths 
very road whleh man must take if he is to fulfill his humanity, 
if he is to be true to essential humanity. Perhaps it is his 
capacity to appreciate the fundamental mystery which makes him man.1
It is possible from our study to correlate concepts within 
depth psychology with various reductions that have been suggested 
in Christian theology for the conception of sin. Theologians have 
said that the sine qua non for sin is: idolatry, selfishness,
unbelief, pride (hubris), rebellion ("revolt"-according to Emil 
Brunner2), breach of community, hatred-nrurder•failure-to-love, and
*Cf. Erich Frank, Philosophical Understanding and Religious
Faith (London, Oxford University Press, l£k§J, p. 5$, where hedis-
CU883S the implications of the fact that human reason does not rest 
upon itself. ’’Rational conclusions are dependent on certain premises 
which reason itself is unable to prove because they are rooted in a 
deeper stratum of the human mind." They spring from a more or less 
unconscious belief or instinct, the justification of whleh is one of 
the principal tasks of the philosopher, says Frank. "The real proof 
of God is the agonised attempt to deny God," he argues.—-Ibid., p. 1+3.
Grace Stuart says significantly, in a book which deals 
chiefly with Freudian and other depth psychological doctrines and 
Insights, Hoao faber preceded homo sapiensi man emerged) yet we 
are uncertain W r  and in what way his consciousness developed.—  
Conscience and Reason (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1951),
PP* $5-^7• "Eater she states succinctly her optimistic credo (rem­
iniscent of Pfister's) concerning the nature of man (including 
potentially the ethical quality of "the repressed"): E. g., at
p. 220: Man may arrive at true humanity if he learns to handle
the stuff of his life without ignorance, shame, or fear. Her essay 
is not an exercise in facile optimism. It was bom of suffering 
and agonising contemplation, along with much and varied reading.
2Aotually, "Widerspruch" ("contradiction,” "opposition,” 
"disagreement”)•
In fairness to Professor Emil Brunner, we should discern 
his influence in the revival of the dynamic concept of sin as a 
defiant, aggressive, denial of finitude, defiance of the limitations
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failure to accept the grace of God in Christ. It would be no feat 
to find analogies for the so-called "seven deadly sins." However, 
our concern is considerably too reductionistic itself for such a 
preoccupation•
The following seexa possible correlations:
Sin: both as condition and offense The cental" condition
Idolatry Autistic, pre-logical stage
Fixations during Infantile 
stage of object-cathexis 
Selfishness, egoism, and the like Ego-as-object— cathexis
Omnipotence phantasies (Freud 
and others)
of human creatureliness. See Emil Brunner, "Reinhold Niebuhr*3 Work 
As a Christian linker," in Kegley and Bratail's Reinhold Niebuhr:
His Religious„ Social, and Political Thought; pp. 2^-3^,ekere tka 
author of Man in Revolt tactfully takes Niebuhr to task for not 
acknowledging his indebtedness to that work (which he had read prior 
to delivering the Gifford Lectures on The Nature and Destiny of Man, 
see supre., Chapter Two). Professor Niebuhr's equally tactful con­
fession and attempt to make restitution ("some amends for a grievous 
omission') are in his "Reply," Kegley and Bretall, ibid., pp. ^31-451, 
at pp. *1-31-2. See also Bans Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 
p. 1*1-5.
Of course, this is not to say that this view of sin (either 
Brunner's or Niebuhr's) does full Justice to the entire STElical 
conceptions, which include also the despair vhich is resignation from 
authentic involvement in "life" (a denial of both being and becoming;). 
There is more to this kind of "wrongness" than "sin as sensuality,"
(see supra, Chapter Two), as Niebuhr today would surely agree. We 
draw from recent impressions while hearing Dr. Niebuhr, especially 
as a preacher.
See Brunner's recent, brief treatment of "original sin" in 
The Scandal of Christianity (London, SCM., 1951), Chapter III,
pp. 51-72.
Cf. Karl Helm, Jesus The World's Perfecter (1939), trans.
D. H. Van Doolen (Edinburgh and London, Oliver and Boyd, 195*0, 
pp. 3-52.
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Neurotic pride (neurotic denial 
of shame due to rejection—  
Horney)
Superiority fiction derived 
from inferiority feeling 
(Adler)
Attempts— in phantasy— to
replaces the father (Freud), 
the mother (especially those 
who speak of "an Electra 
complex1), the sibling 
(Suttie, among others).
Inferiority compensation (Adler)
The will to power (Adler)
The Counter-will (Rank)
Oedlpal guilt (and Suttie*s 
analogues)
Aggression, destructiveness 
(considered as a primal 
instinct, by the later Freud)
Destructiveness as a form of 
despair (Horney)
Resignation as a form of despair
(Horney)
^Freud himself resisted the use of the term. Yet is is used. 
As we have seen, he felt that the girl's "complex" was at root the 
same as the boy's, vis., desire for the mother and rivalry with the 
father, ftte solution— and "resolution"— is different because of the 
avenue of identification.— Sigmund Freud, "Rie Psychogenesis of a 
Case of Homosexuality in a Woman" (1920), trans. by Barbara Low and 
R. Oabler, Collected Papers, II, pp. 202-231, at p. 211 n. Cf. Freud, 
An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p. 99-
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Sin: both as condition and offense The "mental" condition









Rationalization as ego-defense 
(Freud, and consensus)








Hie return of the repressed 
(Freud)
The dominance of Irrational, 
unconscious forces (Freud,
Jung)
^For example, in "Psychotherapists or the Clergy” (Psychology 
and Religion: West and East, pp. 32k-3k7, at p. 3klj Modern Man in
Saarch or a SouiripT~22T3i&, at p. 237). ------------
2*., for instance, in Rank's discussions of 'the spiritual' and 
the "irrational" in Psychology and the Soul and Beyond Psychology. Tet 
Rank had come to look on the unrationulizable" aspects of the psyche 
as the springs of creative, Indeed authentic selfhood. Hence it seems 
inappropriate to seek correlation with the conception of sin, except 
with reference to "the irrational" when— and if— out of control.
^This description is akin to Freud's statement, as late as 
his posthumously published An Outline of Psychoanalysis (p. 2k), 
that the whole body is an erotogenic zone. Polymorphous perversity” 
(normal for early Infancy, manifest in seme prostitutes and in other 
types, according to Freudians) is discussed in the following, among 
other, works: Sigmund Freud, "Infantile Sexuality" (in Three Contri­
butions to the Theory of Sex), Basic Writings, at p. 592-5; A. A.
Brill, Freud's Contribution to Psychiatry (Mew York, Horton, 19^3), 
pp. 125-139; Paula Reiman, "Certain Functions of Introjectlon and 
Projection in Early Infancy," reprinted in Melanie Klein et al, 
Developments in Psycho-Analysis (Joan Riviere, editor, LonSon,
Hogarth and the Institute, 1952), pp. 122-168, at p. 163 et passim.
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Sim both as condition and offense 
Hatred, nurder, failure to love
Laatfulness (Concupiscence)
Rejectiag**the ffru-jo of God
Unbelief** "unfaith", mistreat, 
despair
The mental condition
The death or destructiveness 
instinct (Freud)
latwnullMd rejection (Horney)
Bags doe to fear of the less or 
continued deprivation of 
lave (Suttie, and others)
The nature of the life forces 
as libldo*eraa*eatlsfaction - 
araSESTKiSd)
Instinctualiso (Freudians)
Piaplac imswt of anxiety (Horney)
Displacement of othsr emotion**
love (Buttis)
Resistance by qj>q~( subject* 
self )-defensiveness (Freud, 




Relative fixation on objects 
during the depressive stage 
of infancy (Melanie Klein)
Failure of the primal, pre- 
peychlo*eeanlng love 
relationship (Buttle, 
sod probably the consensus)
Most psychoanalytical thinking supports the rule that one 
learns to love by first being loved and that one learns to hate by
3$ee infra, Bart Three.
%ere us are anticipating our discussion of transference 
phenomena in Bart Buree (infra). The concept of negative trans* 
feraaee is akin to those ' of parataxis distortion, seeing another 
as a "’bad object,' and reciprocal rejection.
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first feeling that he is hated, that his physiognomic milieu is 
hostile to him. Even the duallstic Freud and the dualistlc Jung can 
be cited in support of this rule. However their positing, each in a 
distinct vay, of a dualism within the psyche Itself, Independent of 
environmental influences, calls for some qualification. 1
Perhaps one of the most embarrassing lessons taught by both 
depth psychology and Christian theology is that the ugly, " the 
’'hateful,** the persons and groups most noticeably evoking hostility 
and evil Images, are those who have been most deprived of love and 
goodness. As lepers, in Hew Testament times and sinoe, aroused fear 
of illness, so the love-deprived arouse fear of seme "psychic" danger. 
The practical logic of Christian thought and, strikingly, cerrobora- 
tively, the logic also of depth psychology, is that the evil is 
distinct from the person who bears it. He may wear it as a garment 
or as a mask. He may be dominated by evil so as to appear its very 
personification. But he is, in every case, It3 victim. Hate the 
sin but love the sinner is no paradoxical slogan. The so-called 
"sinner” is the beleaguered self who has been taken slave by the 
sinister and destructive in human existence. He stands in need of 
rescue. But his deliverance can be effected only through 'saving
1-See, for Instance, the correspondence between Jung and H. L. 
Philp, in the letter’s JunL and the Problem of Evil (London, Boekliff, 
1958), 271 pp. Jtaag thinks something is lost from our grasp of the 
problem of evil If ve try to reduce it to a simple statement of evil 
as the prlvatio bonl. In Answer to Job he had called it a nonsensical 
doctrine, derived from a naive assumption about the nature of God 
(as "a conscious being"). (Psychology and Religion, West and Hast, 
pp. 367*^70, at 383n).
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acts" which in their "physiognomic’ aspect seen to understand hist In 
all the dimensions of his existence.
Therefore no hortatory or mere superficial heralding of so- 
called "saving knowledge" can bring him up out of prison. His situ­
ation cannot be transformed by a magic wand of words even when It Is 
proclaimed In stentorian voice that it is "the Word of God." Such 
an appeal Is only to the magic stage of infancy to which he may have 
already made his regressive pilgrimage. The Gospel— the actual Word 
of God— to him must be a reaching down and embracing of his whole 
being. He must feel it through and through, If but for a moment or 
a composite of moments. 1 Hie must be loved from the earliest-Inf ant- 
self-of-him to his waking selfhood If he Is to love, if he Is to 
enter the Joy of the Lord. -
^Here the Wesleyan theology has preserved an insight which 
should not be lost. Our construction of It is, simply, that to 
experience "saving grace" one must receive the taste, the "Joy” by 
which he discerns the wrongness and despair of the condition of 
"unfaith" from which he is being delivered. He "grows In grace." 
(Caveat: Formalising the experience— like formalising the doctrinal
statements of former eras— risks the losing of the very dunamls Tou 
Theou, which cannot be continued by any rigidiflcation— or dissocl- 
ation from the rest of "reality.") -Cf. John Wesley, "A Plain Account 
of Christian Perfection., ” The Works of the Rev. John Wesley (ten 
volumes, New York, 1827), Vol."THY, pp. 5-£>7j ct passim.
PART THREE
JUSTIFICATION" IN DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
THE ’’SOTCRIOLOGICAL” DYNAMICS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 2  DEPTH 
The Process of Psychotherapy
Justification Is the act and the process of bringing forgive­
ness, worth, hope, and meaning to man-in-his-existence-and-in-society. 
Theologically, it is the bringing of "righteousness” to replace 
'unrighteousness,' or, simply, ultimate rightness to replace wrongness, 
ultimate goodness to replace badness. It resolves not only the 
punitive power of guilt but also the destructive power of evil. In 
the ordo salutis it is the health of the healing, the being delivered 
of the deliverance.^
In Depth psychology we see it most dramatically in the psy­
chotherapeutic relationship Itself. The agent of therapy is another 
person. According to present theory, the crucial phenomenon in 
psychotherapy is the patient's transference of emotion from certain 
objects— preeminently, person-objects—  of his physiognomic milieu 
onto the therapist himself.
■^ Often justification has been distinguished as the act—  
once-and-for-all, with regeneration and sanctification denoting more 
the 'process" aspect of the saving grace7” However,' we are taking 
the liberty to call it both act and process, in consonance, we feel, 
with the Biblical origins of what was always a dynamic concept.
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Psychoanalytically-oriented therapy^ * is essentially a personal 
relationship: one in which the patient is self-revealing and dependent,
while the therapist is understanding, supportive, and accepting. Freud 
called the "reexperiencing' of repressed emotion, abreaction.2
No matter how gently and permissively the analyst attends the 
patient during abreactions, he will be put to the test. The first 
climax is the 'negative transference,” when the patient has succeeded 
by the mechanism of projection in casting the analyst in the role of 
villain. After all, the neurosis was "caused” by a primal villain; 
namely, the early environment of bad images. The role always manages
-"Psychoanalytically-oriented" therapy is to be contrasted 
with the so-called client-centered— and non-directive—  Rogerian’ 
therapy, whose foremost theoretician is Carl R. Rogers. Of course 
Rogers has been influenced by the teachings of the depth psychologists, 
especially Otto Rank. His method too, is dependent on personal 
dynamics, Whether Sulllvanlan "participant observer" or Freudian 
"transference" or some other "phenomena” are to be preferred in de­
scribing what happens in the process of therapy via therapist. (See 
supra, Chapter Two, notes).— Carl R. Rogers (Professor of Psychology 
and J&xec. Secretary, Counseling Center, U. of Chicago), Client- 
Centered Therapy, with chapters contributed by three others (Boston,
N. Y., Houghton-Hifflin, 1951)* Cf. Hall and Lindsey, Theories of 
Personality, pp. U67-502.
2This term was used more in the early practice of psycho­
analysis, when Freud was still using the so-called cathartic treat­
ment (See for instance, Sigmund Freud, "Psycho-Analysis’, 1922, 
under "Two Encyclopaedia Articles," in Collected Papers, V, pp. 107­
130, at pp. 108-109). Josef Breuer and Freud used the term in their 
Studies in Hysteria (1895) trans. by A. A. Brill, Monograph series,
(New York, Nervous & Mental Disease Publications, 1936;. Breuer had 
cured a hysteria patient by hypnosis and "mental" catharsis.
Brill says, "to ab-react literally means to re-act or work 
off something repressed, thereby unburdening oneself of unconscious, 
strangulated feelings. ’— ' Introduction' to Freud, Basic Writings, 
trans. by Brill, at p. 9n.
See Clara Thcmpson, An Outline of Paychoanalysis ("Glossary”).
to be filled. In the setting of psychoanalysis a time cones vhen the 
patient "transfers” his hostile feelings principally on to the analyst, 
allowing him the "honor" of representing the collective villain* Such 
transference can be more or less violent, 1 more or less openly express­
ed* It is that phase vhen the patient insists that the analyst—  
however he nay try to disguise his attitude toward the patient— is 
like the rejecting parent, the very personification of all that has 
been negative, repressive, cruel, and threatening to him from the very 
first day of his life* This negative transference marks the patient's 
reaching the very source of the poisoned vaters, all the bitterness 
that has gone Into his making* He has come to the very devil in his 
conflict•
The analyst seeks a positive transference! A sustained, 
positive transference should follov the negative phase because of 
the therapist's expert handling of the negative transference. The 
patient should be made to feel— not by a magic uand of words, but 
by a general attitude, vhich of aourse uses vords skillfully and 
creatively— that the analyst, though at first cast in the role of 
earliest negative-parent image and ergo society, is accepting instead 
of rejecting toward him.
Most therapists assume that a positive transference is re­
quired before the therapy can attain any measure of deep success*
Such transference of positive feeling* toward the analyst, now being
Robert Lindner nearly lost his life under the hands of a 
prisoner-patient, who had come to see him (his therapist) In a spon­
taneous "need for help. But suddenly the therapist was cast in
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cast In the role of the good parent, the good images of society, 
must not be overextended. The danger is a too dependent relation­
ship. Some critics of Freudian analysis suggest that long courses 
of analysis do perhaps over-extend the positive transference phase, 
thus delaying the proper terminus of the therapy.1
A common interpretation of the therapeutic use of the positive 
transference is somewhat as follows. The patient makes a psychic re­
turn to infancy, or to the beginning of his twisted route. He gets 
on the other side, as it were, of his trauma and proceeds again for­
ward "without" it.
The new self is at least superimposed on the old one. The 
Injured child continues to be in the picture, much as in Pauline 
theology, the old nature" continues to assert itself even for the 
man en Christo. But a "healthy child' comes into the picture.
the role of a hated object ("the bad breast, the bad mother").
— Robert Lindner, The Fifty Minute Hour (New York, Rinehart, 1955# 
Bantam Books, 1958), pp. l-kf. "
^An example of such criticism is: C. H. Patterson, Counsel­
ing and Psychotherapy: Theory and Practice (New York, Harper, 1959)#
3^2 pp., especially chapter 11, !!!Ts Depth Psychology Necessary?"
(the author answers in the negative), pp. 253*278.
Frank Barron, In a review entitled "The Freedom in Determinism" 
(on Charles Berg's Being Lived By tfr Life, something of an autobiog­
raphy by a psychoanalyst), scores psychoanalysts for what he calls 
their loftiness, assuming a god-like know-it-all attitude in the 
practice of their "art" and in their theory. He suggests that, a la 
their own— Freudian— theory, they are motivated by a repressed guilt. 
Barron is a prominent research psychologist, with a special Interest 
in experimental studies of creativity and "creative" personalities.
Many of such representative criticisms of "depth" therapy can 
be cited.
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In Horney*8 language, the patient comes to understand his 
basic anxiety. She Is thinking of ’'neurotic anxiety” vhich derives 
from an original fear of being abandoned. A possible reconstruction 
of vhat takes place is that the patient is enabled to release the 
burden of his neurotic anxieties and at long last to confront vhat 
ve have called the fundamental anxiety vhich points the way to 
individuation.
In terms of privation-distress and separation-anxiety as veil, 
the positive transference vhen handled carefully by the therapist, 
can mean that the patient is taken back emotionally to the other side 
of the privation and the threat of being abandoned. “Spiritually” 
he receives back that Which vas taken away from him or denied him 
from the beginning. Hie "soulT of that for vhich he has ever been 
in quest, though dimly, that vhich vas somehow left behind on his 
journey through existence, is the belongingness, the love, like that 
vhich Suttie describes. Hie "cured" patient can seyt "Whereas I vas 
rejected, now I am accepted. Whereas I vas deprived, nov I aa made 
vhole. ”*■
■khir exposition of psychotherapy draws on sources which have 
been cited previously. In addition, others should be cited, including! 
Lawrence 8. Ruble, Practical and Hieoretlcal Aspects of Psychoanalys is. 
(Kev York, International Universities Press, 1956j, 2^2 pp.j Melanie 
Klein, Hie Origins of Transference," International Journal of Psycho­
Analysis, XXXIII, 1952, pp. ^33-^38; W. ftonald Fairbaira, "The Effect 
of A Xfng's Death Upon Patients Undergoing Analysis" (1936), Psycho­
analytic Studies of the Personality, pp. 223-232; Fran* Alexander and 
Thomas Morion French, Psychoanalytic Therapy (New York, Hie Ronald 
Press, 19^6); Fran* Alexander and Helen Ross, editors, Dynamic Psy­
chiatry (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1952); Edmund Bergler,
Chi A Clinical Approach to the Psychoanalysis of Writers," Hie
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The Development of Depth Psychology's Understanding 
" jjyramifcg of Psychotherapy ~
Sigmund Freud recognized transference as crucial in analysis. 
His characteristic use of it was somewhat different from that vhich 
ve have described. He interpreted the patient's casting him in the 
role of the parent as an acting out of the request of the small child 
to be told what to do. The child is suggestible and fearful before
Psychoanalytic Review (New York), XXXI, 19^# PP* **0-70; Klein, Reiman, 
Money-jjjyrle, l$ev Directions in Psychoanalysis, 1956; Sandor Rado and 
George E. Daniels, editors, SSanging Concepts of Psychoanalytic Medi­
cine, Proceedings of the Decennial. Celebration of the Columbia Univer­
sity Psychiatric Clinic, 19-20 March, 1955 (N«* York, Grune & Stratton, 
1956); Alice and Michael Balint, "On Transference and Counter­
Transference," International Journal of Psycho-Analys is, XX, 1939# 
pp. 223 ffarticles by Paula keimann, Michael Balint, Annie Reich, 
Edith Buxbaum, Marion Milner, W. Hoffer, John Rickman, and Sylvia 
Payne on counter-transference (Heimann), and on aims and techniques, 
especially vith reference to the termination of analysis, in The 
International Journal of Psycho-Analysia, XXXI; James Strachey,
The Nature of the Therapeutic Action of Psycho-Analysis, Inter­
national Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XV, 193*+# PP« 127-159# k-mjamin 
Wolstein, Transference: Its Meaning and Function in Psychoanalytic 
Therapy (Nev York, Grune and Stratton, 195*0# abstracted by the 
author in The Annual Survey of Psychoanalysis - "A Comprehensive 
Survey of Current Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice," V (Nev York, 
International Universities Press, 195*0, pp. 555-571— Paula Heimann, 
’Review of Benjamin Wolstein, Transference, International Journal of 
Psycho-Analysis, XXXVII, 1956, pp. *9i-A93 (Th® reviewer is generally 
favorable. But she thinks Wolstein is seriously mistaken in his view 
of Freud's ovn use and construction of transference phenomena); Selma 
Freiberg, "Clinical Notes on the Nature of Transference in Child 
Analysis, Fsycho-Analytic Study of the Child, VI, 1951, pp. 286-306; 
Harry Stack Sullivan, The Psychiatric Interview, ed. by Helen Svick 
Perry and Mary Ladd Gavel (New York, Norton, 195*0# 2k$ pp.; Frieda 
Frcsm-Reichmann, Principles cf jfctensive Psychotherapy (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press,~T956J.
Lucy Freeman’s Fight Against Fears (New York, Crown Publishers, 
1951j other editions, including ^Cardinal," New York, Pocket Books 
1953) i® an engaging account of psychoanalysis from the retrospective 
viewpoint of an analysand.
Especially informative are selected articles Included under 
"Therapy ! in An Outline of Psychoanalysis (edited by Clara Thompson,
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the awesome father-figure. His negative transference reflects the 
rivalry of the young Oedipus. But the positive transference suggests 
the healthier resolution of the Oedipal complex. The analyst Is ahle 
to undo some of the oppressiveness of the injuring superego. This 
is the "parentif ying" type of therapy, which suggests" to the sug­
gestible patient the cause of his distress and thus helps him lift 
it into consciousness where the ego can control it in the light of 
what it actually it. This makes for ego-strength. Although hia 
interpretation of the dynamics of therapy was continually subject 
to review and to revision, Freud maintained from the beginning that 
it was ego-therapy; in other words, the bringing of health to the 
reality-governed executive I within the psyche.^
It is not surprising that Freud considered those who had 
never made it to an Oedipal-type crisis as being inaccessible to his
Milton Mazer, and Earl Wltenberg), which we have cited previously; - 
'Goals of Therapy "— Michael Balint, Frans Alexander, Otto Rank; 
"Transference and Countsrtransference — Michael Balint, Janet Mackenzie 
Rioch, Thomas M. French ("The Transference Phenomenon), Clara Thompson, 
and Mabel Blake Cohen; "The Psychoanalytic Process'—  A. H. Maslow and 
Bela Mittelman ("Psychoanalytic Therapy"), and Sartor Rado (Recent 
Advances in Psychoanalytic Therapy !).— pp. U23-61U.
Also helpful have been Julian H. Pathman and Vernon Clark, 
'Psychoanalytically Oriented T— rapy, and Sidney W. Bjou, Thera­
peutic Techniques with Children," in Pennington and Berg’s An 
Introduction to Clinical Psychology, Chapters 21 and 23, 557­
585 and pp. 60vT-£>31*
•^ It seems fair to say, "From the beginning," althougn Freud 
did not elaborate hie conception of the ego until after some of his 
early contributions to therapy.
Cf. New Introductory Lectures, pp. 111-112 ( . . . . Where 
id was, there shall ego be . . . . .*)•
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technique. Psychoses and the so-called narcissistic neuroses are 
Interpreted In terns of libidinous attachment to the subject’s own 
body. Attachment to the mother as an object has somehow been frus­
trated or forestalled of completeness, as has been the possibility 
for the lntrojection of the Individual father-image— superego.
Nevertheless psychotherapy has reached into the world of the 
psychotic. Harry Stack Sullivan and Frieda Frosn-Reichmann, have had 
outstanding success with schizophrenics, for instance.1
To Freud the transference itself— sometimes described as the 
’ transference neurosis'— would terminate when it was explained by the 
therapist to the patient. Such analysis could be achieved only when 
the patient was able to receive the interpretation. Barriers to 
this optimum stage are the various resistances to analysis. The 
weak ego which the therapist hopes to reach in order to strengthen, . 
is covered by layers of neuroses. Vhen one is peeled off, another 
is there. These layers are what Freud calls "defenses." By defini­
tion, it would seem, neurosis is ego-defenst* We recall the delinea­
tion of the various "mental mechanisms which can be employed in the 
defense of the ego.^  Hence, it is understandable how theologians can 
suggest neurosis itself as the analogy to "sin."3
•kllara Thompson discusses the implications for the theory of 
transference in PsychoanalysisI Its Evolution and Development,
pp. 1C&-105.
-Supra, Part Two, especially Chapter Four.
3See Mary Frances Thelen, op. cit., pp. 183-186, 200-213*
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Theoretically, Freud's therapy removed the defenses one by one. 
Before it could allov a defense to be taken away the ego would have to 
become strong enough to rely on another one. The cure was in the ego's 
assimilating the new understanding of the problem biographically. The 
understanding gained by the analyst, when imparted to the patient and 
assimilated by him would be self-understanding.
Freud's "parentlfying" technique developed out of his expert- . 
ence with hypnosis, under Charcot, for instance.^ During hypnosis 
the patient is most suggestible. His post-hypnotic behavior will 
obey the therapist's suggestions made during the sleep. Later, after 
giving up hypnosis, Freud still used the technique of suggestion, 
Interpreting it in terms of the child's responsiveness to the parent 
during the unresolved Oedipus phase before the external parent has 
been effectively replaced by the introjected parent.
The extensive development in psychotherapy for children has 
forced a revision in the classical Freudian understanding of therapy. 
Melanie Klein and her school speak of positive tranference in children 
just as Freud could speak of it in adults. Anna Freud, daughter of the 
founder of psychoanalysis, Is another pioneer in the field of child 
therapy. She and her school speak of "transference phenomenan but 
consider them qualitatively different from the classical "transference."2
^See Ernest Jones, The Life and Vork of Sigmund Freud, I, 
pp. 227 ff. and passim.
2Anna Freud sees the analyst as sharing the parent-image and 
thus becoming a part of the introjected "parent"— or super-ego.—  
Psycho-Analytic Treatment of Children (London, Imago Publishing Co.,
Sandor Rado speaks of "resistance transference'1 in describing 
the classical doctrine. He himself goes on to develop vhat he calls 
adaptational therapy, vhich can be used for those patients vho for 
some reason cannot be given the longer "parentlfying" analysis. 
Adaptational therapy concentrates on keeping the patient on "the adult 
level," trying to avoid an emotional regression to an infant-parent 
relationship. He admits that this is not possible for every patient. 
Rado says he is backing up to Breuer, the Viennese physician, vith 
vhotn Freud discovered via a case of hysteria the phenomenon elabo­
rated as repression." He thinks that the Freudian theory of 
repetition-compulsion obstructs the path of therapy.1
Breuer’s method vas to allov and encourage a complete "mental 
catharsis.2 Freud did not abandon this technique. But he felt that 
the patient vas continually reliving his early traumatic experience, 
deep vithin his repressed unconscious. The therapist intrudes into 
this drama, vhlle lifting the stage to viev, so to speak.
Frans Alexander, for many years the leader of the so-called 
Chicago school of psychoanalysis, emphasises flexibility in therapy. 
Intense transference situations are to be avoided more often than not
^Sandor Rado, ’Recent Advances in Psychoanalytic Therapy,"
An Outline of Psychoanalysis (ed. by Clara Thompson et al.), pp. 593- 
ST3 (reprinted from Psychiatric Treatment— Proceedings, Association 
for Research in Ner.ous and Mental Disease, 1951, Nev York, Baltimore, 
Williams and Wilkins Co., 1953)*
2We have referred to the vork vhich Breuer and Freud wrote 
together. See Ernest Jones, "The Breuer Period" (1882-1885) in The 
Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, I, pp. 2U3-29I*. Also, Sigmund Freud, 
'*A History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement," (Basic Writings, ed. by 
Brill, at p. 93*0*
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for successful therapy, he contends. ** Yet no analysis is complete 
without a careful interpretation and manipulation of transference 
phenomena.
Clinical psychologists, like Maslov and Millelmann, can 
describe for the layman the actual process of psychoanalysis almost 
without describing "transference." But they depict as crucial the 
analyst's understanding the patient's attitudes toward the therapist
himself
Alfred Adler taught a method of quick analysis, using the 
Freudian concept of ’’screen memories,” a bit too superficially, 
according to his critics. The patient's earliest conscious memory 
was an important clue. He considered the patient's style-of-life 
as based on an error, which could be readily identified, explicated, 
and rectified, if the patient had the moral support of the therapist 
and friends.3
Jung's theory of psycho-dynamics reveals his interests in 
therapy. The patient's world is fascinating. His self-concern 
should sustain him in his Increasing freedom to be himself. The 
patient is encouraged in a new philosophy of himself by his skilled
^Frans Alexander, 'Analysis of the Therapeutic Factors in 
Psychoanalytic Treatment,Psychoanalytic Quarterly. XIX, 1950, 
pp. 482-500, reprinted in Thompson et al., An Outline of Psycho­
analysis, pp. 436-454.
2A. H. Maslow and Bela Mittelmann, Psychoanalytic Therapy,:! 
from their Principles of Abnormal Psychology (New York, Harper, 1941,
’51), reprinted in Thompson et al.TAn Outline, pp. 565-592, especially 
at pp. '?68-9 ("Effects of Investigation of Attitudes Toward the Analyst").
j Supra, Chapter Six.
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and vise counselor. Analysis is aomevhat like an exciting journey 
to the center of the earth.1
Otto Bank's theory should he distinguished from his therapy. 
His so-called Will therapy may seem somewhat like Rado's adaptatlonal 
therapy and like Adler’s "quick conversion" technique. He believed 
in setting a terminus to the analysis and using the date as a part of 
the technique, as a goad to the forces of reconstruction already at 
vork in the patient. His technique has been criticised as expecting 
more of some patients than they were capable of undertaking. But 
his theory does reflect his driving faith in the meaning implied in 
the very fact of individuation. The therapeutic agent, according to 
Rank, is love. He even uses the term agape, as ve have seen.2 His 
emphasis reflects the therapeutic technique employed— somewhat over 
Freud’s protests— by Sandor Ferencsi, who thought the "parentifying” 
should be demonstrably "loving," though not physically.3
■^ See, for instance, the first eleven essays in the volume:
C. 0. Jung, The Practice of Psychotherapy, "Essays on the Psychology 
of the Transference and Oiher Subjects {Bollingen Series, XX, 16,
Nev York, Pantheon, 195*0*
2Supra, Chapter Five. Bank taught that the crucial handling 
of the transference situation is successful vhen the analyst accepts 
the patient's counter-vlll.— Otto Rank, Will Therapy.
^Sandor Ferencsi vas a pioneer in the appreciation of accept­
ance -love as a technique. Hardly a paper that ve read on the thera­
peutic process (certainly by Freudians and so-called revisionists") 
fails to mention him vlth appreciation. For Freud's (and Jones'— vho 
vas psychoanalysed by Ferencsi) "ambivalent" appreciation of the 
famous Hungarian analyst, consult Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of 
Sigmund Freud, II, III, passim, especially, III, pp. S9-0O, 1^8-9, 
171-73, VfZ-77.
In a paper on 'Psycho-Analysis of Sexual Habits," Ferencsi 
vrote: "Uie aim of analysis is the development of a personality vith
Ian Suttie interpreted psychoanalytic therapy, regardless of 
vhat the theoretical frame of reference vas, operationally as love 
therapy." The prototype for such love is the "breast-fceding," 
mothering lore of the parental milieu.*1'
Most if not all analysts agree that without some positive 
transference hy the patient of his feelings from the erstwhile envir­
onment to the therapist the prognosis is not hopeful. They agree also 
that the therapist's careful skill is required in Interpreting and 
manipulating such transference phenomena.
The Significance of the Therapist's Attitude
Increasingly nowadays psychotherapists are concerned with the 
very obvious presence of transference phenomena in the attitude and 
behavior of the therapist himself in his relationship with his patient. 
The classical analysts had hoped and often assumed that their ovn 
psychoanalysis while in training would mean the relative absence of 
serious counter-transference— that is, of the therapists' projecting 
emotional roles on to the patient. Any noticeable emotion toward a
powerful instinctual trends but at the same time vith great capacity 
for controlling them. Ve might say that a successfully educated or 
analysed individual is one vho does not repress his desires but at 
the same time does not become their slave."— International Journal
of Psycho-Analysis, VI, 1925# pp. 372-^CA, at p. 466.  tn this article
Ferenc si went so far as to reeoamsend (for some patients) privation—  
abstinence— in order to Increase inner tension to facilitate the 
reaching of a definite crisis in the "positive transference."
^Ian Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate, Chapters XII 
( Psychotherapy ) and XIV ("Freudian £rac€ice Is A Cure' By Love"), 
pp. 2 0 2 - 2 1 7 #  2 ^ 2 - 2 5 5 .
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patient vas, logically, a signal that the therapist Bust have some 
unanalysed, "unveeded-out" patches in his own personality. Gradually 
they cane to realise that no analysis can be thorough enough to elimi­
nate the possibility of counter-transference.1 The problem became 
one of understanding and interpreting for oneself the counter­
transference and directing it to profitable ends.2 Indeed, nany 
agree that there Bust be a positive response to the patient ( counter­
transference”? ) or else therapy is impossible.
•^See, for example, Lawrence KSubie, Practical and Theoretical 
Aspects of Psychoanalysis, Chapters VII and VYff, pp. bkJPf, and
m T 'a t i : ‘239^ 0
We have referred earlier to Freud's Analysis Terminable and 
Interminable," Collected Papers, V, pp. 316-357* In this paper he 
actually recojasendc that the analyst himself be re-analysed every 
five years.
2The tens counter transference" is technical nosnnclature 
for the therapist's own transference resetions to the client or 
patient. However, an accepting response to the patient is a requisite 
to successful therapy.—  Bruno Bettelhelm, "Harry— A Study in Rehabili­
tation, " The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology (Albany,
American PsychoTogicaT”Association, XLivJT 1 9 ^ 9 pp. 231-265* See 
infra, Chapter Twelve. Cf. Bettelhelm'e Truants from Life (1955)*
Mabel Blake Cohen's article gives quite a thorough review of 
contributions to the subject of counter-transference* She offers a 
list of sixteen sltuatlon-elgnals of anxlety-defenslveness responses 
on the part of the therapist. This article should be helpful to 
pastoral-counselors as well as to psychotherapists, generally.—  
"Counter-transference and Anxiety," Psychiatry, XV, 1952, pp. 231- 
2fc3, reprinted in Thompson et al., An outline, pp. 539-561.
See Leo Berman, "Countertransferences and Attilades of 
the Analyst in the Therapeutic Process," and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, 
"Notes on Personal and Professional Requirements of a Psychotherapist," 
in Psychiatry, XII, 19^9*
The inferences for our theological study of this process, 
include the rather obvious, but all-important, consideration: 
Theologically, agape must be actual, not simply conceptual.
Harry Stack Sullivan speaks pf the therapist as a "partici­
pant observer." His whole emphasis on inter-personal relations, 
vith concepts of prototaxie, syntaxlc, and parataxic modes, is built 
on the awareness of the dynamics of both transference and counter­
transference phenomena.1
The importance of the different theoretical frames of refer­
ence must not be overlooked. Hence ve avoid too summary a conclusion 
as to the sine qua non of good psychotherapy. As Hank protests, 
good" therapy may not always be the best for the patient, relative 
to the possibility of individuation.2 However, our study of the 
dynamics of the psychotherapeutic relationship suggests for us cer­
tain inferences for the Christian theology of Justification.
^Harry Stack Sullivan, The Psychiatric Interview, pp. 3-27*
See also Clara Thompson's argument for a distinction between "counter­
transference" (Freud et al.) and Sullivan's description of the thera­
pist's response (and Initiative)! "In the Interpersonal situation, 
the analyst is seen as relating to his patient not only vith his dis­
torted affects but with his healthy personality also" (Psychoanalysis I 
Its Evolution . . . ., p. 108). ......
2Supra, Chapter Five.
CHAPTER TWELVE
"JUSTIFICATION” IN DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY
The Meaning of Psychoanalytic Therapy
Dreams,1 chance remarks, failures of memory, mistakes, and 
apparent accidents in everyday life— 'every idle word”2— reveal un­
conscious motives! Free association in 'conversation" with the 
analyst is the route for serious therapeutic discovery of the patient’s 
unconscious disturbances. He may come to the analyst vith an apparent 
organic complaint or nervous trouble” such as obsessions, compulsions, 
hallucination, disturbances of memory, tics, feelings of depression, 
or of unreasonable fatigue. Unless the physical examination reveals 
organic illness, the complaints are interpreted as symptoms of *
In addition to works already cited, on dreams, we should 
refer to two other representative approaches; Erich Frosmi's The For-
fotten language, "An Introduction to the Understanding of Dreams, airy Tales and Ityths" (New York, Rinehart), and J. A. Hadfield, 
Dreams and Nightmares (A Pelican Book, London, Penguin Books, 195*0. 
To Freud goesthe credit, of course, for introducing the dream into 
the technique of psychotherapy.
^oth chance remarks and actions ( parapraxis”) disclose the
Cf. Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious (1905) (Basic 
Writings, pp. 633-306)7




emotional conflict within the personality, the peyche, the unconscious 
world of the patient.
Analytic therapy demands patience on the part of two human 
beings,1 one of whom is especially unwell. The fact that analysis 
takes from weeks to months to years2 for satisfactory results may be 
due partly to the tremendous distance the patient must traverse through 
his own inner world of emotions. It is due also to the fact that he 
is traversing this distance with another person, the analyst, who 
represents" the society which helped shape these emotions. The ana­
lyst is the object alternately of love and hatred and also of various
lGroup psychotherapy is also being attempted nowadays. Pio­
neering work has been done at the Tavistock Clinic, In London. See, 
for a brief description of this trend, Hubert S. Coffey, "Group 
Psychotherapy,” Pennington and Berg, oj>. cit., pp. 586-607.
See also Leo Berman, 'Mental Hygiene for Edueatorss Report
on an Experiment . . . ."in group psychotherapy in Boston, Psycho-
 ^ analytic Review, 1*0, 1953, PP« 319-332.
In the same issue of Psychoanalytic Review, see Benjamin 
Kbtkov, ’Analytically Oriented Group Psychotherapy of Psychoneurotic 
Adults," pp. 333-350. He deals with "repression as therapy," the 
oldest, most widely disseminated form of psychotherapy in the world.
He points to religious groups as examples of its use.
T^ ie length depends on the technique of the particular ana­
lyst (along with his criteria for "cure" or termination of analysis), 
and also, of course, on the nature and depth of the emotional problems 
t of which the patient is a victim. In Part Two we referred to Adler
and Rank's comparatively short-term analyses. Vilhelm Stekel said,
"I have seen severe compulsive neuroses resolve after two months of 
treatment, because I was able to uncover the motives of the will to 
illness in time. — Wilhelm Stekel, Compulsion and Doubt, authorized 
trans. of Zwang and Zweifel (New York, Liveright, 19^9J, p. 623.
See Kubie, op. cit., pp. 39-^3*
Cf. also J. D. Sutherland, "Scientific Tasks for the Psycho- 
f logical Clinic" in Current Trends in British Psychology, ed. by C. A.
Mace and P. E. Vernon (London, kethuen, 1953), pp. £23-233. Ifce
emotions that fuss the tvo*3' Tbs patient sees himself laid bare and 
looks at his psychic nakedness# He views it vith another person, 
society's surrogate, the analyst. It is not surprising that his 
unconscious defenses resist such invasion by his ovn conscious and 
by another person. Resistance takes many forms: blocking, complain* 
ing, changing the subject, becoming acutely hostile to the therapist, 
and often, breaking off the analysis altogether.
If in the process the patient la made to feel that the analyst* 
in the role of earliest parent image, or, according to Harry Stack 
Sullivan, the composite of images from the crises of Interpersonal 
relationships— is accepting instead of rejecting, loving instead of 
hating, affirming instead of negating toward existence, he can be 
established in a pattern of basic trustfulness and "be saved" from 
the destructiveness that has heretofore overtaken hla In hla existence. 
His emotions undergo a change of direction. He now feels that he la 
accepted. Hla emotional structure la rebuilt from the foundation up. 
This is true if the analytic therapy has approximated a psychic return 
to the nursery, or to wherever the "personality structure" or” life 
style has gone awry.
As we have noted in Part Tvo, psychotherapy presupposes that 
many so-called emotional, mental, and character disorder* have their
author, the Medical director of the Tavistock Clinic, in London, dis­
cusses analytic procedures and also the experiments in group therapy.
He and his colleagues have found Freud, McDougall, and especially, now, 
Hurt Levin (Field theory) moat helpful in providing the theoretical 
frame of reference for the formulation of needs and goals.
Vflhere it "ambivalence" of emotion in the interaction, not 
simply positive and "negative" transference phenomena.
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origin In an early feeling of deprivation and rejection, vhich has 
never been overcome in subsequent interpersonal relations. The 
"sinner" is vhat he is because he has been "sinned" against. Effec­
tive psychotherapy means emotional restitution, restoration, and 
acceptance* The patient ia saved by being loved. Be learns to love 
by being loved*
A graphic picture of personal dynamics in psychotherapy 
ia given in the ease study of a pre-adolescent unusually disturbed 
truant, named "Harry."
While his truancy can be explained as the avoidance of actual 
and psychological dangers, it had also the connotation of a search 
for the "good" mother of vhom he vae in need and vho had probably 
been available to him before the arrival of his sister. This 
"good" mother ves accessible to him only in fantasy* He sought 
his in the dream vorld provided by movie theaters. There he 
could enjoy the warmth of the room, the softness of the chair in 
vhich he curled up as in a crib, and vas relatively happy and 
secure, either eating— if he had something to eat— or sucking 
his thumb. But even this haven vas full of anxiety-creating 
experiences— the threatening and incomprehensible events on the 
screen— so that all of his efforts at escape only increased his 
difficulties and forced him to additional acts of delinquency
The therapist vas a women, whose "counter-transference" vas positive. 
Harry vas an unusually destructive, dangerous, and suioldally inclined 
youngster, to say the least. But he vas rehabilitated. The "rehabili­
tation" process vas long and painstaking* In Bettelheim's description 
of It ve see that the therapeutic agent vas love— yes, ve shall have 
to call it agape.
^Bruno Bette lhelm, "Harry— A Study in Rehabilitation, The 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, pp. 231-265, at p. 2$B.
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From our study of the theoretical formulations and the ther­
apeutic dynamics, ve conclude that there are basic presuppositions 
and affirmations in depth psychology vhlch suggest the same kind of 
genius vhich informs the Christian understanding of justification by 
grace through faith.
(1) The therapist presupposes that the life and personality 
of the patient have meaning, inherent and potential. His existence 
and his possibilities are considered as justified already. This is 
not argued. It is simply presupposed.
(2) The therapist enters the vorld of the patient; he goes 
vith him through his hell, like Vergil vith Dante. He seeks to help 
him undo that hell.
(3) The therapeutic agent is love, agapeistic— ■in principle, 
certainly. True, it is structured by the clinical situation. It 
accepts the patient and his hell. It supports and encourages him in 
the encounter vlth his ovn subterranean vorld.
(k) The therapist tries to bring the patient to the strength 
that can bear insight into his deepest distress.
(3) Along vlth the bringing of insight the emotional support 
must continue if the patient is to assimilate his nev knovledge. The 
therapeutically-instilled insight becomes genuine understanding.
(6) The patient is thus delivered from a fictitious concept 
of himself and his worlds. The way is opened to a realistic vorld- 
and-life viev and to a kind of realistic— even if not "high"
^f. John Oman, Grace and Personality (Macmillan, 1925), 
p. 209: "The essence of being justified is emancipation from moral
1*02
coamitsent. He Is brought ’’body and soul” to the threshold of 
authentic adulthood.
Alfred Adler and Otto Rank, among others, go further and 
suggest the kind of life-commitment vhich the "saved” man should 
have. In this they are speaking as ethical philosophers, Indeed, 
as "theologians."
Despite the many, often valid, criticisms of psychoanalysis1 
it abounds in analogies to the Christian understanding of salvation 
and its 'elan, Justification by grace.
Ian Suttie goes so far as to say: "The ideal attitude (of
the therapist) is very like that of Christ . . . .  serene without 
being aloof, sympathetic without being disturbed; exactly vhat the 
child desires in the parent.'2
Sin and Justification in the Light of Psychotherapy
In our study of "man as sinner" in the light of depth psycho­
logy ve considered the views of various theorists on the subject-self, 
the nature of guilt feelings, shame feelings, anxiety, despair, and 
self-concern. Without again elaborating the vievs and theoretical 
differences of opinion vhich ve noted there, ve nevertheless draw
Juggling vith ourselves by giving us the pover to look all reality 
in the face, but as a mere legal fiction, it would only be another 
Illusion, and could do nothing to deliver us from hypocrisy."
*We have already referred to some of these criticisms: 
supra, Chapter Eleven, notes.
2Ian Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate, p. 217.
the two studies of depth psychology together in their inferences for 
the Christian rubric of justification by grace.
(1) In presupposing a subject-self, centered-selfor ego* 
which can and must be strengthened vis-e-vis existence and society, 
ve assume that there is vithin the "normal" individual an I vhich 
says, yes insists: "1^ though Inadequate am nevertheless capable of 
being responsible to the call of meaning in my existence Insofar as 
that meaning confronts me."
(2) Guilt feelings cry out for forgiveness and restitution. 
Psychotherapy encourages the patient to live by some such conviction 
as thisx "I can be both realistic and responsible, striving to avoid 
fictional guilt, making 'restitution' realistically and not slavishly 
at the beck and call of inner 'shoulds' vhich may actually be destruc­
tive In their aim. In the main, I shall assume that I am accepted;
I shall accept myself.1^
(3 ) Psychotherapy seeks to explicate the basis of inferiority 
and shame feelings and to provide, at least temporarily, partially,
in the structured relationship of the clinic, the kind of acceptance- 
love which may enable the patient to take courage to live vith his 
privation and his sense of inferiority, to face realistically and 
constructively the problem of his "vorthfulness." It seeks to share 
with him its ovn conviction that he is "vorthful."
-^Supra, Chapter Four. We recall that Professor Tillich’s 
favored term is "centered-self."
^Cf. Robert Bonthius, Christian Paths of Self-Acceptance,
(New York, King's Crown, 19*i8).
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(U) Psychotherapy works toward the goal of "rehabilitation" 
for the patient. It aids him in his progress toward a taking hold 
of life, a faith-as-commitment to some goal or cause.1 In trying 
to remove neurotic defenses, neurotic anxiety, It tries to strengthen 
the subject-self for purposeful living. In more enlightened therapy, 
as we see It, the patient is encouraged to throw off his neurotic 
anxieties and to confront with courage, what we have called, his 
fundamental anxiety.
(5) Psychotherapy*s concern Is to redeem the patient from 
despair and to activate all of the resources available to his in 
setting him upon a hopeful path.
(6) Psychotherapy does not try to eradicate the patient's 
Inherent self-concern. It does try to remove his illusions about
its presence and its nature. Some psychotherapists may take a further, 
most constructive step and try to lead the patient into a kind of 
devotion to the essential humanity present in himself and in others.2
^Rollo May goes so far as to says "The therapist's aim, with 
regard to ethical standards, is to help the other person to remove 
distortions and the various forms of neurotic contradictions within 
himself that he may arrive at and choose freely the value Judgments 
and ethical standards which are most constructive for him."—  
"Historical and Philosophical Presuppositions for Understanding 
Therapy, " in Psychotherapy: Theory and Research, 0. Hobart Mowrer, ed.
(New York, Ronald Press, 19531/ PP« 9-^3* al p. k3.
Also specific "character disorders” seem to be accessible 
to treatment in depth. For instance, Edmund Bergler writes of his 
conclusions (which tend to be hopeful as well as msliorlstlc) on 
the effectiveness of psychoanalysis with homosexuals: Bergler,
Edmund, Homosexualityj 'Disease or Way of Life?" (New York, Hill and 
Wang, 19571- "
our understanding, Homey, Rank, Jung and the "existential 
analysts,” and many others, seem to fit this description.
(7) Psychotherapy looks realistically on the unfortunate 
events and circumstances that affect the patient in his emotional 
distress. He is to he strengthened in his efforts to mitigate their 
ill effects and to avoid morbid self-condemnation for that over 
which he has little or no control.
The Inferences are strong enough to encourage practical 




TOWARD A RESPONSIBLE USE OF THE CHRISTIAN 
CONCEPTIONS OF SIN AND JUSTIFICATION 
IN THE LIGHT OF DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY
CHAPTER •!
SUMMARY
As ve try to bring together the threads of our theological 
research into the psychological understanding of the nature of man- 
in-hls-exlstenee-and-ln-society, ve shall first summarise the lead­
ing inferences drawn from each of the three parts of the study.
Admittedly our exposition of the contemporary expression of 
the conceptions of sin and justification has been selective, from 
vhat may be described, generally, as a Protestant, ecumenically- 
oriented, and practical, "instrumentalistic" point of view. Our 
attention to the theologians has been necessarily somewhat sketchy, 
since our inquiry has been primarily into depth psychology. It has 
been necessary, however, to present for the purpose of comparison 
what we find to be representative in theology today.
Our orientation to the Biblical origins is, of course, basic, 
since the conceptions are anchored in the "world of the Bible." Our 
study of the Biblical origins has been quite dependent on vhat are 
considered reliable authorities. Of course there is some limited 
venturing forth from these sources into inferences of our own.
Likewise, there is a serious limitation to our treatment of 




Vith these limitations in mind ve shall reviev the implica­
tions yielded hy our study thus far*
I* The Christian Conceptions
(1) The conception of sin Is properly understood only frost 
the side of grace— or after entering the process of being delivered 
from the power of sin and evil.
(2) Justification Is ths act and process of bringing 
"righteousness," worth, goodness, and meaning*
(3) It presupposes the essential goodness of essential 
humanity*
(*) It includes forgiveness and healing.
(5) It proceeds via the Christ— as event and symbol.
(6) It bespeaks the living presence of the Christ as
soter— savior.
(7) Sin is by definition before and against God-as-the- 
God-and-Father-of-Our-Lord-Jesus-Christ, God as Love— Agape.
(8) Sin is offense against the lav and the grace of agape. 
against the fulfillment of essential selfhood, essential humanity as 
it is defined— according to Christian faith— in the Christ.
(9) Sin, though still a confused term in theological
vrltings, should be distinguished from the greater, inclusive cate­
gory of tragic evil in human existence.
(10) Sin, as culpable offense, is rejection of the grace 
°* the grace of God in Christ. The logic seems to require
that the grace in some sense be experienced, "tasted," known, if its 
rejection can be considered culpable.
(11) So-called "sins' nay be instances of the basic offense 
and condition (of being in "darkness").
(12) The Christian conceptions together say that one is 
truly free and participating in "righteousness ’ only when he depends 
on the grace of God for ultimate worth and meaning for his life and 
efforts.
II. "Man As Sinner" in the Light of Depth Psychology
Our study of depth psychology brought us to the following 
inferences for the questions: Who is sinner? and What is the nature
of his guilt?
(1) The subject-self, although it may be much less of a 
unity, much less in actual control, and less centered than many 
philosophers and theologians have been wont to imagine, is neverthe­
less presupposed. It has a limited freedom of choice, varying with 
the individual.
(2) Guilt feelings presuppose relationship and love. They 
may be distorted. When "realistic” they represent a capacity for 
freedom and responsibility.
(3) Often fused with guilt feelings, and sometimes present 
without them, are compulsive shame feelings, which derive from in­
ternalised privation and rejection in infancy and early childhood.
(k) Restless fearfulness, or anxiety, is present in both 
guilt feelings and compulsive shame feelings. Anxiety may be neurotic;
iK)9
k io
that is, it asay be a device for protecting the subject-self from 
reality* Some psychologists, especially therapists influenced by 
contemporary "existential analysis," recognise the anxiety, vhich 
ve have dared to call "fundamental anxiety." It is like that vhich 
is described by the existentialist philosophers, theologians like 
Paul Tillich, and depth psychologists: Otto Bank, Ludvig Binsvanger,
and Hollo May. It is the anxiety vhich is implicit in the potentlad 
for individuation. Following Bank, ve have seen its twin aspects as 
fear of separation and fear of union.
(5) Despair means destructiveness of the potential for indi­
viduation. It nay be relative. In a sense, it Is never absolute so 
long as there is life* It harks back, psychogenetlcally, and aetio- 
loglcally, to a basic pattern of distrust, set in earliest infancy.
Ve nay speak of "culpable wrongness with regard to despair— this 
subjective dimension of vhat Tillich calls tragic self-loss and 
vorld-loss— only insofar as ve may assume that the subject-self has 
been free to choose a vay of despair when a vay of hope vas a "visible" 
alternative. Yet our concern, theological, soteriologlcal, is not 
vith placing blaae, but vith bringing salvation. Hence the only 
interest vhich theology can have properly in the question of culp­
ability or accountability le the "Instrumentalistic" implications
for the bringing of "salvation."
(6) Although Christian theology has indulged in reductionist 
definitions for sin, such as "selfishness," "egoism," and "idolatry," 
it need not, indeed, it is not encouraged by the insights of depth
psychology to accept such reductions. Intrinsic self-concern is 
implicit in individual existence. Secondary, "unattractive" self­
concern is largely imposed upon the subject by an indifferent, de­
priving, rejecting, or irresponsibly pampering ‘parentalmilieu* 
Belief in magic and idolatry, even sophisticated idolatry, suggest 
infantile fixations during the autistic, highly undeveloped stages 
of early object-relations• .
III. TJustification" in Depth Psychology
We find that no school of psychoanalysis makes a systematic 
attempt to demonstrate vhy healing is to be preferred to allowing 
the psyche to deteriorate* There is an implicit conaltment, a quasi- 
theologlcel, soterlologlcal, foundation for the art of psychotherapy.
A partial description of the dynamics of psychotherapy is as
follows•
(1) The therapist tries to achieve In depth an understanding 
of the patient's problems*
(2) He gradually shares his insights into these problems, 
in terms of the pat lent #s biography, as he finds him becoming able 
to reoeive and assimilate them.
(3) He supports the patient as he helps him to orient his 
life to reality and to possibility*
(U) By being a participant with the patient in this task of 
emotional and volitional reorientation he helps right some of the 
wrongs inflicted by the physiognomic social milieu*
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(5) The goal of therapy is to help the patient take hold 
of his life and face with courage the possibilities for purposeful 
living open to him in his Halted freedom from crippling neurosis.
There is structured acceptance, agapeistic concern, a kind 
of "rescue,1 'deliverance,” "raaking whole (again),” "salvation," 
within the context of cllnieal healing and rehabilitation.
We proceed now to a concluding study of the Christian con* 





The Christian Conception of Sin in Perspective
Theologically, sin is conceived as offense primarily against 
God. The conception seems more difficult to understand and to com­
municate in a day when the meaning of the term God eludes our grasp. 
Certainly the apostles and the Hebrew prophets did not seem to have 
the kind of struggle the modem mind is "blessed" or "cursed" with 
in defining the use of the awesome name.
The foundation of Christian theology is the conviction that 
Jesus Christ as depicted in the New Testament writings is the reve­
lation of what "God" means for humanity. Chrlstologles vary as to 
their opaqueness and transparency in presenting Jesus Christ as a 
lens through whom we see "God," as the source of meaning and life. 
Certainly regardless of whatever the relationship may be between 
the Christ of Christian faith and God as God-beyond-all-concoptions- 
of-God, It cannot be demonstrated indisputably through theological 
or philosophical exposition. The assertion that Jesus Christ is 
"the revelation of God" is a part of the articulation of that trust­
fulness which we have described as the subjective dimension of the 
grace "of God in Christ." Having received it, being established in
M3
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it, having left the "darkness," one reflects upon vhat has happened 
and Is happening• Thus, in former ages the doxologles, the creeds, 
the dldache, yes, even the kerygtaa itself have found their verbal 
expression. Arguments for the existence of God can never win their 
case in the court, either of "pure reason," or of the so-called 
"scientific method." They may be used in the articulation of one's 
faith.1 But Christian faith is by its very nature naive faith, with 
a somewhat "calculated" naivete to be sure. The credo is: "I believe—
we believe— in God. What is store, I believe in the God vho is behind 
the Jesus Christ of the New Testament portraiture. In this I do not 
put forth an 'argument'— if it were such a proposition, of course it 
would be 'question begging'—  since that there is (a?) God behind 
Jesus Christ as portrayed in the New Testament is already presupposed.
I am simply making my religious confession. I am making a 'religious 
statement.'2 I believe in God— the reality— that God represents as 
Jesus bore witness to such reality. By 'Jesus Christ' I mean all 
these: a person, an event in history, a symbol*  ^I mean his teaching—
*Cf. J. C. Smart, "The Existence of God," in New Essays in 
Philosophical Theology, ed. by Antony Flew and AlasdairMacintyre 
t^ew York, fciscmillan, 1955)# PP* 28-H6.
2lha linguistic analysts goad us to examine the nature of 
the meaning of our terminology. Our implied argument here is that 
there is a language expressive of human reality and "personal knowl­
edge" (Polanyi) which may be described as "religious." It is a 
language of devotion.
See also Ian T. Ramsey, Religious Language (London, SCM, 1957). 
He discusses "Justification (pp7 lt9-i$2) as a relational term, with 
a special meaning (for "religious language").
!• e., Symbol, in the sense in which Tillich uses it. "Ihe 
symbol participates in the reality which is symbolized." Systematic 
Theology, II, p. 10. We do not mean Jesus as mere "symbol.
his life— the whole story about him and what they convey to me.
I believe in the continued presence of this reality in the world, the 
’Spirit of God.'"
The guiding star for theology has its haze about it, to be 
sure, often difficult if not impossible to penetrate: The grace of
God in Christ is the way out of darkness into light, the rescue of 
mankind from meaninglessness. What is the way of life for our situ­
ation, hie et rnrncT Such causes as "Christian pacifism" illustrate 
the ambiguity. What do we mean by the phrase "which is seen in Christ"? 
This is a never-ending problem for Christology. It is easy to over­
simplify, to sentimentalise, the impact of "Jesus as the Christ, the 
Son of Man, the Son of God, the Savior of the World."
Theologians will not likely abandon their telescopes, which 
do soem to be improving with the aid of Biblical criticism. "Bible 
students" who prefer not to use such equipment are numerous in the 
United States, for instance.1 They say the star is lost to view 
when the modem" telescope is used. The response to their criticism 
is that Light and obscurantism can hardly be compatible.
The theologians who do not cower before any new discovery and 
plausible new hypothesis in research into the antiquities still do
^This fact hardly needs documentation. Some of the "free 
mall" on any clergyman's desk, in the United States at least, is 
evidence enough. Along with the more non-intellectual literalism 
evident in some revivalism, there is an impressive scholastic 
fundamentalism, with centers of learning, often of a "non- 
denominational" character. See Hordern's discussion of a more 
respected representative of this stance: William Hordern, A Layman’s
Guide to Protestant Theology, pp. 56-76.
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not deny the star. But its location and bearing are for every gene­
ration the subject of most painstaking contemplation. Indeed the 
conceptualising, symbol-redisco/ering enterprise can be relevant only 
if the conceptions and symbols of the Christian faith are continually 
re-interpreted even as the "science1' problems of mankind are subjected 
to change in their aspect.
Yet, as ve have suggested, the inquiry is made vithin the 
circle of faith.1 Christianity's conception of its gospel, its con­
ceptions of sin— and of all tragedy— are on this side of the experi­
ence of grace.2
It is true, Paul says that by "the lav" is the knowledge of 
sin.3 What does he mean? He answers: "If it had not been for the 
lav, I should not have known sin. I should not have known vhat it is 
to covet if the lav had not said, 'You shall not c o v e t I * I n  the 
Epistle to the Galatians he says, "The lav vas our custodian until 
Christ came, that ve might be justified by faith. "5 The word for 
custodian is paidagogos— a trusted servant or slave who watched over 
the child, accompanying him to school and supervising his outward 
behavior. Paul continues: "But now that faith has come, ve are no
longer under a custodian; for in Christ Jesus you are all sons of 
God through faith." Paul's use of the lav vas instrumentalistic.
The essence of righteousness is revealed by grace. Being baptised
*Cf. Tillich's theological circle" (for instance, in Systema­
tic Theology, I, pp. 3»7)»
2Supra, Part One. ^Romans 3:20. ‘Honans 7:7.
5Galatians 3:2k,
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into Christ" is like "putting on Christ.” "There is neither Jew nor 
Greek; there is neither slave nor free, there is neither sale nor 
female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus," spiritual heirs of 
Abraham and therefore parties to the covenant promise made to him.^ 
There is neither this kind or that kind of person-object, but all 
are one in Christ.
Paul, in the Epistle to the Romans, describes the gospel as 
the power of God for salvation to everyone who has faith. "For in 
it the righteousness of God is revealed through faith for faith; as 
it is written, 'He who through faith is righteous 6hall live,''2
Later he elaborates the point.
Now the righteousness of God has been manifested apart fron 
the law, although the law and the prophets bear witness to it, 
the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ for all 
who believe . . . .  They are justified by his grace as a gift, 
through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus, who® God has 
put forward as an expiation by his blood, to be received by 
faith. This was to show God's righteousness, because in his 
divine forbearance he had passed over former sins; it was to 
prove at the present time that he himself is righteous and 
that he justifies him who has faith in Jesus.3
Here the apostle is expressing at once what is simple and what seems 
intricate in his understanding of the Christ, both over against the 
lav and in fulfillment of it. In Galatians he reiterates the same 
thought. In Christ ve see and partake of righteousness— as funda­
mental meaning and essential humanity. In the apostle's thought 
this is not simply moral righteousness, a righteousness of my ovn, 
based on the law," but a righteousness "which is through faith in 
Christ, the righteousness from God that depends on faith."
^Galatians 3*23-29* ^Romans 1:16-17. R^oioans 3*21-27. 
^Galatians 3:11-1^.
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Likewise, the writer of the Fourth Gospel enunciates a 
soteriological revelation, via grace rather than via law, in Christ:
The word fiio Logos"] became flesh and dwelt among us, full of 
grace and truth) we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only
Son from the Father....... And from his fullness have we all
received, grace upon grace. For the law vas given through Moses) 
grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. No one has ever seen 
God; the only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has 
made him known.1
Christianity, in its genius, regards sin as offense against 
this God. In such a context, "failure to accept Jesus Christ as 
Lord" makes sense as a definition of sin. Likewise understandable 
are the familiar descriptions of sin as "unbelief" and "disobedience," 
when they connote failure via free choice to commit one's life to 
'the Kingdom of God” as it manifests itself. Surely there must be 
encounter before there can be accountable offense. Wrongness is sin 
when it is against the Light. As Professor Edgar P. Dickie, of 
St. Andrews, says: "Light is a symbol of the self-communicating, self
authenticating goodness of God.
With Robert Mackintosh and others, we can appreciate the 
significance of the fact that Jesus' only denunciations of sin were 
against (l) hypocrisy, which is a kind of inner dishonesty and ob­
scurantism, (2) leading others astray, and (3) blasphemy against the 
Holy Spirit, which is treating goodness as though it were evil.3
xJohn 2Edgar P. Dickie, G^_ Is Light, p. 39.
3snpra. Chapter One. Tb* reference here Is to Robert 
Mackintosh,Christianity and Sin, p. 72.
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Vho sinned, this n n  or his parents?’' the disciples asked 
Jesus, according to the Fourth Gospel*1 In context they are asking 
him to explain by a familiar "logic” the tragic condition of a man 
bom blind* Jesus shuns the type of answers given by Job’s comfort­
ers. He sayss "neither this man nor his parents*” He goes on to 
speak about the glory of God. Perhaps his answer raises other ques­
tions, but It corrects the error that confuses culpability with tragic 
situations where evil, though present in perhaps its most ugly and 
frightening fora, la not proper ceuee for blaming the one who beers 
it, nor necessarily, for blaming those who are In s causal relation 
to hlm-ln-hls-plight*
The Christian gospel addresses not only that condition which 
we describe as sin but also the tragic helplessness in which man finds 
himself. "The son of man came to seek and to save the lost*"2 The 
lostness Is not simply culpable straying away* It is having been 
carried or snatched away by foul circumstances, by "the demonic" in 
man's existence.3
Tragic circumstances are fertile soil for Vhat may be described 
under the rubric of sin. But they are to be distinguished sharply from 
accountable wrongness. As we have seen in our study of depth psychol­
ogy, guilt feelings do assert accountability, culpability. But It is 
possible, even coraon, for a person to fsel guilty for that over which 
he has had no control and on which he can have little or no effect in
XJohn 9:1-3. %fetth«v 16:11) Ink. 19:10. 
^Cf. Gu»taf Aulen, Chrl.tua Victor (1931).
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the future. It it possible for "spiritual' leaders, in politics, 
religion, and other spheres, to inculcate and/or evoke such dis­
torted guilt feelings. Hence the fact that nan feels guilt "for 
this or for that' does not begin to prove that he is in fact guilty. 
The fallacy of equating objective guilt vith subjective guilt has 
sometimes led hortatory theologians astray and done injury to the 
integrity of the Christian insight.1
The very "guiltiness" in too much assumption of "account­
ability" may itself be "sinful" if the person vho feels guilty for 
that over vhich he has no control Is trying to protect infantile 
omnipotence feelings from the purging light of reality. Whether 
"accountable" or merely "neurotic" his attitude is strangely like 
that of "Lucifer": he is trying to be "like the Most High," to be
over all circumstances and all events, determined to find the cause 
for every fateful event somevhere vithin his ovn constricted area 
of freedom. He is despairing because of his ovn finltude.
Yet Christians have reflected that Jesus took upon himself 
the sins of the vhole vorld. Without digressing here to search out 
the vast problem for Nev Testament scholarship of determining vhat
1The confusion, vhich may sometimes be hard to avoid, espe­
cially in ’hortatory’ preaching, is in the failure to discern the 
categorical differences betveen "emotional' (psychological) and 
"actual" (objective dimension of the ethical). Hence "guilt" and 
"guilt feeling’ must be distinguished carefully In our discussion 
of culpable vrongness. Generally, in this paper, ve have italicised 
(underlined) the vord vtaen ve have meant to convey primarily the 
subjective or emotional dimension of "guilt."
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« M  the conscious— or unconscious (?)— intention of Jesus,1 we can 
safely allow that the ancient confession does not depend on his haring 
accused a guilt feeling" for that over whleh he had no control. The 
Idea seems rather to be that he waa likened to a sacrificial lamb, a 
representative of the people in his death-at-passover-tlee. He did 
take action against the evil in the world. We say as sum, from the 
gospel accounts, that he did, in sose profound sense, feel the burden 
of the world. It was sorrow, synpathy, empathy, love. The line nay 
be fine indeed between "sorrow-and-loveM and "the feeling of guilt, 
but it aust be drawn qualitatively. Indeed, with the help of depth 
psychology, it can be drawn.2
-^Besides the writings of Bultmann and score of his fellow heirs 
of fora criticism, we refer to other works, including: John Vick 
Bowmen, Tbe Intention of Jesus (Philadelphia, Westminster, 19^3); and 
Principal tieorge S. Duncanvs highly readable Jesus, Son of Man (London, 
Nisbet & Co., 19^7)* Amos Niven Wilder, Eschatolbgy andTthlcs in the 
Caching of Jesus (Hew York, Harper, 1939 5 •
Earlier we cited the suggestive thesis presented, though 
briefly, by W. R. Matthews in Tfre Problem of Christ in the Twentieth 
Century.
Works that bear on the subject, in varying ways, include: 
William Mane on, Jesus the Messiah; W. A. Curtis, Jesuj Christ, the 
Teacher; and John McLeod Campbell, The Nature of the Atonement Twhich 
is being reprinted, although it animates noleni critical studies)—  
aa# Bibliography, infra.
%his is not to say that dopth psychology is the only disci­
pline (or even the only kind of peychology) that can be of such aid 
to theology and ethics.
The point to be salvaged is that the Insights of depth psy­
chology encourage theologians to distinguish between objective wrong­
ness and subjective guilt and to try to help man's capacity for ths 
latter to advantage In overcoming the former. Certainly, for Instance, 
one can be responsible in his attitude toward evil forces and events
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The Light of Depth Psychology
Despite the much discussed Freudian hypothesis that God is 
hut a projection of the L&ius-father image, and the various re­
finements which may he possible for such a reductionistlc "Theology 
proper, it is beyond the purview of depth psychology to deny the 
being of God#1 Nor can its technique find him for our gasa. Can 
there be any light in such a discipline for the basic aspect of 
the Christian conception of sin, the before-and-against-God aspect? 
The analogy of alienation from the parent-image and of healing via 
reconciliation with the parent image may be of some help. However 
in our inquiry we hare concentrated on the anthropological aspect 
of the problem#
The waking self, the subject-self, or ego, insists on 
assuming responsibility for the navigation of the vastly irrational
without necessarily feeling the I-personally-am-guilty kind of 
guilt for every instance of evil which he recognizes. Yet at the 
same time he should be helped to awareness of his failures to be­
come authentically involved in the "business of living." These 
statements may help complement our earlier critical note on a pos­
sibly "careless' use of the concept of "guilt" by Reinhold Niebuhr 
(supra, Chapter Two, notes).
^Cf. however, C. A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood (Gifford 
Lectures, St. Andrews, 1953-5^, 5^-55, London, Alien and Unwin, N# Y., 
Macmillan, 1957): To exhibit the merely factual origination of an
idea in subjective processes raises no presumption against its objec­
tive validity. To exhibit its explanatory origin does. Even then, 
the object may have independent existence. But our having an idea 
of it can no longer be taken as establishing any presumption to that 
effect." He goes on to say that the task of arbiter is laid at the 
door of the philosopher (at p. 22 and preceding pages).
Cf. also, Professor J. G. McKenzie's use of Spearman's prin­
ciple of correlated eduction," in view of the Freudian "projection" 
argument.— J. G. McKenzie, Nervous Disorders and Religion, pp. 1^5-6.
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psyche of a nan. Guilt feelings when viewed as dynamism behave 
almost like a "faculty/ revealing (a) a will to freedom, (b) the 
primacy of relationship, hence (c) love, and (d) the assertion of 
responsibility. Early experiences of deprivation and rejection, 
along with later negative experiences are internalized as a sense 
of inferiority and of shame. When compulsive, the sense of shame, 
as self-hatred, reinforces guilt feelings. It may be dominant when 
the "capacity for guilt feeling" is comparatively undeveloped.
Shame reflects the injuries inflicted by circumstances— organic, 
societal, and historical. When turned outward it often assumes the 
form of active hostility toward society. The shame syndrome suggests 
more the nonculpable tragic element in a person’s existence. It 
does hold the possibility of striving "for glory." This is inter­
preted by depth psychologists as striving for psychic restitution 
to the deprived self and as seeking acceptance for the rejected 
self. Ibis striving delineates some specific needs which Justifica­
tion must meet if it is to be the bringing or confirming of a raison1 
d ’etre. Hence the cry of the shamed, as of the guilty, is for Justi­
fication. One seeks justification for his impoverished self as he 
experiences himself. The other, the guilt-assuming, seeks Justifica­
tion for his culpable self. Shame is the burden of an "offensive" 
self. Guilt is the burden of an "offending self. The burdens nay 
be compounded. Tfte "guilty" person feels compelled to justify him­
self before the "law"— of inter-personal relations, for instance—  
which he has broken. The shame-ridden person feels cospelled to
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Justify his very existence. His "behavior reflects, though often not 
directly, the constellation of hie fears. For example, obsequious, 
acceptance-oriented, behavior suggests an inner sense-and-fear of 
rejection tantamount to the loss of weaning to existence. One's 
style of life may be governed by his internalized privation and 
rejection.
As Professor Reinhold Niebuhr, like Kierkegaard, over a 
century ago, points out, anxiety provides the temptation "to sin." 
However, the offensiveness of the offense is in the particular re­
sponse to the fundamental anxiety. That anxiety is the basic aware­
ness of the risks one must take at each step in his pilgrimage of 
individuation and responsible relationship. The 'pilgrimage" begins 
in mystery and ends in mystery; it is surrounded by it. To refuse 
to confront the anxiety and respond to it creatively is to despair 
before the mystery and to reject any meaning which may be offered 
by it. Anxiety may disclose— by the questioning mode— the possi­
bility and challenge of essential humanity. But the fundamental 
anxiety may become burled under neurotic and other more superficial- 
less human (?)— anxieties which can work to prevent one from becoming 
authentically involved in realising and fulfilling the meaning which 
is implied in his being.
The last precipice before self-loss through a psychotic 
break with reality or through suicide is the condition we have 
described as despair. It harks back to a pattern of distrust,
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perhaps inflicted on the young "psyche." It nay he manifest in com­
plete resignation from the enterprise of living or from some essential 
part of that enterprise. It is manifest often in destructiveness. 
Indeed destructiveness may he a way of "life."
Although suicide is a ready symbol for absolute despair, 
even suicidal phantasies can he interpreted as expressing the wish 
to he horn over agdin. Further, where there is life there is not 
complete, or absolute, despair. Ibis fact is significant for any 
soterlologlcal concern.
Despair seems to he destructive of self-concern, although 
sinfulness has often been characterized as self-love."
Certainly Christian theology has regarded self-concern as 
being wrongful when it falls to he united to, or "lost in,” genuine 
concern for "ibe Kingdom of Qod." However so-called "selfishness," 
"self-centeredness" and ego-centrlsa'' have been determined largely 
by a failure of the "fostering" environment to center the growing 
child on other concerns and to relate him to persons and values. He 
has been forced to withdraw into himself and/or to "rely" too much on 
his own extremely limited resources during a stragetlc formative era 
when his psyche’s need has been to be related authentically to persons. 
At an early age he has been deprived of realistic, responsible relat­
edness. This deprivation is continued throughout his life. Idolatry 
and superstitious phantasies and practices also suggest such a stunt­
ing of "psychic" growth.
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What ia required of nan? Christianity says: To love God
vith all one's being and to love one's neighbor as one loves him* 
self.1 Reformed symbols elaborate the injunctions "Man's chief 
end is to glorify God and to enjoy him forever."2 "To glorify 
God" suggests a polarity vith shame-driven behavior. Rather than 
to glory in his shame and be buried in it or to seek glory for him­
self, man is to glorify God.3 He is injoined by his very construc­
tion as a human being to seek the essence of humanity. In Hebrev 
and Christian theology this la conceived as the imago Del— the image 
of God. To enjoy Him forever must include "to fulfill the essen­
tially human meaning in life." This surely is Included in the con­
tent of the Christian goal-symbolt "the Kingdom of 3od." Man's 
chief end is to be loyal to it and to "enjoy it."
What is sin? The Westminster catechisms say, "Sin is any
vant of conformity unto, or transgression of, any lav of God, given
as a rule to the reasonable creature.^ This may not tell the Btory
■^ -Implicit is the injunction "to do Justly, to love mercy, 
to valk humbly vith . . . .  God" (Mlcah 6x8).
Westminster Shorter Catechism, Question 1.
3cf. Dietrich Ronhoeffer's moving discussions of ahame in 
contrast to remorse and shame and conscience.— Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 
Ethics (ed. ty fiberhard Betti&e, Nev York, Macmillan, 1955)* 
pp. 145-15^.
**Cf. David Calms, The Image of God in Man.
Westminster Larger Catechism, Question 2k.
The Conception of Sin in the Light of Depth Psychology
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In all Its complexity. It la not the clearest idiom for our times, to 
be sure. However, it does give a working definition which Informs 
the issue. It recognises the sine qua non of culpability. It does 
not require guilt feeling. Actual guilt is deliberate want of con­
formity or transgression of lav given as a rule to reasonable human 
beings. Sin is a certain choice, even if the choosing is a default­
ing. The lav of God— or ’any lav of God"— is also identified vith 
"the vill of God," although "the lav" as given to mankind is the 
"expression" of the vill of God. To the minds of the Reformers and 
to the Westminster Divines it vas present certainly in both the 
decalogue and the portrait of Jesus the Christ in the Nev Testament. 
The genius of Christianity, to be sure, is opposed to a precept- 
minded conception of "the lav of God" and "the vill of God." No 
doubt the debate vill continue as to the relevance of ideas of 
"natural lav" to vhat Christian faith has called the lav of God.
The distinctive emphasis in Christian appropriations of conceptions 
of lav Is that the lav of God-in-Chrlst is the lav of agapa. "Thou 
shalt love . . . .  God . . . .  neighbor . . . .  thyself."1 "A nev 
commandment I give to you, that you love each other as I have loved 
y o u . T h e  Sermon on the Mount enunciates a lav of forgiving, 
edifying love, radically different from so-called "justice’ as lex
1Matthev 22:37-39v
2John 13:3^1 cf. John 15:17; II John 5.
talionis. That Christian agape is "law' as well as grace is evi­
denced by its imperative quality. It commands.
By agape or the perhaps too hackneyed expression "Christian 
love" is meant compassion and justice2— with mercy for all humanity.
It is subject-to-subject, I-Hiou, love in its social and religious 
dimensions.
Much human evil can be described as the failure of love, 
although it would be too over-simplifying to subsume the entire 
problem under the category of the failure of love, even after ex­
panding the definition, with the use of other Greek words: phllia
and eros.3 Not all the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune seem 
to spring simply from the failure of love. Yet the despair of the 
shame-driven person is a failure of love insofar as it is Internal­
ised rejection. To be sure, the tragic sense of worthlessness which
we witness in the shame-ridden is not his sin, although it has re­
sulted from someone or society's failure to love him. It is rooted
in such a failure, even the most blatant and "offensive" self­
justification-seeking behavior.
1M»tthew 5-7- Cf. Lulce 6112-1+9.
^"Justice" in the eenae of effective rightness, measured by 
the lav-and-gospel of agape. Cf. Emil Brunner's criticism of 
Reinhold Niebuhr's undeveloped concept of Justice— Kegley and Bretall, 
editors, Reinhold Niebuhr. Cf. Brunner's Justice and the Social 
Order, which he himself mentions in his friendlycriticism of 
Niebuhr’s too indefinite use of the term justice. We shall forego 
here an examination of Brunner's own proposals.
3cf. the concepts of love in Pfister's Christianity and Fear, 
Suttie's Hie Origins of Love and Hate, supra, Part Two; also our dis­
cussion of the Biblical conceptions of love, supra, Chapter One.
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Sin Is culpable failure to love aright. It is failure to 
love God-and-essential-humanity. Essential humanity is offended as 
it is present both in the subject-individual and in his neighbor—  
others. Sin traditionally has been defined as failure to love God 
with all one's being and failure to love one's neighbor as oneself.
However, the victim of a pattern of despair which has been 
inflicted on him by his conditioning circumstantial and societal 
environment cannot love God and neighbor or self arighti He cannot 
as a unity, as a centered-self, choose the way of agape. If he 
cannot he is not so much blameworthy as simply tragic. To sin is to 
choose freely against loving aright. Such a statement seems on the 
verge of losing Itself in inner contradiction: To be free to choose
against loving aright one must first have experienced the right kind 
of love. If he has been loved aright can he choose against love?
Our assumption seems to be a qualified yes because of the presence 
Of that which Is experienced as the opposite of the agape, namely 
the accumulation of evil which is a part of the given for any gen­
eration, along with the apparently unavoidable negation and destruc­
tion vhich plague the noit «a»pelatlc enterprise. Agape vages con­
tinual war with evil- Perhaps the free choice against agape, if and 
when it occurs, is possible because of ths svll, which is also in 
the field bidding for the allegiance of the psyche. But the dialectic 
continues: If anyone should choose the evil over the good, having
experienced the good, can he have received enough of the good? The 
perennial debate over determinism moves in on our question. However,
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there seems to be a rallying ground for the Christian insight; namely, 
the soteriological concern, which may well find an Ingtrumentalistlc 
use for the conception of sin as culpable wrongness• We hare seen 
how both Christianity and psychotherapy are concerned with soteria-- 
ae rescue and as healing. Although it may not be quite accurate to 
say that all the schools of depth psychology employ an instruaental- 
istic conception of accountable wrong analogous to sin, it Is true 
that they all assume the capacity for a responsible taking hold of 
the helm of one’s life (psyche). There is a sense in which the 
subject-self which refuses the task of helmsman for his own sailing 
is lost at sea. Wie Christian conception of sin is focused not on 
the culpability so much as the opportunity to have metanoia: to
change one’s course and to navigate according to the chart and 
compass of agape— the Kingdom of God-as-revealed-in-Jesus-Christ.
If "authentic" guilt feelings can be evoked for offense against 
agape, then perhaps the subject-self is already being moved to cor­
rect his heading. He knows the agape of God: he regrets that he is 
off course. Se feels compelled to get on course. It is difficult 
to find any other valid reason for including the emotional dimension 
of accountability or culpability in a theological analysis of 
human wrongness. Yet, restrained though the "doctrine" may be, it 
is of crucial importance in the matter of addressing and implementing 
the invitation to live by grace through faith. We recall that guilt 
feeling presupposes the presence of some love and loyalty.
Hence we must conclude that for the individual and for col­
lective dan the area of freedom, responsibility, and accountability 
ie limited indeed. It seem® to vanish altogether in some case®. 
Nevertheless it is "normally" there, implicit in awareness, reflec­
tion and anticipation. It is both definite and "necessary. ” Indeed, 
as ws have seen: the very compulsion to make restitution is a kind
of as®ertion of freedom and responsibility even when they are fic­
tional. When the capacity for guilt i® denied or suppressed, so is 
the capacity for freedom and responsibility which it seems to accom­
pany. Man is not man without the possibility of guilt.
The problem of psychotherapist and pastor includes: "Why
does this person feel guilty?" It often includes also: "Why does
this person not feel guilty?" Our principal concern in the present 
study of the conception of sin has been with the question of objec­
tive guilt: Wherein is the centered-, waking, more or less respon­
sible self of this person in his attitude, choice, decision, action, 
accountably wrong? For what should he feel guilty unto salvation; 
that is, unto changing his course?
As we have seen, even a thorough-going determinist— if there 
could actually be such a phenomenon, and perhaps Freud in some moods 
came nearest the position— recognizes the psychological fact that 
man at least seeks and actually insists on hla own guilt, his own 
responsibility, his own freedom. Shame without guilt and the vill- 
to-freedom veers toward self-loss and world-loss in despairing both 
of individuation and authentic relatedness.
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We have also seen the other side of the problem. Both 
moralists and theologians meet the insidious fact that man often
(l) either asserts responsibility for more than he can assume real­
istically or (2) denies that responsibility which he should rightly 
and realistically assume. Sometimes these tvo phenomena occur 
together. The "faculty" of guilt is continually being manipulated 
in the interaction of the subject-self and his milieu.
A child is conditioned to feel guilty for certain specific 
thoughts and actions, although, in the objective, they may not be 
wrongful. Both shame feelings and guilt feelings can be instilled 
and directed by significant adults, by peers and by society in 
general. A member of one religious denomination may actually have 
a strong sense of guilt if he should find himself in a service of 
worship sponsored by other denominations. Society's power to build 
superstructures of guilt upon the fundamental anxiety is a fearsome 
power indeed! Though we may object to the speculative framework in 
which he announces it, Freud's insight is prophetically helpful: 
that the so-called "conscience” Itself can be a destructive agent 
against the potential for "love" within the individual.
Although guilt feelings do disclose an underlying dependence 
upon love and relationship with some other or others, the sense of 
guilt itself is often the most "guilty," the most "culpable" in the 
situation. Karen Horney's portrait of "the tyranny of the should” 
eloquently illustrates the fact. She "conscience" is the place of 
prejudice as well as "justice." Yet if this "faculty" of guilt is
I
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distorted, as it is inevitably to some degree in everyone, can we 
say that its bearer may on occasion be culpable for obeying his 
conscience— hie own inner tribunal?
Some, including Professor Paul Tillich, with his concept of 
a transcendent moral conscience,1 and the late Professor Donald 
Baillie, in his Kerr lectures Faith in God,2 suggest another "con­
science" besides that which is simply relative to internalised fears 
and societal mores* There is an inner sense of right which tran­
scends the "conscience" that is determined by one's particular 
culture* This may be difficult to demonstrate by consulting the 
depth psychologists* Certainly the systems which allow for presen­
tational as well as representational unconscious "thinking" within 
the psyche,3 Including, notably, those of Jung and Bank, leave room
'^'The Transmoral Conscience," Tillich, The Protestant Era, 
pp. 136-1^9, especially at p. 11*5 •
Paul Tillich, "Morallsms and Morality: Theonomous Ethics,"
in Theology of Culture (Robert C* Kimball, ed.), pp. 133-1^5* With 
a not uncritical deference to Kant, Tillich argues for "morality 
unconditional" despite our increased understanding of the extensive­
ness of "morallsms conditioned*" "The moral co-rand is unconditional 
because it is we ourselves commanding ourselves. Morality is the 
self-affirmation of our essential being.’— at p. 136*
2Donald M* Baillie, Faith in God and Its Christian Consum­
mation (Kerr Lectures for 19^>, Edinburgh, 1927, "^aith and Moral 
Conviction," pp. 151-188).
"This Conscience of which we speak is not * * * . a thin and 
Isolated voice crying in the wilderness of our human nature* It is 
the moral consciousness) the apprehension of absolute values) which 
traverses the whole field of life, making the wilderness to blossom 
as the rose, reducing confusion to order and beauty, bringing cosmos 
out of chaos . . . . ’If any man will do his will, he shall know')
'He that Aoeth the truth comath to the light'j aud this 18 faith"
(pp. 181-2).
^Again we refer to Susanne K. Langer's Philosophy in a New Key.
for such a possibility, Horney's idea of a real self hints at least 
an analogy to the viev, Freud's positing of a phylogenetically pro­
duced and transmitted "conscience” is certainly a doctrine of innate 
conscience. But, on the whole, there is little in the way either of 
explicit corroboration or of exhaustive contradiction of the thesis 
we find in Tillich, Baillle, and others.1
The problem of finding a distinctly "Christian conscience" 
which is not dependent on a "society conscience” is somewhat like 
that which exercises H. Bichard Niebuhr in his penetrating study 
Christ and Culture.2 It is in the question famously mooted by Karl 
Barth and Emil Brunner.3 is there a point of contact within human 
nature for the gospel of agape in Christ? To what in man can the 
"law" of agape appeal? Or, is such a question poorly conceived? 
Should we ask, rather, ’Does not the coming of the grace of agape, 
the acceptance of the grace of God-in-Christ, transform the "con­
science,” or at least orient the self to a "conscience" outside— or
kpha hypothesis does not seem to be suited to either labora­
tory or clinical verification (or refutation!). Yet, as we have 
noted, at least inferentially, especially in Chapters Four and Five. 
supra, the Freudian hypothesis of a sadistic "conscience" (superego) 
and the classical Freudian fragmentary hypothesis of a pleasure- 
determined "ego-ideal" are hardly adequate to account for the phe­
nomena of "conscience” as they are seen by theologians like Tillich 
and Balllie, along with Reinhold Niebuhr (whose self-transcendent I 
we discussed, supra. Chapter Two, and again in Chapter Seven, noteT*
^Cited previously, in Chapter Two, supra.
^See the discussions in David Cairns, op. cit., pp. 1 k6 ff. 
and passim and Edgar P. Dickie, God Is Light, p. 22? and passim.
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beside itself, 'the mind of Christ"? The debate perhaps should 
continue, although our ovn tentative conclusion for this study has 
been that the "image of God in man" has remained, with essential 
humanity still present within the psyche to respond to the Son of 
Man.
Aside from the question of accountability, w® find profound 
validation within Depth Psychology for the ageless conviction that 
the essence of sin is unbelief. By unbelief is meant failure to 
trust, not intellectual failure to know the unknowable— the erron­
eous cast which is sometimes given to the "doctrine," subverting 
the original insight which it held. One may refuse intellectually 
to affirm "the Christ," the ragape, the description which Chris­
tianity customarily uses In expressing its genius. He may be a 
thorough-going pessimist in his intellectual philosophy but never­
theless a believer-in-fact if he affirms vith-his-life "the love 
of Christ.' The parable in Matthew of the Last Judgment is apropos 
of this truth.^
Christianity teaches that it is wrong and tragic for one to 
refuse to commit himself to that meaning which is asserted to be by 
the lifo-death-and-resurrection of Jesus Christ. Existence, suffering 
and life itself find their meaning and Justification only by faith- 
as-ccmmitiaent to the "lav" and "grace" of agape, the grace of God in 
Christ. This is the genius of Christianity. It can never be proven 
by "science" or even "by logic" to the satisfaction of every "science"
^35
^Supra, Chapter One, notes.
and every method of "logic.” Yet it can be expressed understandably. 
It can be lived. It can be articulated vith a kind of saving clarity 
and transparency, since it bears witness to an order which it con­
siders to be ever present. It is reflected in the lives, in the 
moeientB of men’s lives, that can be described as ”en Christo.t!
We ask again the question: Who is the sinner? The non-
b lame worthy element of tragedy is so profound and pervasive in the 
human situation, in the psyche and its field, that ve cannot easily 
focus the I of responsibility. Non-culpable wrongness may dominate 
the whole picture as it entwines itself with choice. Theologians 
will do well to distinguish clearly between the over-all power of 
evil and the sin which they mean when they speak of accountability. 
Man-as-man is subject to the troubles of the vorld. Man-as-sinner 
is the self who chooses in freedom against whatever ground there Is 
for hope, to despair. The Christian gospel is that there is such a 
ground, the trustworthiness in agape disclosed for all human life 
in Jesus Christ.1 The "sinner” is the self that chooses against 
this meaning, against this Christ.
Sin and the Law of Agupe
The lav of agape is expressed in the summary of the law:
Ihou shalt love the Lord thy God . . . .  and . . . .  thy neighbor.
'Not to love one's neighbor as oneself” sounds, in one sense an
1*36
-^Inherent in Christian theology is the conviction that its 
gospel in its genius is universal In scope and soteriologlc al concern.
anomaly to depth psychology. The neighbor is in the line of fire of 
projected self-hatred. To love one's neighbor is to love oneself 
aright. Love for neighbor nay mean comparatively healthy object- 
cathexie, to use Freudian terminology. Healthy self-concern has not 
been twisted from its normal outgoingness by being turned through 
circumstances back upon itself. To love oneself aright is to love 
one's neighbor.
In another sense, however, "not to love one's neighbor as 
oneself'’ is a statement of the obvious and irreversible ’nature of 
the brute." Any as sumption to the contrary is merely indulging in 
self-deception, regardless of how "saintly’ and altruistic one's 
pattern of life may seem. Freud considered the so-called love com­
mandment as against nature.1 Some innate quality or bent, which 
Freud calls primary narcissism, Horney calls "the urge to grow,1 
Suttie calls "solipsism," others have called "the instinct of self- 
preservation,"^ seems to preclude any complete displacement of the 
self with others. This quality may be what has puzzled theologians
S^. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, pp. 66-87.
instlnct(s) of self-preservation Freud called the 'ego- 
instincts’’— de-sexualized drives for preservation of life (and ego). 
After he introduced a primitive death instinct Into the psyche-field- 
of-force, he combined the sex drives and the life-preservation drives 
in eros, or "life instincts."
"Life preservative instincts” have been given a place in 
theories of W. K. R. Rivers (inatlnct and the Unconscious, Cambridge 
University Press, 1920) and William Mcfkxigall. For a concise re­
view of McDougall’s "hormic" psychology, with his elaborate doctrine 
of instincts— though without exhaustive exposition of the life- 
preservative” instincts, see J. C. Flugel, A Hundred Years 01 
Psychology, 1833-*1933 plus 1933-19^ -7 (London, Duckworth, 2nd ed., 
19W), PP. 272-278.
down through the centuries, bringing such unfortunate descriptions 
as "total depravity" for the nature of "fallen ' man, who is unrelent­
ingly "self-centered," 'selfish," "egoistic*" Our critique sees two 
unrelated facts which must he included in any balanced handling of 
the problem, (l) If the quality or "bent" is innate it is not in
Itself "culpable, accountable," unless we are willing to land in
the absurdity of saying, "I am to be blamed— and punished— for being 
'me.*1 (2) There are Instances of heroism and sacrifice, if we
may still capture meaning with such over-used banner words, that 
suggest that the commandment may be realistic, after all, in earns 
transcendent dimension. Indeed the classic instance, the one which 
has continued to emblason the love commandment, is the man on the 
cross, who died for sinners, who forgave his persecutors, who chose 
not to live by bread alone, not to "sell out1 to the powers that be, 
not to demand "sight’ instead of "faith."4^ But the presence of 
average man" type crucifiers,3 the average man that is so ouch in
^Thls does not reflect on the poetic use of the idea in
Masefield's The Everlasting Mercy, for instance (cited earlier).
Saul Kane should indeed have come to see the harm "I done by being 
me" (the Saul Kane he was before his conversion). An awareness of 
one’s objective” image in the perspective of relationships (both 
distorted and potentially healthy) need not be self-loss through 
overwhelming guilt or shame■ Awareness may indeed be the first 
step toward freedom.
2II Corinthians 5 *T-
3our allusion here, of course, is to Rank’s characterisation
of those "normal" and relatively healthy’ fion-neurotic") persons who 
have been stunted in their growth toward authentic "individuation." —  
Supra, Chapter Five, and passim.
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everyone "late and soon/' suggests the truth in Freud*s appraisal 
of the "lew" of agape*
The commandment does express the norm which Christianity 
envisages in the transformed nature of things. Therefore, we must 
asks In the light of depth psychology what is the offense against 
the neighbor? Por a moment we suspend the question of culpability.
We shall think of offense as an act, a failure to act— a malfeasance, 
misfeasance— or an attitude, which causes Injury to another person, 
especially when it is beyond comparison with any "actual" provoca­
tion* Such an offense is camsltted when the offender Is pursuing 
one or a combination of the following patterns:
(1) Protecting himself from a threat, perhaps an inner threat 
(as from internalised bad objects, persecutors, and from unconscious 
drives) that is projected on to the outside world, implicating the 
victim*
(2) Trying to remove an obstacle from hie path as he "moves 
toward" seme goal, such as "self advancement" or satisfaction of some 
specific appetite, or as he moves away from some threat. He may be 
"moving away from" the fact of dependence and finitude as though it 
were a threat to any possibility of meaning for his life* He may
be "moving away from1'— recoiling from— the fact of solitude and 
individuation*
(3) Trying to appropriate an object which he "needs" or 
desires for his own satisfaction or gain In pursuit of some goal, 
such as "self advancement" or satisfaction of some specific appetite.
^39
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The exploitation nay be predominantly pleasure-seeking or predomi­
nantly deetruction-seeking. In either case its effect on the "object” 
Is destructive Insofar as It denies to it potential for subject-to- 
subject relationship and authentic individuation.
We notice at once that in some measure each of these patterns 
is “natural” for animals as veil as for men. Hence if they are to be 
identified as such vlth fallen human nature it may seem appropriate 
to some to describe the fallen state or condition as merely animal 
as distinguished from human. But other paths open to our inquiry.
Simply by being vhat he is as naan kind, distinct from crea­
tures that live by "the lav of the jungle”— of threat-obstacle- 
object and defens iveness-pertinaclty-exploltation— man has placed 
himself under another lav, even as animals in certain relationships, 
as that of the herd, obey another lav.1 For man it is societal, 
cultural, moral. Its principle is social wisdom, vhlch acknovledges 
both "enlightened self-interest” and the rights and privileges vhich 
must be alloved others.2 Hence, aggression and exploitation vlthin 
given cultures and societies may be considered morally vrong; that is, 
against custom, against the conscience and against the actual health 
of that society.
However, according to Christianity, not to exclude other 
faiths— vhich variously may Include something of the same genius,
*Cf. "Social Psychology of Animals’ in David Rats, Animals 
and Men, trans. Hanna Steinberg and Arthur Suamerfleld (a Pelican 
Book, London, Penguin Books, 1953)# PP* 133-163.
2See, for instance, the arguments of Ruth Benedict in Patterns 
of Culture, pp. 1-19*
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mankind Is under still another lav: the lav of God-as-love, of
aubject-to-subject love. Ckie is "called’5 to realise and fulfill 
his ovn individuality-in-relationship, to love the individuality 
of his neighbor as he does his ovn. He is to reverence persons in 
reverencing Ood-as-agape.
Hence, aggression and exploitation are wrongful because in 
pursuing such activities the subject is violating the subjectness 
of his fellov creature, preempting the role of "Nature"-"Fate"-and*
’ God" over him and reducing him to mere object, ftras the offense 
is against the sine qua non of humanity Itself, against that vhich 
seems to distinguish man as a being. Ibis is the essence of human­
ness, or essential humanity. In religious language, the offense is 
before and against God, vho is regarded as the Giver of the essence. 
It is against neighbor, because he shares this essential humanity 
and vhat ve may call, again in religious language, the language of 
devotion, "the grace of life"—  the grace of God." Man is to love 
his neighbor as himself.
What then is the problem of evil as Christianity persists in 
describing it? It is two-fold: (l) The over-all problem of tragic
evil in human existence,1 and (2) Sin, or culpable, accountable
C^f. Whitney J. Oates' theory of the tragic. Our reference 
is to his lecture "Ifce Greek Sense of Tragedy," published in The 
Princeton Seminary Bulletin, LIII, I960, No. 3, pp. 23-32. His 
basic three assumptions are: (l) The individual possesses dignity
and vorth. Thus "the tragic can easily be distinguished from the 
pathetic" and also from unmitigated horror. "Dignified and vorthful 
man and his human predicament are alvays to be found at the center 
of the tragic." (2) Man "in some sense possesses freedom of the 
vill." "And . . . .  there is the inescapable corollary of moral
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wrongness. Both involve aggression and exploitation. Both offend 
against the law of love. The victim is wronged as much if his as* 
sailant is blind circumstance, savage animal, demented neighbor, or 
culpable neighbor. Moet often the offense cosies as a mixture of 
"blind” evil and accountable wrong. Vhat Christianity has heralded 
as salvation must surely be from the power of both kinds of evil.
It is the making whole of broken humanity both in its helplessness 
and in its freedom.
Within the context of mores, societal codes, custom or moral 
law, "moralizing” is perhaps among the effective control factors.
It is unrealistic when it exhorts and punishes to no purpose the 
man who is "sociopathic," incapable of assuming guilt or responsi­
bility. Society must be protected from its more harmful deviates 
as it must be protected wherever possible from foul circumstance 
and wild animals. Meanwhile moralists, theologians, and therapists 
together can study and try to remedy the subjects' mal-allgnment.
responsibility which goes with any doctrine of the freedom of the 
will." (3) "Man lives under some kind of super-human power over 
which he has no control, though it in part can control him" (Fate, 
God, Zeus, Providence, Moral Order have been suggested designations). 
Obviously then, ’the tragic is always and inevitably religious. 
Finally, the concept of "the tragic" addresses itself to the prob­
lem of man "as he faces the awfulness of evil." Professor Oates 
(of Princeton University) is thinking primarily of the tragic as 
conceived and portrayed in Greek and subsequent tragic drama. He 
sees in it a profound optimism and argues for a definition that 
will preclude despair (l. e., that man is doomed to ultimate abject 
defeat). "TUe tragic," according to Professor Oates, asserts "the 
existence in man, somehow and in some sense, of a power or a grace 
• • • • which will enable him in the end to triumph over evil. ”
The author goes on to document his theory with selections frost 
famous tragedies.
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Probably no one is without seme accountability. But the psychopath's 
outrageous crises against hla society, against essential humanity, 
against love, are a manifestation of his being possessed by the 
simply tragic, more than by sin— as "accountability.” Be is not 
able as a healthier personality would be to choose the right. Chris* 
tlan theology should concede readily that society's deviates and 
"incorrigibles" are illj indeed often the victims of society's own 
"accountable" offenses. This is not to say that such persons do not 
act as agents of destructive evil. Just as carriers of lethal con* 
tagious diseases and as ferocious dogs are agents of the tragic 
element in existence, so are the moral deviates of society. It 
should protect Itself from their threat, even while it learns that 
their evil Is as "innocent," in a real sense, as is an Infant's 
teething on the hand of its mother. This insight, which has boon 
both deepened and broadened by depth psychology, is being increas­
ingly accepted by both theology and social philosophy.1 Yet
■^ Pauline and Augustinian theology (indeed Christianity 
in its genius) have had the insight, despite the occasional, if not 
frequent, beclouding of it. Social studies, including social psy­
chology, tend to be carefully aware of this distinction. Indeed 
critics of theology may at times wonder why a "theological" model—  
to use the characteristic terminology of science and "social science"—  
is being retained by enlightened observers.
We cite but one, representative, example of the social con­
cern of non-theologically-oriented disciplines, influenced, though 
not uncritically, both by the genius of Christianity and by the 
teachings of depth psychology: Alexander H. Leighton, et al.,
Explorations in Social Psychology (New York, Basic Books, 1957).
These ^explorations^ are the type that should be helpfully sugges­
tive to those who seek ways to Implement the Christian gospel.
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perhaps some of the moat publicized spokesmen for religion often 
leave the hearer in considerable doubt as to whether the insight 
is being assimilated as it should be.1
The Christian Conception of Justifications 
The Grace cl Agape
The solution to human evil comes only as actual deliverance. 
This is the cardinal insight of Christian faith. Its theology is 
essentially soterlology. The salvation is from the slavery and 
meaninglessness which are the power of ain and evil over men's lives. 
Man has to be lifted out of mere-object mentality. This deliverance 
comes not primarily by intellectual enlightenment. It comes in the 
experience of being loved as a subject— a person— rather than an 
object. It comes as grace and truth— as 'aletheia, trustworthiness.
It must be more than a theory, more than a pipe dream. It must
actually come to the victim of evil. There must be what Professor
Tillich has called a Gestalt of grace.
In a sense, it is learned, but not simply by the intellect.
It must be learned by the whole person and eventually, it is hoped, 
by all mankind, the whole community. The Initial coming of salvation 
is an event followed by a more or less lengthened crisis of
are thinking of that American radio phenomenon (extend­
ing to Radio Luxembourg): "the radio preacher.” She designation,
so used, does not extend to the more thoughtful presentations via 
radio and television of the Christian message.
integration, analogous to the integrity crisis described by ego- 
psychologists like Erik Srikson. 1
It is the gospel of crucifixion and resurrection that is
good news to the despairing subject-man. His hope, spelled out
simply by his continuing to exist, is that he is not alone, that
somewhere he is understood, loved, and being given worth and meaning.
Look down, 0 Lord, on me poor man,
In thee I live, I move and am.
0 clear my soul and conscience,
That I in thee my peace may find,
Rest to my heart, Joy to my mind,
Freed from ay sin, and mine offence.2
The Christian saga is that the essential humanity has borne the pain 
of ’’human' offense against it, the pain of aggression and exploita­
tion unto death. "He was despised and rejected of men." Then "God
raised him from the dead.” "Alive forevermoreJ” "As in Adam all
die; even so in Christ shall all be made alive!" "The lamb of God!" 
"The lamb slain from the foundation of the vorld!" "The lion of 
Judah fought the fight and hath prevailed." These are the poetic 
Christian affirmation. The Church's theologians continue to try to 
understand and to express the meaning of the formative conviction 
of the Christian movement.
^This analogy extends, of course, to the Christian concep­
tion of sanctification, with which we have not dealt too explicitly 
in the present study.
%ir William Leighton (l6lk) - Look Down, 0 Lord.
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Hie Christian conviction Is that had we not known grace we 
should not have known the polarity: "the righteousness of God" over
against sin and evil, This is the fundamental supposition of the 
Christian theology of sin and Justification. The "righteousness of 
God in Christ" is that righteousness of trustworthy love--agape, 
with charis and ’aletheia ( ’grace," and "truth'-in-the-cense-of- 
trustworthiness).1 It affirms and undergirds essential humanity 
against the forces of degradation and destruction.
Yet this principle which the New Testament writers formulated 
seems to apply to morality as well, even as the rationale of morality 
often supports— though at times it subverts— that Grace. Societal 
rules, the mores of a culture, are inculcated— and obeyed— not only 
by fear but also by love, by what we understand in Christian theology 
as grace. For example, can we not say though with qualification, 
that civil laws are being obeyed out of gratitude for the blessings 
of that order which they establish. The offender, the blatant law­
breaker, may be one who does not fear or who suppresses his fear.
But he is also likely not aware of the "grace" of the society whose 
laws he violates. Depth psychologists give cogent support to the 
notion that love— eros (?)— is basically gratitude.2
^Our principal reference here is to the Prologue of the 
Fourth Gospel.
^Alice Balint can say this without leaving an almost rigidly 
Freudian frame of reference.— "Identification," International Journal 
of Psycho-Analys is, XXIV, 19^3, PP« 97-107 at p. 99T ^ ' — —
"Love is gratitude • • . • Identification removes tension 
between ego and external world and recollects the happiness of the
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Had ve not knovn grace ve should not have knovn sin. This 
is the stance of Christian faith. Nov knowing grace ve behold it 
everywhere we look; yea ve look for it beyond the evil through vhich 
ve must pass, and for which, alas, ve shall continue to be agents 
both unvlttingly and culpably so long as ve live. Ve look to God 
for deliverance and thus daily confess our guilt--our sins, believ­
ing that He is ’faithful and righteous to forgive our sins and to 
cleanse us from all unrighteousness ' as ve commit our lives to that 
faithfulness and that righteousness. Thus, In ''religious language," 
the language of devotion, the Christian conceptions find their 
expression. Christian faith does not argue itself into being.
Having been produced by saving event, it simply tries to express 
its guiding conviction about life Itself.
Sin and Justification
To be justified by grace through faith means to be caught 
up into that meaning of life disclosed in Jesus Christ. As sin is 
basically a part of the problem of despair and meaninglessness, so 
justification is basically the bringing of hope and meaning to the 
individual and to society. To be justified by faith means, for the
sucking period. The relation to the self develops In the same way.
In narcissism there is a secondary self-love by identification vith 
people vho are fond of the child . . . .  The gratifications of Identi­
fication facilitate a child's social adaptation. Obedience is the 
result of identification . . . ."— quoting from the abstract in 
Psychoanalytic He view, XXXI, 19*&, PP* ^75-6*
Cf. The Heidelberg Confession gives as title to Part III 
(on Good Works): "Concerning Biankfulness" (Dankbarkelt).
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individual, not that he can escape his anxieties, including the 
fundamental anxiety, but that he can live with them and through 
them as a victor over the threat of meaninglessness, over despair.
Such Justification is not escape from the risks of guilt, from all 
the painfulness of shame, from the temptations and suffering of 
doubt, nor from all the ravages of self-concern. It is an armor 
one can wear in passing through them. It is a reliance which says,
"Our citizenship is in Heaven,1,1 not removed from this world, but 
within it, in the realm of God as agape both here-and-now and 
eternal, where "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" is God 
indeed.
Therefore the basic conception of sin which is held by Chris­
tian faith is: Sin is choosing a despairing response to the fundamen­
tal anxiety whan a hopeful response is possible. The only true 
ground for such hope is trustworthiness. Hence, sin as accountable 
offense is against trustworthiness, against the grace that is offered.
Concern for the Kingdom of God is a proper anxiety. It means 
a commitment to take the risk of becoming individuated-in-responsible- 
relationship. The relationship is with the milieu, significantly, 
with other persons. They are reverenced as persons, fellow "subjects," 
Just as though all men share one life together.
Ibis united life is perhaps still best expressed by the sym­
bols "en Christo" and "the Kingdom of God." The individuation aspect
iphilippians 3:20-
Is reflected in symbols such as "child of God." The telos for the 
community (of mankind?) is "the fullness of the stature of Christ."1
In a sermon called "Pride and the Grace of God," Donald H. 
Baillle reiterates the conviction, Which elsewhere he calls "the 
paradox of grace.1’2 As the pearl diver can remain dry and secure 
from the dangers of the sea by wearing a diving suit, so can the 
subject-self wear protective armor through the anxieties and respon­
sibilities of this life without escaping his fundamental task. One 
kind of armor suggested is pridefulness or "self-conceit." As in 
depth psychology, so in theology, men of discernment see this as a 
kind of reactlon-formatlon, a compensatory fiction, hardly suitable 
for the enterprise; that is, if fundamental anxiety and responsibil­
ity are to characterize the enterprise. But the armor which Chris­
tian faith sees as suited to the awful challenge is justification 
by grace through faith.
"I am crucified with Christ — enduring the shame and self­
loss in the sense in Which he endured them, but by identification 
with him; nevertheless I live; Yet, not I, but Christ liveth in 
me," the contemporary Christian can say with Paul. But he says it 
with great care, it is hoped, not to oversimplify or to "primitivize" 
the meaning of the poetic statement "Christ liveth in me." Pastor
•^ Ephesians Ht13.
2Donald M. Baillle, Out of Nazareth (ed. by John Baillle,
New York, Charles Scribnerfs Sons, 1958 j", pp. 55-61.
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Pfiater says of Albert Schweitzer that he has 11 introjected" Christ*^ 
However, perhaps "introjaction" is not quite the meaning either.
The pilgrimage to vhich Christianity invites one can be both 
realistic and responsible. One does not escape ;?iilt. If Otto Rank 
is right, to decide, to choose, and to act in any sense on one's own, 
mean to have "guilt feelingB," the "ethical guilt" vhich derives 
from the will's genesis as counter-will. Although he does not 
escape such anxiety, the "Christian man" can rely on a strength 
beyond his own. He says, realistically and responsibly, "I cosnit 
myself to be vhat I must be, individuated. Yet, not I alone; I 
depend on the undergirding relationship of life vith life grounded 
in ultimate meaning, in agape-love. I am depending on it. Hence­
forth I as being freed fro© the compulsion to justify myself before 
others, even before God. I assume that my life is already justified.
I say "I", the waking, "prospective" self of me. But I know its 
limitations only too well. It is significant however that I can 
"transcend" it enough to discuss it as I do now. Yet the subject- 
self of me is earthbound, object-bound. Not I but a much greater 
identity is my center of devotion and my service: Not I but the
grace of God." The original statement, by Paul, was in an activistic 
vein. "I labored more than they all." It sounds self-congratulatory. 
More significant however is its mood of action, productive action for 
the cause, the very cause vhich, he said, sustained him. 2
*Oscar Pfiater, Christianity and Fear, p. 5^9*
2I Corinthians 15:10 and context.
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The Practical Questions
Hov can ve see and assist this grace, in our tine, as it 
seeks to take fora among us? This is the question asked hy the 
theologians. What is the Church's responsibility in being authen­
tically a means of grace? Hov is 'the community of faith’ to be 
continually reshaped as an instrument of God's peace, of the soteri- 
ological revelation in Christ?1
What is society' 8 collective responsibility in becoming trans­
formed in the image of Christ— as the vision of true humanity— rather
refer again to H. R. MacKintoah, The Christian Experience 
of Forgiveness] and to Donald M. Baillie, The Theology c? “the Sacra­
ments Tour reference is especially to Lecture III, "The Sacrament of 
Baptism," pp. 72-90, at pp. 86-88 and throughout).
Baillie says, "Perhaps modern psychology has given us a clue 
beyond vhat Calvin could possess” (p. 88). He follovs the "clue” he 
picked up from a child psychologist, vho quoted a woman in India who 
advised— out of her wealth of common (maternal) sense, 'Why don't 
you let the nurses dandle the babies? A baby must have love'"
(pp. 86-87).
This insight is reinforced by the various schools of depth 
psychology. Objective longitudinal studies are being made of the 
progress and regress in health made by children in various rela­
tionships (vhich vary in hov and hov much they provide maternal 
love). Some have been cited.
A volume Which has recently been compiled by abstracting a 
large number of longitudinal studies (under the aegis somewhat of 
ego-psychology, vith the inspiration of the late Ernst Kris) is 
Alan A. Stone and Gloria Cochrane Onque, Longitudinal Studies of 
Child Personality (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University 
Press, 1^59)* Needless to say, such volumes invite the researching 
eye of theologians concerned with the practical problems of implemen­
tation ©f the evangel of agape.
Cf. also J. S. Bezsant, "Sin and Infant Baptism," Theology; 
"A Monthly Review,” London, LXII, November, 1959# PP» Ui6-45 «^
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than being conformed again and again to the "wisdom" of mere custom. 
Can social morality be caught up in grace so that the community of 
mankind may in any sense be en Christo? The important questions 
are the practical ones, since Christianity is, after all, a way 
into life and meaning, a way both of acceptance and of commitment.^ 
Both our study of the Biblical origins of the conception 
and our resume of the dynamics of psychotherapy encourage the 
understanding of Justification in dynamic terms. It is the process 
of bringing forgiveness, healing, rescue, and meaning to man-in-his- 
existence. The gospel of grace is good news of trustworthy love and 
hope. If it has substance, the grace of God is actually experienced. 
Therefore the "servants of God" have as their mission the implement­
ing of this grace. Where and how does it take form in the midst of 
social, racial, International, political, problems? The implication 
of depth psychology is that the saving agape must somehow reach 
into the victim's inner world and convince hla that life is worth 
living, that he is loved, that he is "justified" in existing, and,
^f. Suttie (who is not alone): The infant is basically
structured for "give-and-take” in basic community (The Origins of 
Love and Hate, p. 53 ®t passim).
The mother-child relationship . . . .  is a true, 'balanced', 
Symbiosis; and the need to give is as vital, therefore, as the need 
to get. The feeling that our gifts (love) are not acceptable is as 
Intolerable as the feeling that others' gifts are no longer obtain­
able."
Not only child-therapists but also parents of young children 
(including the present writer) find such an observation corroborated. 
At times one is tempted to assume that the child learns not to give, 
giving seems so native to the infant! At other times, the balancing 
truth is only too evident, that he learns to let go (to share" as 
his "socialization” progresses).
beyond that, In being. Such a gospel la proclaimed: it finds expres-
slon In maanlngful sysbolo at worship,4 verbali satIons, and institu­
tions. But these mast grasp with personal genuineness the very being 
of the individual and of the society*
Practical Implications
Any attempt to apply our insight Involves us la the ssfbigu- 
ltles whleh Infest the concrete situation. Hence the examples used 
never fully represent the potential of justification v y £race.
Surely one instance of the problem of evil, both In Its simply 
tragic and in its culpable forms, Its demonic end its accountable 
aspects, is the ’ Apartheid or "segregationist syndrom in South 
Africa, parts of the United States, India, and elsewhere* At great 
risk of oversimplification we suggest the following construction on 
the phenomenon*
So-called "Christina" segregaticniam, regardless of how 
"cool' and rational it beeooss as s social and political philosophy,
1 Vorshlp, we recall, ia a contraction of vorthahip and 
focuses on Intrinsic worth*
It is common— though embarrassing— knowledge that earn so- 
celled Vhite Cltisens* Councils1* assume the designation "Christian* 
Tbs leaders of apartheid in South Africa call theunaclvea Christian. 
Acts 17:26b has been used (by clergyman of a segregationist psrsua- 
slen) to justify** their social philosophy* The damaging statements 
'God that made the world • • • . hath made of or;® tlo o d  all nations 
of men for to dwell an all ths fees of tbs eartV . • • • they all 
but eradicate by the way they construe the added phrase s And hath 
determined the times before appointed, and the bouodt of their habi­
tation* — Acts 17i2^-06. It la wrenched out of its conEextifwul’s 
sermon in Athens)* The present writer once hoard such an exegesis" 
in an address by a learned professor of Church History, of a segre­
gationist parsussion*
is at base a wrong response to the fundamental anxiety*-and its die- 
guises. 1!If ve change our accustomed way toward the negroes among 
us, then we lose our own security and Our own individuality— our 
envisioned 'destiny. 1 Twee, we are accustomed to speak about ultimate 
reality in terns of 'Christianity.' We are 'Christian*.' We are 
'God's people.' We love 'the Church,' the Bible, and so forth. We 
cannot, ergo we should not, allow negroes 'equality. 1 Therefore 
(via rationalisation) cur fear as to the consequences of any change 
in our policy toward tho negro is ipso facto 1 righteous concern.'"
The fallacy is in accepting fc»tiflcatlcn for the response— or for 
the "answer‘’••to the anxiety which poses the question of meaning. Chris­
tian justification is only efficacious for the question itself. The 
segregationists' responseis self*Justification: a raging resistance 
to the Scylla— which is the calamity they associate with the loss of 
the kind of pattern which they identify (idolatrouely) with security 
and meaning. Their Bible-quoting, all-out avoidance of any "convic­
tion of sin" backs them Into the Charybdls of destructive self-loss 
and world-loss. He that seek* his life in such a manner loses it!
Yet he is accustomed to fear most of all, change as carrying the 
threat of self-loss and world-loss. " •
Jv The implication of our study is that the segregationist- 
mentality should be change^ end reason (having metanoia!) somewhat 
as follows:
"Our error has been the following 'logic*;
n(l) We cannot put oar hearts into giving what the Injunction 
to integrate the races requires.
"(2) Ve are justified— we are righteous— in refusing to do that 
vhich ve cannot do sincerely. •
”(3) Therefore the Injunction is vrong. The ethic It represents 
Is the source of any evil there is In the tension arising now.
(U) With courage and resolution, vith seal for 'the right1 
as ve see it, ve shall fight to the end the principle of integration.
"If ve insist that our reasoning is to he Christian, then ve 
oust examine it in the light of the Christian ^gospel, the gospel of 1 
grace. Its logic for our situation is:
"(l) The lav of agape— 'the righteousness of (Jod-as-He-is- 
in-Christ'— is that the negro is sharer vith us of essential human­
ity, and regardless of our fears, ve must grant him, 'equality.'
(2) Of course ve must vlev vith honesty the actual probability 
of our feeling this agape for the negro. We, perhaps not without 
ambivalence, have identified him as a 'had object,' a symbol of 
danger, within our 'concept' of ourselves and of our milieu. We 
simply are not accustomed to think of him as an equal, as 'a friendly 
powsf,1 or as a bearer of the same kind of essence vhlch distinguishes 
us from other beings. Our fear, our dread, our anxiety is
1For instance, the interpretative (yet binding) statement 
of what the lav actually Is (in the United States), as given in a 
famous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in April, 
195^. By 9 to 0 ths court found against the n separate -but -equal ” 
doctrine, specifically as applied to public education in the United States•
understandable. But it is woag, In the objective. The lav of agave 
alone determines what is right.
"(3) Therefore the evil, the vrongness, is in our attitude, 
even though we ourselves are not altogether accountable for it, since 
ws were conditioned by a society which twisted our conscience away 
from the law of agape with respect to this particular matter. Although 
ear attitude toward the negro is condemned— it is wholly pathological, 
a 'fallenness1 within ue, we ourselves are justified in our being 
(though not in our prejudices).
*(!*) Our problem now is simply what to do about the total 
situation; Our ingrained attitude Is counter to that of the King* 
dam of God. What can ve do? The answer is: In the midst of our
anxiety, our misgivings^ our conditioned fears, and gtysers of hos* 
tllity, vs must simply give the negro the justice which the law of 
agape requires • Time, we are not able to give it with our whole 
heart. It is not sincere as from us-in-ourselves. But it is re­
quired.
”(5) How can ve? 'By the grace of agape,1 is the only answer. 
We are not required to delude ourselves into thinking that ve feel in 
accord with this policy which we must serve. Authentic, valid faith 
cannot require such dishonesty. Whereas our logic has been: I cannot;
ergo I should notj it can and should be: I should j ergo I shall,
although in a sense I  cannot; I shall, yet not I but the grace of 
God! As God has loved me and established my way, restoring unto me 
***• goodness and meaning that are the telos of my essential 'humanness*
1*56
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before God, I rely on Him— his grace, his trustworthiness, his lore, . 
not on «y own conditioned response to the anxiety whieh the specter of 
integration has always aroused in se. This slavishly segregationist jt 
is crucified with Christ* It vust he crucified again and again* 
'nevertheless I llve> yet not I, hut Christ llveth in *e. ,f1
Some such route seens implicit In the genius of the Christian 
conception of justification* In tine, the 3^ say come to feel the agapi> 
winning control over ’‘the law in my members. ' It may some day he 
transformed hy the "spiritual law." ,rWho shall deliver me from the 
body of this death?" asks Paul. His "answering theology'1 to hie 
"existential question" is 3
Thanks he to God through Jesus Christ our Lord! So then, -v';
I of ayself serve the law of God with my mind, hut with my 
flesh I servo the lav of sin. There is therefore now no con­
demnation for those Oho are in Christ Jesus* For the lav of 
the 8plrlt of life in Christ Jesus has sat se free from the 
lav of sin and death . . . .  All who are led hy the Spirit of 
God are sons of Got. For you did not receive the spirit of 
slavery to fall bach into fear, hut you have received the 
spirit of sonahip . » • . « •  The Spirit helps our weakness
.......  I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor angela,
nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor anything else in all 
creation, will be able to separate us from the a^ape fteg shapes! 
of God in Christ Jesus our Lor&«*
-^Romans 7 and & (selections).
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